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Liberalism and Federalism in Russian State-Building, 1992–2017

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Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism

Part of the book series: Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations ((PPCE,volume 8))

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the reasons for the contradictions that have arisen in Russia between the post-Soviet liberal reforms in the economy and the conservative policy in state-building. In contrast to purposeful liberal economic reforms, some of the spontaneous decentralization that occurred in the 1990s was replaced with a purposeful centralization of public administration in the 2000s. The chapter discusses the hypothesis that this trend towards centralization of state administration was inevitable in the context of the course taken by President Boris Yeltsin to build state capitalism in Russia, where private businesses are either closely connected with the state-backed entrepreneurs or with state officials themselves. This model of capitalism includes only part of the elements of the concept of liberalism that capitalism generally accepts. Both federalism, and the institutions of democracy, were sacrificed to enable the “liberal reformers” of the 1990s to appropriate state property.

This research has been funded by the Russian Fund for Basic Research (Research Project No. 16-06-00532а).

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Notes

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    In mid-1991, six months before the disintegration of the USSR, a Russian law “On Registered Privatization Accounts and Contributions to the RSFSR” was adopted, creating an institution for the protection of citizens from fraud. This law prevented the “reformers” of the Yeltsin government from carrying out the wholesale robbery of national assets during privatization. On 24 December 1993—just after the dissolution of the previous parliament—President Yeltsin abolished this law by presidential decree. The incoming Parliament adopted a new law, which replaced personalized allocations of shares in public assets with an allocation to citizens of a single non-personalized voucher, which could be exchanged for money. As a result, the majority of the population, inexperienced in finance, sold these vouchers for a pittance, losing their share of state property. Thanks to this and other mechanisms of deception, swindlers close to power became oligarchs virtually overnight, appropriating all the state property that had been marked for citizen-shareholders. The repeal of the law protecting the interests of financially illiterate citizens was made possible by the violent dispersal of the parliament by Yeltsin in September–October 1993. See: A.Erdelevskiy A. (2001). “Nulevoy variant rossiyskoy privatizatsii”, Grazhdanin i pravo 1, 2001, p. 61 (https://www.lawmix.ru/comm/6711). Yeltsin’s supporters justified these actions by saying that personalized vouchers might promote corruption and hamper the privatization process. V. Mau, “Anti-Stiglitz. Russian Economic Reforms as Perceived by Western Critics”, Voprosy ekonomiki 11, 1999, pp. 4–23.

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    Later, Berezovsky fell out of favor with President Vladimir Putin and emigrated to the UK, where he died. He had lost almost all his fortune by the time he left Russia.

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  26. 26.

    Due to the relative sensitivity of prices to demand for oil, very slight decreases in the level of world demand in 2008 (and again in 2014), saw prices fall by around 200% in both cases. As the automotive industry moves towards electric-powered vehicles, the price of oil can be expected to fall virtually to zero (i.e., to the level of the marginal cost of production of the most easily extracted deposits, located in the Persian Gulf).

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Correspondence to Ildar Zulkarnay .

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Zulkarnay, I. (2019). Liberalism and Federalism in Russian State-Building, 1992–2017. In: Cucciolla, R.M. (eds) Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05784-8_13

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