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Preface

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A Philosophical Autofiction

Part of the book series: Performance Philosophy ((PPH))

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Abstract

Golub presents the book as a thought experiment on the theme of uncertainty, taking as its premise G. E. Moore’s notion of mutually incompatible statements in relation to life being held together by a shifting first-person subject that hypothesizes narrative as a single subject through-line. Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resemblance” is recalled as a genre rather than biological or genealogical classification. Golub undoes history and memory for the purpose of discovering the self via a reconstructed language game of family resemblance in which a single self metastasizes from a family cell (or cells), drawing on events from his own and other real and fictional characters’ lives.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wittgenstein’s last words appeared in Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Memoir (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962) and again in the biography of record, Ray Monk’s, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Penguin Books, 1991); G.E. Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,” in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1942), 543.

  2. 2.

    G.E. Moore, Selected Writings, ed. T. Baldwin (London: Routledge, 1993), 211, paraphrased in Mitchell Green and John N. Williams, “Introduction,” in Mitchell Green and John N. Williams, eds., Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3.

  3. 3.

    à: could mean of, at, to, in, for, on.https://www.quora.com/What-does-à-mean-in-French.

  4. 4.

    Roy Sorenson, “The All-Seeing Eye: A Blind Spot in the History of Ideas,” in Green and Williams, eds., Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person, 45.

  5. 5.

    Morris Lazerowitz, “Moore’s Paradox,” in Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 371.

  6. 6.

    Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright and trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

  7. 7.

    The case for this manner of reading Wittgenstein’s last and unfinished book is made clearly and persuasively in Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

  8. 8.

    Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), 1.

  9. 9.

    Bruce Duffy, “Preface,” in The World As I Found It (New York: New York Review Books, 1987), i and 558.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 556.

  11. 11.

    Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, 26.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., 176 and 178.

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Golub, S. (2019). Preface. In: A Philosophical Autofiction. Performance Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05612-4_1

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