From Biolaw to Technological Innovation in Law

  • Amedeo SantosuossoEmail author
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 78)


This chapter is not about biolaw and what it will be in the 21st century. It is rather the story of the personal involvement of the author in biolaw, of his activity in the field and of his recent coming back to law, in general terms, having in mind his fascinating and enriching background at the intersection between science, technology and law. Having spent more than three decades working on the relationship between law and biomedicine, first, and, then, between law and life sciences, and then between law and science and technologies, the author reaches the conclusion that it does not make a lot of sense to create and cultivate discrete fields of law according to specific scientific fields and neither for the all area of technology and law.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PaviaPaviaItaly

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