Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Corporate Board of Directors pp 1–27Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

The Impact of Corporate Board Characteristics on Firm Value: A Literature Survey

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 1113 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter provides a review of theoretical and empirical studies that analyze the effects of board characteristics on firm performance. It serves the purpose of demonstrating different approaches to studying corporate board characteristics as well as the importance of examining these characteristics, namely, board size, board independence, board leadership, gender diversity, board busyness and staggered boards.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Another study carried out by Coles et al. (2008) shows that larger boards are not equally detrimental for all firms. Specifically, they find that the negative effect of board size on firm performance does not hold for firms with greater advising needs.

  2. 2.

    Directors are usually classified into three categories: insiders, independent and gray directors. Inside directors are the firm’s executives and officers, “gray directors include former employees, family members of current employees, owners of majority voting control, and individuals with disclosed conflicts of interest such as outside business dealings with the company, receipt of charitable contribution from the company, and interlocking director relationship with the CEO” (Masulis et al. 2012).

  3. 3.

    The US stock exchange listing requirements state that “no director will qualify as independent unless the board affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company and require companies to disclose determinations of independence in its annual proxy statement”.

  4. 4.

    Other recent studies examine different aspects of board independence (see, e.g., Borokhovich et al. 2014; Crespí-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster 2013; White et al. 2013).

  5. 5.

    The board leadership structure trend is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

  6. 6.

    Liu et al. (2013) further find that the effect on firm performance is stronger when the woman is an executive director (rather than an independent director).

  7. 7.

    Likewise, using a unique matched worker-plant data, Tate and Yang (2014) suggest that having women in leadership positions help cultivate more female-friendly cultures, with smaller wage differences between men and women.

  8. 8.

    The study of Field et al. (2013) is also related to the growing literature analyzing how the effects of busy directors vary across firm characteristics (see, e.g., Cashman et al. 2012; Masulis and Mobbs 2014). The general conclusion of these studies is that directors’ busyness is not equally detrimental for all firms.

Bibliography

  • Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008). Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 154–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R. B., & Funk, P. (2012). Beyond the glass ceiling: Does gender matter? Management Science, 58(2), 219–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board structure and performance: Evidence for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 243–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58–107.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2012). The changing of the boards: The impact on firm valuation of mandated female board representation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 137–197.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahn, S., & Shrestha, K. (2013). The differential effects of classified boards on firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(11), 3993–4013.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amihud, Y., & Stoyanov, S. (2017). Do staggered boards harm shareholders? Journal of Financial Economics, 123(2), 432–439.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, C. A., & Anthony, R. N. (1986). The new corporate directors: Insights for board members and executives. New York, NY: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014). Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency? Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baliga, B., Moyer, R. C., & Rao, R. S. (1996). CEO duality and firm performance: What’s the fuss? Strategic Management Journal, 17(1), 41–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2), 409–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A., Coates IV, J. C., & Subramanian, G. (2002). The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: Theory, evidence and policy. Stanford Law Review, 54, 887–951.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital theory. Columbia University Press: New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benkel, M., Mather, P., Ramsay, A. (2006). The association between corporate governance and earnings management: The role of independent directors. Corporate Ownership and Control, 3(4), 65–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H. C., & Nielsen, K. M. (2008). The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(6), 1098–1109.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bennouri, M., Chtioui, T., Nagati, H., & Nekhili, M. (2018). Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? Journal of Banking & Finance, 88, 267–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhagat, S., & Black, B. S. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27, 231–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borokhovich, K. A., Boulton, T. J., Brunarski, K. R., & Harman, Y. S. (2014). The incentives of grey directors: Evidence from unexpected executive and board chair turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 102–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), 301–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997). Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3(3), 189–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., & Coles, J. L. (1999). What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 52(3), 341–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bugeja, M., Rosa, R. D. S., & Lee, A. (2009). The impact of director reputation and performance on the turnover and board seats of target firm directors. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 36(1–2), 185–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byrd, J., Fraser, D. R., Scott Lee, D., & Tartaroglu, S. (2012). Are two heads better than one? Evidence from the thrift crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4), 957–967.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003). Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(1), 33–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cashman, G. D., Gillan, S. L., & Jun, C. (2012). Going overboard? On busy directors and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 3248–3259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Catalyst. (2017). Quick take: Women on boards (Technical report). New York: Catalyst.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Evans, K. P. (2018). Female board representation, corporate innovation and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 48, 236–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 157–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. (2013). How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(3), 627–641.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coles, J. L., & Hoi, C.-K. (2003). New evidence on the market for directors: Board membership and Pennsylvania Senate bill 1310. The Journal of Finance, 58(1), 197–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2008). Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 329–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2017). Firm performance and boardroom gender diversity: A quantile regression approach. Journal of Business Research, 79, 198–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board size and corporate performance: Evidence from European countries. The European Journal of Finance, 4(3), 291–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cotter, J. F., Shivdasani, A., & Zenner, M. (1997). Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics, 43(2), 195–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cremers, K. M., Litov, L. P., & Sepe, S. M. (2017). Staggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited. Journal of Financial Economics, 126(2), 422–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crespí-Cladera, R., & Pascual-Fuster, B. (2013). Does the independence of independent directors matter? Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 116–134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dah, M. A., Frye, M. B., & Hurst, M. (2014). Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Journal of Banking & Finance, 41, 97–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dahya, J., Garcia, L. G., & Van Bommel, J. (2009). One man two hats: What’s all the commotion! Financial Review, 44(2), 179–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 269–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6), 674–686.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dang, R., & Vo, L. C. (2012). Women on corporate boards of directors: Theories, facts and analysis. In Board directors and corporate social responsibility (pp. 3–21). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • De Andres, P., & Vallelado, E. (2008). Corporate governance in banking: The role of the board of directors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(12), 2570–2580.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size, composition, functioning and effectiveness. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 197–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dey, A., Engel, E., & Liu, X. (2011). CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1595–1618.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duru, A., Wang, D., & Zhao, Y. (2013). Staggered boards, corporate opacity and firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(2), 341–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duru, A., Iyengar, R. J., & Zampelli, E. M. (2016). The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating role of board independence. Journal of Business Research, 69(10), 4269–4277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Comission. (2011). The gender balance in business leadership. Commission staff working document.

    Google Scholar 

  • Falato, A., Kadyrzhanova, D., & Lel, U. (2014). Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value? Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 404–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faleye, O. (2007a). Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(2), 501–529.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faleye, O. (2007b). Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure. Journal of Management & Governance, 11(3), 239–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farrell, K. A., & Hersch, P. L. (2005). Additions to corporate boards: The effect of gender. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 85–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M. A., & Raposo, C. C. (2011). Board structure and price informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523–545.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferris, S. P., & Yan, X. S. (2007). Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2), 392–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087–1112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689–724.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Field, L., Lowry, M., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Are busy boards detrimental? Journal of Financial Economics, 109(1), 63–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, J. N. (2007). The rise of independent directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of shareholder value and stock market prices. Stanford Law Review, 59, 1465–1568.

    Google Scholar 

  • Green, C. P., & Homroy, S. (2018). Female directors, board committees and firm performance. European Economic Review, 102, 19–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guest, P. M. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: Evidence from the UK. The European Journal of Finance, 15(4), 385–404.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gul, F. A., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A. C. (2011). Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), 314–338.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A theory of board control and size. Review of Financial Studies, 21(4), 1797–1832.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haslam, S. A., Ryan, M. K., Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., & Atkins, C. (2010). Investing with prejudice: The relationship between women’s presence on company boards and objective and subjective measures of company performance. British Journal of Management, 21(2), 484–497.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hauser, R. (2018). Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 128(1), 16–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. J. (2013). Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives? Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 822–839.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Husted, B. W., & de Sousa-Filho, J. M. (2018). Board structure and environmental, social, and governance disclosure in Latin America. Journal of Business Research.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1995). Specific and general knowledge, and organizational structure. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8, 4–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. I. (2009). Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(5), 819–828.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiraporn, P., Chintrakarn, P., & Kim, Y. S. (2012). Analyst following, staggered boards, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(11), 3091–3100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, J. L., Daily, C. M., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1996). Boards of directors: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 22(3), 409–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kadyrzhanova, D., & Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2011). Concentrating on governance. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1649–1685.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990). Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 389–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kesner, I. F. (1988). Directors characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender. Academy of Management Journal, 31(1), 66–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(3), 189–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561–1605.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koppes, R. H., Ganske, L. G., & Haag, C. T. (1999). Corporate governance out of focus: The debate over classified boards. The Business Lawyer, 54, 1023–1055.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krause, R., & Semadeni, M. (2013). Apprentice, departure, and demotion: An examination of the three types of CEO_board chair separation. Academy of Management Journal, 56(3), 805–826.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. A. (2014). CEO duality a review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 40(1), 256–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kumar, N., & Singh, J. (2013). Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: Some empirical findings from India. Corporate Governance, 13(1), 88–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B. G., Mora, A., & Scapin, M. (2017). The monitoring role of female directors over accounting quality. Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 651–668.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larcker, D. F., Ormazabal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). The market reaction to corporate governance regulation. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 431–448.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larmou, S., & Vafeas, N. (2010). The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance. Journal of Management and Governance, 14(1), 61–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2014). Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 185–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2009). The effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the supply and demand for directors. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3287–3328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The Business Lawyer, 48, 59–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liu, Y., Wei, Z., & Xie, F. (2013). Do women directors improve firm performance in China? Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 169–184.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, Y., Miletkov, M. K., Wei, Z., & Yang, T. (2015). Board independence and firm performance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 223–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loderer, C., & Peyer, U. (2002). Board overlap, seat accumulation and share prices. European Financial Management, 8(2), 165–192.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mak, Y. T., & Kusnadi, Y. (2005). Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(3), 301–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manne, H. G. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. The Journal of Political Economy, 73, 110–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851–1889.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012). Globalizing the boardroom—The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(3), 527–554.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. (2013). A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5(3), 136–169.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palmon, O., & Wald, J. K. (2002). Are two heads better than one? The impact of changes in management structure on performance by firm size. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(3), 213–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pathan, S., & Faff, R. (2013). Does board structure in banks really affect their performance? Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(5), 1573–1589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perry, T., & Peyer, U. (2005). Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholders perspective. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 2083–2123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petra, S. T. (2007). The effects of corporate governance on the informativeness of earnings. Economics of Governance, 8(2), 129–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pi, L., & Timme, S. G. (1993). Corporate control and bank efficiency. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17(2), 515–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013). Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance. In G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of finance (Vol. 2, Part A, pp. 493–572). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Rose, M. J. (2009). Heterogeneous impacts of staggered boards by ownership concentration. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(1), 113–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829–1853.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sierra, G. E., Talmor, E., & Wallace, J. S. (2006). An examination of multiple governance forces within bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Services Research, 29(2), 105–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stein, J. C. (1988). Takeover threats and managerial myopia. The Journal of Political Economy, 96, 61–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tate, G., & Yang, L. (2014). Female leadership and gender equity: Evidence from plant closure. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(1), 77–97.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uribe-Bohorquez, M.-V., Martínez-Ferrero, J., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2018). Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of institutional context. Journal of Business Research, 88, 28–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, J. T., Woidtke, T., Black, H. A., & Schweitzer, R. L. (2013). Appointments of academic directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 135–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581–606.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yang, T., & Zhao, S. (2014). CEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock to the competitive environment. Journal of Banking & Finance, 49, 534–552.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Burgundy, Auxerre, France

    Ismail Lahlou

Authors
  1. Ismail Lahlou
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ismail Lahlou .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Lahlou, I. (2018). The Impact of Corporate Board Characteristics on Firm Value: A Literature Survey. In: Corporate Board of Directors. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05017-7_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05017-7_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-05016-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-05017-7

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation