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Evaluation of Vertical Integration

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Abstract

A number of theorists have dealt with the effects of vertical integration as well as the thread of vertical foreclosure as an important effect of vertical integration. Riordan (1998) identifies the possibility of preventing market entry after vertical integration and the availability of superior technology for the integrated enterprise as crucial factors to determine the effects of vertical integration.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Riordan (1998), p. 1246; for additional theories on vertical integration see Chap. 2.

  2. 2.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 513–568; there are other approaches which are less comprehensive, but that do not add any additional aspects to it, these approaches can be found in Salinger (1988), pp. 345–356; Siegwarth Meyer and Wang (2011), pp. 7–11; Normann (2008); Foros and Stehen (2013), pp. 640–661; Rey and Stiglitz (1988); Hart and Tirole (1990), pp. 205–286; Beard et al. (2001), pp. 319–333.

  3. 3.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 523 ff.

  4. 4.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 526.

  5. 5.

    For further information on the effect of the elimination of double marginalization see Durham (2000), pp. 207–229; Gaudet and Van Long (1996); Lantz (2009), pp. 434–439.

  6. 6.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 517.

  7. 7.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 528.

  8. 8.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 529.

  9. 9.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 533 f.

  10. 10.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 536 ff.

  11. 11.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 539.

  12. 12.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 539 f.

  13. 13.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 541.

  14. 14.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 542.

  15. 15.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 542 f.

  16. 16.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 543 ff.

  17. 17.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 545.

  18. 18.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 546 f.

  19. 19.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 547.

  20. 20.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 549 f.

  21. 21.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 551 f.

  22. 22.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 554.

  23. 23.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 555 f.

  24. 24.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 556.

  25. 25.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 556 f.

  26. 26.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 557 ff.

  27. 27.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), pp. 561 f.

  28. 28.

    See Riordan and Salop (1995), p. 564.

References

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  1. Competition & Regulation Institute, Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany

    Christoph Kleineberg

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Kleineberg, C. (2019). Evaluation of Vertical Integration. In: Vertical Integration and Regulation. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11358-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11358-2_3

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