Abstract
The recent framework for tiered spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band allows for environmental sensing capability (ESC) operators to measure spectrum occupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when incumbent users are not present. Motivated by this, we consider a scenario in which two spectrum access (SA) firms seek to access a spectrum band for secondary access and must in turn purchase spectrum measurements from one of the two ESCs. Each SA has an exclusive licensed access to a spectrum band. Given the purchased measurements, the SAs compete on price to serve customers. We study how the ESCs’ cost of obtaining the spectrum measurement, the ESC’s prices, and the quality of the spectrum measurements impact the resulting market equilibrium between the SAs. In particular, we show that when the ESCs offer different qualities, the only equilibria that can exist are when both SAs purchase measurements from the same ESC.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants AST-1343381, AST-1547328, and CNS-1701921.
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- 1.
In the first round of applications, six different companies requested that the FCC approve them as SAS operators [2].
- 2.
For example, as of February 2018, four different entities have been conditionally approved as ESC operators [3].
- 3.
We can view an SA as either an SAS provider selling access directly to end users or a wireless service provider in a market in which the ESC and SAS providers are a single firm.
- 4.
Our analysis can easily be extended to the case where instead ESC’s A and B make independent errors.
- 5.
Note this models a situation where the cost \(c_j\) is incurred primarily for operating an ESC’s sensor network and there are no additional costs when this is used to inform multiple SAs. The model and analysis can easily be extended to the case where there is an additional marginal cost per SA.
- 6.
For example, this is reasonable when users are purchasing service contracts with a long enough duration so that they see many realizations of the ESC reports.
- 7.
In an \(\epsilon -\)Nash equilibrium, no player can gain more than \(\epsilon \) by unilaterally deviating from its own strategy.
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Ghosh, A., Berry, R., Aggarwal, V. (2019). Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum. In: Walrand, J., Zhu, Q., Hayel, Y., Jimenez, T. (eds) Network Games, Control, and Optimization. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10880-9_10
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