Abstract
Synopsis: Thus far we have exposed the two sides of the betrayal of liberal economics. On the one hand (the first four chapters), we discussed the betrayal in the sense of the false promise generated by the pretence of a universal and ethically neutral system of competitive decentralised decision-making. On the other hand (Chaps. 5 , 6 and 7 ), we explored the betrayal in the sense of the misconception of the idea of liberal economics given the inability of economics to capture the sociality which is embedded in human nature. In this chapter, we ask what could be the possible meaning of liberal economics had we integrated human sociality into the foundation of our economic analysis. In so doing, we explore a third aspect of the betrayal: the misinterpretation of liberal classical economics. We argue that what is known as liberal classical economics is indeed a form of liberal economics where the sociality of agents plays a significant role. Therefore, while the modern belief that classical economics is merely a primitive form of modern economics suggests an intellectual betrayal, it also offers an opportunity to examine what liberal economics could look like. By examining some aspects of classical economics, we uncover the difference between a conceptual framework of liberal economics which is organically social and the one which is entirely functional. In the former framework, economic analysis is a consequence of social interaction, while in the latter society is the consequence of economic interactions. At the same time, the analysis of natural liberty—the system of competitive decentralised decision-making—is, in the one case, measured against its purely economic success in producing plenty, while in the other case it will be measured against the ability of the system to service the social drive behind it.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to say that we are not referring here to socialist ideas but rather the method employed by scholars like Marx. J. S. Mill writes sympathetically and at some length about socialist ideas and even communism in his very liberal oeuvre Principles of Political Economy but his methodology is individualistic at the core. Marx, on the other hand, begins his study with the nature of commodities and the notion of abstract labour. It is difficult to interpret this as an individualistic approach. There is, of course, the additional epistemological distinction between rationalism and empiricism but while there is an interesting question regarding the influence of epistemology on the nature of one’s social theory, we have not used this as a distinguishing marker.
- 2.
There is, of course, no doubt that some of the material provisions (like food and shelter) are indeed natural necessity but it does not follow that the individual will find them through an independent search (i.e. the dominance of the own-regarding interests). It is not difficult to imagine that natural other-regarding inclinations could help resolve this natural necessity. In the age of hunter-gatherers, according to Henry Maine, there was no conception of the individual at all. Humans were part of a group in which they had distinct functions. The provision of their life’s necessity came from their participation in the group and not from an independent search for these provisions. Adam Smith held a similar conception of society except that he never removed the individual from his considerations. We shall say more about this later in the book.
- 3.
It is important to emphasise here that by material affairs we are not referring to the need to subsist. We are referring to the almost-unbound desire to acquire material wellbeing which is embedded in the modern conception of the individual.
- 4.
One should not confuse the concerns which many have raised regarding the freedom facilitated by the working of competitive institutions with a rejection of the notion of the minimal society (or civic society). One can mention in this context the rise of the capabilities approach (see Nussbaum and Sen). However, what is at stake here is the correction of either initial conditions or final distributions so that within the competitive paradigm, such freedoms will indeed be granted. This is very much in line with the discussion we had in the previous chapter about the role of welfare economics as a correcting mechanism based on competitive institutions and not an attempt to contain or restrict competitive practices.
- 5.
Indeed, as we mentioned earlier this was very much an important part of Robbins’s argument for the neutrality of economics (Robbins 1935). Following Wicksteed (1933[1910]), he too felt that it stands to reason that whatever society may wish to achieve can be better accomplished in a world of plenty than in a world of shortage. This, of course, could potentially be true if one measures things only by their consequences. However, if consequences are perceived in a broader sense than immediate ones, then it is far from evident that the process of producing that plenty will not have a detrimental effect on what one may wish to achieve in the social domain. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Witztum (2011).
- 6.
In other words, whatever behavioural code is necessary for the maintaining of the natural order, it would not develop from social interaction as it would be a result of expediency considerations. In terms of our previous discussion we are referring here to what can be called I-mode of co-operation.
- 7.
We can see that such an approach fits well what we said in Chaps. 5 and 6. The role of nature is in setting the brain such that humans can form social bonds that will increase their survival probabilities. The way humans achieve this is by forming abstract cognition and language which is facilitated by the brain. However, the development of such cognitive abilities leads to the creation of technology and the expansion of one’s sense of association well beyond that which nature (in lowercase n) intended. What Smith refers to as Nature may well be related to this cognitive development.
- 8.
Which corresponds to the Mandevillian dilemma. It is important to say, however, that Smith did not agree with Mandeville and the characters inhabiting the economic systems are not really those of the ‘industrious knave’.
- 9.
‘It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion’ (On Liberty, p. I.10).
- 10.
Either through the failure of income distribution to allow all agent access to education or through the collective failure to provide education publicly.
- 11.
His other writings or pronouncements (unpublished during his lifetime) are collected in three volumes: Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ), Essays on Philosophical Subjects (EPS) and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL). On the face of it there seems to be a clear division of labour here.
- 12.
Alas, the majority of economists seem to fall into this category. It is worth repeating here parts of the footnote from Chap. 1 with the quotes from the bicentennial of The Wealth of Nations. J. M. Buchanan wrote: ‘Adam Smith’s system of natural liberty, interpreted as his idealized paradigm for social order, embodies justice as well as economic efficiency’ (Buchanan 1978, p. 77). G. Stigler is quoted to have said: ‘I bring greetings from Adam Smith who is alive and well and is living in Chicago’ (in Meek 1977, p. 3). R. Meek, who quotes Stigler, goes on to say: ‘Smith’s great message of good cheer-that competitive capitalism is, if not the best of all economic systems, at any rate the best of all possible systems’ (ibid., p. 4). M. Friedman, who was clearly aware of Smith’s other writings but whose support of natural liberty needs no further proof, has taken Smith’s ideas ad absurdum: the invisible hand organises well not only the pursuit of material wellbeing but also, through sympathy, the distribution of charitable activities. Hence, both self-interest and sympathy should be governed by markets, (Friedman 1978, p. 18).
- 13.
For instance, Viner (1927) felt that Smith writings could provide material that ‘would suffice to provide ammunition for several socialist orations’. Similarly, Meek (1977)—after describing the received view—argued that some of Smith’s writing is ‘distinctly radical and Marxian in character’. Heilbroner (1982), for instance, went as far as to say that Smith’s theory cannot be seen but as a reiteration of Mandeville’s ‘Private vice, Public benefits’.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
There is an enormous body of literature dealing with Das Adam Smith Problem but what dominates the received view is an attempt to reconcile the morality of the system of natural liberty. This led to the conclusion that ‘only in a world of ethical beings would the system of the WN work’. I shall deal with these issues directly further down the line.
- 17.
I shall explore this aspect further below when I will discuss Smith’s methodology.
- 18.
In the sense that there is no collective solution which is not based on each individual solving his or her problem.
- 19.
In the absence of competition, market prices may not reflect the true opportunity costs and, subsequently, agent may choose the wrong specialisation.
- 20.
Harmony of sentiments, as we shall see later on, is also the origin of moral approval and, hence, social approbation.
- 21.
This is not necessarily a basic talent as the hunter could have become good at hunting through unspecialised experience (or, perhaps, through an Aristotelian intra-household division of labour to which Smith does not refer explicitly). However, it is important to say that even for Smith talent does matter. While it is true that the philosopher and the porter were very similar until the age of eight, the difference between them became apparent from that point onwards (WN, pp. 29–30). These differences may be the result of education and environment but not necessarily of any prior division of labour. In other words, there is an element of confusion here as the WN seems to suggest that it is the division of labour which generated specialisation. However, even there Smith admits that the division of labour is a result of the desire to persuade which, in turn, has been manifested in the exchange of gifts. Surely, that which one can exchange is only that which one does not need. Hence, even though at early stages people were similar as they produced everything, there were still some differences between them which facilitated the initial exchange of surpluses. Another possible explanation can be based on Smith’s account of the power and significance of persuasion in the TMS (pp. 336–337). There, the main implication of the need to persuade is the development of language which, in part, may explain how a basic initial division of labour (in particular, within a household) could take place while society may still be in an autarkic state.
- 22.
‘By this disposition to barter and exchange the surplus of one’s labour for that of other people … he will live better than before and will have no occasion to provide for himself, as the surplus of his own labour does it more effectually’ (LJ, p. 493).
- 23.
‘In a tribe of hunters of shepherds’, writes Smith, a person ‘excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it in his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter’ (WN, pp. 27–28, my italics).
- 24.
For a more systematic analysis of this issue, see, for instance, Witztum (2005b).
- 25.
See, for instance, TMS 50. We will return to this issue further below.
- 26.
There is a certain similarity here with Aristotle, who also discusses the importance of the division of labour within the household (which is what he calls ‘efficiency’) but who rejects the division of labour across households. The purpose of the division of labour is to supply individuals with their needs but any further specialisation for the purpose of want-satisfaction will lead to excesses which are inconsistent with the good life or the just society. Namely, one can have a division of labour as an instrument which supports social objectives rather than the material wellbeing to which it may give rise. In Plato—which is a different story altogether—we already have a social division of labour which is there merely to support the just organisation of society.
- 27.
Naturally, we assume here complete sovereignty of the individual in the sense that they can refuse to participate in the economic game if they feel that it is not helping them. We discussed this issue at length in Chap. 4.
- 28.
This, of course, is reflected in the scheme we proposed in the first section of this chapter. The fact that society precedes the economy means that unlike the modern scheme specialisation is the conclusion of individuals’ sociality and, as such, the premise of the economic system. This is very unlike the modern scheme where specialisation is the logical conclusion of the desire for more material wellbeing. It is interesting to note that there is something here which resembles what Mill calls train of reasoning. As he objected to deductive reasoning but recognised its necessity in what he calls moral sciences (or social sciences), the idea that the conclusion of one aspect of the theory is the premise of the other makes deductive reasoning more appealing. In particular, as specialisation is an observed conclusion of the social life, one can argue that the premise of the economic system, that is, people seek social approbation through the division of labour, is learnt inductively.
- 29.
Here we are referring to what one may need to subsist. Better satisfy their needs does not mean to have as much as possible from everything but have a better way (less exertion, more socialising) to get that which one needs. The notion of needs—or subsistence—should not be taken here literally as reflecting physical survival. We are referring here to a bundle which allows people to function socially. What is contained in such a bundle may vary over period and with the wealth of society in general.
- 30.
The cycle begins with the social drive, goes through exchange of gifts or surpluses to specialisation and trade and feeds back through the broken line which proposes a confirmation of one’s social standing through the exchange of gifts or surpluses without harming one’s ability to satisfy his or her needs. This is the first aspect of the sustainability of the system in the sense that the attempt to acquire social approbation through specialisation has been successful. For Smith, the empiricist, the fact that people did not revert back, in the past, to autarky is the ultimate proof of this.
- 31.
This is all in line with our argument about the role of cognition and the increase in the size of social group. It will inevitably have an effect on the social distance among members of the same society.
- 32.
In WN 277 Smith emphasises that without accumulation there can be no division of labour.
- 33.
Theoretically one could argue that if, for instance, there are two individuals and two goods, then each one of them will appropriate one of the goods and the relationship between them is equal. But there are more individuals and many who seem to be good in hunting one particular animal. When the process begins, some may be quicker in appropriation than others, which will lead to those people who are good in hunting this particular animal, with a reduced ability to acquire their own subsistence let alone enough animals to generate a surplus which they can then exchange.
- 34.
Indeed, for Rousseau, the beginning of property is the end of equality. Smith’s discussion in the TMS of the ‘invisible hand’ is, to some degree, a response to Rousseau’s concern.
- 35.
We discussed this issue in the context of modern economics in Chap. 4.
- 36.
In the same way as we admire the beauty of nature as a complex system which works without clear organiser, we may admire a social system which seems to naturally generate plenty without any guidance. We shall discuss below how in Smith such a corruption of sentiments can take place.
- 37.
In fact, this is not just about maintaining the person during the production but also about the stability of occupational choice. Namely, it is also the price in which the cost of acquiring an occupation will also be taken into account. ‘A man then’, says Smith elsewhere, ‘has the natural price of his labour when it is sufficient to maintain him during the time of labour, to defray the expenses of education, and to compensate the risk of not living long enough and of not succeeding in the business’ (LJ, pp. 495–496). This means that there is a certain differential in what is required to maintain different occupations but these differences are there to ensure that the expected return will be at the general subsistence level, broadly defined.
- 38.
Both directly and through technological improvements through learning by doing.
- 39.
The price here is meaningful only if there are other goods too and in such a case this becomes a problem of general equilibrium. It should not be difficult to construct such a system but it is beyond of what interests us here. The interested reader may consult Witztum (2009).
- 40.
This, of course, is similar to J. S. Mill’s view, according to which the developed individual will become increasingly more co-operative and this, in turn, will lead both to a change in the form of economic organisation and to a change in the long-term objective which he thought would be stagnation.
- 41.
The evidence for this line of reasoning can be found in Witztum (1997, 2005a) and Witztum and Young (2011), where Smith’s theory of distributed justice is discussed in great length. The upshot of this is that, according to Smith, the acquisition of property lays a responsibility on those who own property towards those who remain property-less.
- 42.
We have already mentioned, Viner (1927), Meek (1977), Heilbronner (1982) and Griswold (1999) but there is, of course, a great deal more of it within the literature on Das Adam Smith Problem, some of which we mentioned earlier in this chapter as well as surrounding the debate about the real benefits of the system which we will mention below.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
This idea has been reiterated in more recent times by Force (2003), who argues that, notwithstanding the principles which guide the sovereign, ‘it allows the power of individual self-interest to be harnessed for the common good’ (p. 251). Griswold (1999), who examines in detail the corruption of moral capital, claims that according to Smith, the social benefits of self-interest can be protected through proper attention to the development of virtue (pp. 291–301).
- 46.
Whether or not ‘unity’ mattered to Smith can be derived from the way in which Smith describes the human character. There are three such methods (all explored in the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres): (a) ‘Direct Method’: when a character is presented as a set of features which are described by their intrinsic value rather than by their effects on others; (b) ‘General Indirect Method’: when a character is described by the cumulative effect it creates on the observer; (c) ‘Particular Indirect Method’: when the cumulative effect that the character creates on the observer is broken down to the effects on the observer that is created by the various aspect of the character. It is only the ‘direct method’ which corresponds with the received view about the resolution of Das Adam Smith Problem, but the fact of the matter is that when we decompose the concepts of sympathy as a capacity and self-interest as a motive, this method generates a contradiction in terms. Hence, the only possible coherent way of interpreting the method which was actually used by Smith is to adhere to the third method where the coherence of the cumulative effect is dominant.
- 47.
I do not contest here the role of ‘sympathy’ as the premise of Smith’s theory. But ‘sympathy’ too can be employed in different ways according to individuals’ character.
- 48.
Note that ‘virtue’ here does not represent a moral judgement. It denotes a certain feature of human character that may or may not be virtuous. (This can easily be proved for at some point Smith discusses the ‘improper’ and the ‘proper’ prudence. Obviously, if prudence can be ‘improper’ it cannot be at the same time virtuous by definition). So self-interest, according to this approach, is that part in our nature that directs us to the care of those things which affect us.
- 49.
- 50.
Submission to authority is explained by ‘sympathy’: The principle of authority ‘arises from our sympathy with our superior … we admire their happy situation, enter into it with pleasure, and endeavour to promote it’ (LJ, p. 401).
- 51.
But it is not only that Smith finds the judgement that is based on ‘sympathy’ as different from the one that is based on ‘utility’. He also argues that one of them—‘sympathy’—is more legitimate than the other. He insists: ‘it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well contrived building’ (TMS, p. 188). Yet he admits, as we have shown before, that on many occasions people do tend to confuse the two.
- 52.
- 53.
In his Theory of Justice, Rawls proposes to counter the often-difficult-to-defend reign of Utilitarianism as the predominant moral theory. Utilitarianism is a teleological theory in which the right is derived from the good. Rawls’s attempt is deontological where, in broader a term, that which is right is determined independently from that which is good (see a discussion in his Chap. 7).
- 54.
Witztum (1997).
- 55.
Witztum (2005a).
- 56.
Had the knave, in Smith’s example, not been industrious, should he have been given anything at all? Equally, had the indolent man not been a man of virtue, would he deserve reward?
- 57.
- 58.
Section 3 of part 1 till the end of part 2, to be precise.
- 59.
As a matter of fact Smith’s entire moral theory is based on the principle of ‘propriety’. However, following his own structuring, I distinguish between propriety and merit, although in both cases the measure of moral approval can be said to be propriety.
- 60.
Which, I believe, is also consistent with Smith’s analysis of the three types of passions which rests in all humans: the social, unsocial and selfish (see TMS, pp. 34–42). This distinction between them seems to be based on the attitudes towards the others which are embedded in each type of sentiment.
- 61.
Notice, however, that Smith’s analysis is in the discrete form. Namely, there are no degrees of benevolence or malevolence.
- 62.
With respect to Smith’s analysis of action, the idea of the ‘impartial spectator’, as we hinted before, seems to resemble the Kantian notion of the ‘Universal test’ (see Kant, Ground Work of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 88). Kant also uses explicitly an idea of the ‘impartial spectator’ in his ‘Reflection on Anthropology’. There, however, he describes the ‘impartial spectator’ as the observer who views things from the point of view of society without giving any account of how this spectator formulates society’s point of view.
- 63.
‘To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design, all praise or blame … must ultimately belong’ (TMS, p. 93).
- 64.
This knowledge, in Smith, probably means that the action that would have been taken by someone who is not directly involved and thus whose judgement is not clouded by emotions.
- 65.
The discussion of resentment and the general problem with unsocial sentiments can be found in TMS, pp. 34–38.
- 66.
Here too we may find some resemblance to the Kantian idea of the ‘universal test’. For the ‘impartial spectator’s’ approval of sentiments we needed a universal test in the sense that all would have felt the same had they been in place of the subject of approbation. Here, however, we are concerned with action. The ‘universal test’ means to ask ‘what if everyone acted in this way?’ which is perhaps even closed to the Kantian idea and use of the Universal test.
- 67.
Obviously it is possible to consider situations where individuals behave differently, that is, they might feel resentment in spite of a beneficent outcome. It will be up to the ‘impartial spectator’ to determine whether or not the particular circumstances of the person who is being acted upon allow a reversed respond from what an innocent observer might expect.
- 68.
For Smith, resentment is within the domain of justice while hatred is not.
- 69.
In Witztum and Young (2006) we show how politics interfered with the transmission of what would constitute justice in the eyes of an ‘impartial spectator’ onto law.
- 70.
In TMS, p. 96, Smith specifies what is required for moral evaluation. Someone feeling either gratitude or resentment is one of the conditions.
- 71.
In our case we needed the wheat to serve as seeds as well as the food for the capitalist and labourer during the period of production. By food to the people involved in the process of production, I mean the level of physical subsistence.
- 72.
Note that we are examining the beneficence of the action, which is a dynamic concept, rather than the beneficence of the situation. Someone may feel grateful for what he has in comparison to what he might have had. Nevertheless, the action itself has not brought about any change in his conditions. There is no reason to suppose that as a result of a stationary state a person will attribute his position to actions which merely preserve what he has already been enjoying before.
- 73.
I shall assume that when surplus prevails, no capitalist will reduce his labourer’s wages below subsistence.
- 74.
‘It is to no purpose that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, and without a thought for the wants of his bretherns in imagination consumes himself the whole harvest that grows upon them. … The capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will receive no more than that of the meanest peasant. The rest he is obliged to distribute among those, who prepare in the nicest manner, that little which he himself makes use of. … The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor. … They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants’ (TMS, pp. 184–185).
- 75.
By the action of production I also mean the productive labourer’s remuneration. I refer to it as part of production because the subsistence of the productive labourer is part of the reproduction of the whole process. Obviously, the capitalist can share the surplus with his own labourer, and increase his wages above subsistence, but, as it might affect production (in terms of productivity) I shall not discuss it here. This sort of analysis must be carried out in a more complete model of Smith’s economic system. For the moment, we may distinguish between the remuneration of the productive labour, as part of production, while the unproductive labourer receives his remuneration in the process of the exchange of surplus.
- 76.
In the previous case 20 workers produced 200 and now 100 ‘worker’ produce the same quantity.
- 77.
A discussion of whether there is symmetry in the rationality of agents can be found in Witztum (2005b).
- 78.
The question of whether Smith’s speculative evolutionary tale is entirely correct is irrelevant to the argument. The key point here is that even if people were part of a collective (the hunter-gatherers, for instance) in which there had been a social division of labour, their interest in the others was not, in essence, economical.
- 79.
In the context of Mandeville’s paradox this is a very dim resolution of it. Smith actually claims that though there is nothing about the greed which leads to plenty that is morally acceptable, the public will, through the deception by nature, deem it as such.
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Witztum, A. (2019). The Classical Alternative. In: The Betrayal of Liberal Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10671-3_4
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