Things and Reality: A Problem for Husserl’s Theory of Constitution

  • Takeshi AkibaEmail author
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 101)


In Ideas II and other works, Edmund Husserl gives a constitutional analysis of material reality. His basic thought on this matter is that a material thing is constituted when it is shown to causally depend on its surrounding circumstances. In this essay, I will first try to show that this appeal to causal dependence involves an important problem, namely, the circularity or regress problem. I then consider how this problem can be solved from both theoretical and exegetical standpoints. As a key that could lead to a solution, I propose the hypothesis that Husserl’s notion of reality is holistic. By attributing this notion to Husserl, I argue that we can find a satisfactory answer to the aforementioned problem, as well as a perspicuous way of understanding some of his passages.


Husserl Constitution Material reality Circularity Infinite regress Holism 


Husserl’s Works

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentChiba UniversityChibaJapan

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