Abstract
A changed international post-WWII environment and the decolonization process formed the Dutch aid and development policy. During the early years, national interests related to decolonization—along with idealist norms—resulted in a high multilateral component, while bilateral assistance became concentrated on the former colonies. In the mid-1970s, the Netherlands was the second OECD country to meet the international 0.7% target set for ODA, subsequently staying above that level—and at times even exceeding the 1% target. Shifting coalition governments made consensus-seeking a necessity, also involving the aid and development policy. With the emergence of nationalistic and populist political parties, the balance shifted in the new century. This chapter analyses the evolving policy and performance trends.
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Notes
- 1.
For an overview and analysis of the efforts to establish a multilateral development assistance system, see Stokke (2009): chaps. 2–3 (pp. 43–129).
- 2.
Ibid: Table A.1.
- 3.
Bertholet et al. (1984: 298) (disbursements, prices deflated by the wholesale index).
- 4.
The empire also included the Netherlands Antilles, six islands in the Caribbean.
- 5.
In 1978, J. L. Heldring (then the director of the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs)—portraying the long lines in Dutch foreign policy—noted that the pacific policy of maintaining a balance between the neighbouring powers was the most practical method of guaranteeing Dutch independence and security. “But in the long run, pragmatism also needs a moral justification and a legal basis. As to the latter, it is small wonder that in a country which considered unimpeded trade as its greatest interest, a school of international law arose at a very early date; its founder, Hugo Grotius […] was to gain world fame by his Mare Liberum (1609). The foundation was thus laid for a typical Dutch tradition which tends to regard international law as a substitute for foreign policy. This tradition, of course, became stronger as the real power of the Dutch State declined—a process which already began in the second half of the seventeenth century” (Heldring 1978: 309).
- 6.
Vandenbosch (1959: 4) (quoted in Baehr 1978: 6) observed that “[i]n the course of time the Dutch began to look upon this cautious, purely national policy as a positive good and sacred international duty. In line with this the Dutch began to regard themselves as the great mediator between various peoples, culturally and in every other way”. Baehr added that a more recent Dutch observer (Boogman et al. 1970: 16) had recalled that the Netherlands was considered the most unselfish of all states; it was the Joan of Arc among the nations (Ibid: 6).
- 7.
To quote Heldring (1978: 311): “After the obvious failure of the attempt to establish a universal rule of law under the aegis of the United Nations, the Dutch plunged unhesitatingly, even enthusiastically, into the regional military, political, and economic organizations which arose in the West European and Atlantic areas.”
- 8.
Peter R. Baehr concluded that, since WWII, the foreign policy “has been characterized by a close alliance with the US. This alliance has strongly influenced all aspects of its foreign policy—even those that had no direct relationship to the Cold War. Long-serving Foreign Minister Luns became the symbol of this pro-American foreign policy” (Baehr 1978: 24).
- 9.
Commercial concerns were prominent from day one. The chairman of the first interdepartmental commission for development cooperation, de Vries, argued that sending out experts and training people in the Netherlands would result in “a higher likelihood of orders placed with our industry than without the participation of The Netherlands. Finally, there is also the perspective of capital investment opportunities for The Netherlands” (de Vries 1949; quoted in Hoebink 1999a: 181).
- 10.
According to Lieshout et al. (2010: 26), “human dignity” (the 1956 report) was “mainly being developed by outlining how an international economy can eventually benefit everyone (‘we need natural resources’). Knowledge transfer shifted to the background and investments of foreign private and public capital became the new priority”. The 1962 report, focusing on a stable world order, argued that “[t]he discontinuation of excessive differences in wealth is important from the political perspective as well. The social tensions which result from poverty and hunger lead to political tensions, extremism and chaos. Even if they are initially determined at national level, such circumstances tend to generate international tension and risk of war. Peace in the world is enhanced by increasing prosperity and particularly by helping underdeveloped countries to catch up”. It was for this reason that the Netherlands decided to invest structurally in knowledge accumulation. “Lastly, in view of the needs for accelerated social development in the underdeveloped countries the government proposes making one-off contribution available, as a specific Dutch initiative, for an institute for social development planning” (DuMFA 1962: 1, 14 (quotes); quoted and summarized in Lieshout et al. 2010: 26).
- 11.
Representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs “visited the aid-receiving countries to negotiate aid disbursements, and carried ‘shopping lists’ in their bags [according to Hoebink (2007b: 25), double tying of aid]. Although the stated goal was to integrate developing countries into the world economy and thus to alleviate their poverty, promotion of Dutch exports was clearly the most important, if unstated, goal. From 1973 onwards, this changed dramatically” (Hoebink 1999b: 188). However, later Hoebink qualified this “dramatic change”: “In reality […], Dutch aid continued to be tied to expenditure in the Netherlands and could only be untied with the permission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs” (Hoebink 2007b: 26).
- 12.
The following statement (in Accent, 4 January 1969) by Mr. Udink, minister for development cooperation (1967–1971; CHU—Christian Historical Union, Dutch Reformed) and previously the director of the Central Chamber of Commerce, may be illustrative: “It is, for instance, a fact that 100 per cent of the aid which we give to Indonesia is spent in The Netherlands and is paid to Dutch industries and producers. 100 per cent of development aid which we give to countries such as India, Pakistan, Kenya, Colombia, Peru, Tunisia … is spent in The Netherlands.” In the same interview, the minister stated that he saw development aid as an instrument for employment and stimulation of the Dutch economy (quoted in Hoebink 1999a: 185; 2007b: 24–25). Hoebink found that “the trade relationship with the Netherlands and the request for specific technical experience from the Netherlands” were among the first criteria used for the selection of concentration countries (Hoebink 2007b: 10).
- 13.
“Tying our aid to the supply of Dutch goods and services meant that we shipped as ‘development assistance’ Frisian cows and stalls from De Boer in Leeuwarden, aircrafts from Fokker, milk and sugar processing plants from VMF-Stork, DAF trucks, X-ray equipment from Philips Medical Systems, dredging equipment from IHC in Kinderdijk, ‘indestructible’ water pumps from DHV in Amersfoort, fertilizers from NSM and UKF, and hangars from Hollandia-Kloos to our ‘concentration countries’” (Hoebink 2010: 199).
- 14.
The political parties on which these government coalitions were based were the Catholic People’s Party (KVP), the conservative Liberal Party (People’s Party for Liberty and Democracy—VVD), the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP—Calvinist), the Christian Historical Union (CHU—Dutch Reformed). Later (in 1977), the Christian parties (KVP, ARP and CHU) merged into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA).
- 15.
- 16.
Bertholet et al. (1984: 294, 299). According to Cooper and van Themaat (1989: 123–126), volume targets “are set in terms of funds described as ‘development assistance’ (ontwikkelingshulp), expressed as a proportion of the NNI. Since 1973, successive governments have committed themselves to maintaining development assistance at 1.5 per cent of the NNI. […] As defined by the Netherlands, ‘development assistance’ has usually been about 20 per cent greater than the ODA”. However, it included a non-ODA component (see infra, notes 18, 50).
- 17.
As measured by DAC, the ODA of the Netherlands made up 0.58% of GNP in 1971 and 0.67% in 1972 (OECD 1985: Table 26).
- 18.
The 1.5% of the NNI target established by Parliament (the Lower House) in 1974 included non-ODA expenditures considered to be an essential part of a comprehensive development strategy. No fixed, immutable norm was established for the ODA component. However, to avoid the risk that non-ODA expenditure might increasingly take the place of ODA expenditure, the government stipulated that non-ODA expenditure should be kept to a minimum—at least 1% of NNI should be devoted to ODA and efforts be made to increase that proportion. However, the non-ODA share increased from 0.13% of NNI in 1976 to 0.32% in 1993 (van den Dool 1994: 40–42).
- 19.
In 1975, the 0.7% target was met (0.74% of GNP). The percentages in the two last years of Pronk’s first period as minister (1976 and 1977) were 0.80% and 0.81% of GNP, respectively (OECD 1985: Table 26).
- 20.
Stokke (2009: Tables A.3, A.7).
- 21.
Van Act I (1977–1981). In 1976, the three Christian parties—KVP, the Dutch Reformed CHU and the Calvinist ARP—formed a federation, the CDA, and elected Van Act as its first leader. The three parties ran with a united list in the 1977 general election and merged in 1980.
- 22.
Bertholet et al. (1984: 293–297). The authors found that “[t]he more conservative outlook of the new government [Van Agt I] did not change the direction of development policy” (p. 296). Part of the explanation may be the broad political agreement on the aid policy, including the volume target, established during the Den Uyl government. It may also, in part, be explained by the parliamentary setting: after that Van Act took over as leader of a new-established federation (CDA)—seeking an alliance to the right (the VVD)—the Labour Party (PvdA) had strengthened its parliamentary position in a general election.
- 23.
- 24.
Cooper and van Themaat (1989: 143–144) observed that, by that point in time, even the extreme left (the Communist Party—CPN) had given up the view that aid merely served the expansion of capitalism and better be stopped. “The only major item of contention between the parties is the desirable extent of involvement of the Dutch private sector (tying versus untying, participation of Dutch private sector in decision-making, etc.) with a rather predictable pattern of views as between the left, centre and liberal right”. One explanation may be that they all agree on the issue, another that “both government and political parties try to file off the sharp political edges in their views on aid and consciously aim at national support for their policies. Aid in the Netherlands is very much a non-partisan affair and is presented to the public to a large extent as an apolitical issue”.
- 25.
In actual practice, the budgetary target (including non-ODA items) fixed to 1.5% of the estimated NNI, varied somewhat over the years. In 1978, the target was declared as a minimum percentage; in 1982–1985, it was 1.42%; between 1982 and 1989, 1.50%; in 1990–1991, 1.50%, supplemented by various expenditures by other ministries. The ceilings for 1992 and 1993 were 1.44 and 1.38%, respectively; and it was expected that it would be 1.42% in the year 2000 (van den Dool 1994: 39–40).
- 26.
Henny Helmich adds another justification for the “new” ODA target. “Against a background of general cutbacks in welfare spending during the mid-1980s, Parliament’s new norm for ‘pure’ ODA became 0.8 per cent of GNI. Polling evidence in 1994 showed that the public did not like the use of aid funds for non-ODA purposes, and NGOs were also critical of aid diversion. These were among the influences persuading government to replace its previous norm of 1.5 per cent of Net National Income to both ODA and non-ODA purposes, with this new target of 0.8 percent for ‘pure’ ODA” (Helmich 2003: 158).
- 27.
The new 1.1% GNP budget line to foreign affairs included, in addition to development cooperation, contributions to peace operations, programmes for Central and Eastern Europe, export instruments under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, embassies and consulates and contributions to international organizations such as NATO and OECD. Hoebink (1999a: 196) concluded that this implied a real cut of 20% in the ODA.
- 28.
- 29.
However, the public opinion survey of the preferences of those who had voted for the various parties in 2002 provides additional insight, an especially interesting one, regarding the major political parties. Whereas the Labour Party opted for 1.0% of GNP in ODA, 53% of its voters preferred 0.8% (38% preferred an increase); the VVD wanted to reduce ODA to 0.7% of GNP, while 62% of its voters preferred 0.8% and another 16% a further increase; the CDA had programmed 0.8% of GNP in ODA and 65% of its voters agreed, while 24% wanted an increase (Schulpen 2005: Table 12.1).
- 30.
Balkenende I, 2002–2003 (CDA, VVD, LPF); II, 2003–2006 (CDA, VVD, D’66); III, 2006–2007 (CDA, VVD). The List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF), coalition partner in the Balkenende I government, was established by Fortuyn in February 2002. Fortuyn made several controversial public statements, such as “Islam was a backward culture”, that no more asylum seekers would be allowed into the country, and, if necessary, the anti-racism clauses in the Dutch Constitution might be repealed to protect the freedom of speech. In May, shortly before the general election, Fortuyn was murdered. In the general election, LPF obtained 17% of the vote and became the second largest party in the House of Representatives (26 seats). The CDA leader, J.P. Balkenende, had earlier announced that his party would follow a tougher line towards asylum seekers, and he later agreed with much of Fortuyn’s criticism of the purple government coalition and the country’s multicultural society. The Balkenende I government became short-lived because of turbulence within the LPF. In a new general election, the following year, the LPF obtained 5.7% of the votes and was not included in the Balkenende II coalition (in the general election in 2006, LPF obtained 0.2%). By the end of the decade, former LPF supporters had mostly moved on to support Geert Wielder and his Party for Freedom (PVV) (Wikipedia 2014: 10.11.2014).
- 31.
The PVV emerged as the third largest party in the 2010 general election (15.5% of the votes). Its political profile included anti-Islam, anti-immigration and EU scepticism.
- 32.
The VVD obtained 26.6% of the votes and Labour 24.8%. Geert Wilders’ PVV came third (10.1%), although it lost 5.4% in comparison with the 2010 election; followed by the Socialist Party (SP) (9.7%); the CDA (8.5%—down 5.1%); and the Democrats 66 (8.0%).
- 33.
The trade promotion budget was transferred to the MFA from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and a Dutch Good Growth Fund with a yearly funding of €250 million between 2014 and 2016 was established. It included a structural funding for peace and security in the budgetary plan for 2013–2017, also this with a yearly contribution (€250 million).
- 34.
The budget implied a downward trend for the following years even in absolute terms (DuMFA 2013: 60).
- 35.
After 2010, the ODA followed a downward trend—from 0.81% of GNI in 2010 to 0.75% in 2011, 0.71% in 2012 and below the international 0.7% target the following two years. However, in the stated policy, the government remained committed to the international 0.7% target, which was met again in 2015 (0.76%), much due to the inflow of refugees. In 2014, the in-country costs of refugees amounted to 16.5% of the total ODA; in 2017 it stayed at about the same level (16.9%) (OECD 2013: 214; 2014: 337; 2015: 243; 2016: 231; 2017a: 237; 2018: 111 (preliminary data)).
- 36.
See Hoebink (2018) for a critical note on the realism of meeting the 0.7% target with the budget cut of 1.4 billion Euro still intact.
- 37.
For an analysis of the policies and efforts of the so-called like-minded countries, see Løvbræk (1990).
- 38.
See Hoebink (2007a: 9–12) for a brief overview of the criteria established for the selection of main aid-recipient countries and the actual selection over the years.
- 39.
Bertholet et al. (1984: 302–306), and calculations based on these data.
- 40.
Cooper and van Themaat (1989: 121, 136). The declaration affected the choice of projects and the policy dialogue with recipient governments. The authors were quite candid when it came to the human rights criterion: Up to the late 1980s, human rights considerations “have hardly affected the geographical distribution of aid”, although there were exceptions (p. 136). Paul Hoebink (1999b: 190–191) argued, more generally, that until the 1970s, “the Netherlands had virtually no human rights policy”. Although a change took place with the Den Uyl government, its human rights policy “was not very coherent”.
- 41.
The policy objectives of development cooperation formulated in A World of Difference (1990) were summarized, three years later, in A World of Dispute (DGIS 1993: 123–124).
- 42.
The reform—outlined in The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands: A Review and approved by Parliament in 1995—aimed at administrative reform, “a virtually complete delegation of the aid management and funds to Dutch embassies and the concentration of responsibilities for the aid budget with DGIS”, and a shift from projects to programme aid (OECD 1997b: 14–17; quote 14). Nine years later, another OECD peer review commended the follow-up on these administrative reforms, although some areas “merits further attention” (OECD 2006b: 11).
- 43.
Inter alia, Hoebink and Schulpen (1998); Schulpen and Hoebink (1999); Schulpen (2005: 406–410); Hout (2007: 166); Hoebink (2010). In 2010, Paul Hoebink argued that while poverty reduction had been the central objective of Dutch policy for 35 years, “the ministry has never produced a clear analysis of what poverty actually is, what faces it has, what has been done to reduce it, what lessons can be learned from it, and how it will be tackled differently in the years to come. […] Dutch aid is certainly given with the best of intensions, but there is a lack of collective reflection and collective self-reflection” (p. 202). The DAC peer reviews in 2001 and 2006 struck a different cord. The 2006 review concluded that since the early 1990s, “the Netherlands has been a leading player in consistently promoting poverty reduction, with a particular focus on the quality of aid and the international aid effectiveness agenda as now contained in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this context, efforts by the Netherlands to adapt aid delivery modalities to changing circumstances and test new operational approaches are widely recognized” (OECD 2001: I-16; 2006b: 21).
- 44.
“These new policy directions […] recognize the relationships between development objectives (the MDGs remain a focus of Dutch aid); global public goods, such as climate policy or protecting biodiversity; and Dutch national interests. The policy revision also responds to growing public and parliamentary pressure in the Netherlands for the government to demonstrate the results of its development co-operation and also to reflect Dutch national interests in this activity” (p. 24).
- 45.
The policy measured included, inter alia, reducing the number of partner countries from 33 to 15; narrowing the thematic focus to just four areas, namely (1) security and legal order; (2) water, (3) food security; and (4) sexual and reproductive health and rights; and “[i]ncreasing opportunities for the Dutch private sector to engage in development co-operation” (idem).
- 46.
The following extract from the white paper catches the core of the “new look” as well as the continuity of the policy: “We are shifting from an aid to a trade relationship with ever more countries, opening up our markets to each other and supporting local authorities and entrepreneurs. Since trade and investment do not by themselves lead to sustainable and inclusive growth, we will continue to combat inequalities, emphasise sustainability, invest in the rule of law and support civil society organisations in their pursuit of human dignity for all. We will also remind Dutch businesses of their responsibilities” (DuMFA 2013: 11).
- 47.
Ibid: 5–6, 10–11 (quotes). “Emerging markets presents an opportunity for our business community, especially in sectors where the Netherlands is an international leader. The combination of aid and trade can be mutually advantageous. But conflict of interest can arise where diverse motives play a role. […] In such cases, we will carefully weigh the different interests at stake, taking sustainable and inclusive growth as our guiding principle”.
- 48.
Ibid: 6. Aid relationships were to focus on “countries that are unable to solve their poverty problems singlehandedly [where we will] invest in a global development agenda to follow up the Millennium Development Goals. Apart from the four priorities of Dutch policy—women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR ), water, food security, and security and the rule of law—the Netherlands wants sustainability and a minimum level of social rights to be included in this agenda”. Transitional relationships would focus mainly on “low and middle-income countries with burgeoning economies”, involving “a combination of aid and trade [that can] benefit both the developing country and the Netherlands”. When it comes to trade relationships, “our main aim is to promote trade and investment, with activities that contribute to economic growth and employment in the Netherlands”. In these countries, “we will work towards the conclusion of free trade agreements—with the US for instance. We will also work to create a level playing field for international finance, attract foreign investors and protect Dutch investors abroad. […] And we are going to help Dutch companies win contracts put out to tender by international institutions” (Ibid: 6–8).
- 49.
The annual development budget (ODA) in 2017 was to be cut by 1 billion euro vis-à-vis the 2013 budget (€750 million the preceding years)—as a percentage of GNP down from 0.68 to 0.55% (Ibid: 25, 59–65).
- 50.
DuMFA (2018). Migration was the dominant theme of the white paper. As summarized by OECD, the government’s policy (Investing in Global Prospects, 2018) was guided by the SDGs. The main objectives were (1) preventing conflicts and instability, (2) reducing poverty and social inequality, (3) promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and climate action worldwide, and (4) enhancing the Netherlands’ earning capacity. The government aimed at tackling “the root causes of extreme poverty, which is increasingly concentrated to fragile regions and the closely intertwined nature of global problems such as poverty, conflict, terrorism, climate change, population growth and irregular migration” (OECD 2018: 110). Paul Hoebink is critical to the new term used—“focus countries” (previously “cooperation countries”). New “focus countries” were countries hosting refugees in the Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) and countries which were important from the perspective of stopping migration (Nigeria, Benin), at the cost of current aid programmes in Ghana and Benin (Hoebink 2018; personal communication, 29.10.2018).
- 51.
“Aid-tying did not lead to an increase in Dutch exports to developing countries. On the contrary, despite a generous aid programme, these steadily declined to less than ten per cent of total export—under half the OECD average. […] If one were to deduct investments in oil and chemicals (Royal Dutch Shell), investments in the least developed countries would be next to nothing” (Hoebink 1999b: 189–190).
- 52.
The “non-ODA” part of the 1.5% target included a variety of elements, such as current administrative costs of the programme in the Netherlands and subsidies of various kinds paid in the Netherlands. The two major elements, however, consisted of grant contributions by the government to assist the settlement in the Netherlands of former residents of Surinam who opted to leave the country when it obtained independence and in implicit subsidies to cover part of the interest payments of the loan component of the overall aid budget to soften the terms of the loans (Cooper and van Themaat 1989: 124–126).
- 53.
However, critical Dutch observers were not impressed (inter alia, Hoebink 1999b: 205–206).
- 54.
The Netherlands was not alone in making such reservations; the other so-called like-minded countries reacted in more or less the same way. See inter alia Løvbræk (1990).
- 55.
Estimates differed. According to Bertholet et al., the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs estimated that, for the period 1976–1980, “approximately 55% of Dutch bilateral ODA money is spent on purchases in the Netherlands or on payments for services provided by Dutch firms or individuals”. That estimate was contested—a spokesperson of the Foundation for Research into Transnational Corporations found an estimate of about 78% more correct. A calculation by DAC officials of Dutch multilateral aid for the years 1972 through 1976 put the return flow at 36% (Bertholet et al. 1984: 313). Cooper and van Themaat (1989: 149–150) held that the estimated return flows of aid to the concentration countries for the years 1976–1980 varied between 87% and 70%, with a downward curve; and that the actual tying of bilateral aid to 37 recipient countries for the years 1970–1982 varied between 57% and 71%.
- 56.
In recent years (2011–2014), OECD statistics maintains that an increasing share of the ODA has been untied. Untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) increased from 95.0% in 2011 to 98.4% in 2014 (the DAC average: 80.6%). However, it declined to 92.2% in 2015 (DAC average 78.1%). In 2014, in-donor refugee costs made up 16.8% of total ODA (OECD 2016: 231; 2017a: 237).
- 57.
The need to finance local costs at a time of economic recession meant that less money was available for purchasing Dutch commodities and services. Together with the “normal” weaknesses of Dutch business in relation to exports to developing countries, this “made the efforts of De Koning, Van Dijk, Schoo and Bukman [ministers of development cooperation in the period 1978–1989] to increase the involvement of Dutch industry in the foreign-aid programme virtually impossible from the start” (Hoebink 1999a: 193).
- 58.
In 1978, around 73% of aid grants and loans had been spent in the Netherlands. It had declined to 56% by 1983 (when around 70% channelled through multilateral organizations was spent in the Netherlands). By the end of the 1980s, the return flow had declined to 52% (Hoebink 2007b: 28). Please note the discrepancies between OECD and Dutch statistics in this regard (inter alia, supra, note 53).
- 59.
Referring to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, both giving priority to ‘ownership’ and demand-driven assistance, Paul Hoebink rhetorically asks what happens when priorities are conflicting—as they often are, contradicting demand-driven aid? The answer: “the consensus-based model, which also leads to a form of supply-driven aid, has no place in modern, demand-driven development cooperation” (Hoebink 2010: 204–205).
- 60.
The policy paper presented to Parliament recommended that the position of women should be improved primarily by integrating this subject within the framework of the existing aid policy. The major goal of an action programme in 1987 was to improve women’s socio-economic position by increasing their active participation in the development process. For an assessment of the early efforts, see Baud et al. (1992: 91–98).
- 61.
Although, in the early 1990s, the Netherlands was a pioneer in integrating a gender perspective in the field of development cooperation, Anouka van Eerdewijk and Tine Davids argue that despite the early success, the struggle for gender equality encountered setbacks in the late 1990s and into the new century due to the way mainstreaming was conceived and practiced—mainstreaming was emphasized at the expense of the stand-alone track, they posited (Eerdewijk and Davids 2010).
- 62.
The activities supported cover a wide field—such as equal rights and opportunities for women and girls, securing property and inheritance rights for women, promoting equality of employment conditions and opportunities, increasing women’s participation in politics and public administration and stopping violence against women. A DAC peer review in 2011 stated that the Netherlands was “an internationally recognized leader on gender equality and women’s empowerment in development” (OECD 2011b: 30).
- 63.
Hoebink (1999b: 199–200). However, the commitment at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to provide an extra 0.1% of GNI in environmental protection was not followed up and finally included in the 0.8% ODA target agreed in the mid-1990s. Efforts to link other ministries to an ecological development policy, “and build in some policy coherence through these treaties [the so-called Sustainable Development Treaties with a few developing countries, ratified by Parliament in 1995] has clearly failed”, Hoebink argues.
- 64.
Ibid: 201. Although noting that the analytical section in A World of Difference on this topic “was widely praised, and was seen as breaking the existing pattern”, translating the analysis into policy raised questions, “not only because financial inputs did not match policy intentions and international promises”, Hoebink argued. He did not, however, refer to the specific policy area of development cooperation, but the penetration of the policy into the domestic policies of the Netherlands.
- 65.
Part of the Dutch commitment for climate change was included in the budget line for ODA (for the period 2010–2012, €350 million was earmarked). For the same period, additional €310 million was earmarked for fast-start finance pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord outside the ODA budget line to finance a programme on mitigation, especially renewable energy, divided over seven sub-programmes. The additional funding was to be channelled through existing bilateral and multilateral aid channels to ensure the linkages between climate change and development (Bakker and Ligtvoet 2010: 44–45).
- 66.
Henny Helmich observed that Dutch civil society organizations “feel strong responsibilities for development co-operation activities claiming that development co-operation cannot be left to government alone. There is, nevertheless, active collaboration between government and NGOs in shaping Dutch development co-operation policy (including also private enterprises, municipalities and academic institutes). In addition, the active involvement of Dutch civil society in policy formation has a direct impact on public awareness of Dutch aid policies and the issues involved” (Helmich 2003: 158).
- 67.
In 1966, Mr. Bot, the first Minister for Development Cooperation, stated that to raise the level of consciousness about the development problems among the Dutch public, government money should be made available (Bertholet et al. 1984: 291). Cooper and van Themaat (1989: 144–145) noted that a “considerable amount is spent every year by the government in trying to mobilize public opinion in favour of aid (USD 4 million). The role which public opinion really plays is less clear, however”.
- 68.
Between 1998 and 2002, the amount increased from €27.69 million to €33.58 million, of which approximately two-thirds was for development education and one-third for information. In the same period, the support for development education increased from €1.22 per capita to €1.42 and the support for information from €0.54 per capita to €0.67 (Helmich 2003: Table 2).
- 69.
Interestingly, 55% of the individuals “feel that they do enough and 42 per cent that they do not. A significant decrease can be observed in the feeling of guilt as a motive for action: from a level in 1994 of 45 per cent, this factor decreased to 29 per cent in 2002” (Ibid: 160).
- 70.
The 1997 peer review posited that the performance “has been based on a strong national sense of responsibility for the welfare of the disadvantaged…” (OECD 1997b: 7). The 2001 DAC peer review argued in the same vein—“the laudable achievement [in DAC statistics, the Netherlands came out as the second most generous bilateral ODA donor] was undoubtedly greatly facilitated by the strong and widespread Dutch public and political support for development assistance. The formal shaping of Dutch development co-operation by Parliament is similarly influenced by many civil society groups, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private enterprises, municipalities, research institutes and universities” (OECD 2001: I-9, quotation; I-61).
- 71.
More than half the Dutch public “reports to have donated for private aid efforts an average of 213 euros per person in the past 12 months. A large part of the public purchased products in fair trade shops (44 per cent), paid contributions to a development NGO, adopted a child (23 per cent), or was an active member of a NGO (10 per cent)”. A bi-annual report (Giving in the Netherlands 2001) estimated that total private donations in 1999 was approximately 4.5 billion euros (1.2% of GNI), of which €665 million (a staple 15 percent of total private donations) were given to international development, representing a rise of 70 percent from 1995 (Helmich 2003: 161). The following observation—“Many institutions, trade unions, local authorities, harbour-boards, schools, police organisations, lawyers and organisations of entrepreneurs are addressing international development as part of their regular activities […] an estimated 1.7 million Dutch citizens, are in some way directly or indirectly engaged with international development activities” (p. 165)—provides yet another inroad to the very active civil society involvement in international development activities in the Netherlands.
- 72.
The state is given an active role in the redistribution of incomes to such groups, “both in the provision of basic services, such as housing, health and education, and in the provision of basic income. […] Despite criticisms, this very active role of the state is still accepted, albeit in varying degrees, by all political parties. This set of expectations, as well as the trust that the state can fulfil them, are similar to the expectations and trust which feed attitudes about the role of the Dutch state with regard to low-income groups in other countries. Given the domestic role of the Dutch state, it is not surprising that it should be required to play a predominant role in policy-implementation vis-à-vis the Third World. It is especially in this welfare function that the similarity between the domestic and the foreign-aid roles of the state is apparent” (Cooper and van Themaat 1989: 148–149; also 154).
- 73.
Hoebink (2010: 199 (quote ), also 200; emphasis in original).
- 74.
A series of DAC peer reviews sing a similar song, including OECD (2001: I 9; 2006b: 11 (quote)). “The Netherlands is viewed within the international donor community as a front runner with regard to its ability to adapt to new challenges and to test innovative operational approaches. Since the early 1990s, the Netherland has been a leading player in consistently promoting poverty reduction …”. The applaud was more tempered five years later, offering recommendations affecting “some bold choices”, including the shift of focus from the social sectors towards the economic sectors (OECD 2011b: 11).
- 75.
In 2009, Paul Hoebink observed that until the end of the 1980s, the VVD “generally tended not to get involved in the debate [on development assistance]. In the 1950s, the party regarded the provision of assistance as primarily related to the Cold War. Later, it did not support any increase in the level of aid but did advocate involving the business community”. During the first part of the 1990s (under the new leadership of Frits Bolkestein), however, attacks on the usefulness of the aid started to appear, hardening in more recent years. During the budget debate in 2003, the spokesperson of VVD called the Dutch development policy “a complete failure” (Hoebink 2009: 40, 43 [quotations]).
- 76.
The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), established in 2002, obtained 17% of the votes in the general election that year. As the second largest party, it became a coalition partner in the first Balkenende cabinet (CDA, VVD, LPF). By 2010, the LPF had faded away, but had been “replaced” by the PVV of Geert Wilders with a similar political platform. In the general election that year, the PVV emerged as the third largest party and constituted part of the parliamentary platform of the first Rutte cabinet (VVD, CDA).
- 77.
Jan Pronk served as Minister for Development Cooperation in 13 of these years (May 1973–December 1977; November 1989–August 1998 (except for a few months in 1994)). Then he served as Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment for almost four years (August 1998–July 2002).
- 78.
Dutch aid became increasingly provided as grants, and the loans were increasingly provided on soft conditions. In 1970, the grant element of total ODA was 85%, increasing to 94% in 1975 and 95% in 1981. The grant element of bilateral ODA commitments to the LLDCs increased from 62% in 1972 to 94% in 1975 and 98% in 1981. Into the new century, the grant element has been 100% (Stokke 1984: Tables 5, 7; Table A5—Appendices).
- 79.
The Dutch ODA budget consisted of loans on “soft” conditions and grants, of which the grant component was the largest. The loans were financed from resources raised for the aid programme on the Dutch capital market on commercial conditions, but provided to recipients on concessionary terms, especially regarding interest rates. The difference (subsidy) was accounted for as part of the 1.5% of the NNI budget (the non-ODA component).
- 80.
As a percentage of the development assistance budget, the interest subsidy increased from 1.2% in 1976 to reach 5.0% five years later and 9.2% in 1986. The political parties to the left generally opposed the arrangement (Cooper and van Themaat 1989: 123–126).
- 81.
- 82.
However, the close association was not without problems. The peer review “recommends that the ministry develop a clear statement of vision for the personnel policy of its development co-operation operations” (idem).
- 83.
The issue related, in the first place, to which budget line was to pay for what. Paul Hoebink observed that the Ministry of Defence, “confronted with Post-Cold War budget cuts, always seemed to hunt at the coffers full of money at the other side of the fence, in the development cooperation budget. It often got support, already […] in the beginning of the 1990s, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who also like to break through the fence. The reverification of Dutch foreign policy in 1995 in the first so-called ‘Purple Cabinet’ […] tried to debate the relation between the three policies in the new era. […] minister Van Ardenne declared her intention to get in the Development Assistance Committee [ OECD] a wider definition of [ODA ], including more aspects of peace keeping operations” (Hoebink 2007a: 18).
- 84.
- 85.
The Dutch government became a part of the operations in Afghanistan beyond its development assistance, participating with military personnel and equipment in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Uli Mans concluded a discussion of the complexity of the security-development nexus and the challenges posed in the operations in Afghanistan (and in so-called failed states more generally), that “full integration at all levels is at best wishful thinking. There are too many stakeholders with agendas too diverse to match” (Mans 2007: 75). For the objectives—and actual development effects—see the brief conclusions of an evaluation of the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan (supra, Chap. 6; infra, Chap. 10, note 18; NOU 2016: 8).
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Stokke, O. (2019). The Netherlands: Merchant and Clergyman. In: International Development Assistance. EADI Global Development Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06219-4_8
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