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The Regulatory Power of Corporations

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Corporate Power and Regulation

Part of the book series: International Series on Public Policy ((ISPP))

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Abstract

This chapter develops the book’s conceptual framework. It revisits the discussion of the public–private divide in the literature on governance, regulation and international political economy. Eckert suggests moving from demand-side arguments about the shadow of hierarchy, regulatory threats and authority to considering what private actors have to offer on the supply side. She spells out expectations for the three types of corporate power in regulation: How the expert will use the power of knowledge; how the innovator disposes of decisive resources as a first mover; and how managing a critical infrastructure gives the operator authority as the guarantor of secure supply. The last section presents the case study selection: paper and plastics industry (expert), home appliance and ICT industry (innovator), and electricity transmission industry (operator).

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  1. Goethe Universität Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Hesse, Germany

    Sandra Eckert

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  1. Sandra Eckert
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Correspondence to Sandra Eckert .

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Eckert, S. (2019). The Regulatory Power of Corporations. In: Corporate Power and Regulation. International Series on Public Policy . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05463-2_2

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