Abstract
Here, I hold conversations with the Nigerian philosopher Udo Etuk and the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine whose respective essays “The Possibility of African Logic” and “Carnap and Logical Truth” have stoked the fire of exciting conversations among some philosophers on the nature of logic within African intellectual landscape. I will demonstrate the potency of Etuk’s stimulation as an African philosopher of African origin and transcend the possibility question in African logic. I will further clarify the concept of African logic in order to answer the questions some colleagues and students have put across to me in the recent time. Some peers have continued to confront me with the question, is there any justification for the African logic project? I will attempt to provide them with some justifications. Thereafter, as part of the justifications, I will undertake a more rigorously committed exercise of investigating the structure: ‘q na abughi q’ which I suppose to be the hub of all controversies surrounding the logic question in African philosophy in this contemporary time. I will conclude following the insight of W. V. O. Quine that bad translators are responsible for the creation of what may be called the ‘pre-logicality’ thesis and adduce that ‘q complements not q’ which Africans accept as true is the correct translation of ‘q na abughi q’ rather than the contradiction ‘q and not q’.
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- 1.
Etuk most likely got this inspiration from Leopold Senghor (1962) who employed the concept ‘affective ’ in his articulation of the doctrine of black emotional reason.
- 2.
See specifically Odera Oruka (1975: 50).
- 3.
The principle of ‘Etuk’s Natural Selection’ or ENS for short which is inspired by the thoughts of Charles Darwin on evolution may be conceived as an intellectual strategy to affirm or discredit a scholar’s submission in African logic based on his/her ontological ties to the cultural roots of the continent.
- 4.
See Jonathan O. Chimakonam (2015: 115–116).
- 5.
See Innocent Asouzu (2007:.30–32).
- 6.
See Paul Feyerabend (1975).
- 7.
See Uduma Oji Uduma (2015).
- 8.
See Uduma (2015: 89–93).
- 9.
See Jonathan Chimakonam (2011). In 2011, I was in the final year of my PhD programme and undoubtedly unrenowned and uninfluential in the field but it would be unfair to dismiss one’s publication as “a gustation for easy shine” simply because he was a student. Not all criticism are correct of course, but sometimes, not all writers express their ideas clearly and without vagueness and ambiguity. The essence of criticism is not limited to making authors correct a presumed error but more importantly, to make them clarify their ideas.
- 10.
See Uduma (2015: 92).
- 11.
- 12.
This particular structure was erroneously rendered as ‘q ka bu. q’ by Quine’s bad translator. See W. V. O. Quine (1960: 352).
- 13.
See: Francis L. K. Hsu (1964). Hsu did a wonderful survey of the use and meaning of the concept ‘primitive ’ in the field of anthropological studies.
- 14.
See: William V. Brelsford (1935).
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Chimakonam, J.O. (2019). Justifying the System of Ezumezu Logic: An Analysis of the Problematic Structure of ‘q na abughi q’. In: Ezumezu. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11075-8_10
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