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New Phenomenological Studies in Japan pp 1–15Cite as

Akrasia and Practical Rationality: A Phenomenological Approach

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Part of the book series: Contributions To Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 101))

Abstract

Akrasia, or weakness of will, has been a significant philosophical problem since the time of Ancient Greek philosophy. Unfortunately, this topic has not been treated systematically in the phenomenological tradition. This paper seeks to redress this situation through a critical assessment of contemporary approaches to the problem of akrasia in light of a proposed phenomenological analysis. As this paper argues, a phenomenological approach over-comes an intellectualism often found in discussions of akrasia while identifying its distinctive kind of rationality. This paper further argues that there are no perfectly self-regulating agents and that weak-willed agents are able to vindicate their moral sanity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hare and Davidson’s arguments have been the starting points in contemporary philosophical approaches to akrasia. Hare is a skeptic who denies the possibility of akrasia (Hare 1952; 1963). Although Davidson is not a sceptic, he interprets it as an action following judgments by finding out alternative judgments in akratic phenomena (Davidson 1970). They both take intellectualist positions and regard akratic actions as irrational.

  2. 2.

    Socrates, in Protagoras, states: “Do you consider that knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succor for mankind?” (Protagoras 352c).

  3. 3.

    I think of the passivity (Husserl), nothingness or without power (Heidegger), ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty), and vulnerability (Levinas).

  4. 4.

    “All judgment “knowledge” of what is “good” is without fulfillment in a felt value. For this reason such knowledge of moral norms is not determining for willing. Even the feeling of what is good determines willing only if the value is given adequately and evidentially, i.e., only if it is self-given. What is wrong with Socrates’ formulation (not with his knowledge of the good, whose power over willing was so clearly demonstrated by his death) is the rationalism, which implies that the mere concept of what is “good” has the power to determine the will” (SGA/II, p. 87 [=Scheler 1973, p. 69]).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Arpaly 2000, p. 506.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Bennett 1974, McIntyre 1990, p. 380f.; Arpaly 2000; Tappolet 2003, p. 115f; Jones 2003, p. 186.

  7. 7.

    It is possible that the reason that we can justify actions is external to the agent (McIntyre 1990, p. 384ff.; Arpaly 2000, p. 505; Jones 2003, p. 193). Namely, the reason for this is the fact moral evaluation of actions depends on factual situations.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Melle 2007.

  9. 9.

    I use the translation in Melle 2007.

  10. 10.

    Manuscript, B I 21, 57a. quoted in Melle 1988, p. xlviii.

  11. 11.

    Cf., Arendt 1963–1965, p. 135ff. But it would be possible that we consider Eichmann to be a weak person because he lived as ‘the they-self’ in Heidegger’s terminology by obeying social norms in the Third Reich.

  12. 12.

    I use the translation given by D. Ross.

  13. 13.

    ‘But to sum it all up, I must say that I regret nothing’. Life, Vol. 49, No. 23, 5 December 1960, pp.158–161. Moreover, ‘Regret is something for little children’. During the cross-examination at his trial, Session 96, 13 July 1961, as quoted in Stangneth 2015.

  14. 14.

    Aristotle stated, ‘Now anyone would think worse of a man with no appetite or with weak appetite were he to do something disgraceful, than if he did it under the influence of powerful appetite, and worse of him if he struck a blow not in anger than if he did it in anger; for what would he have done if he had been strongly affected? This is why the self-indulgent man is worse than the incontinent’ (NE, 1150a20-30).

  15. 15.

    Cf. Williams 1981.

  16. 16.

    Williams characterises this issue as ‘practical necessity’ with ‘impossibility of the alternatives’ or ‘agent’s incapacity’ (Williams 1981, pp. 124–131. Cf. Williams 1985, p. 187ff.). Frankfurt takes the impossibility of ‘I can do no other’ as ‘volitional necessity’ (Frankfurt 1988, p. 86ff.).

  17. 17.

    ‘“Yet I could not do it”—I am lacking the original consciousness of being able to do this action or having the power for this action …; this action contradicts the kind of person I am, my way of letting myself be motivated’ (Hua. IV, p. 265 [=Husserl 1989, p. 277]). Cf. Hart 2009, p. 270f.

  18. 18.

    See Arendt’s remarkable mentions, “Morally the only reliable people when the chips are down are those who say “I can’t”’ or ‘These people are neither heroes nor saints, and if they become martyrs, which of course may happen, it happens against their will. In the world, moreover, where power counts, they are impotent” (Arendt 2003, p. 78f.).

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Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Andrew Oberg (University of Kochi) for his informative comment. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number (26370027, 17K02178).

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  1. Faculty of Cultural Studies, University of Kochi, Kochi, Japan

    Takashi Yoshikawa

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  1. Takashi Yoshikawa
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Correspondence to Takashi Yoshikawa .

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania, PA, USA

    Nicolas de Warren

  2. Faculty of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan

    Shigeru Taguchi

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Yoshikawa, T. (2019). Akrasia and Practical Rationality: A Phenomenological Approach. In: de Warren, N., Taguchi, S. (eds) New Phenomenological Studies in Japan. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 101. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11893-8_1

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