Mild Asymmetry and Ethnoterritorial Overlap in Charge of the Consequences of Multinationalism. A Country Study of Constitutional Asymmetry in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

Based on the Dayton Peace Agreement the present system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is arranged around three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), two very dominant entities (the Federation of B&H and the Republic of Srpska), and one weak central level, which is in daily political discourse referred to as “joint institutions”. The Brčko District, a small subnational entity in north-eastern B&H, goes almost unnoticed within the state structure. Parity, vital national interest, and consensus are some of the terms that determine the essence of the constitutional system and provide sustenance for its preservation but also its decomposition. Three tendencies still remain: the Bosniaks favor a unitary state system; the Croats call for equal footing in ethnoterritorial representation through establishing a third “Croat” entity; and the Serbs swing from being mere bystanders to being extremely vocal about their exit strategies and threats to organize the independence referendum. Despite all of this, B&H represents a weak case of constitutional asymmetry. Possible explanations for this shall be sought in the process of establishing the present constitutional system, a small number of powers of the central level, and vast residual powers of the subnational entities.