Abstract
This essay represents an attempt to bring prostitutes’ and clients’ voices into the philosophical discourse about prostitution. We wish to add the voices of individual prostitutes and clients in order to expand the contemporary philosophical understanding of prostitution as a complex and problematic ethical concern. The first section of this essay explains the concepts of subjectivity, sexuality, and violence that underpin our analysis of prostitution. The second section scrutinizes the prostitute’s and client’s motivating goals and the means they use to accomplish them. The third, and final, section presents a phenomenological description of prostituted sex from the prostitute’s and client’s respective viewpoints.
Reprinted material from Clelia Smyth Anderson & Yolanda Estes: “The Myth of the Happy Hooker: Kantian Moral Reflection on a Phenomenology of Prostitution,” in Violence Against Women: Philosophical Perspectives. Stanley G. French, Wanda Teays, and Laura M. Purdy, eds. Copyright © 1998 by Cornell University. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
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- 1.
We do not discuss the present legal status of prostitution, since the problematic aspects of prostitution do not depend on its criminality. In fact, strong argument could be offered in defense of decriminalizing prostitution, but we do not offer it here. If prostitution were decriminalized, then at least some threats to the lives and health of prostitutes might be mitigated: they might have legal recourse when they became victims of coercion, theft, and assault.
On the origins of prostitution and the need for a theory of prostitution see Jaggar (1980: 348–68). For a comparison of prostitution in different societies see Shrage (1994). For a discussion on the role of prostitution and marriage in patriarchal, capitalist society see Pateman (1988). For a discussion of the need for prostitutes to assume a subject position in philosophical discourse on prostitution see Bell (1994).
- 2.
In the original version of this essay, we did not reveal that this account was heavily informed by Yolanda Estes’s experience as a prostitute and her personal relations with other sex workers.
- 3.
Although not an empirical investigation, this essay depends on empirical observation. It is informed by the art, literature, and self-descriptions of prostitutes. In order to protect the privacy of these women, specific details of these conversations and the identities of the women themselves will remain confidential. We hope to convey a sense of the pain and struggle that traditional modes of empirical investigation often fail to capture.
- 4.
Our moral reflections are “Kantian” insofar as we presuppose basic Kantian notions of human dignity and morality, as well as particular views about freedom, recognition, subjectivity, and objectification that are rooted in German Idealism. Although we assume a Kantian approach to morality, we do not mean to imply that this essay represents Kant’s account of women, sexuality, or prostitution.
- 5.
The phenomenological portion of this paper should not be confused with a phenomenology in the traditional Husserlian sense. “Phenomenology” in this context refers to a descriptive account of an individual’s, or individuals’, experience rather than a generalized account of experience. Such an account is perspectival by definition.
- 6.
Potential forms of prostitution falling under this definition include kissing booths, pornography, some marriage relationships, some dating relationships, many labor relationships, and so on. We do not argue that these diverse activities constitute prostitution.
- 7.
Many feminists, for instance Alison Jaggar, Catharine MacKinnon, Carole Pateman, and Sarah Wynter, argue that prostitution exists solely in a context of sexual oppression and misogyny. Jaggar suggests that even male prostitution reflects the fundamental misogynist character of society, that male prostitutes are feminized to the extent that they are prostituted. We agree that prostitution involves misogynist, sexist elements and serves as an instrument of domination, but we would maintain that it reflects a larger problem of oppression of which sexism and misogyny represent a subset.
- 8.
Kant’s “Principle of Humanity,” a formulation of the Categorical Imperative, states: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1964: 96). Actions should not merely consider humanity as an end in itself but should promote this end. To be sure, promoting the moral perfection of oneself and others is a “meritorious” rather than a “strict” duty, but it is not for that reason “optional” (ibid.: 96–97).
- 9.
This concept of human subjectivity originates with Kant and is perpetuated throughout German Idealism. Fichte begins with Kant’s notion of an intelligible subject or “transcendental I” and argues that it appears in consciousness through the empirically determined, limited, embodied individual members of a social whole. According to both the Kantian and Fichtean theories of morality, rational beings such as ourselves possess dignity because they are “ends in themselves.”
- 10.
In expanding on the views of Hegel, Freud, Sartre, and de Beauvoir, feminists such as Judith Butler, Iris M. Young, and Sandra Bartky have greatly enriched our understanding of the integral relationship between subjectivity and sexuality.
- 11.
If Linda Lemoncheck’s clarifying variety of observations in “What’s Wrong with Being a Sex Object?” indicate the diversity of public opinion, then “objectification” has been defined in many different ways; the apparent diversity of opinion on this topic may be an indication of miscommunication rather than disparate values (Lemoncheck 1994: 199–205). Sandra Bartky clearly states what we mean by objectification in a sexual context: “A person is sexually objectified when her sexual parts or sexual functions are separated out from the rest of her personality and reduced to the status of mere instruments or else regarded as if they were capable of representing her. On this definition then the prostitute would be a victim of sexual objectification, as would the Playboy bunny, the female breeder, and the bathing beauty” (1990: 26).
- 12.
It should be self-explanatory that we violate a person’s freedom when we involve them in activities without their obvious agreement. For this reason, consent is a necessary condition of sexual relations according to the implications of most classical moral theories. To assume that consent is a sufficient condition for morally acceptable sexual relations, however, seems a reckless moral attitude.
- 13.
We suffer when we must engage in undesired activities, and we suffer when our desires are ignored or unfulfilled. Most moral theories, including the Kantian, admit that we are allowed to act according to some desires and that we ought to take others’ desires into consideration as well.
- 14.
In this context, “concern” does not mean a type of emotional sympathy, but simply a moral regard for the integrity of others’ interests, which include their needs, desires, and projects as well as their moral well-being.
- 15.
Many sexual abusers attempt to justify their actions by claiming that their victims “really” wanted, needed, or enjoyed the sexual encounter. Some claim to feel genuine concern and affection for their victims, which reveals that even the abuser recognizes the significance of concern and desire within sexual relations.
- 16.
An article in Playboy concurs with this analysis. In “The Rules of the Game,” James R. Peterson cites Al Goldstein’s explanation of why men seek the services of prostitutes:
Of all the commentators, Screw publisher Al Goldstein was most honest, reporting a story about the night he spent $1000 on an escort. “It was splendid, rollicking sex. When it was over I felt like willing my body to science. And then she left. She left. As the supreme final act in our opera of fucking, her leaving was like a cherry on a sundae, a sumptuous dessert after a seven course meal, a plunge into cool water after running a marathon. That’s when I had my glistening realization. I realized I wasn’t paying this woman for sex. I was paying her for the luxury of her leaving after sex”. (Peterson 1995: 52)
- 17.
The issue is that their fiduciary agreement is intended to excuse him from any obligation. If in fact he assumes some responsibility, it is viewed as an act of generosity rather than as a duty.
References
Kant, Immanuel. 1964. Groundwork on the metaphysics of morals. Scranton: HarperCollins.
Lemoncheck, Linda. 1994. What’s wrong with being a sex object? In Living with contradictions: Controversies in feminist social ethics, ed. Alison M. Jaggar. Boulder: Westview.
Mill, John Stuart. 1970. The subjection of women. In Essays on sex equality, ed. A.S. Rossi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pateman, Carole. 1994. What’s wrong with prostitution? In Living with contradictions: Controversies in feminist social ethics, ed. Alison M. Jaggar. Boulder: Westview.
Peterson, James R. 1995. The rules of the game, Playboy, October.
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Smyth, C., Estes, Y. (2019). The Myth of the Happy Hooker: Kantian Moral Reflections on a Phenomenology of Prostitution. In: Teays, W. (eds) Analyzing Violence Against Women. Library of Public Policy and Public Administration, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05989-7_18
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