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The 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: A Promising European Rite to Remove the Natural Resource Curse?

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Book cover Human Rights in the Extractive Industries

Part of the book series: Interdisciplinary Studies in Human Rights ((CHREN,volume 3))

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Abstract

Following more than 5 years of intensive and quite controversial debates, the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation was finally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in spring 2017 and entered into force in June 2017. Against this background, the contribution intends to take a closer look at this recent and rather ambitious regulatory regime in the field of good raw materials governance aimed at promoting responsible business in the context of so-called “conflict minerals”. Subjects to be addressed in this connection include the EU primary law background of this regulation, its legislative history, the regulatory structure of this steering instrument as well as the particular role played by the principle of transparency in this context. The analysis first and foremost attempts to illustrate that the regulatory features of the 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation distinguish themselves by transcending the distinction between traditional law enforcement mechanisms and law-realisation approaches by combining “command and control” elements in the form of legally binding supply chain due diligence obligations with more indirect steering tools aimed at improving transparency; a path so far less taken in the realm of international and domestic normative regimes aimed at promoting the observance of human rights in the extractive industries, but definitely worth exploring. EU Regulation 2017/821 is to be regarded as a promising—and thus laudable—regulatory approach to adequately address, and hopefully to constructively contribute to overcome and remove, one of the worst manifestations of the natural resource curse.

The introductory section as well as the first two parts of this contribution substantially borrow from Nowrot (2017).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Generally on the phenomenon of the so-called “natural resource curse” see for example WTO, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in Natural Resources. 2010, pp. 91 et seq.; DeKoninck (2015), pp. 134 et seq., each with numerous further references.

  2. 2.

    See also already Schorkopf (2008), pp. 252 et seq.; Nowrot (2013), pp. 21 et seq.

  3. 3.

    See generally thereto more recently for example Chilton and Sarfaty (2017), pp. 20 et seq.

  4. 4.

    On this steering regime see the contribution by Heidi Feldt in this volume. For an overview and evaluation of other related normative instruments see for example Al Faruque (2006), pp. 72 et seq.

  5. 5.

    See thereto as well as generally on the correlation between natural resources and civil wars Ross (2004), pp. 35 et seq.; Smillie (2013), pp. 1003 et seq.; as well as specifically with regard to the violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo more recently Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 26 November 2014, UN Doc. S/2015/19, 12 January 2015, paras. 73 et seq., 156 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Generally on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme see, e.g., Brouder (2009), pp. 969 et seq.; Meessen (2015), pp. 173 et seq.; Vidal (2012), pp. 505 et seq. On the role of the EU in this regime see, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 2368/2002 of 20 December 2002 implementing the Kimberley Process certification scheme for the international trade in rough diamonds, OJ EC L 358/28, 31 December 2002; and Fernandez Arribas (2014) The European Union and the Kimberley process. CLEER Working Papers, 2014/3, http://www.asser.nl/media/1645/cleer14-3_web.pdf (last accessed 30 September 2017), pp. 7 et seq.

  7. 7.

    UN Security Council Resolution 1952 (2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1952 (2010), 29 November 2010, para. 8, with reference to the Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 26 October 2010, UN Doc. S/2010/596, 29 November 2010, paras. 356 et seq. See also subsequently for example UN Security Council Resolution 2198 (2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2198 (2015), 29 January 2015, paras. 20 et seq.

  8. 8.

    OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 3rd Edition, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018), p. 3.

  9. 9.

    Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, OJ EU L 130/1 of 19 May 2017. Generally on EU regulations in the sense of Article 288 (2) TFEU see, e.g., Schütze (2015), pp. 89 et seq.; Bradley (2017), pp. 99 et seq.

  10. 10.

    The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is for example reprinted in Foster (2017), pp. 21 et seq. Generally on the distinction between the autonomous and the contractual trade policy in the field of the common commercial policy see, e.g., Khan (2015), paras. 17 et seq.; Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (2011), pp. 963 et seq.

  11. 11.

    On this perception see also for example already van der Velde (2017).

  12. 12.

    See thereto, e.g., Krajewski (2013), pp. 68 et seq.; Tietje and Nowrot (2016), pp. 1469 et seq.; Larik (2016), pp. 55 et seq., each with further references.

  13. 13.

    Larik (2016), pp. 88 et seq.; see in particular id., 88 (“This chapter shows that foreign policy objectives abound in contemporary constitutional law. They are not the exception, but rather the rule, both within and outside the EU.”).

  14. 14.

    The Treaty on European Union is for example reprinted in Foster (2017), pp. 1 et seq. Generally on the idea of a constitutionalisation of the EU foreign (trade) policy on the basis of constitutional-like foreign policy objectives see also for example von Arnauld (2014), p. 54; Krajewski (2016), p. 248; Larik (2016), pp. 125 et seq.

  15. 15.

    Vedder (2013), pp. 143 et seq.

  16. 16.

    See also already, e.g., Krajewski (2005), p. 92 (“the common commercial policy was and still is the most important constitutional battleground for European external relations”).

  17. 17.

    On this perception see for example also Cottier and Trinberg (2015), para. 7.

  18. 18.

    See thereto, e.g., Vedder (2013), pp. 127 et seq.; Weiß (2014), p. 527.

  19. 19.

    Vedder (2013), p. 137, with further references.

  20. 20.

    Cremona (2003), “the lengthy and wide-ranging list of external policy objectives […] is unlikely to bring about a greater policy focus”, p. 568.

  21. 21.

    See the references provided by Larik (2016), p. 168.

  22. 22.

    See thereto for example also Tietje (2009), pp. 19 et seq.; Hahn (2016), paras. 5 et seq.; Bungenberg (2010), p. 128; Terhechte (2012), para. 7.

  23. 23.

    Meng (1997), pp. 271 et seq.; Boor and Nowrot (2014), p. 241.

  24. 24.

    See also, e.g., Krajewski (2012), p. 297; Boysen (2014), pp. 468 et seq.; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), paras. 37 et seq.

  25. 25.

    See for example General Court, Case T-512/12, Front Polisario/Council, 10 December 2015, paras. 164 et seq. This judgment was on appeal subsequently—albeit for reasons unrelated to the present issue—set aside by European Court of Justice, Case C-104/16 P, Council/Front Polisario, 21 December 2016. See in the present context also the Opinion of Advocate General Melchior Wathelet of 13 September 2016, Case C-104/16 P, Council/Front Polisario, paras. 220 et seq.

  26. 26.

    See also, e.g., Dimopoulos (2010), p. 165; Herrmann and Müller-Ibold (2016), p. 647; Hahn (2016), para. 4; Tietje (2015), p. 802; Krajewski (2016), p. 243.

  27. 27.

    See also for example Heintschel von Heinegg (2017), para. 11; Larik (2016), pp. 154 et seq.; Dimopoulos (2010), p. 165; Krajewski (2016), p. 242; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), para. 24; Cremer (2016), para. 2.

  28. 28.

    Thereto among others also for example Bungenberg (2017), para. 10; Terhechte (2012), para. 8; Lachmayer (2015), para. 11; Nettesheim and Duvigneau (2012), para. 24; Krajewski (2016), p. 242.

  29. 29.

    Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203—July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1375 (2010), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018). The steering influence exercised by this legislation on the current EU initiative is for example illustrated by European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document—Impact Assessment, SWD(2014) 53 final, 5 March 2014, p. 8, 13 and passim; European Commission, Assessment of Due Diligence Compliance Cost, Benefit and Related Effects on Selected Operators in Relation to the Responsible Sourcing of Selected Minerals, Final Report by Katie Böhme, Paulina Bugajski-Hochriegl and Maria Dos Santos, September 2013, p. 9.

  30. 30.

    See thereto, e.g., Taylor (2017); as well as the contribution by Patrick Keenan in this volume.

  31. 31.

    For a more detailed description of the personal scope of application of this provision see, e.g., Nelson (2014), pp. 227 et seq.; and the contribution by Patrick Keenan in this volume.

  32. 32.

    On section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act see also the contribution by Patrick Keenan in this volume.

  33. 33.

    For a vivid description of the supply chain for conflict minerals see for example European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final, 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  34. 34.

    European Parliament, Resolution of 7 October 2010 on failures in protection of human rights and justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo, P7_TA(2010)0350, para. 14.

  35. 35.

    See for example European Parliament, Resolution of 5 July 2011 on increasing the impact of EU development policy, P7_TA(2011)0320, para. 60 (“Calls on the Commission to make a legislative proposal with a similar objective to the new US ‘Conflict Minerals Law’, namely to combat the illegal exploitation of minerals in developing countries, in particular in Africa, which fuels civil war and conflicts, and to ensure traceability of imported minerals in the EU market;”); European Parliament, Resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, paras. 45 et seq.

  36. 36.

    European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, COM(2014) 111 final, 5 March 2014.

  37. 37.

    For a more in-depth evaluation of the 2014 Commission’s draft regulation see also already for example Brackett et al. (2015), pp. 80 et seq.; Vyboldina (2015), pp. 341 et seq.; Nowrot (2016), pp. 240 et seq.

  38. 38.

    See thereto, e.g., Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final, 5 March 2014, p. 7; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document—Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment, SWD(2014) 52 final, 5 March 2014, p. 3; Conflict Minerals—An Evaluation of the Dodd-Frank Act and other Resource-Related Measures, Öko-Institut e.V., August 2013, p. 27; Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), Conflict Due Diligence by European Companies, SOMO Paper, October 2013, p. 3; Veale (2013), pp. 533 et seq.; Brackett et al. (2015), pp. 74 et seq.; for a more optimistic perception see, however, also Schwartz (2016), pp. 171 et seq.

  39. 39.

    European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final, 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  40. 40.

    See thereto already my critical evaluation in Nowrot (2016), p. 243.

  41. 41.

    For a more detailed evaluation, also on the envisioned incentives for as well as control mechanisms in case of participation in this self-certification process, see for example Brackett et al. (2015), pp. 80 et seq.; Nowrot (2016), pp. 243 et seq.; Schuele (2015), pp. 772 et seq.

  42. 42.

    Generally on the Union’s ordinary legislative procedure see, e.g., Schütze (2015), pp. 243 et seq.; Bradley (2017), pp. 120 et seq.

  43. 43.

    See for example European Parliament, Resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, “create a legally binding obligation for all upstream companies operating in the EU that use and trade natural resources sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas and all downstream companies that act as the first placer on the European market to undertake supply chain due diligence to identify and mitigate the risk of conflict financing and human rights abuse” para. 46 (a).

  44. 44.

    Thereto as well as with regard to all other amendments see European Parliament, Amendments adopted on 20 May 2015 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, P8_TA(2015)0204.

  45. 45.

    On the respective voting at the initiative of the Chair of the INTA Committee, Bernd Lange, see PV 20/05/2015—10.7.

  46. 46.

    On the approach of institutional trilogues in the EU legislative procedures see European Parliament/Council/Commission, Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision Procedure, OJ EU C 145/5 of 30 June 2007; as well as, e.g., Schütze (2015), pp. 249 et seq.; Chalmers (2015), pp. 322 et seq., with further references.

  47. 47.

    See European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press Release of 16 June 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20160615IPR32320/20160615IPR32320_en.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018) European Council/Council of the EU, EU Political Deal to Curb Trade in Conflict Minerals, Press Release 342/16 of 16 June 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2016/06/16-conflict-minerals/ (last accessed 1 October 2018); European Commission, EU Political Deal to Curb Trade in Conflict Minerals, Press Release of 16 June 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2231_en.htm (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  48. 48.

    See European Commission, EU Reaches Landmark Agreement on Conflict Minerals Regulation, Press Release of 22 November 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3931_en.htm (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  49. 49.

    European Parliament, Resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, para. 46 (c).

  50. 50.

    See thereto, e.g., van der Velde (2017); Heße and Klimke (2017), p. 450.

  51. 51.

    See the information provided by the European Commission under http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/conflict-minerals-regulation/regulation-explained/ (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  52. 52.

    See, e.g., European Parliament, Resolution of 26 February 2014 on promoting development through responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, P7_TA(2014)0163, para. 46 (a).

  53. 53.

    On the respective content of the political understanding see European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Secure Mandatory Due Diligence for Importers, Press Release of 16 June 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20160615IPR32320/20160615IPR32320_en.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018); as well as Nowrot (2017), pp. 398 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Article 2 lit. I EU Conflict Minerals Regulations states that Union importer refers to “any natural or legal person declaring minerals or metals for release for free circulation within the meaning of Article 201 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council or any natural or legal person on whose behalf such declaration is made, as indicated in data elements 3/15 and 3/16 in accordance with Annex B to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446”.

  55. 55.

    In accordance with Article 2 lit. j and k of the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, “upstream” refers to “the mineral supply chain from the extraction sites to the smelters and refiners, inclusive”, whereas “downstream” means “the metal supply chain from the stage following the smelters and refiners to the final product”.

  56. 56.

    See the information provided by the European Commission under http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/conflict-minerals-regulation/regulation-explained/ (last accessed 1 October 2018). See also, e.g., European Commission/High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas—Towards an Integrated EU Approach, JOIN(2014) 8 final of 5 March 2014, p. 6.

  57. 57.

    See also already the respective regulatory approach foreseen in the 2014 Commission’s draft, see Sect. 4.3.

  58. 58.

    On this definition see in principle also OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 3rd Edition, 2016, p. 13, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  59. 59.

    See in this connection also for example already Directorate-General for External Policies, Briefing—EU Initiative on Responsibly Importing Minerals from Conflict-Affected Regions, December 2014, DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_195, “To help ‘responsible importers’ determine whether their sources are in conflict-affected or high-risk areas, the European Commission will establish an expert group.”, p. 6.

  60. 60.

    See also already Brackett et al. (2015), pp. 83 et seq.; Nowrot (2016), pp. 241 et seq.; Heße and Klimke (2017), pp. 449 et seq.

  61. 61.

    For a vivid description with regard to the potentially adverse effects of section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act, see Brackett et al. (2015), “The result could in fact exacerbate the harm the Conflict Minerals Rule is seeking to address by increasing smuggling, weakening governance, and depressing prices for ore. Together, these factors make the violation of human rights even more likely.”, p. 76; Abelardo (2017), pp. 609–610.

  62. 62.

    On this aspect see also Partiti and van der Velde (2017) Curbing supply-chain human rights violations through trade and due diligence. Possible WTO concerns raised by the EU conflict minerals regulation. ASSER Research Paper 2017-02, June 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2983039 (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  63. 63.

    OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, 3rd Edition, 2016, pp. 19, 47 et seq., 106 et seq., http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  64. 64.

    For additional information see http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/conflict-free-smelter-program/ (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  65. 65.

    For respective information on this initiative see https://www.itri.co.uk/itsci/frontpage (last accessed 1 October 2018).

  66. 66.

    Generally on the notion of “law-realisation” as being distinct from the considerably narrower concept of “law enforcement” see Tietje (1998), pp. 132 et seq.

  67. 67.

    Zerk (2006), p. 36.

  68. 68.

    Specifically with regard to section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act see thereto also, e.g., Ochoa and Keenan (2011), pp. 138 et seq.

  69. 69.

    European Parliament and Council, Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ EU L 330/1, 15 November 2014.

  70. 70.

    See Sect. 4.1.

  71. 71.

    See thereto, specifically with regard to section 1502 Dodd-Frank Act, for example also Moncel (2016), “The U.S. Congress thus embraced a transparency-based regulatory theory, according to which exposing a problem to the public can foster public action against it. The result may be the same: several technology companies subject to the rule, including Apple, HP, Intel, and SanDisk, have already committed to removing all conflict minerals from their supply chains.”, pp. 225–226; as well as more generally Chilton and Sarfaty (2017), pp. 20 et seq.

  72. 72.

    Generally on the correlation between the considerably increased parliamentarisation of the EU common commercial policy on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty on the one hand and the effective realisation of the EU (non-economic) foreign policy goals see, e.g., Krajewski (2013), pp. 83 et seq.; Bungenberg (2010), pp. 129 et seq.; Tietje (2009), p. 21.

  73. 73.

    See Sect. 4.4.5.

  74. 74.

    See in this regard also for example recital 13 of the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: “Public reporting by an economic operator on its supply chain due diligence policies and practices provides the necessary transparency to generate public confidence in the measures economic operators are taking.”.

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  1. University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Karsten Nowrot

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  1. School of Law, University of Würzburg, Würzburg, Germany

    Isabel Feichtner

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  3. School of Law, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Ricarda Roesch

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Nowrot, K. (2019). The 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: A Promising European Rite to Remove the Natural Resource Curse?. In: Feichtner, I., Krajewski, M., Roesch, R. (eds) Human Rights in the Extractive Industries. Interdisciplinary Studies in Human Rights, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11382-7_4

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