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Subjectivity

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Abstract

Any plausible solution to the mind-body problem needs to account for subjectivity. In this chapter, I discuss and use a notion of ‘mineness’, and I compare it to related neighbouring notions. We thus realize that we can have an account of subjectivity in terms of a first-order aspect of experiences, and I show how such a view nicely combines with dual-aspect monism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This parallels what Zahavi says about the self (i.e. his very minimal notion of the self, which is not, in his view, an independent subject but the subjectivity of experience); he says “Nor is [the self] given as an additional experiential object or as an extra experiential ingredient, as if there were a distinct self-quale, next to and in addition to the quale of the smell of burnt hay and roasted almonds” (Zahavi forthcoming).

  2. 2.

    This is a standard view. See, for instance, Lewis (1976a, b) and Parfit (1984).

  3. 3.

    We could be tempted to say “qualitative”, but remember that they are not qualia.

  4. 4.

    In the case of experiences, this can involve short intervals of time (the idea here is the one of the specious present (see, inter alia, James (1890), Husserl (1964), Broad (1923), Dainton (2000, 2003), Hoerl (2009), Phillips (2011), and my discussion in Benovsky (2013))).

  5. 5.

    There are many variants of this view; see, inter alia, Armstrong (1968, 1984), Lycan (1996, 2001), Gennaro (1996, 2005), and Rosenthal (1986, 2002).

  6. 6.

    Brentano (1874, pp. 153–154).

  7. 7.

    Kriegel (2009, p. 1 and 2).

  8. 8.

    Lewis (1986, p. 145).

  9. 9.

    Philosophical theories rely heavily on their primitives to do the job they do. I discuss in detail the role of primitives in philosophical theories in Benovsky (2016, especially Chap. 4).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Jiri Benovsky

  2. University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland

    Jiri Benovsky

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Benovsky, J. (2018). Subjectivity. In: Mind and Matter. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9_5

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