Abstract
We describe a marketplace for content distribution, specifically stored-video streaming, involving both edge cloud (fog) and remote cloud computing and storage resources. Three different types of participants are considered: providers that are affiliated with the remote cloud, those that are affiliated with the ISP/edge, and those affiliated with neither. For a simple model, we explore the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we formulate a leader-follower game involving a market regulator maximizing a social welfare and study its Stackelberg equilibrium. For a market regulator seeking to limit prices charged by an edge-cloud entrant, we show an interesting trade-off between “moderate” edge-cloud prices and existence of follower (Nash) equilibrium.
This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1526133.
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Notes
- 1.
The recent actions of the American FCC to revoke network neutrality regulations, which some states are litigating against [14], is just the recent salvo of the American debate. Europe generally remains strongly in favor of network neutrality.
- 2.
ISPs have pruned ads from delivered content arguing that they were not requested by the end-users [16], while CPs argued that (otherwise free) content or services are monetized through embedded advertisements the receipt of which end-users implicitly request.
- 3.
Here, ISPs that service end-users.
- 4.
Netflix now uses AWS primarily for client login and content search/selection. To stream selected video, Netflix now employs its own CDN.
- 5.
Note that CDNs like Akamai and Amazon CloudFront provide datacenter presence nearer to the network edge.
- 6.
This transformation may be due to the ease through which media from legitimate sources can be purchased online, new and very popular content only available as streamed online, and the presence of trojans in pirated media.
- 7.
Note that LRU approximates as the least popular object the current LRU one residing in the cache. Evicting the least popular object is an element of the optimal noncausal (offline) caching policy, e.g., [19].
- 8.
Again, Netflix has developed its own CDN and currently only uses public cloud facilities for its user interface. So, compared to this type of provider, it would have reduced remote cloud and networking costs, and may not need edge-cloud facilities depending on how extensive its CDN is, but would have significant operating and amortized capital expenditures associated with its CDN.
- 9.
More complex models of inertia involve hysteresis in dynamic response to competitive prices wherein demand as a function of price is larger when prices increase compared to when prices decrease.
- 10.
Numerical results are qualitatively the same for much larger values of X, e.g., \(X=10^6\).
- 11.
Note that if \(\gamma _2=1=\gamma _3\), the side payments among all CPs cancel out in the expression for \(\varOmega \).
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Hu, X., Kesidis, G., Heidarpour, B., Dziong, Z. (2019). Media Delivery Competition with Edge Cloud, Remote Cloud and Networking. In: Walrand, J., Zhu, Q., Hayel, Y., Jimenez, T. (eds) Network Games, Control, and Optimization. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_5
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