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International Investment Law and the Law of Armed Conflict pp 459–486Cite as

Corporations and Crimes Against Humanity: Financial Liability Through ISDS?

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Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

Abstract

This Chapter explores the overlapping conceptions of “international legal personhood” in international criminal law and international investment law in light of the December 2016 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Award of Urbaser v Argentina. It is an effort to parse out and test potential standards for investor-to-State liability for corporate participation in mass atrocities and human rights violations, particularly in instances of armed conflict. In exploring the question of when a corporation can be held financially liable for human rights violations under international investment law, this Chapter suggests that Urbaser invites an application of ICL liability doctrines as “boundary crossing” tools that arbitrators can use to further define the contours of corporate subjectivity to international law.

A previous version of this chapter was originally published in the Berkeley Journal of International Law 37:1 (2018). I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very thorough and insightful comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a discussion on the existence of global public policy based on the idea of global public goods, see e.g., Kaul et al. (1999).

  2. 2.

    See Franck (2005), pp. 1521–1625. The document that best describes the issues raised by this backlash is the Public Statement on the International Investment Regime of 31 August 2010, where pro-investor interpretations of investment treaties were critically questioned and which recommended to withdraw or renegotiate investment treaties.

  3. 3.

    For a general overview of the Argentine financial crisis and its relationship to international investment law, see Alvarez and Khamsi (2009), pp. 379–478.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Hoffman (2015), pp. 505–520.

  5. 5.

    This is a general rule, but in rare circumstances, tribunals have found jurisdiction to hear counterclaims. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (7 May 2004). See also Antoíne Goetz & Consorts and SA Affinage des Metaux v Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award (21 June 2012), Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (5 October 2012). See also older decisions, e.g., Limited Liability Company AMTO v Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award (26 March 2008). RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award (13 March 2009).

  6. 6.

    Emphasis added. Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award (7 December 2011).

  7. 7.

    See Article 14.11 of the 2015 India Draft Model BIT, Chapter 14. See also Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), Chapter 9, Article 9.19(2), and accompanying footnote 32.

  8. 8.

    Hoffman (2015), pp. 505–520. See also Tietje and Crow (2017), Chapter 4.

  9. 9.

    Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Chapter 9.

  10. 10.

    TPP, Chapter 9, footnote 32.

  11. 11.

    See 2016 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty.

  12. 12.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016).

  13. 13.

    See Crow and Lorenzoni-Escobar (2018), p. 87. In that article, we articulate three standards for potential liability set out in Urbaser that are reproduced in this chapter. We argue that, because the standards seem to punish only cartoonishly evil behavior, they are largely nominal. However, in that article, we explore the role of Corporate Social Responsibility, and the commitments of individual corporations to CSR, in the assessment of corporate functions in international arbitral tribunals, and we conclude that because Urbaser recognized a corporation’s internal CSR standards as a measure for determining the aims of its behavior, Urbaser could be considered a small win for human rights activists.

  14. 14.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005). BG Group PLC v The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL Final Award (24 December 2007). TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/05/5, Award (19 December 2008). SUAR International SA v Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/04/4, Award (22 May 2014). See also Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 49. The Tribunal in fact recalls the cases that have derived from privatization of water and sewage services in several Argentine provinces.

  15. 15.

    Urbaser held 27.4122% of the capital stock and CABB held 20%. See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 61.

  16. 16.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 61 et seq.

  17. 17.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 69 et seq.

  18. 18.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 55 et seq.

  19. 19.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 74 et seq.

  20. 20.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 36 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1156 et seq.

  22. 22.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1157 et seq.

  23. 23.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1194 et seq.

  24. 24.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1194 et seq.

  25. 25.

    See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1195 et seq.

  26. 26.

    The necessity of the correlation between rights and duties, however, is dogmatically questionable, at least under the traditional theory of international subjectivity. See Nowrot (2012) K. Nowrot provides an extensive overview of the theory of subjectivity under international law and a critical approach to the conclusion that rights must be mirrored by duties.

  27. 27.

    Koskenniemi (1990), p. 88. Koskenniemi uses the phrase “theoretical minefield” in reference to “mysteries” of customary law formation.

  28. 28.

    See Nowrot (2012).

  29. 29.

    There are less-frequently litigated human rights treaties that do, in fact, place explicit obligations on individuals, such as the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981).

  30. 30.

    That is, the Rome Statue applies only to individuals, not to States, although States accede to the ICC’s jurisdiction. See UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, UN Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6.

  31. 31.

    ICJ, Reparation of Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11th 1949, 4 (9). The UN was described by the ICJ as an organization “[…] which occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its Members.”

  32. 32.

    ICJ, Reparation of Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11th 1949, 4 (8).

  33. 33.

    ICJ, Reparation of Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11th 1949, 4 (9).

  34. 34.

    ICJ, Reparation of Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11th 1949, 4 (10).

  35. 35.

    See Alvarez (2011), p. 26.

  36. 36.

    Id at 31. Alvarez however takes efforts to point out that “skepticism about the “personhood” of corporations should not be confused with doubts about whether international corporations have responsibilities (as well as rights) under international law. Clearly now they have both.”

  37. 37.

    Aftab (2014), p. 9.

  38. 38.

    See e.g. Alvarez (2011), p. 26.

  39. 39.

    This reveals the gap between theory and practice that is made especially evident in the domain of subjectivity in international law. See Nowrot (2012), pp. 25 et seq.

  40. 40.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1206  et seq.

  41. 41.

    For a more thorough analysis of Urbaser and CSR, see Crow and Lorenzoni-Escobar (2018), p. 87.

  42. 42.

    Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law” (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 11 (report of the study group of the International Law Commission) [hereinafter ILC Study].

  43. 43.

    Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law” (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 11 (report of the study group of the International Law Commission) [hereinafter ILC Study].

  44. 44.

    Alvarez (2016), pp. 171–228. As elaborated in rule 20 of the ILC’s Conclusions: “Application of custom and general principles of law. Customary international law and general principles of law are of particular relevance to the interpretation of a treaty under Article 31(3)(c) especially where: (a) The treaty rule is unclear or open-textured; (b) the terms used in the treaty have a recognized meaning in customary international law or under general principles of law; (c) The treaty is silent on the applicable law and it is necessary for the interpreter, applying the presumption in conclusion (19)(a) above, to look for rules developed in another part of international law to resolve the point”. ibid 15. See also El-Hage (2012), pp. 452–454.

  45. 45.

    To the knowledge of this author, there is not a single international investment treaty that touches on this subject, but I have not analyzed all 3000-plus of them.

  46. 46.

    See Crow and Lorenzoni-Escobar (2018), p. 87.

  47. 47.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  48. 48.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  49. 49.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1215.

  50. 50.

    The Tribunal relies on Article 5 ICESCR, Article 30 UDHR, and Article 17 ECHR.

  51. 51.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1214.

  52. 52.

    Domestically, most jurisdictions hold that corporations are incapable of committing crimes because they are incapable of authorizing them; it is only the individuals within them that can foster the mens rea necessary to incur criminal culpability. See, e.g., De Jonge (2012), p. 127. However, on the international stage, lawyers would be remiss to ignore JCE’s similarity to the corporate legal person. It is worth noting also that JCE III in particular places great weight on what would appear to be the mens rea of the enterprise; the structure of the enterprise—even if only a vehicle to undertake a criminal act—lowers the mens rea standard necessary to prove individual culpability.

  53. 53.

    Here, JCE is described as “doctrines” rather than “doctrine” because the evolution of JCE has produced three similar but separate doctrines, each with slightly different mens rea requirements. Jose Alvarez has cautioned generally about transposing such concepts of public law to the international investment arena, even as a way to generally inform arbitral interpretation, because the circumstances and stakeholders in the various branches of international law tend to differ so vastly. See Alvarez (2016), pp. 171–228.

  54. 54.

    For a brief history of JCE’s evolution, see Bigi (2010), pp. 51–83.

  55. 55.

    I recognize that the equation of an “enterprise” in JCE to a “corporation” under general international law is problematic, at least because of the different avenues through which corporations and JCEs are formed. Nevertheless, JCE is the only such tool in international law available to determine mens rea, and as such, could be considered by an ICSID Tribunal’s interpretation of “aimed”. This is because the ICSID Convention requires that the terms of treaties litigated under its rules be interpreted according to the VCLT Article 31. The VCLT Article 31(3)(c) stipulates that, in interpreting treaty language “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” be taken into account. And as an element of public international law to which virtually all the world’s States are party, the ICJ Statute can inform the sources arbitrator use; specifically, Article 38(1) of that statute stipulates that “international custom” and “general principles of law” can be considered, among other sources.

  56. 56.

    The Rome Statute requires that the “aim” of each individual to further the criminal purpose of the enterprise, but the standard remains results-based for demonstrating “common plan”. See Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.

  57. 57.

    See Article 6 of the Rome Statute.

  58. 58.

    Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

  59. 59.

    Article 66 of the Rome Statute.

  60. 60.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  61. 61.

    “Although the conduct of corporations under these treaties is regulated by an international instrument, the international legal obligation under the treaty rests with the State, which needs to adopt national measures to regulate the activity of the corporations on the domestic legal level. Corporate responsibility under these treaties is thus purely domestic rather than international”. De Brabandere (2011), pp. 268, 275.

  62. 62.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1207.

  63. 63.

    The Tribunal’s finding implies that the investor is bound by treaties that typically govern only State action toward individuals, which suggests that investors carry greater obligations than individuals. However, the finding does not place investors under the same standard as States under international law, as is clear in the first “negative” standard. Thus, investors appear to be placed in an undefined zone with greater responsibilities than individuals but lesser responsibilities than States. See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), paras 1207–1210.

  64. 64.

    CSR nuances this to the extent that horizontal relationships are created beyond the binary dichotomies of binding or non-binding law. As we will see at point 2) below, after the United Nations Guiding Principles, it is universally accepted that companies hold responsibilities—a category that is distinct but not necessarily below the category of obligations—vis-à-vis the society in which they operate. These responsibilities are thus horizontal.

  65. 65.

    See, e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.

  66. 66.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  67. 67.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  68. 68.

    Ibid. at p. 322, fn. 446.

  69. 69.

    Filártiga v Peña-Irala, U.S. Court of Appeal, 2nd Circuit, 630 F.2d 876, June 30, 1980 (ALRA 307).

  70. 70.

    See generally Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016).

  71. 71.

    Filártiga v Peña-Irala, U.S. Court of Appeal, 2nd Circuit, 630 F.2d 876, June 30, 1980 (ALRA 307).

  72. 72.

    Filártiga v Peña-Irala, U.S. Court of Appeal, 2nd Circuit, 630 F.2d 876, June 30, 1980 (ALRA 307).

  73. 73.

    Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Final Award (8 December 2016), para. 1210.

  74. 74.

    See, e.g., Sabahi (2011), p. 143. Sabahi discusses Turkish arbitration cases in which the states successfully alleged damage to its international reputation as a result of the “jurisdictionally baseless claim asserted in bad faith”. See also PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007).

  75. 75.

    See, e.g., Sabahi (2011), p. 143. Sabahi discusses Turkish arbitration cases in which the states successfully alleged damage to its international reputation as a result of the “jurisdictionally baseless claim asserted in bad faith”. See also PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007). The standard makes no mention of intention.

  76. 76.

    Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 94 LNTS 65 (1925); Chemical Weapons Convention, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993).

  77. 77.

    See, e.g., Monsanto’s webpage detailing involvement with the government-sanctioned manufacture of Agent Orange during the Vietnam War.

  78. 78.

    Article 14.11 of the 2015 India Draft Model BIT.

  79. 79.

    TPP Chapter 9.

  80. 80.

    Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award (7 December 2011).

  81. 81.

    Alvarez (2016). As elaborated in rule 20 of the ILC’s Conclusions: “Application of custom and general principles of law. Customary international law and general principles of law are of particular relevance to the interpretation of a treaty under Article 31(3)(c) especially where: (a) The treaty rule is unclear or open-textured; (b) the terms used in the treaty have a recognized meaning in customary international law or under general principles of law; (c) The treaty is silent on the applicable law and it is necessary for the interpreter, applying the presumption in conclusion (19)(a) above, to look for rules developed in another part of international law to resolve the point”. ibid 15.

  82. 82.

    As far back as 1985, former ICJ Judge Bruno Simma noted that the prospect that any international legal regime, no matter how detailed its own treaty rules, has no need to resort to non-treaty sources of international obligation is unlikely since no international legal regime had managed to avoid them. So far as I am aware, this observation still holds true. See Simma (1985).

  83. 83.

    See, e.g., Workshop (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 899–978; see also generally Special Issue—Transnational Business and International Criminal Law (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice.

  84. 84.

    Indirect perpetration through an organization was originally conceived by German legal theorist Claus Roxin with the particular experience of Nazi state-orchestrated crime in mind: see Weigend (2009), pp. 94–97; Jessberger and Geneuss (2008), pp. 859–862.

  85. 85.

    For detailed analysis of this form of liability and its origins and application at the ICC, see (2011) Special Symposium in 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, pp. 85–226; Jain (2011), pp. 159–200; Jessberger and Geneuss (2008), pp. 853–869; Olasolo (2009), pp. 116–134 and 302–330; Van der Wilt (2009), pp. 307–314.

  86. 86.

    See, e.g., Kelley (2014).

  87. 87.

    See, e.g., Kelley (2014).

  88. 88.

    See, e.g. Kelley (2014).

  89. 89.

    See, e.g. Kelley (2014).

  90. 90.

    See Kyriakakis (2012), p. 981.

  91. 91.

    Article 25 of the Rome Statute, emphasis added.

  92. 92.

    For a description of the test for aiding and abetting under customary international law, See, e.g., the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (ICJ Expert Panel) (2008) Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, 2 International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, pp. 17–24. However, also note the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that import a “specific direction” requirement as a material element of aiding and abetting. This new requirement demands that to constitute an accomplice under international criminal law a person must not only provide assistance that has a substantial effect on the commission of an international crime, but such assistance must additionally be specifically directed toward assisting such crime. See ICTY, Prosecutor v Momčilo Perišíc, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (Appeal Chamber), 28 January 2013; ICTY, Prosecutor v Jovica Stanišíc and Franko Simatovíc, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber I), 30 May 2013. While the introduction of a “specific direction” requirement will have significant implications for satisfying aiding and abetting in the context of commercial relationships and international crimes, this paper’s primary aim is to apply doctrines that emerged from ICL in the context of IIL. Moreover, the Rome Statute, on which this paper’s argument rests, was not at issue in the 2013 ICTY decisions on aiding and abetting.

  93. 93.

    See ICTY, Prosecutor v Momčilo Perišíc, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement (Appeal Chamber), 28 January 2013; ICTY, Prosecutor v Jovica Stanišíc and Franko Simatovíc, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgement (Trial Chamber I), 30 May 2013.

  94. 94.

    Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 674.

  95. 95.

    See Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 242: “[t]he mens rea required for aiding and abetting is that the accused knew that his acts would assist the commission of the crime by the perpetrator or that he was aware of the substantial likelihood that his acts would assist the commission of a crime by the perpetrator.” (quoting Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 776); Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 546. The STL Appeals Chamber subsequently endorsed this Court’s jurisprudence that awareness of a substantial likelihood is a culpable mens rea for aiding and abetting liability in customary international law. STL Applicable Law Decision, para. 227. The Appeals Chamber notes that in certain domestic legal systems this mental state ranges from “being ‘indifferent’ to the result, to being ‘reconciled’ with the result as a possible cost of attaining one’s goal.” Van Sliedregt (2012), p. 41.

  96. 96.

    International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, 2 International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, pp. 22–24.

  97. 97.

    International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, 2 International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, pp. 22–24.

  98. 98.

    See, e.g. the ICTY Statute and the SCSL Statute.

  99. 99.

    This is an old debate in U.S. jurisprudence, and different States still take different approaches. For an old but classic example of the scholarship on the issue, see, e.g., Strahorn (1939), p. 1.

  100. 100.

    See Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Judgment Summary), SCSL-03-01-T, Special Court of Sierra Leone, 26 April 2012.

  101. 101.

    See Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Judgment Summary), SCSL-03-01-T, Special Court of Sierra Leone, 26 April 2012.

  102. 102.

    Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, para. 6904.

  103. 103.

    See, e.g., Clermont and Sherwin (2002), p. 243.

  104. 104.

    A “mailbox” company is typically an organization set up for legal rather than business purposes. The test typically applied by tribunals in determining whether a company is a mailbox company is an analysis into whether the company has “substantial business activity” in the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. See Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 February 2005), reprinted in 20 ICSID Review-FILJ 262 (2005).

  105. 105.

    The producers of Agent Orange settled suits brought against them in the U.S. in a politically-charged class action suit in 1984. The claim was based on US products liability tort law. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).

  106. 106.

    For a discussion on what constitutes “widespread and systemic” “attacks”, the seminal ICTY case defining these terms is Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 22 February 2001.

  107. 107.

    ICL and the Geneva Conventions distinguish between treatment of “civilians” and “combatants” in defining the parameters of international war crimes. Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as a specified criminal act “committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”. Article 7(1) Rome Statute.

  108. 108.

    See, e.g., Ignatieff (2000), p. 326.

  109. 109.

    Feldman and Seibel (2005).

  110. 110.

    Feldman and Seibel (2005).

  111. 111.

    Feldman and Seibel (2005).

  112. 112.

    Botur (1995), pp. 71–73.

  113. 113.

    Article 17 of the UDHR.

  114. 114.

    Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.

  115. 115.

    Article 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute.

  116. 116.

    Most prominently, Austria School economist Murray N. Rothbard’s 1959 essay that described human rights as an extension of each individual’s “property right” over their own body, and accordingly, material things produced by the body are an extension of those rights. Rothbard (1959).

  117. 117.

    This is apparent from numerous treaties and prohibitions in the constitutions of many of the world’s countries.

  118. 118.

    The seminal regulatory takings case in the U.S., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), has been cited in numerous ICSID and UNCITRAL Awards over the past century, one recent example being the somewhat controversial case of Methanex Corp. v United States of America, UNCITRAL Rules, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2008, Part IV.

  119. 119.

    See e.g. OECD (2004) “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2004/04.

  120. 120.

    See Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, Order, Trial Chamber VIII (17 August 2017).

  121. 121.

    Although there are more than 4000 “civil party” cases on file at the ECCC, political hurdles and changes to the ECCC’s Internal Rules have rendered that tribunal’s enhanced victim participation all but nominal. See Stegmiller (2016), pp. 535–550.

  122. 122.

    Feldman and Seibel (2005).

  123. 123.

    Feldman and Seibel (2005).

  124. 124.

    This information is stated on the company’s official website.

  125. 125.

    This information is stated on the company’s official website.

  126. 126.

    Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Report, 2016.

  127. 127.

    This information is available on the Bureau’s website. See “Drone Wars: The Full Data,”.

  128. 128.

    It recently did exactly this, but it did so in a no-bid contract, which would complicate the hypothetical with issues of control. See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Contracts, 24 May 2017.

  129. 129.

    Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

  130. 130.

    See, e.g., Filkins, “Operators of Drones are Faulted in Afghanistan Deaths,” New York Times (29 May 2010).

  131. 131.

    See, e.g., Filkins, “Operators of Drones are Faulted in Afghanistan Deaths,” New York Times (29 May 2010).

  132. 132.

    For problems with applying ICL to individual HR violations, most notably with respect to group dimensions of ICL crimes, see, e.g., Renzo (2012), p. 443. Moreover, such an interpretation of the Chapeau to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which defines “crimes against humanity” as a specified criminal act “committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”, would require an extremely expansive reading of the phrase “attack on”.

  133. 133.

    See “Northrop Grumman Human Rights Policy,” on the company’s official website. See also Article 3 of the UDHR.

  134. 134.

    See Crow and Lorenzoni-Escobar (2018), p. 87.

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  1. Asia School of Business/MIT Sloan School of Management, Law & Ethics, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

    Kevin Crow

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  2. Athens Public International Law Center, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece

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  3. French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)-CERSA, University Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France

    Catharine Titi

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Crow, K. (2019). Corporations and Crimes Against Humanity: Financial Liability Through ISDS?. In: Fach Gómez, K., Gourgourinis, A., Titi, C. (eds) International Investment Law and the Law of Armed Conflict. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10746-8_21

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