Abstract
Sweden started on the road towards its own 1% ODA target in the early 1960s. Pushed by political parties in the centre and to the left, the Social Democrat (SD) government met the international target of 0.7% in 1974, as the first OECD country to do so, and its own target a couple of years later. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the basic structures of Sweden’s aid and development policy were formed. Searching for policy drivers and constraints, this chapter narrates the political tensions and consensus-seeking efforts during these early years and into the present, involving Sweden’s foreign policy traditions and concerns, predominant societal values and trends in its post-WWII economy. The focus is on the balance between idealistic and vested interests.
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Notes
- 1.
Swedish (Christian ) missionaries had previously been active, particularly in Ethiopia; and civil and military experts had served in the Ethiopian administration and military service (Halldin Nordberg 1977). Carl Gösta Widstrand, for years the director of the Nordic Africa Institute, observed that “the Linnaean and other traditions notwithstanding, Swedish knowledge of the modern aspects of the developing world around 1960 was rather scant” (Widstrand 1986: 206–207). Lars Anell noted that before the mid-1960s, “there was no systematic research on development issues at Swedish universities outside the departments of social anthropology” (Anell 1986: 234).
- 2.
Prop. 100 1962: 20–24; quotations 20, 21. The 1% target “has […] its primary value as a general direction” (p. 21). The proposition emphasized that although Sweden was a rich country, in “the social welfare of Sweden, poverty still exists. It would be unfortunate if a conflict should develop between, on the one side, our will to assist the poor peoples and, on the other, our efforts to develop the social security and improve the economic conditions for the least well-off groups in our society” (p. 22). Quotations from Prop. 100 1962, here and later: English translation, this author.
- 3.
This did not happen by accident—conflicts on the amounts allocated to development assistance in the government propositions for 1966 and 1967 divided the governing Social Democrat Party—in 1966 even leading to the resignation of the minister for development cooperation.
- 4.
Prop. 101 1968: 1, 19–20, 95–96. The government presented a three-year plan for the budgetary years 1968/69–1970/71, specifying the distribution on the main (national and international) agencies in general terms. The 1962 proposition related the 1% target to GNP. The 1968 proposition, more precisely, related the target to GNP at market prices according to the Swedish definition, which was 7–8% higher than the UN definition. It defined ODA at a net basis, with amortizations, interest and other return payments deducted. Quotations from Prop. 101 1968, here and later: English translation, this author.
- 5.
In Parliament, opposition parties made several additional proposals. In 1966, the leaders of the Liberals and the Centre Party had asked for a plan to meet the target at a set date; the leader of the Communists at the latest by the end of the 1960s. For a detailed overview of the positions of the political parties in Parliament in 1968 and the following years, Stokke (1978): 21–24; 320–326 (endnotes 138–168).
- 6.
In previous centuries, Sweden had taken part in European wars—including the Napoleonic wars. After the collapse of the so-called Kalmar Union of 1397 that united the Nordic kingdoms under one throne (the Danish), regional wars were frequent, in the first place between Sweden and Denmark/Norway. As cast by Nils Andrén and Yngve Møller, “[b]oth from a Danish and a strictly legal point of view, the conflict with Sweden was considered a civil war against those rebelling against the Danish legal order. But the winner wrote the history; for Sweden, it was a war of national liberation” (Andrén and Möller 1990: 16; English translation, this author).
- 7.
The government issued a formal declaration of neutrality in 1834, when British-Russian relations became tense, and again before the Crimean War (1853–1856). When WWI started, Sweden immediately issued a declaration of neutrality, emphasized through an agreement with Norway that both countries should do their utmost to maintain neutrality. As Andrén and Möller (1990: 26) have commented, however, this was neutrality with different connotations: Norway, closely connected to Great Britain, appeared almost as a “neutral” member of the allied nations; while Sweden’s neutrality appeared more favourable towards Germany than to the Western powers. On 3 September 1939, when WWII started between Germany and France/Great Britain, Sweden again immediately declared its neutrality.
- 8.
Kaartvedt (1995: 363); Andrén and Möller (1990: 23). According to Nils Andrén and Yngve Möller, the end of the union between Sweden and Norway created new frameworks and conditions for Swedish foreign policy. “Norway was no longer a restraining, pacifying factor.” Russia wanted a permanently neutral Norway, and so did Sweden. However, Norway obtained a guarantee from the major powers, without a neutrality clause. The countries concerned entered into two treaties that recognized the new realities involving the Baltic region and the North Sea. The treaty system “did not impose restrictions on Sweden that reduced its foreign-policy freedom of action. This also meant that the emerging neutrality-policy tradition could be carried further” (Andrén and Möller 1990: 24–25; English translation, this author).
- 9.
Past practices include the support provided to Denmark, when it was in conflict with Germany over Schleswig-Holstein in 1848 and subsequent years. In more recent times, Sweden’s massive economic and material support to Finland, when the Soviet Union attacked that country in November 1939 (“the Winter War”), may illustrate the point. The support included military equipment. Sweden allowed volunteers to take part in the war. Under strong pressure from Nazi Germany , it gave a “green light” to transit of equipment and personnel when Norway was attacked and occupied in the spring of 1940. This too may illustrate the point. After WWII, when the East-West conflict was underway, Sweden offered its two neighbouring countries a joint Scandinavian defence cooperation agreement (Denmark and Norway abstained).
- 10.
When the Per Albin Hansson government (Social Democrat) decided (22 October 1945) to join the United Nations, this membership was considered as a breach with the neutrality policy because of the collective security clauses of the UN charter. Similar concerns were also voiced when Sweden joined the League of Nations.
- 11.
During the period 1952–1960, most of the multilateral development assistance was administered by the Swedish Institute for International Cultural Relations and by other, more specific, agencies relating, inter alia, with FAO , WHO and the IBRD. The CK consisted of some sixty representatives of NGOs and civil society institutions, business and trade unions, government and Parliament. Like the Swedish Institute, the CK was a semi-public body.
- 12.
A concentrated, vivid account of the CK is given by Sixten Heppling. The committee started as a membership organization. “Altogether, 45 organizations were invited to become members of CK. They were all in the nature of nation-wide NGOs and represented the major associations and popular movements in the country.” At the inaugural meeting in September 1952, Axel Gjöres, was unanimously elected chairman, “because of his firm roots in the Swedish cooperative movement, which exercises a mighty influence in Swedish society. His election confirmed the broad public involvement in development assistance that CK represented” (Heppling 1986: 17).
- 13.
The total expenditure of the CK during 1952–1961 amounted to slightly above USD4 million, spent on information and education activities, administration and development projects in Ethiopia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), mainly funded by the government. As noted by Heppling, field programmes needed thorough negotiations with the recipient government to reach a common understanding, which in turn needed a certainty of funding ahead of the negotiations. Obtaining such government funding was difficult, increasingly so after mid-1954, when Ulla Lindström was appointed special minister for development cooperation: “Her duties manifested the Government’s ultimate responsibility for what happened in a new, but important field of endeavour. Mrs. Lindström took the reins into her firm hands and exercised her authority to the full. […] This firm stance left little room for the kind of dialogue with the recipient countries in which CK was involved” (Heppling 1986: 19).
- 14.
Support for the UN was a goal with multilateral aid as an instrument—“multilateral aid coincides with Sweden’s foreign policy” (Prop. 100 1962: 19). Nils Andrén defined “strategic motives” in this context as “a strictly military and security oriented definition of the world strategy” and accordingly Sweden’s assistance to developing countries “essentially conditioned by general considerations of foreign policy” and “part of Swedish foreign policy”. Swedish development assistance “becomes significant also for its policy of non-alignment. Sweden’s assistance can contribute towards improved external conditions for this policy” (Andrén 1967: 152–153). In 1965, Ernst Michanek, the longstanding head of SIDA, argued that “in the longer term, the development assistance helps us all: if it is an insurance for peace, it is an expense that pays for itself ” (Michanek 1970b: 22; English translation, this author).
- 15.
According to the Palme report, on which the 1962 “bible” rested (annexed to Prop. 100 1962), the neutrality policy was not only given a passive definition (non-alignment in peace, aiming at maintaining neutrality in war). It was given an active definition as well: “already under peaceful conditions take care of our national interests, with strong consideration for international solidarity and, beyond that, to enable ourselves to contribute to a peaceful development in the world, inter alia, through contributions in the UN.” It considered it a Swedish interest to consolidate the image of Sweden “as a neutral and progressive country that is willing and able to provide support for peaceful cooperation between peoples”. Reference was made to the new states in Asia and Africa “that, in spite of their economic and military weakness, exert a growing political influence” (Prop. 100 1962: 131 [quotations]). Again, the aid policy stood out as a foreign policy instrument.
- 16.
- 17.
Prop. 100 1962: 7. According to the Palme report, Sweden had a basic foreign policy interest in an increased world trade under as liberal conditions as possible. “Production, employment, and living standards in Sweden depend on the opportunity for our foreign trade to develop in various ways. It is a legitimate and important interest in Swedish foreign policy to establish conditions for increased Swedish exports. We have also, for both economic and political reasons, an interest in keeping the exports of the developing countries to the industrial countries at as stable and high a level as possible”, referring to efforts within GATT, ECE, OECD and EFTA (p. 132).
- 18.
Several of its architects—members of the Palme committee, Olof Palme included—continued for years to carry responsibility for the policy and the way it was formed in practice. Thus, Ernst Michanek, then State Secretary (deputy minister) in the Ministry of Social Affairs, later became head of the aid agency (SIDA; director-general and chairman of the board) during the formative years (1965–1979). Lennart Klackenberg, representing the Ministry of Finance on the committee, later became state secretary for development cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 19.
Stokke (2009): 47–48; 199–205; 618–621 (notes 26–47).
- 20.
“Development in developing countries is increasingly considered a many-faceted process, encompassing economic, social, political and administrative changes, including both structural change and social and economic growth and distribution. The social, economic and political structure in developing countries is considered central among the causes of underdevelopment. […] improved education, health services and housing along with reduced unemployment—must be considered a precondition for and not only a result of long-term economic growth.” Sweden’s development cooperation was based on this conceptualization of reality (Prop. 1 1970, Bilaga 5: 12–14; English translation, this author).
- 21.
The NIB had a “dynamic” beginning—its three years of existence has been termed “the sprinkle can period” of Swedish aid. As described by Börje Ljunggren, starting from scratch, its policy tended to be to approve of all project requests deemed generally feasible, with no actual preceding project analysis. “Also, no analytical work on the country level was undertaken before getting involved in a new country. Inexperience—outside as well as inside the NIB—was to blame” (Ljunggren 1986: 67).
- 22.
In the analysis of Christian Andersson, this split reflected an ambivalence towards international solidarity within the government party—“between the historical international sensibility of the Party and its concern for the national electorate”. The current and potential Social Democratic voters with a labour class background (the background of Finance Minister Sträng)—“this was before the intellectuals and university graduates had taken over the Party leadership”—“may have had the feeling that there were still problems in the Swedish welfare state to be dealt with and that those in need were, first and foremost, his own electorate” (Andersson 1986: 32).
- 23.
Stokke (1978): 21–22, 321–323 (endnotes 144–146). In Parliament, Inga Thorsson—a Social Democrat heavyweight within this policy area—argued (2 February 1972) that in “a combination of enlightened self-interest and moral responsibility—and moral is and remains an important political driving force—the target will be fulfilled”.
- 24.
Although all the political parties agreed on the target and the stepped-up budgetary plan, the Conservatives were, at times, divided on the issue.
- 25.
The UN target (and Sweden’s commitment) was expressed in actual transfers (0.7% of GNP), unlike the Swedish budgetary target (1% of GNP in ODA).
- 26.
The amount proposed for the 1975/76 budget was calculated at 1% of GNP at market prices (Prop. 1 1975, Bilaga 5: 1, 37). This target related to the government budget, not to the actual payments, on which the international 0.7% target was based.
- 27.
This “should make it possible for Sweden to increase its contributions to various international development programmes and direct efforts through SIDA to recipient countries so that their real value by and large would be maintained. It would enable extended or new efforts in support of the poorest countries to be made and at the same time make needed amounts available for reconstruction in Indochina and such efforts for the people in South Africa that have now become possible or may be possible during the coming year” (SIDA 1975: 85–86; English translation, this author).
- 28.
Proposal 1975:730 by Gunnar Helén et al.; UU 1975:4 p. 110. Parliament turned the proposal down.
- 29.
As noted, the non-Socialist coalition government stated, in 1976, that the 1% target constituted only the first step. A few years later, however, it was more cautious, confronted with Sweden’s budgetary and current-account deficits (it kept ODA slightly above the target [1.024%] in the 1980/81–1982/83 budgets). Then the incoming Social Democratic government (with the support of the Conservatives) abandoned the 1% target, proposing 0.94% of GNP as budgetary target. The Communists, the Centre Party and the Liberals protested—as did the “aid constituency” and, in addition to the political parties identified, associates of the governing party, such as the Social Democratic Youth League, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women in Sweden, and the Swedish Association of Christian Social Democrats (Kärre and Svensson 1989: 238–239, 263).
- 30.
The attitudes of the followers of the various parties at a point in time when the Swedish economy was under pressure may deepen this picture. In 1980, public opinion polls on development assistance showed an overall positive score of 65% (present level or should be higher) and a negative score of 35% (should be reduced or terminated ) (Kärre and Svensson 1989: 295 [Tables 10 and 11]). The overview portrays a telling picture. Most telling is that the two most ardent pro-aid parties—the Christian Democrats and the Liberals—seem to have strong backing from their voters—54.7% of those voting for the Christian Democrats wanted ODA to be raised beyond the 1% target (47.5% even much higher!); for the Liberals, 42.4% higher. Equally interesting is the score for those voting for the Conservatives—42.1% wanted to reduce or terminate ODA (and 23.3% had no opinion). More than half of the respondents voting for the Social Democrats wanted to terminate or reduce the ODA or had no opinion. The response of the Communist voters—traditionally a strong pro-aid party—is more difficult to explain (23.4% wanted to terminate aid): my guess is that it reflected a disagreement with the increased commercialization of ODA by the non-Socialist government.
- 31.
The OECD Peer Review 2000 noted that the government’s cuts had resulted in a decline of total ODA disbursements from USD2 billion in 1992 (peaking at 1.03% of GNP) to USD1.7 billion in 1999 (0.7% of GNP) (OECD 2000).
- 32.
Increasing the ODA/GNI ratio towards the 1% level, the government again used the method of stepped-up budgetary allocations. In its 2003 white paper, the government (Social Democrat) stated that “the goal of allocating 1% of Sweden’s GNI for international development cooperation remains unchanged” (Gov. Bill 2002/03:122: 73).
- 33.
In 2015, ODA increased by 36.8% in real terms (USD). Sweden, became, by far, the largest provider of ODA within OECD in relative terms (ODA/GNI ratio) and the sixth largest in real terms. Sweden’s expenses for in-country refugees represented 17.6% of total net ODA (OECD 2016: 265).
- 34.
In 2016, the ODA/GNI ratio was 0.94% (preliminary data). In-country refugee costs represented 17.9% of total ODA (OECD 2017: 271). The ODA budget for 2017 amounted to SEK46.1 billion—0.99% of the calculated GNI, up from 0.98% in the 2016 budget. The allocations for in-country refugees made up SEK8.1 billion (17.6%) of the ODA budget for 2017 (18.8% in the 2016 budget) (SMFA 2016).
- 35.
See Løvbræk (1990) for an excellent overview and analysis of the achievements of the Group of Like-minded Countries—which were not always like-minded.
- 36.
A lively debate took place on the NIEO issues. As put by Ljunggren (1986: 75–76), ideas of this kind “were not only put forward by idealistic youth, extreme Leftists or spokesmen for Christian and another non-governmental organizations”. The 1977 parliamentary commission came up with follow-up proposals, which the government confirmed the following year. The government followed up also by establishing an inter-departmental committee, headed by the under-secretary general for development cooperation, to facilitate concrete results during the following years. However, to quote Ljunggren again, “the second oil crisis and global recession removed such visions from the agenda” (p. 76).
- 37.
Prop. 100 1975/76, Bilaga 5: 15–16. This prioritizing was expressed in quantitative terms—85% of the direct aid to countries should be directed to the poorest countries.
- 38.
In the public discourse as well as in the stated policy, broader issues—reflected in the demands for a NIEO—came high up on the agenda. During a visit to Latin America in 1975, Olof Palme, the prime minister, stated that the international power structure had to change to the benefit of developing countries, and freedom from oppression and hunger in these countries was more necessary than even détente. “A more just and secure world demands, therefore, structural changes and an acceptance of the need for a change in the power balance in favour of developing countries” (SIDA 1975: 22; English translation, this author).
- 39.
A statement of the aid objectives which reflected these underlying attitudes and values was incorporated in an Act of Parliament in 1978, “defined as the promotion of (1) economic growth, (2) economic and social equality, (3) economic and political independence and (4) the development of democracy in society” (quoted in Kärre and Svensson 1989: 231).
- 40.
- 41.
The DAC 2005 peer review stated, inter alia, that “Sweden has been a major source of influence on the growing consensus among DAC donors” (OECD 2005: 3). In its 2009 peer review, Sweden remained “a vanguard” in this field among DAC countries (OECD 2009: 2–3). The 2013 peer review noted that Sweden stayed in front within DAC in this field. However, it also noted that “the Swedish parliament and civil society organisations would like the government to be more transparent in how it deals with conflicts of interest and policy adjustments. It might be time for Sweden to renew its political commitment to PCD” (OECD 2013: 16 (quote), 26–31).
- 42.
Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 58. “The purpose of this formulation is to identify poor women, men, girls and boys as active subjects and agents of change, rather than as passive objects. […] The six subgoals that were previously adopted for development cooperation policy tended to overshadow the primary goal of poverty reduction. The effects of this were that poverty reduction in reality was not able to serve adequately as either the focus or the goal of development cooperation” (p. 59). In the summary of the bill, the government stated that the goal “is to contribute to equitable and sustainable development […] this goal should apply to all policy areas. Trade, agriculture, environment, security, migration and economic policy” (p. 1).
- 43.
“Development cooperation will be based on a rights perspective and on the perspectives of poor people. This means that people’s rights will be the starting-point for activities and that the main focus will be on poor people’s needs, interests, capacity and conditions” (Ibid, p. 60).
- 44.
In 2005, a DAC peer review identified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a driving force for the wide geographical disbursement of bilateral ODA: it “is interested in maintaining Swedish presence abroad, prefers to spread ODA resources across many countries, but is receptive to limiting the numbers of sectors of involvement” (OECD 2005: 2).
- 45.
- 46.
Summarized in the DAC 2013 peer review, “Sweden’s Policy for Global Development continues to provide a strong foundation of its development co-operation system. Sweden has maintained its focus on poverty reduction and its three thematic priorities identified in 2007: (1) democracy and human rights; (2) environment and climate change; and (3) gender equality and the role of women in development” (OECD 2013: 37).
- 47.
The peer review noted that according to Sweden’s own statistical classification, the share of the three priority areas received 28% of its aid in 2011. Referring to the OECD classification, however, the data suggested “that two of these thematic and cross-cutting issues, gender and environment, are central to its aid investments. In 2011, 78% of Sweden’s bilateral commitments had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective […] significant amounts were allocated to climate change, desertification and biodiversity in 2010 and 2011” (OECD 2013: 57, 61).
- 48.
Several additional priorities—each with their own policies and strategic documents—contributed to layers of complexity. Until a clearer policy vision and result-oriented strategies are in place, “there will be uncertainty about Sweden’s future direction, with consequences for its partnerships and programmes” (OECD 2013: 37). The peer review referred (idem) to an even sharper statement by the Swedish Agency for Public Management: the overarching problem was that Sweden’s aid steering documents “collectively form a highly complex management system without any clear hierarchy of aims which rank them in terms of priority. Accordingly, it is difficult to discern the Government’s will and ambitions in its development co-operation” (Statskontoret 2011: 25).
- 49.
According to the government, the point of departure for the distribution was 35% multilateral aid and 65% bilateral aid (SMFA 2013). According to the DAC 2013 peer review, the multilateral component had been maintained on average at 35% since 2007 (DAC average 27%). Sweden had used its multilateral channels with increasing effectiveness, with a more focused and strategic approach and the use of performance assessments. The non-core (multi-bi) assistance had increased—assistance attuned to Swedish priorities (OECD 2013: 59–60).
- 50.
It soon became evident that the benefits of the largest SIDA project in that country—the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit—would go to the landlords, and that the small tenants would be evicted. This raised a storm in Sweden. Gus Edgren noted that, as a result, “SIDA probably came close to a world record in project conditionality by requesting the Ethiopian Government to undertake a nation-wide land reform as a condition of continuing Swedish aid for the project”. He added that the land reform came about after many years, “not so much because of the SIDA pressure as because a revolution took place” (Edgren 1984a: 154).
- 51.
The government and Parliament established these principles in 1970 (Prop. 1 1970, Bilaga 5: 17; SU 84 1970: 21–13). During this process, it was clarified that these norms should apply to the selection of new programme countries (not imply a discontinuation of aid to established programme countries), and that the goals set for Swedish aid could be achieved in countries with different political and social systems.
- 52.
This guideline, mainly related to the so-called programme countries (“priority countries”) for bilateral development cooperation, repeatedly confirmed, although shifts took place in this group of countries over the years. Several other guidelines did the same. Thus, as summed up in the government’s white paper in 2003, long-term development cooperation “will be based on close partnerships under the primary responsibility and leadership of the developing country. Cooperation must be based on national needs, priorities and development strategies. Sustainable results cannot be achieved without strong national responsibility. Effective partnerships must be based on respect, trust, openness and a long-term approach, as well as on a common foundation of values” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 62).
- 53.
Inter alia, Torsten Nilsson, the minister of foreign affairs (Nilsson 1969: 141–142) and Ernst Michanek, the head of SIDA (Michanek 1970a). Nevertheless, in 1970, all political parties agreed on the 1970 government proposition, although the Conservatives were hesitant from the very beginning. Cuba became priority country/programme country for Swedish development cooperation in 1971. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam—recognized by Sweden at the beginning of 1969, before the war was over—was included as a priority country in 1972, but received more than 8% of Sweden’s total bilateral aid in the period 1967–1976—being the third largest recipient during these ten years (Stokke 1978: 128).
- 54.
The lively discourse on these issues during the late 1960s and into the 1970s—in Parliament and in a rich flowering of academic and political publications as well as in the press—is presented and summarized in Stokke (1978: 58–108). According to Marian Radetzki, the selection of recipient countries in the 1960s “did not reflect any political evaluation, nor was it a result of thorough economic analysis. In general, the choice fell on the countries which had up to then been the main beneficiaries of Sweden’s bilateral programs” (Radetzki 1972, vol. 2: 143).
- 55.
Andersson et al. (1984a: 11).
- 56.
By 1990/91, Sweden distributed its bilateral ODA to 77 countries. Five years later, the number had increased to 114 (Danielson and Wohlgemuth 2005: Table 15.5).
- 57.
According to Gus Edgren, the country-programming approach of the early 1970s “was met with a rousing welcome in Sweden, as well as in other like-minded countries (e.g. Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands). The idea of establishing a more egalitarian aid relationship was supported by those political and NGO groups which [in Sweden] had successfully lobbied for an expanded aid programme” (Edgren 1986: 49).
- 58.
Bertil Odén gives an excellent presentation of the stated motivation for the principle of recipient orientation of development cooperation and the way it was implemented during the first part of the 1970s (country programming with a three-year planning horizon, with indicative figures for the two last years). He identifies a core weakness when it came to the implementation, namely the imbalance between the planning and implementation capacities of two parties at that point in time (Odén 1976).
- 59.
- 60.
- 61.
In the 2003 white paper, the government emphasized that humanitarian operations “cannot be subordinated to the political priorities of recipient countries or other actors. Instead, they are based on international humanitarian law and basic humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Such operations must be geared entirely to the needs of the victims” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 64).
- 62.
The 1996 DAC peer review noted that Sweden provided “by far the largest share of its ODA disbursements for this purpose (over 18 per cent compared with the DAC average of 6 per cent)”. Furthermore, “the disasters to which Sweden has been directing its resources are increasingly long-term, complex cases […] and not so much the classic short-term natural disaster. […] As more efforts are devoted to disaster relief, less resources are available for traditional development cooperation. Disaster relief is visible and popular. But, it is costly and cannot be equated with long-term sustainable development” (OECD 1996b: 5). Again in 2005, another DAC peer review noted that many of Sida’s partner countries were in difficult situations of transition or armed conflict, which had stimulated the government to focus more on the relationship between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. “It has introduced a humanitarian policy which confirms previous practice, while strengthening compliance with principles and practices of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). This approach to policy could serve as a model for other donors” (OECD 2005: 5).
- 63.
Tanzania—for years the main recipient of Swedish and Nordic development assistance—was the case in point. The government refused to accept the structural adjustment conditions set by the IMF, and hoped for political support and assistance from its longstanding Nordic partners. As laconically put by Gus Edgren, state secretary (deputy minister) for Development Cooperation (1982–1985), “[T]he Nordic donors declared that they would continue to provide assistance at the same level as before even if the Government did not manage to reach an agreement with the IMF. If Tanzania wanted to attract additional resources from other sources, however, the Nordic countries saw no other way out than a settlement with the IMF. Some politicians in Tanzania have seen this move as selling an old friend up the river, leaving him to the mercy of the IMF. Perhaps such an interpretation says more about the type of aid relationship which existed in the 1970s than it does [about] the attitude of Nordic aid agencies towards the IMF’s prescriptions for restructuring Tanzania’s economy” (Edgren 1986: 56).
- 64.
A statement by the Industrial Aid Commission in 1972, repeated by the Parliamentary Commission five years later (SOU 1972: 90; 1977: 13), may illustrate the point: “[T]here is a need to make a clear distinction between aid and commercially motivated transactions […]. Private investments in developing countries are—as is trade with these countries—primarily a commercial matter […] with the primary objective of achieving a profit. Aid, in contrast, aims only at supporting the recipient countries’ economic and social development” (quoted in Jacoby 1986: 87).
- 65.
Almost from the beginning, Sweden opted for untied aid in international organizations. Into the new century, the government reiterated its desire for further untying of aid (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 70).
- 66.
Sweden’s ranking (untied aid) was as follows: 1975 (3), 1980 (2), 1985 (4), 1990 (1), 1995 (2), 2000 (10), 2005 (4). These rankings may be indicative. However, what is included (and excluded) as “tied”, “partially tied”, “partially untied” and “untied aid” in these OECD statistics varies, with implications for the ranking. Sweden’s aid-tying during the formative years was, nevertheless, modest compared with that of other DAC countries. According to DAC calculations, Sweden tied 13% of ODA in 1973 (estimate), 21% in 1975, 12% in 1978 and 14% in 1981, whereas the DAC average varied between 55% and 34% during these years, with a downward trend (Stokke 1984: Table 4).
- 67.
Gösta Edgren observed that informal tying had taken place before 1972, “insofar as projects were often chosen in sectors where Swedish exports were competitive (telecommunications, water supply, hydroelectric power). In India, import credits were to some extent set aside for the use of subsidiaries of Swedish companies. Some commodity grants of mainly Swedish origin (paper, trawlers, buses and fertilizers) were extended in a separate programme even before the formal tying was introduced” (Edgren 1986: 59).
- 68.
The discussion on the proposal to increase tied aid—first to 8%, then to 14% of the total aid budget—did not arise out of moral indignations alone, Ruth Jacoby noted. “In several scientifically thorough essays and articles the effects of aid tying on Sweden’s balance of payments and employment were time and again shown to be marginal, and the long-term effects on the Swedish economy negligible, if not negative, whereas the development costs for the recipient countries could well be substantial. Thus, the studies concluded, the decision on tying was an ill-considered reaction of political panic” (Jacoby 1986: 88–89).
- 69.
For extracts from the debate on tied aid in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see Stokke (1978: 322).
- 70.
The 1977 review of Swedish development cooperation noted that Swedish procurement-tying had increased tremendously during the 1970s “due to the wish to strengthen the balance of payments and to promote employment in Sweden. We find that these judgements […] must still be emphasized, as long as an international agreement on untying is not reached” (SOU 1977: 13: 47; English translation, this author).
- 71.
Edgren assessed the percentage to be about 15% of total Swedish ODA during these years; Jacoby assessed it to be “at a level of between 15–20 per cent” of the budget.
- 72.
As Ruth Jacoby put it, “the purity of aid was safeguarded and national interest preserved. Sweden did become a member of the IDB, but the official motive was commercial, not developmental” (Jacoby 1986: 91).
- 73.
Jellinek et al. (1984: 386ff).
- 74.
Commercial export credits got a grant element (from the ODA budget) of 15%, increasing to 25%. Since ODA was involved, the projects had to be assessed for their development effects and for being in line with Swedish development policy. The borrowing government had also to be scrutinized to avoid excessive risks. Although the prime motive for introducing this mechanism clearly was to boost exports, development justifications were also put forward. In most countries, scrutiny of the development effects of these credits was a formality—if it occurred at all. In the Swedish setting, there was a need to combine the justifications. The government established a new institution—separated from SIDA (and from the existing export-credit financing system)—to administer the mechanism, the Agency for International Technical and Economic Cooperation (BITS). The mechanism became slightly circumscribed—the countries eligible were, in addition to the priority countries, countries pursuing a development policy that corresponded with the objectives set for Swedish aid and countries involved in so-called broader cooperation with Sweden.
- 75.
Gus Edgren observed that “[i]n spite of the fact that world trade recovered and Swedish export industry enjoyed a boom as a result of a major devaluation in 1982, export interest continued to press for an expansion of the concessionary credit programme. […] allocations to the programme were added up to more than 5 per cent of the aid budget as a whole, despite a very slow rate of disbursements during the initial years. [The programme] represents a hardening of terms of Swedish concessionary flows as a whole and a shift away from poor towards middle-income countries” (Edgren 1986: 60–61).
- 76.
Ruth Jacoby observed that the “consensus on purity of aid motives showed a strength and resilience in public opinion which may have surprised many, not least politicians and decision makers”. In the light of the strong public reactions, the government modified the scheme (Jacoby 1986: 96–97).
- 77.
As cast by Ruth Jacoby, SWEDFUND “was never permitted to develop into the aggressive promotor of Swedish private investment in the Third World which industrialists had hoped for and many early critics feared. Instead, being continuously guided by the objectives of aid, SWEDFUND had to operate primarily in very poor countries, in small and medium-sized ventures, and only in projects considered to have a favourable development impact” (Ibid: 95).
- 78.
Quoting Gus Edgren again: “Informal tying is sometimes practiced [in the early 1980s] when project specifications are suited to Swedish supply, and open competitive bidding is becoming less common than in the early years. SIDA’s budget for ‘special projects’ outside country programmes, originally used for promoting certain popular projects through UN agencies, is now being deliberately directed towards developing Swedish technology and a national technical resource base for the country programmes.” The use of ODA to settle old commercial credits that had fallen into arrears added to this picture—dubious according to DAC rules and amounting to 5% of the total aid budget for 1985/86 (Edgren 1986: 61).
- 79.
According to Ruth Jacoby: “Business and industrial circles adopted the term with enthusiasm, as did labour market organisations. Now there was official sanction for proving the efficiency of Swedish industry, expertise and know-how at the service of development. Better utilization of the Swedish ‘resource base’ became the new catchword” (Jacoby 1986: 90). She added that the actual implications on Swedish aid practice were by no means insignificant. “The risk of bias towards capital-intensive, Swedish ‘expertise-heavy’ investments increased. The goal of reaching the poorest population groups in rural areas was difficult to achieve …” (idem).
- 80.
Studies of the return flow showed that approximately 40% of Swedish bilateral aid resulted in procurements in Sweden by the mid-1970s. By 1982–1983, the share had increased to between 44% and 52% (Jacoby 1986: 90). Bo Kärre and Bengt Svensson observed that by the mid-1980s, “almost 50 per cent of Swedish bilateral ODA is used for purchases of goods and services in Sweden, while only about 20 per cent of bilateral aid is formally tied to such purchases” (Kärre and Svensson 1989: 245), referring to SIDA sources. They concluded with an understatement: “As regards the Swedish attitude in this respect, it seems likely that a recipient who wishes to use Swedish funds for purchases outside Sweden, in cases in which Swedish industry is normally competitive and interested, must have rather strong arguments for doing so” (p. 269).
- 81.
“Favourable development in developing countries benefits not only these countries and regions but also enterprises in Sweden […] the interests of global development policy and industrial policy coincide” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 52).
- 82.
“Swedish business possesses knowledge and experience, both in policy matters and practical implementation, that could be an asset to Sweden’s development cooperation. […] Nowadays, many Swedish enterprises are among the world leaders in the field of environmental policy, corporate social responsibility and non-corrupt business relations. The Swedish trade union movement’s experience in these areas should benefit the developing countries” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 75–76, 52). The DAC 2013 peer review acclaimed the Swedish private sector policy (OECD 2013: 31–32).
- 83.
Odén (2009: 29–30).
- 84.
“The coherence discussion has almost entirely been linked to the possibility to use the aid budget to fund activities within the responsibility area of other ministries or authorities. The issue of development perspectives influencing activities belonging to the normal international cooperation of these ministries or authorities has been less evident, so far” (Odén 2009: 31). DAC peer reviews pointed in the same direction (OECD 2005: 3; 2013: 16, 26–31).
- 85.
The editors of an anthology appearing in 1984 sum up the essence: “To add yet another demand to the aid authorities […]—namely to favour Sweden—is deemed to reduce the effect of the aid for those it is meant for. […] We are approaching the type of pressure that we dislike when coming from big powers or powerful transnational companies. […] It is doubtful to what high extent Sweden benefits from increased export facilitated by aid. Naturally, most of the production might be sold anyway. For this reason, it will not at all generate so many jobs [in Sweden] as sometimes maintained in the debate. […] We believe that the decisive motive for development assistance is solidarity. […] If the development assistance is mixed with all kinds of transactions driven by self-interests, the willingness to provide development assistance will be undermined in the longer term” (Andersson et al. 1984b: 221; English translation, this author).
- 86.
For an overview of the Swedish discourse on the goal in the late 1960s and the first part of the 1970s, when Sweden selected the programme countries for its bilateral aid, see Stokke (1978): 308–309, notes 56–60.
- 87.
Thord Palmlund observed: “The first line of defence for the programme of cooperation has been to insist that it should not be used to pressure the recipient government on issues unrelated to the development programme. Development cooperation has to be seen in a long-term perspective as aid to people, not to any given regime.” Palmlund added, however, that several departures from that line of action had occurred. He noted a certain difference between the political parties on this account: “Particularly the Conservative Party, at least when in opposition, questions the immunity of the aid programme” (Palmlund 1986: 122–124).
- 88.
See Sellström (1999) for an extensive description and analysis of this assistance.
- 89.
“The policy should be based on the view that all human beings are equal in dignity and rights, on Sweden’s solidarity with the poor and vulnerable people in other countries and recognition of our shared responsibility for the future of the world.” This rationale “reflects the basic values in accordance with which Swedish society has evolved […]. Solidarity is reinforced by the realization that security, equality and sustainable development are not an exclusive concern. Nowadays, the world’s countries are interconnected as never before” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 18–19, 59–60).
- 90.
Ibid: 19. The pursuit of equitable and sustainable development “must be based on a rights perspective on development. This means that poor people are not regarded as recipients of aid, but as individuals and actors with the power, capacity and the will to create development” (p. 20).
- 91.
Ibid: 26, 49–51. “Special attention should be paid to the links between the environment, poverty and the conditions for women, since women are more direct dependent on the natural resource base and are often excluded from the money economy. […] A gender equality perspective enhances both environmental and poverty reduction measures” (p. 51).
- 92.
Bertil Odén noted that together with the other industrialised countries, Sweden contributed more per capita to the climate changes than poorer countries. “This is an issue of moral hazard. The communication [Gov. Com. 2007/08: 89] does not discuss measures to reduce the Swedish carbon dioxide emissions, etc. It focuses on how Sweden may assist the countries in the South to adjust and convince them that they should not follow our developmental steps” (Odén 2009: 28).
- 93.
In 2007, the government established the International Commission on Climate Change and Development in the preparations for its upcoming presidency of the European Union. However, that year the allocation to this policy field made up only 3% of the ODA budget, although DAC statistics found over half of Sweden’s aid partially targeted to environmental sustainability. The DAC 2009 peer review noted that “Sweden faces some challenges in mainstreaming environmental issues”. The review was generous with recommendations (OECD 2009: 8–9).
- 94.
Sixten Heppling describes the emphasis given to public information and education during the early years (Heppling 1986: 24–25). In 1968, the government allocated twice the amount asked for by SIDA for this purpose. Parliament’s budget committee agreed: “Intensified information should create more favourable conditions for expert recruitment as well as greater understanding and larger involvement in government aid activities among the Swedish public as a whole” (quoted in Andersson 1986: 34). The budgets increased steadily towards the mid-1980s. “No other regular budget item has used anything like these amounts to popularize its activities among the taxpayers. No other political message of this scale has had such unanimous backing from all political parties” (idem). This emphasis continued into the new century. In 2003, the government stated that external information and communications activities “should be strengthened in order to disseminate knowledge and stimulate debate on global development” (Gov. Bill 2002/03: 122: 79).
- 95.
The overall SIDA budget for information and educational purposes increased from SEK78 million in the 1993–1994 budget to SEK130 million in 1999, peaking at SEK137 million in 1998. The share channelled through NGOs for their activities amounted to 77% in the 1993/94 budget, but dropped to 58% in the 1999 budget (calculations based on Donnell 2003: 206 [Table 1]). Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden were frontrunners not only in the provision of ODA (the ODA/GNP ratio)—they were also the frontrunners, relative to their GNI, in funding information and education on development. In 2001, Sweden ranked fourth on this account with USD1.66 per capita—as compared with USD0.003 for the US (Donnell et al. 2003: 24, Fig. 4).
- 96.
Kärre and Svensson (1989: Table 10).
- 97.
The 1993 polls showed that 61% agreed to the cut in the aid budget. Nevertheless, Bengt Liljenroth argued, “even under the deepest low-conjunctures, less than half of the [Swedish] population wishes the development assistance to be reduced or totally abolished. And those wanting to abolish all development assistance have never amounted to even a tenth of all Swedes”. The willingness to provide development assistance was based on “fundamental values that are strong in Swedish society—for instance that one should help others who are less fortunate than oneself” (Liljenroth 1994: 189–190; English translation, this author).
- 98.
The authors also identified variations within the population—some of which confirmed well-established patterns. Women, younger people, highly educated and high-income respondents were more in favour of development assistance than men, older people, those with less education and low incomes (Ibid: 602–606).
- 99.
Radetzki added, however, that this “obviously did not mean to say that the Swedish goals remain undistorted by the indirect influence exerted by diverse powerful pressure groups outside the government in the country”. The policy had been “strongly influenced by the missionary notion that Sweden’s solutions of social or institutional problems possess some kind of superiority, and that therefore it is particularly valuable to give them a wide international spread” (Ibid: 45).
- 100.
Already in the early years, Sweden nurtured a culture (unlike most other countries, including its Nordic neighbours) where officials in the aid administration (SIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) took an active part, often with critical views, in the public discourse on the aid and development policy. They were encouraged to do so (see, i.a., the foreword by Ernst Michanek, director-general of SIDA (Michanek 1969: 5–6)). Several of the authors referred to above were part of the “system”. Thus, in the late 1940s, Gunnar Myrdal served as minister of commerce in a Social Democratic government; the troika (Ekéus , Ringborg and Svensson), were active in forming the government’s aid policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as was Gösta (Gus) Edgren, who later served as state-secretary for development cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1982–1985).
- 101.
Jellinek and colleagues identified the following major preconditions for these changes: the economic slow-down in production and investment, resulting from the economic crisis in Sweden, and balance-of payments deficits; the change of government; increased pressure from the Third World “for a more equitable distribution of the global resources, the North-South dialogue and the idea of global interdependence”; and “increased pressure from the Swedish industry for the use of development aid to support Swedish exports” (Ibid: 391).
- 102.
From 1972, Ruth Jacoby served in various positions in the Department for International Development Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She served as the Swedish representative on the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee from 1980 to 1984.
- 103.
With an increasing aid volume, “great care was devoted to refining the formulations of motives and goals for the effort. To the moral and humanitarian ideal of helping people in need was added the recognition that economic development per se is a prerequisite for peace, stability and freedom in the world—longstanding aims of Swedish foreign policy—and the international solidarity claimed a more equitable distribution of wealth between nations. Solidarity and equity, for decades central values in the ideology of Sweden’s ruling Social Democratic Party, could tangibly be applied to the international level through aid” (Jacoby 1986: 86–87).
- 104.
Palmlund joined the NIB from the start in 1962, and moved on to SIDA. During the 1970s, he served in the MFA, in 1978–1979 as undersecretary of state for international development cooperation.
- 105.
“At the UN, Sweden has voted against colonialism and imperialism; it has been an important task for Swedish aid to strengthen the political and economic independence of new nations—in relations to the former colonial powers, to the superpowers and to such regional powers as South Africa that seek to increase their economic and military superiority at the expense of weak neighbours. Growing out of our UN policy as the aid programme did, the goal of supporting national independence was present from the beginning, but mainly a general motive. […] Defence and promotion of democracy and human rights are basic goals for Sweden’s foreign policy which also have inspired the aid programme. Promotion of a democratic development has been established as one of the tasks of Swedish development cooperation” (Palmlund 1986: 110–111).
- 106.
The points identified warrant interest in our context. It had “strengthened our UN-policy and given us a platform for more active participation in the world body”; “supported our policy of non-alignment and over the years contributed to a more radical reading of it, thus, in the eyes of many, increasing its credibility”; “given substance to our stress on a community of interests among non-aligned states, which, on the margin, is part of our security policy”; “contributed to cooperation between the Nordic states and strengthened the international image of close Nordic cooperation”; and “given substance to essential foreign policy objectives with regard to support of national independence and the promotion of democracy and human rights. In concrete situations (Vietnam, South Africa, Chile, i.a.) it has been an important way of expressing solidarity and encouraging the struggle for national independence and human rights” and “commanded greater attention to the Third World and questions of human rights in our foreign policy” (Ibid: 124–125).
- 107.
- 108.
“In order to emphasize that poverty reduction is the main objective of development cooperation, the Government considered a single poverty-oriented goal to be a more effective policy instrument than the previous division into several sub-goals that were assumed to jointly promote poverty reduction ” (Ehrenpreis 2009: 42). In the process leading to the government’s white paper, the aid agency (SIDA) put empowerment up front. “[A] key objective in development work is to enhance the freedom of choice of poor women and men by supporting their empowerment.” SIDA pointed out that “the analysis of poverty is crucial for planning, programming, budget decisions, public debate—and for the design of an intervention. Causes and expressions of poverty often differ between men and women, age categories, ethnic groups and other categories of people”. The aid agency followed up, in 2005 and 2006, with policy documents and a model for poverty analysis at the country level (Ibid: 41–43).
- 109.
Assessments by OECD peer reviews may illustrate the point. “Sweden is seen in the developing world as a committed partner. This reputation has permitted it to play a role well beyond the ODA volumes that it can provide” (OECD 2005: 1). “Sweden is providing crucial leadership within the international donor community” (OECD 2009: 1). “With development at the heart of its foreign policy, Sweden engages strategically on global issues and contributes through high-level political leadership to freedom, peace, security and development. […] Sweden’s willingness to take the lead in addressing global development challenges is commendable” (OECD 2013: 16 [quote], 26). The peer reviews have, as noted, offered constructive criticism and advice as well—expecting improvements!
- 110.
The Liberals increased their share of the vote from 14.3% in 1968 to 16.25% in 1970. In the 1985 general election, the Liberals again placed development assistance as a top priority, and again it increased its vote, this time from 5.9% to 14.2%. This time, too, a newcomer—the Christian Democrats—followed suit, obtaining 3.6% of the vote in the first election it took part in. In the analysis of Bo Kärre and Bengt Svensson, the importance given to development assistance by the Liberal Party was “its close connection with religious and other idealistic associations. When the Party was founded in 1934, one of its constituents had strong affiliations with the Free Churches. The positive attitude of the Christian Democrats may also be explained in the same way ” (Kärre and Svensson 1989: 63).
- 111.
In 1996, a DAC peer review concluded: “In sum, it would appear that the solidarity with third world socialism that characterised Sweden’s policies in the 1970s and 1980s is now being adapted to the major changes in developing countries and in the dynamics of the world economy in the 1990s. On both the development policy front and the political front, Sweden is now part of a solid mainstream in the donor community in which ‘likeminded’ countries and the other donors are joined” (OECD 1996b: 4). The trend towards the mainstream policy, away from “the Swedish model”, had been detected (and criticized) already a decade earlier (i.a., Odén 1984: 26; Kärre and Svensson 1989: 243).
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Stokke, O. (2019). Sweden: Combining Domestic Values with Neutralism. In: International Development Assistance. EADI Global Development Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06219-4_7
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