Abstract
In this chapter, I examine the repercussions of the cognitive impenetrability of early vision and cognitive penetrability of late vision for the epistemic role of visual perception and for the constructivist claim that our access to the world is mediated through our concepts.
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Raftopoulos, A. (2019). The Cognitive Effects on Early and Late Vision and Their Epistemological Impact. In: Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10445-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10445-0_4
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