• Jiri BenovskyEmail author
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)


Any plausible solution to the mind-body problem needs to account for subjectivity. In this chapter, I discuss and use a notion of ‘mineness’, and I compare it to related neighbouring notions. We thus realize that we can have an account of subjectivity in terms of a first-order aspect of experiences, and I show how such a view nicely combines with dual-aspect monism.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of FribourgFribourgSwitzerland
  2. 2.University of NeuchâtelNeuchâtelSwitzerland

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