Abstract
Synopsis : If the promise of economics’ paradigmatic core is neither logically true nor relevant, could there be another reason why we may still wish to promote and defend the proliferation of the idea of competitive decentralisation (i.e. markets)? If markets do not really solve the economic problem and are not ethically neutral but they provide people with, say, freedom and justice, then pursuing this form of economic organisation could still be justified. Moreover, if this were the case, the important association of competitive decentralisation with the basic expression of modern liberalism in the form of civic society can also be maintained.
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Notes
- 1.
To remind the reader, we are referring here to the fact that governments are large because the public wants them so and a large number of people cannot access national income through markets. Those who can, face a diminishing share of it. Moreover, with the conditioning of efficiency (only productive) on particular distributions of property rights, the ability to associate the outcome with all possible distributions of income—which is required for the consequentialist ethical neutrality—is no longer possible.
- 2.
Notably, this is manifested in the continued use of efficiency as the criterion of economic performance and opportunity cost as the notion of price. Globalisation is another expression of this view.
- 3.
I must hasten and say that for those who would consider ethical claims as sufficient for the adoption of competitive decentralisation, the definition of the economic problem is very likely to be different indeed. Hence, if, in a somewhat Aristotelian manner, the objective of the economic system is to support the institutions of the just, or good, society, and if competitive decentralisation achieves just that, it stands to reason that one would wish these institutions to be established, proliferated and guarded. More recently, such a difference may constitute the dividing line between the Austrian school and the neoclassical paradigm.
- 4.
We will expand on this in Chap. 6 but what we mean by civic society—which is quite a dominant expression of what is today understood as liberalism—is an individualistic construction of society where the role of society is merely to facilitate voluntary human interactions.
- 5.
This is, in essence, what is behind the two welfare theorems. We would not have supposed that markets are consistent with whichever distribution society may wish if we also believed that markets violate individual freedom or subvert justice. Equally, even critics in the spirit of Keynes do not deny this property of markets but believe that the economy needs help in getting to where it wants to be (with markets).
- 6.
If indeed such a thing exists.
- 7.
Though it is worth noting that von Mises, and the Austrian school in general, had a different conception of this order from the one adopted by modern neoclassical economics which was generated, among others, from the Lausanne school (notably , Walras) and the idea of spontaneous general equilibrium. Nevertheless, it seems that in terms of the freedom values of the market, there is a considerable amount of harmony between the schools.
- 8.
Namely, if there is a great inequality between two individuals in terms of their initial endowments (assets and abilities) one may think that they are not equally free irrespective of whether the mechanism of the market represents freedom of actions and interactions (and choice).
- 9.
Recall that in a competitive environment economic decisions are based on prices which are determined in markets where no one individual has any influence on their values.
- 10.
- 11.
For more on this, see Witztum (2005).
- 12.
This corresponds to what the capabilities approach presumes as the ‘reason to value’. We should note that a similar issue arose in classical economics where authors like Smith deliberate the notion of effective demand.
- 13.
We are, of course, referring to the logical limit and not to the large literature on asymmetric information, which is treated as a form of market failure for which there can be remedies in the form of mechanism designs.
- 14.
This means that for every hour of work agent I provides (i.e. one hour less of leisure) he can obtains b units of x. Individual II will get a units of x for each hour worked. The values of a and b represent what we call the marginal product of labour. While we normally assume it to be diminishing the more we use the resources (in this case, labour), it is simpler to consider it to be constant here. Note too that the differences in output per hour may not necessarily reflect differences in ability as it may be a reflection of dexterity or the attitude towards this particular work.
- 15.
The restriction imposed on the available set, here, is not really a liberty issue or a limitation of their freedom. Freedom does not really mean the ability to have what you want but, rather, the ability to have what you can want. Clearly, the main issue is that which determines what you ‘can’ want, but in our example here there is no connection between the individuals, so it is not the case that individual I could, should or would have liked to transfer some of what is available to him to the other. In addition, note that while the agent can choose any bundle inside the constraint, given the goal of the agent, the real set of choices would be all the bundles along the line (as he or she would want to have more of both). Von Mises makes this point very clearly: ‘A man’s freedom is most rigidly restricted by the laws of nature as well as by the laws of praxeology’ (ibid.). In other words, restrictions which emanate from nature or what he calls the law of praxeology (i.e. logical consistency of actions, or choices) cannot be deemed as limitation on freedom as the latter must be defined within them.
- 16.
Note that there is one labour market for x and that the difference in the agents’ productivity may reflect their personal dispositions towards work rather than expertise, or abilities, in producing the good (i.e. one of them may be keener on work than the other). Therefore, there will not be separate markets for the different types of ‘abilities’ as they do not reflect different skills.
- 17.
They both will have the same choice set delineated by the broken blue line in the left-hand diagram which is clearly greater than the original set of agent I (denoted by the heavy black line) and the original set of agent II (denoted by the broken black line).
- 18.
When we say ‘were in principle available to them’, we mean that all the points in the shaded areas in the previous diagram were potentially possible in the sense that individuals could have chosen to be there. However, this would mean that they may not survive. Therefore, they cannot choose it. However, this is very different from simply wanting something which one does not have the means to have (like the options agent I has and are not available to agent II).
- 19.
Though this is not a case of missing market in uncertainty, it is a matter of specialisation. If the returns earned by the landowner who is a land specialist is distributed, he may either abandon his work and become a labourer or it will reduce his effectiveness and this will lower the productivity gains.
- 20.
But whether or not this is a good or meaningful story will be explored in the following chapters and, in particular, in Chap. 7.
- 21.
In the exposition of the economic paradigm in Chap. 2, Sect. 1 (2.1), you will find reference to this in points (f)–(h).
- 22.
This is not just a matter of intrinsic value; there will be cost to switching if there are skills involved in any specialisation.
- 23.
We shall return to this point and the question of rationality in economic analysis in Chap. 7.
- 24.
Clearly what this means depends on the social contract.
- 25.
One cannot but recall, in this context, Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous saying from ‘Huis Clos’ (1943) that ‘hell is other people’.
- 26.
One of the best expressions of this position can be found in Hayek (1944).
- 27.
Dyde (1894) writes about Hegel’s conception of freedom and correctly points out the need to distinguish between psychological and moral freedom. Accordingly, Hegel’s conception is very much within the domain of being morally free: ‘Indeed, complete moral freedom implies that within the reach of his volition must be not only a general good, but the ultimate good, however that may be defined’ (p. 656). In simple terms this means that doing the right thing (that which is just) is the ultimate expression of individual’s moral freedom.
- 28.
This, of course, is reminiscent of J. S. Mill’s approach towards human development and individuality which we mentioned earlier.
- 29.
The ancient Greek word for justice is ‘Δίκη’ (dike), which originally meant ‘due share’ (see Spengler 1980, p. 79 for further elaboration). ‘Due share’, referred to by Δίκη, meant first of all the distribution of fate (Μοῖραι-Moirae), which, in other words, is strongly related to people’s character (what they are) within the framework of some kind of a godly design. Later, this Homeric notion was transferred to the ‘city state’. Both Plato and Aristotle saw the concept of justice as arising from a similar notion of ‘due share’ even though it was now confined to the framework of the ‘city state’ and its general governing laws. But while this notion of due share is based on what people are, in Aristotle there is already a distinction between due share emanating from personal virtues and that which is due to human action. In his case, this distinction was mostly felt in the distinction which he draws between distributive and rectificatory (or corrective) justice (Nic. Eth. V, 1131b14 1132a2). The former is based on one’s qualities as a member of society, while the latter is focused on the outcome of voluntary (and non-voluntary) actions like exchange. Johnston (2011) claims that even at the distributive justice level the position was that of contribution-based desert rather than virtue-based desert: ‘Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice appears to be underpinned by a version of what later came to be called the contribution principle, which states (roughly) that it is just for people to reap rewards from a common enterprise that are proportional in value to the contributions they have made to that enterprise’ (p. 71).
- 30.
This is sometime referred to as the problem of responsibility.
- 31.
There are, of course, many more issues associated with understanding desert as an ethical concept. Not least is the question of whether desert—even as an ethical concept—is a concept of justice. Olsaretti (2003) provides a good anthology of the various aspects of this debate.
- 32.
By focusing on desert which is based on actions rather than individual character, we circumvent a great deal of the criticism which was levied against ‘desert-based’ conceptions of justice. When people are deserving because of the morality of their character, we run into immense difficulties of (a) identifying such characters and (b) arguing that they have a particular claim to things.
- 33.
The data in the study is based on average of public spending as a percentage of GDP between 1960 and 1998 and the question of luck is based on the WVS with data between 1981 and 1997.
- 34.
Namely, that differential reward is morally desirable only when people are of equal natural abilities (or their equivalence) but differ in their efforts contribution.
- 35.
To properly survey this literature would require a separate volume. Here I am merely making the point that what seems to be the public intuition today has probably been around for a long time as it influenced (and has probably been influenced by) the more philosophical deliberations. The only point which I would like to make here is that while desert-based justice appeared in all these scholars, it has not always been about contribution-based desert. In Aristotle, as we mentioned in a previous footnote, both notions of moral virtue-based desert and action-based desert appear within his distinction between distributive and corrective justice. St Thomas of Aquinas, who tended more towards the virtue-based desert, still recognised the contribution-based desert through his commentary on Aristotle’s analysis of exchange. He says there: ‘In order to have just exchange, as many sandals must be exchanges for one house … as the builder … exceeds the shoemaker in his labour and cost’ (CNE V ix, p. 426). This very basic form of a labour theory of value (which is also repeated in Adam Smith) implicitly supposes that the only difference between the individuals is the labour input rather than anything about their natural abilities or moral virtue. Leibnitz was definitely about contribution-based desert but as the contribution was broadly conceived, it would be something which is difficult to measure and, therefore, lends itself more easily to virtue. He says in his Ultimate Origin of Things (1697): ‘There couldn’t be a better standard in this matter than the law of justice, which lays down that everyone is to participate in the perfection of the universe, and to have personal happiness, in proportion to his own virtue and to the extent that his will have contributed to the common good’ (p. 353). But from Locke onwards, the role of a well-defined contribution as the base for desert and justice has been better established. In Locke and Hume, a lot has to do with property rights, and in Hume the reason is not even deontological but rather the usefulness of the idea. But in Smith, Spencer and Mill, the idea seems more akin to contemporary public opinion where desert is clearly a contribution-based idea.
- 36.
Though one must hasten to say that he would not have objected to this had contribution-based desert been a question of expediency (Sidgwick 1907, p. 280). This, of course, is similar to Hume’s position, though I would argue against reading him as a utilitarian.
- 37.
See his discussion in lesson 2 of the Elements of Pure Economics.
- 38.
This position whereby one addresses the problem of social justice without opposing private property which is a key component of the decentralised system, by making everyone own property (collective ownership of land) has also been promoted by Henry George in the USA (see a discussion of this influence in Cirillo (1984)).
- 39.
Welfare economics, as was stated before, in most general terms, can be defined as the theory which aims at correcting the outcomes of economic interaction without questioning its nature. Originally, in Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare (1920), the need to correct the outcomes arose from the apparent inefficiency of the competition in the presence of externalities. Then, in the wake of the first and second welfare theorems it was all about correcting the system according to social values determined through the most elusive of concepts: the social welfare function. Sen (1970) was perhaps the only example of an attempt to question something more fundamental (the relationship between the idea of Pareto-efficiency and ethical ideas like liberalism) but this did not seem to have gained any grounds.
- 40.
Rawls (1973) was quite instrumental in generating these changes. In his two principles he addresses both the initial allocation (equal opportunity) and the final distribution (the difference principle).
- 41.
This corresponds to our discussion about the reduced sovereignty which individuals who choose to specialise face when they have no option of withdrawing from the game.
- 42.
Just, to Aristotle, means lawful and fair (Nic. Eth. Book V, 1129a21 b6), and fairness means not to take advantage of another, which, in other words, means not taking more than one’s share.
- 43.
There is a question here with regard to why prices which reflect relative difficulty of attainment correspond to the idea of contribution-based desert. If we consider the exchange of one unit of two goods, then if the contribution of hours in the production of one is greater than the other, the product of the greater contribution should command more of the product of a smaller contribution. Namely, we are not looking at how much an hour produces but we are looking at it from the point of view of the level of contribution per unit of the good. We shall say more about it further below.
- 44.
See Young (1986). We will return to the question of ethical pricing in our longer discussion of the classical perspective in Chap. 8.
- 45.
I am aware of the fact that many interpret Smith’s idea of the natural price as simply the ‘cost of production’ price, which in modern economics is the long-run equilibrium when prices equal the minimum average cost. I will provide a fuller explanation to why this is wrong in Chap. 8, where we discuss the classical perspective. It could be useful to note that in Cantillon’s Essai (I.x) the concepts used are those of market price and intrinsic price, which is also described as the focus of market price fluctuations. At this stage, however, I will only make this brief comment to say that in Smith’s natural price, all participants in the production process receive what can be understood as the value of a socially constructed consumption basket. In modern economics, in the long run, the price equals the cost of production but these costs may be well above that which is needed to perform socially. After all the normal rate of profit is determined in the market for present consumption and not according to any socially constructed measure.
- 46.
See discussions in Hicks (1983, pp. 85–93) and Schumpeter (1954, pp. 951–1052) and in particular pp. 998–1025. It is true, however, that some scholars argue that there is more than that in Walras’s model (see Morishima 1977; Witteloostuijn and Maks 1990) but as far as we are concerned this will make little difference. It is perhaps worth noting that there is nothing extraordinary by the choice of contemporaneous simultaneity as a way of testing whether competitive decentralisation leads to a co-ordinated outcome. Naturally, Walras did not think that the reality is that at any point in time, the economy is in equilibrium. But if one thinks that markets solve the economic problem or provides a co-ordination mechanism, it stands to reason that one has to demonstrate that the different individuals will indeed succeed in reaching a co-ordinated outcome. What better system can one contemplate other than contemporaneous simultaneity. If we are in a constant state of disequilibrium and there is never a co-ordinated outcome, it becomes more difficult to justify competitive decentralisation on these grounds. Indeed, for the Austrians who have not adopted the epistemological approach of Walras, it is less the co-ordination power and more the freedom associated with markets which is the great promise of market economies.
- 47.
The issue of responsibility has been a source of some debate in philosophy. Cupit (1996), Feldman (1996), Smilansky (1996) and Scheffler (1992) are a few examples. We have also mentioned the parallel increase in interest in responsibility in the egalitarian literature (Arneson 1989, 1990; Cohen 1989, 1993; Fleurbaey 2008).
- 48.
Following Elster (1983), I would like to make the distinction between ‘causal relations’ and ‘causal explanation’. The former is a logical statement, describing a regular conjunction of kinds of events. ‘Explanation’, on the other hand, relates to the actual occurrence of specific events. In other words, two endogenous variables may have some kind of ‘causal relationship’ but the actual values of each of them are explained by the exogenous variables. When, in such a system, we study the relationship between the decision of an agent and the outcome of it, we can do so by using comparative statics. This, however, will only tell us about the ‘causal relationships’ in the model but will not offer a ‘causal explanation’. Comparative statics is a professed hypothetical exercise that reveals at best the direction of change but no more than that (see, for instance, Klant 1984, Chap. 4, and in particular, pp. 146–149). In a system of simultaneous equation, only the exogenous variables are the ‘explanada’. The idea of exogenous variables being the only ‘causal explanada’ in a simultaneous system has been discussed by many scholars (see, for instance, Popper (1959), Mackie (1974), Hicks (1979), Elster (1983) and Itkonen (1983)).
- 49.
If we changed the way we see contribution from the difficulty of attainment of a particular commodity to the productivity of labour, we would refer directly to the two individuals (rather than the goods) and say that individual I is more productive than individual II as his unit of labour produced 6 units of y while the same labour by individual I contributed only 4 units of x. However, one can immediately see how this point of view would be wrong as it is not really true to say that individual I is more productive than individual II. Such a claim would have been meaningful if they both produced the same good. Therefore, it stands to reason that the difference between the contributions of the two individual is manifested in the difference in the difficulty of producing that which they own at the beginning of trade.
- 50.
It is easy to see that even if we treated the differences in contributions as the difference in productivity (where individual I is more productive than individual II as his unit of labour produced 6 units of y, while the same labour by individual I contributed only 4 units of x), the idea of justice would still be orthogonal to market outcomes. Evidently, all exchanges consistent with a contribution-based desert would have been organised along the blue line in the above diagram. They too will be orthogonal to the market distributions arranged along the red line.
- 51.
This corresponds to the argument made by Knight and Rawls that marginal product—in the general case—is not a measure of labour contribution. In our example, with constant marginal product and no other factor, it does correspond to labour inputs.
- 52.
As a change in γ1 will in the end also change the price, the additional condition for disutility of effort to be a proxy to labour input when taking this into account is that: \( {\gamma_1}^2\kern0.28em \cdotp \kern0.28em \varphi \kern0.28em \cdotp \kern0.28em a\kern0.28em \cdotp \kern0.28em \frac{\partial p}{\partial {\gamma}_1}<1 \), which is quite likely to hold true as the values on the left-hand side of the equation are generally very small indeed and their product will be even smaller. In particular, with the exception of a, they are all likely to be smaller than 1 so their product will be much smaller so that even with a (which may be somewhat greater than 1 but not by much), the condition is likely to be satisfied. Moreover, while this is relevant to the final outcome in terms of the new price and the new level of labour contributed, the internal logic of the story always suggests that at first the response of the individual to increased disutility of labour would be the increase in labour contribution. See more in the following footnote.
- 53.
It is important to emphasise that while the conditions from the last footnote which will allow us to be confident about the use of disutility as a proxy for labour contribution, the argument holds in general. While in terms of causal explanation, the actions of the agents are determined by the same thing which determines the price, in terms of causal relationship, the story is more complex. If we begin at an equilibrium and now, there is an increase in disutility of labour, and the immediate response of the agent (the one producing x in this case) would be to increase his supply of labour so that he can produce more x and sell it (at the given price) to offset the loss of utility. Therefore, the agent will always first of all increase contribution when disutility of labour increases. The result of such an action would be to increase the supply of x and, therefore, reduce its price. The fall in price may have a secondary effect which may, in principle, make the agent withdraw some of the labour because he is no longer capable of offsetting it only through an increase in consumption through the trading of the x he produces for y.
- 54.
What we are saying here, in more general terms, is that markets tend to reward less, things which are in greater abundance. Therefore, the more effort of labour one offers, the less will be one’s reward. Now, some may argue that in standard labour market analysis, increase in effort (i.e. marginal product) will lead to higher wages and, hence, greater reward. However, for this to be true we must assume that marginal product is indeed a measure of contribution. Here, I concur with both Knight and Rawls, who contest this proposition. Indeed, if a person works a certain number of hours at a given level of effort, his wage (which equals his marginal product) will be so and so. If there is no change in the person’s contribution but another person joins the labour force, the marginal product of the first individual will go down even though he is doing the same as before. Surely, one cannot agree that the contribution of this person has gone down. Moreover, even when marginal product increases, the change is distributed between the worker, other factors and the owners whose claims on the additional output we must further clarify. It is for this reason that we adopted the more general approach embedded in general equilibrium where contributions can clearly be identified and where workers are the sole owners of the produce of their labour.
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Witztum, A. (2019). On Freedom and Justice: A Note Pertaining to Economics’ Liberal Connections. In: The Betrayal of Liberal Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10668-3_4
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