Abstract
The book aims to provide a radically naturalistic account of scientific representation in the field of philosophy of science and within the context of structural realism. The book’s account of scientific representation is presented within the context of a new (Cognitive) version of Structural Realism. This new theory, i.e., Cognitive Structural Realism (or CSR), is inspired by two rival approaches in the contemporary philosophy of science. These are (orthodox) Structural Realism and Cognitive Models of Science Approach. Also, CSR draws on resources of computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, as well as embodied and enactivist interpretations of theories of cognitive psychology, to provide a fresh theory of scientific representation and defend a naturalistically plausible and down-to-earth version of structural realism.
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Notes
- 1.
As I shall explain, since I draw on a moderate form of embodied theory (instead of a radical one), representational relations could be retained, at least to some extent. However, the divide between representations and their target in the external world is not as deep as what is the case in a classical representationalist theory. The reply will be unpacked in Chaps. 6 and 7 of this book.
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Beni, M.D. (2019). Introduction, a Radically Naturalist Solution to the Problem of Scientific Representation. In: Cognitive Structural Realism. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 14. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05114-3_1
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