Biolaw, Liberalism and Cognitive Enhancement: Identifying Harms

  • Daniel LoeweEmail author
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 78)


In this chapter, some of the articulated criticisms against cognitive enhancement through the use of pharmacological agents as well as some ways of counteracting them will be examined. In the argumentation, the institutional apparatus of a liberal democracy of capitalist production will be supossed. While each of these factors (liberalism, democracy, and capitalism) admits different interpretations, the argument is not played in their specification. One important conclusion will be that uncertainty about the consequences of cognitive enhancement in health should also be considered in the equation. If there is no damage in its use, there is no reason to restrict access. But if it causes harm, or is likely to produce it, this consideration may change. As a general rule: the more dangerous the enhancement, or the more uncertain the health consequences, the better it is to control and restrict access. However, if it has no serious consequences on health, there would be no reason, from a liberal perspective, to restrict its use.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Adolfo Ibáñez UniversitySantiagoChile

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