Abstract
The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of the World Soul in Plato’s Timaeus. In showing how the description of the World Soul is elaborated in the Timaeus, highlighting the following dimensions, (a) its composition, (b) its mathematical structure, (c) its moving function and (d) its cognitive function, we will establish how this ontological constitution is articulated within the framework of the teleological dimension of the discourse. It will appear that it is the two functions of the World Soul (moving and cognitive) that justify why it possesses the structure of an intermediate mixture constituted from being, sameness and difference. As such, it is the proper cause (aitia), which is exemplified by the Demiurge’s teleological deduction in Timaeus’ discourse, that determines the auxiliary cause (sunaitia), namely, the structure of the World Soul.
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Notes
- 1.
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 1.301: “For how can any of the grave Grammarians comprehend Heraclitus or follow the meaning of Plato where he says,—“Between the Being which is indivisible and remains always the same and the Being which is divisible in bodies, He blended a third form of Being compounded of the twain, that is to say, out of the Same and the Other,” and the rest of the context, about which all the interpreters of Plato keep silence?” (Trans. Bury).
- 2.
For an account of the main interpretations of this passage from antiquity to contemporary scholarship, see Brisson (1994, pp. 267–354). Proclus’s Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (See Baltzly (2009)) contains a very detailed account of the discourse on the constitution of the World Soul (Proclus, in Timaeum, Book III, Part 2). Plutarch has also written a treatise on this subject: Ploutarchou chairōneōs Peri tēs en Timaiō psycholonias. See Ferrari (1999) for an analysis of Plutarch’s interpretation.
- 3.
- 4.
For a discussion of the notion of teleology, see, in this volume, Brisson’s contribution. Within a cosmological framework, it is important to distinguish Plato’s from Aristotle’s teleology: for Aristotle, teleology can be understood as the final causality of the Unmoved Mover (Metaphysics Λ), whereas for Plato, it must be conceived as the Demiurge’s reasoning who aims to fashion the best possible Universe—from 30b1, this principle will guide every action the Demiurge will undertake, including the constitution of the World Soul (see on that question Karfík 2007). This teleological dimension must be understood within the eikôs mythos framework of Timaeus’ discourse: see Moreau (1939, pp. 10–14 and 39–43).
- 5.
The relationship between the intellect and the soul is commonly related to the question of the function of the Demiurge. His reasoning ability (“λογίζομαι”) seems to imply that he himself possesses a nous, or maybe is nous, as does the World Soul. Since Antiquity attempts have been made to identify the Demiurge with the nous of the World Soul, as, for example, Cornford is tempted to do (1937, pp. 38–39). What our text seems to guarantee is that for visible objects nous will be situated in a soul, which does not prevent the possibility for the Demiurge to be a transcendent pure nous (as defended by Menn 1995). On this problem see also Mason (2013) for an examination of the concept of nous in Plato’s philosophy (Phaedo, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws). What Timaeus affirms here should also be related to Sophist 248e-249a, where the Eleatic Stranger suggests that it is necessary to include in the pantelôs on “change, life, soul, and intelligence” (“κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν”) and that it is not reasonable to think that it is changeless and without intellect (249a1: nous). A few lines later after having added that it is impossible to admit that the pantelôs on has an intellect (249a3: nous) but doesn’t have life, the E.S. asks: “But are we saying that it has both those things in it while denying that it has them in a soul?” (245a5-6: “Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ’ αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;”). On this argument see Mohr (1985), who highlights as the first premise of the argument “when mind exists or comes to be in something anywhere at all, then that thing is ensouled”. Mohr does not agree with Cherniss (1983) who claimed that “Plato could not have formulated [the argument at 249a] if he had believed that there is any real nous which does not imply soul” (607), but affirms, on the contrary, on page 181: “all that is required for the argument to succeed is that (a) there exists some soul and (b) this soul is not chaotic. Both (a) and (b) are established by claiming that rationality exists in us”. In the same vein, Hackforth (1936) wrote: “To identify him [the Demiurge] with psychê would be to deny his transcendence or externality, since psychê is a principle operative only in the realm of kinêsis and genesis and thereby to deny his perfection, since perfection does not and cannot belong to kinesis and genesis” (447). As will appear, the World Soul in its moving and cognitive function will maintain an ordered and harmonious cosmos continuing in a sense the ordering action of the Demiurge who will at the end of his work retire (42e5).
- 6.
See Frede (1980, pp. 222–223).
- 7.
See Brisson, in this volume, page 114.
- 8.
A similar distinction is introduced in Phaedo (97b-99d), especially in 99b2-4, “τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ’ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ’ εἴη αἴτιον”, in the Laws (889a-890b and 892a) from a critical point of view against philosophers satisfied with mechanistic explanations of reality and in the Philebus 28d-e.
- 9.
It should be noted that the distinction between aitiai and sunaitiai is introduced in order to distinguish between a mechanical and material explanation of a phenomenon on the one hand and its teleological explanation on the other. Whether it concerns vision or the cosmos as a whole, we must distinguish between auxiliary causes (the mechanical description of the vision or the description of the action of necessity) and its proper causes (the finality of vision and the finality of the cosmos in function of the action of nous). It is evident that the World Soul, within the cosmological discourse, as (1) possessing intellect within it (see Frede (1980)) and (2) cause of the ordered motions of the planets, exemplifies the category of proper aitiai (which in turn is associated with nous at 46d). Nevertheless, it seems possible, insofar as it is itself considered to be the product of a demiurgic fabrication, that the soul might be understood from two points of view: either by examining its material explanation (it is indeed metaphorically described as an assemblage of various ingredients) or by examining its finality (for the sake of which the soul is made). In this sense, the use of the two kinds of cause appears relevant.
- 10.
The World Soul is extended throughout the World Body, which will constitute a World which is round and revolving in a circle (“ψυχὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ θεὶς διὰ παντός τε ἔτεινεν καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῇ περιεκάλυψεν, καὶ κύκλῳ δὴ κύκλον στρεφόμενον οὐρανὸν ἕνα μόνον ἔρημον κατέστησεν”).
- 11.
Even Timaeus’ discourse associates the two dimensions of nous and necessity (see 34c1-4: “ἀλλά πως ἡμεῖς πολὺ μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ ταύτῃ πῃ καὶ λέγομεν”).
- 12.
The contrast between sameness and difference can be understood as implying an opposition between unity and plurality (as will appear later: only the circle of the Different is divided into seven circles 36b-d). Furthermore, the circle of the Same will dominate the circle of the Different (36c7-d1: “κράτος δ’ ἔδωκεν τῇ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾷ”). The text already suggests here this contrast and will shortly describe the harmonious structure of the World Soul: it seems that the use of harmonic and geometrical proportions will guarantee that the World Soul will maintain a constitutive unity. Proclus suggested that the nature of difference is hard to mingle, since amongst the Kinds of the Sophist, it is the one that has the capacity to separate and to divide and is the cause of progressions and multiplications (II, 158, 18-20: “ὅτι διακριτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ διαιρετικὴν καὶ προόδων αἰτίαν καὶ πολλαπλασιασμῶν”). See below, on pages 102–106.
- 13.
Timaeus, 35a1-35b3: “τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως [αὖ πέρι] καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ. μειγνὺς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμεν, ἑκάστην δὲ ἔκ τε ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμειγμένην”.
- 14.
For an account of the main discussions on this matter, see Brisson (1994, pp. 270–275), Archer-Hind (1888, pp. 106–107), Taylor (1928, pp. 101–108), and Cornford (1937, pp. 59–62). As Brisson points out at page 274, to reject “αὖ πέρι” (“C’est donc dire que, du seul point de vue matériel, refuser, comme le font Rivaud, Burnet et Taylor, les mots “αὖ πέρι” est difficilement défendable.”, page 271) implies: “Ainsi, identifie-t-on même et indivisible, autre et divisible. D’où une triple difficulté. Ontologiquement, cela n’a pas de sens. En outre, du point de logique et du point de vue littéraire, on se demande pourquoi Platon répèterait deux fois la même chose”. See also Plutarch’s interpretation in Ferrari (1999, p. 336).
- 15.
See Proclus II, 155. Manuscripts A, F, P, Y, Pr., Plut., Eus. Stob. all have the “αὖ πέρι”.
- 16.
See Cornford (1937, pp. 60–61), note 2: “The confusions introduced by other commentators arise chiefly from omitting the words αὖ περὶ, and then imagining that τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ means the indivisible and divisible kinds (not ‘of them’ (αὐτῶν), i.e. Sameness and Difference, but) of Existence. This reduces the second clause to a pointless repetition of the first, and leads to an identification of Sameness and Difference with Indivisible and Divisible Existence, which is flatly inconsistent with the Sophist”.
- 17.
- 18.
See 31b-32c. At this moment, the existence of four elements is assumed. It is only in the second part of the discourse that their constitution, out of the two kinds of basic triangle, will be explained (53b-61c).
- 19.
This does not mean that Forms cannot be divided in a non-material way. A possible support for this idea might be found in the Sophist 258a-259c. See Brisson (1994, pp. 271–272).
- 20.
In general, this definition is not directly found in the discourse of Timaeus, although it is possible to claim that an allusion of it can be found in 46d7-e2, 89a1-2 and 37b5 in the expression “ἐν τῷ Κινουμένῳ ὑφ ‘αὑτοῦ”. See Brisson (1994, pp. 333–340).
- 21.
See note 10.
- 22.
See also 36d9-e1: “πεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέσῃ συναγαγὼν προσήρμοττεν”.
- 23.
See Plotinus Ennead IV, 2, 1 and Brisson (1994, p. 272). Proclus (II, 117) claims that the World Soul is, as an intermediate mixture of divisible and indivisible, intelligible and yet generated, simple in a sense and yet composed in another sense.
- 24.
- 25.
See Owen (1953, pp. 326–329) and Cornford (1937, pp. 61–66). Owen defends the idea that (1) Plato’s reader should not await the Sophist in order to be informed that each Form exists, possesses identity and differs from others (Owen mentions Phaedo 78d5-7, Symposium 211b-1-2 and Republic 597c); (2) the Sophist does not discuss the difference between the indivisible and the divisible as it is discussed in Timaeus 35a1-b3 (moreover, indivisible Being, Sameness and Difference cannot be Forms, as Cornford claims, since this would contradict 52a2-3’s affirmation about the intelligible that “ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἑαυτὸ εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ἰόν”); and (3) the passage of the cognitive function of the World Soul (37a-c) does not presuppose the analysis of negation in terms of thateron, as offered in the Sophist. More specifically, the Sophist account of negation which implies that “τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὂν” (254d1) is contradicted by Timaeus at 38b-2-3 when he points out that it is illegitimate to say “ὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὂν εἶναι”. To Owen’s argument on the relation between the Timaeus and the Sophist, it can be answered that (a) even if existence, sameness and difference are ontological categories that can be found in more general terms in the dialogues, it should be noted that their articulation as the three more fundamental Kinds can only be found in the Sophist; (b) as we have shown below (pages 90–92), the indivisible/divisible opposition represents a modulation of the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible in the cosmological account of the constitution of the World Soul (the affirmation that there is an intelligible Form “ungenerated and indestructible, which neither receives anything else into itself from elsewhere nor itself enters into anything else anywhere” does not prevent the Forms from having non-material parts and to be divisible (a support of this idea could indeed be found in the Sophist 257c-258a)); and (c) the fact that the account of negation as defended in the Sophist (not being F signifies to be different from F) is not explicitly introduced when the cognitive function of the World Soul is described does not imply that it is incompatible with it. The objective of this passage is not to come up with a criticism of the sophist, and in doing so justifying the possibility of false discourses, but to show how the World Soul can access both the sensible and the intelligible in all its diversity. Furthermore, since this is not the focus of the Timaeus, we should not expect an explicit discussion on the various kinds of non-being. Nothing prevents non-being at 38b2 from meaning that which is absolutely not, a claim that even after the argument of the Sophist cannot be truly affirmed.
- 26.
Sophist 247d8-e12: “I’m saying that a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by even the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once”. (“Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν [τινα] κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι.”)
- 27.
See Frede (1980).
- 28.
This implies that Being, Sameness and Difference participate in themselves, since all of them exist, are identical to themselves and are different from every other Kind.
- 29.
On this question see note 24 and Cornford (1937, pp. 61–66).
- 30.
That the aim of dialectic is to study the relationship of association and exclusion between the Forms can find some support in the second part of the Parmenides (see Karfik 2005) and in Republic 510a-c.
- 31.
It seems as such that Motion and Rest are not on the same level as the three other Kinds, since the Sophist (254d-255a) tells us that those two Kinds are not participated in by Being, Sameness and Difference. Furthermore, they exclude themselves since Motion does not participate in Rest nor Rest in Motion. See 248d-249d.
- 32.
See Timaeus 52d-53c. It must be noticed here that becoming cannot be fundamentally opposed to being, since there is being that becomes in body. In that sense, at no point in the Timaeus does Plato deny the existence of the sensible or describe it as a mere illusion. On this question see Pitteloud (2017, pp. 215–240).
- 33.
For an analysis of the notions of identity, sameness and difference in Plato’s dialogues, see Gerson (2004).
- 34.
Zeno asserted at the beginning of the Parmenides that sensible objects could not be both similar and dissimilar (cf. Parmenides 127e3). In the Timaeus, identity and difference have also a mathematical exemplification in the context of the mathematization of the World Body (31b-32c), the World Soul (35b-36d) and the constitution of the four elements (52d-55c). See O’Meara (2017, pp. 65–82). In some sense, there is a relation of identity/difference between (1) Forms, (2) mathematical objects and (3) sensible objects. In the deductions (137c–166c) of the second part of the Parmenides, the properties of identity/difference, similarity/dissimilarity and equality/inequality are examined within the range of properties which are attributed (or not attributed) to the one. As we are faced with three different levels, we must find three different exemplifications of the relations of identity and difference. See Pitteloud (2017, pp. 119–127 and 226–237).
- 35.
For an account of the distinction between a literal and a didactic reading of the Timaeus, see Pitteloud (2017, pp. 197–198). The didactical approach might be more convincing on the problem of the description of the constitution of the World Soul, since on that reading the World Soul would be temporally ungenerated (which is claimed at Phaedrus 245d1: agenêton) but ontologically generated. See Brisson (1994, pp. 336–340).
- 36.
See Cherniss (1965, pp. 358–360).
- 37.
Although it is the circle of the Different which will be divided according to the sequence 1–27 (36c-d), it seems nevertheless that the Demiurge first divides the whole mixture that constitutes the World Soul according to the intervals mentioned (36b) and then cut into two bands the whole mathematized blending (36c). See also Brisson (1994, p. 315): “Les deux termes importants de ce texte sont diastêma et mesotês qui, par ailleurs entretiennent des rapports mutuels. Diastêma désigne le rapport qui existe entre des termes consécutifs, aussi bien qu’entre les distances séparant des termes consécutifs”.
- 38.
9 comes before 8 because 32 comes before 23 in the order of the progression.
- 39.
For a complete analysis of this part of the text, see Cornford (1937, pp. 66–72).
- 40.
A complete survey of the views and interpretations of the mathematical structure of the World Soul in Antiquity can be found in Brisson (1994, pp. 314–332).
- 41.
It is difficult to find such objects in the dialogues, except in the case of a very specific reading of Analogy of the Divided Line in Republic 509c5-511e5. On this question see Brisson (1994, p. 293), who is in agreement with Plutarch: the soul is constituted according to numbers and harmony, but this does not make of it either a number or a harmony, as Plato criticized in the Phaedo 84c-88b: “D’une part, Plutarque fait très judicieusement remarquer: “dire que l’âme est composée selon le nombre ne revient pas, semble-t-il, à faire de son essence un nombre; en effet, elle est composée selon l’harmonie, sans être une harmonie, comme Platon l’a démontré dans son traité de l’Ame””.
- 42.
See note 12.
- 43.
Timaeus, 32b8-c4: “καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων τοιούτων καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τεττάρων τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα ἐγεννήθη δι’ἀναλογίας ὁμολογῆσαν, φιλίαν τε ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, ὥστε εἰς ταὐτὸν αὑτῷ συνελθὸν ἄλυτον ὑπό του ἄλλου πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ συνδήσαντος γενέσθαι”.
- 44.
In a comparable manner, the fact that the World Soul possesses a harmonic structure does not mean that it is a harmony. As Brisson (1994) notes, in p. 328, nothing in the text suggests either that the World Soul is identical with its harmonic structure or that it produces a musical harmony (the notion of the harmony of the spheres seems indeed excluded in 37b5-6).
- 45.
See Brisson (1994, p. 325), for a reconstruction of how the idea of the World Soul as a moving number emerges from a certain reading of the Timaeus in the context of the assumption of mathematical entities within Plato’s ontology and a mathematized version of the hypothesis of Forms: “Bien plus, cette interprétation d’Aristote selon laquelle les entités mathématiques sont, pour Platon, des intermédiaires entre l’intelligible et le sensible repose, elle-même, sur une incompréhension de la métaphore de la ligne, où, en fait, les entités mathématiques ne sont pas, en tant que telles, considérées comme des réalités distinctes. Et par ailleurs, on ne voit pas comment Speusippe, qui avait remplacé la doctrine des formes intelligibles par celle des nombres mathématiques séparés, et Xénocrate, qui, tentant de faire la synthèse des systèmes de Speusippe et de Platon, avait élaboré la doctrine des nombres idéaux, auraient pu tenir les entités mathématiques pour intermédiaires entre l’intelligible et le sensible (...) le rôle que jouent le même et l’autre dans le cadre de la fonction motrice de l’âme du monde repose d’une part sur le fait que Platon qui, par ailleurs, tient l’âme du monde pour automotrice, ne mentionne pas, en Timée 35a1-bl, cet aspect fondamental; et d’autre part, sur un certain type de déduction qui, au terme d’une série d’équivalences, identifie le même et l’autre respectivement au repos et au mouvement”.
- 46.
See note 34.
- 47.
Timaeus, 36b6-c4: “ταύτην οὖν τὴν σύστασιν πᾶσαν διπλῆν κατὰ μῆκος σχίσας, μέσην πρὸς μέσην ἑκατέραν ἀλλήλαις οἷον χεῖ προσβαλὼν κατέκαμψεν εἰς ἓν κύκλῳ, συνάψας αὑταῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ τῆς προσβολῆς, καὶ τῇ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐν ταὐτῷ περιαγομένῃ κινήσει πέριξ αὐτὰς ἔλαβεν, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔξω, τὸν δ’ ἐντὸς ἐποιεῖτο τῶν κύκλων”.
- 48.
Timaeus, 36d7-36e5: “Ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν τῷ συνιστάντι πᾶσα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς σύστασις ἐγεγένητο, μετὰ τοῦτο πᾶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἐτεκταίνετο καὶ μέσον μέσῃ συναγαγὼν προσήρμοττεν· ἡ δ’ ἐκ μέσου πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον οὐρανὸν πάντῃ διαπλακεῖσα κύκλῳ τε αὐτὸν ἔξωθεν περικαλύψασα, αὐτὴ ἐν αὑτῇ στρεφομένη, θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον”.
- 49.
These will be parts of the human soul as it appears at 69d-73b.
- 50.
- 51.
See Brisson (1994, pp. 353–354). As we have seen below (pages 93–95), in the context of the Sophist, Motion and Rest are introduced within an ontological discussion on the nature of being, and are not Kinds which are universally participated in.
- 52.
As Xenocrates did. See also Aristotle, Physics, 201b 20-21, and Timaeus 57e.
- 53.
For a description of motion and rest within the Receptacle, see 57d-58c.
- 54.
The mathematization of the World Soul will exclusively be used here to give an account of the orbit of the seven planets (36d). As the World Soul is nowhere identified with a number, neither should the World Soul’s two circles be identified with the observable motions of the planets and the fixed stars. As Mason (2013) rightly points out on pages 212–213: “In short, both the world-soul’s circles have visible analogues in the heavens, to which they are irreducible. What we see in the heavens is not the world-soul’s motions but its body’s obedience to them”.
- 55.
For a schematic description of all the motions that the two circles explain, see Cornford (1937, pp. 136–137).
- 56.
Timaeus’ discourse seems to distinguish between two kinds of motion: the irrational-unordered motion which takes place in the Receptacle and the rational-ordered one which is caused by the World Soul. Both are also distinguished by the presence or absence of the god (53b3-4). This of course can be understood in a literal or didactic sense. In both cases, the existence of the chaotic motions in the Receptacle must be justified. If one believes that all motions are caused by the soul in Plato’s philosophy, then one of two theses will emerge: (1) the hypothesis of a precosmic irrational soul (as Plutarch thought; see on that problem Cherniss 1954) or (2) an irrational part of the World Soul (as Cornford (1937) defended on pages 209–210): “And since, on Platonic principles, all physical motion must be due to a living soul, I do not see how to escape the conclusion that the World-Soul is not completely rational. Besides the circular revolutions of the Reason it contains, there are the six irrational motions characteristic of the primary bodies. These bring about some desirable results, such as intelligence could purpose; but the picture of their working below the level at which the Demiurge first takes a hand and introduces an element of rational design can hardly be accounted for unless we take it as representing an imperfectly subdued factor of blind necessity always at work in Nature”. This clearly implies an identification of the circle of the Same with rational motions and another of the circle of the Difference with irrational motions, which the text never explicitly makes, as we will see in the next section). For the hypothesis of an irrational soul, see Brisson (1994, pp. 295–299). Another way of explaining the chaotic motion in the Receptacle can be found in Brisson (1994, p. 298): “Premièrement parce que s’agissant d‘une variation imaginaire qui n’a donc aucune prétention historique, la description de Timée 52d-e ne peut être considérée comme d’un âge du monde. Et deuxièmement parce que la nécessité, qu’on peut identifier au mal positif relatif, distinct du mal positif absolu, c’est-à-dire le mal moral, n’apparaît que comme le résultat incident de l’action rationnelle de l’âme du monde s’exerçant aux extrémités du corps du monde jusqu’où le mouvement de l’âme du monde se propage de proche en proche en perdant de plus en plus sa rationalité”. In a nutshell, the necessity of an irrational (or irrational part of the) soul does not need to be assumed in any case, as the precosmic chaos could also represent a thought experiment of what the Universe would be like without its rational dimension caused by the action of the World Soul, a kind of mechanist vision of the world that Plato wants precisely to refute in the Timaeus.
- 57.
Timaeus 36e5-c3: “καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ὁρατὸν οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόρατος μέν, λογισμοῦ δὲ μετέχουσα καὶ ἁρμονίας ψυχή, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων. ἅτε οὖν ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἔκ τε οὐσίας τριῶν τούτων συγκραθεῖσα μοιρῶν, καὶ ἀνὰ λόγον μερισθεῖσα καὶ συνδεθεῖσα, αὐτή τε ἀνακυκλουμένη πρὸς αὑτήν, ὅταν οὐσίαν σκεδαστὴν ἔχοντός τινος ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ἑαυτῆς ὅτῳ τ’ ἄν τι ταὐτὸν ᾖ καὶ ὅτου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς ὅτι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὁπότε συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί. λόγος δὲ ὁ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀληθὴς γιγνόμενος περί τε θάτερον ὂν καὶ περὶ τὸ ταὐτόν, ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὑφ’ αὑτοῦ φερόμενος ἄνευ φθόγγου καὶ ἠχῆς, ὅταν μὲν περὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γίγνηται καὶ ὁ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος ὀρθὸς ἰὼν εἰς πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν διαγγείλῃ, δόξαι καὶ πίστεις γίγνονται βέβαιοι καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ὅταν δὲ αὖ περὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ᾖ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ κύκλος εὔτροχος ὢν αὐτὰ μηνύσῃ, νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποτελεῖται”.
- 58.
- 59.
See Laws 896e8-897a3, where a clear relationship between the moving and the cognitive function of the soul is established: “ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ’ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν ταῖς αὑτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστιν βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐψευσμένως, χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, θαρροῦσαν φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν στέργουσαν, (…)”.
- 60.
See Proclus, II, 312, for the identification of the object and not the subject of thought.
- 61.
See above pages 93–94.
- 62.
See note 34.
- 63.
See Brisson (1994, pp. 307–310).
- 64.
As we have seen, Plato’s general definition of the soul implies that it is a self-moving principle, intermediary between the sensible and the intelligible, which possesses, in the case of the World Soul, only a rational part. See note 49.
- 65.
See Sophist 263e3-5 where discourse and thinking are related.
- 66.
See also Timaeus 44a concerning the judgements of individual souls.
- 67.
Individual souls, too, will provide such judgements, except that they will find the motions of their two circles destabilized by external influences, whereas for the World Soul, although united with the World Body, no external influence can disrupt it (see 47c).
- 68.
No sounds nor words actually come from the World Soul (see note 44). Discoursing and thinking are the two sides of the same coin (Sophist 263e3-5). The World Soul possesses a thinking activity without the necessity to produce an oral discourse.
- 69.
On the problems of translation of 37a6-37b3, see Cornford (1937, pp. 94–95), note 4; Brisson (1994, pp. 344–347). It seems that after having defined the subject of the knowledge (the World Soul), Timaeus here indicates that (1) the objects of knowledge are the sensible and the intelligible; (2) for each of the two kinds of object, the World Soul will know them as being the same as and different from each other; and (3) after having judged their identity and difference, the World Soul will assess the mutual relations that can be found between those objects. This appears to imply not only horizontal relations (Forms-Forms and sensible objects-sensible objetcs) but also vertical relations between the sensible objects and the Forms: as the World Soul is an intermediate between the intelligible and the sensible, its knowledge must encompass the whole reality in its complexity and variety. See Mason (2013, p. 213): “Secondly, while it does this with regard to generated things (τὰ γιγνόμενά) and Forms, the key point is that the former are seen in relation both to Forms and to other generated things. It is a matter, in light of Forms, of knowing everything that ‘comes to pass’ (ξυμβαίνει) in its ‘where’ (ὅπῃ) and ‘when’ (ὁπότε), its ‘in what way’ (ὅπως) and ‘in relation to what’ (πρὸς ὅ τί): under what conditions it comes about that a given thing ‘is’ or ‘is affected’ (εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν) by something else in this or that way”.
- 70.
Cornford (1937, pp. 209–210).
- 71.
See Brisson (1994, pp. 350–354).
- 72.
It will be another story when it comes to describing the relations of the two circles in the case of human knowledge. In that case, the body plays a decisive role in the disruption of knowledge (as, e.g. in the case of children (43e)).
- 73.
Timaeus 40c-d.
- 74.
Perhaps it is possible to suppose that in a certain way being is implicitly included in the description of the cognitive function of the World Soul since as the Sophist 237c7-d4 points out, before having a certain property (like being identical or different) or being something qualified (a ti), an object must exist (to have being—to on). The question of existence is not crucial in the case of the cosmos since it is described as beautiful image which is said to exist (53c-d).
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Research funded by the FAPESP (São Paulo Research Foundation—Grant number: 17/00336-0) and the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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Pitteloud, L. (2019). Why Is the World Soul Composed of Being, Sameness and Difference?. In: Pitteloud, L., Keeling, E. (eds) Psychology and Ontology in Plato. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 139. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04654-5_7
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