Abstract
Is the location of a cell phone something that is private and protected from warrantless search by the Fourth Amendment, or are the electronic data that indicate a person’s location owned by the phone company, which can offer them to law enforcement if they choose? The multiple layers of constitutional questions about the nature of electronic data, personal privacy, and law enforcement are addressed in the Court’s decision in Carpenter, reflecting our changing conceptions of the nature and ownership of electronic data.
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Notes
- 1.
Carpenter decision, page 3.
- 2.
Ibid., page 14.
- 3.
Ibid., page 15.
- 4.
389 U.S. 347.
- 5.
Carpenter decision, page 22.
- 6.
Carpenter Thomas dissent, page 21. Many readers will be aware of Justice Thomas’s reputation for seldom participating in oral arguments, but they may not be aware that he is a notably active and forceful opinion writer.
- 7.
Ibid., page 1.
- 8.
Carpenter Gorsuch dissent, page 12.
- 9.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
- 10.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
- 11.
Carpenter Kennedy dissent, pages 17–18.
- 12.
Carpenter decision, page 21.
- 13.
Ibid., pages 17–18.
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Klein, D. (2019). Carpenter v. U.S. on Digital Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment. In: Klein, D., Marietta, M. (eds) SCOTUS 2018. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11255-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11255-4_2
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