Abstract
“Dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism” is a long and complicated name for a simple and elegant view. In this first chapter, I explain what this view is about and what it is for. I introduce the combination problem and the general direction to take in order to solve or avoid it.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
As Martine Nida-Ruemelin rightly pointed out (in a talk given at the ‘Self and Subjectivity' workshop in Ovronnaz, March 2018), nothing ever has a self. If there are selves, then there are things which are selves.
- 3.
Perhaps I should add here that the experience of shamanic journeys (to the Lower World and Upper World) is a very rich, strong, and useful experience, which I recommend to everybody. But one does not have to—and as a metaphysician one should not—take the alleged ontology behind it too seriously.
- 4.
See this chapter of my “Eliminativism, objects, and persons—the virtues of non-existence” (2018, Routledge) where I discuss these problems in detail. In the end, I conclude that eliminativism is the best way to go indeed—see §6.
- 5.
Goff's (2017a, §7.1 and p. 168) “threat of noumenalism” for the panprotopsychist is an example of such a requirement.
- 6.
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Benovsky, J. (2018). Dual-Aspect-Pan-Proto-Psychism. In: Mind and Matter. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9_1
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