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Economical Unification in Philosophy of Science Before and After Ernst Mach

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Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence

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Abstract

This article portrays unification of physics as a central tenet of Ernst Mach’s thought, and organizes some of the focal issues in philosophy of science around the process of unification of science. Mach finds a natural place in the history. Newton’s Principia marked the beginning of the era of mathematical physics, which developed triumphantly in the eighteenth century, until new phenomena were discovered in the nineteenth century whose explanations went over and above Newtonian physics. Also Positivism emerged in the nineteenth century. This was the setting where Mach entered. The notion that a central function of physics is to give mathematical descriptions of perceptions is all over Mach’s work, but in Mach’s thought mathematics comes together with hypothetical laws of nature and an overall world-view, similarly as in Newtonian physics where mathematics comes together with the laws of motion. Mach’s criticism of Newtonian absolute time and space was in line with positivism, and his suggestions about an overall holistic world-view were to function as an intuitive background for the new physics. Thus, as a physicist and a philosopher of physics, Mach should be seen primarily as a unifier, and his famous anti-metaphysics should be seen as derivative from this unificationist project: he did not intend to banish the metaphysical core that he himself proposed, but only metaphysics that is not needed in unified science.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, “Ontology and ideology”, in: Philosophical Studies 2, 1, 1951, pp. 11–5.

  2. 2.

    For comparison, Michael Heidelberger (lecture on 17.6.2016, Ernst Mach Centenary Conference, Vienna) maintained that according to Gustav Fechner (Über die Physikalische und Philosophische Atomenlehre, Leipzig: Hermann Mendelssohn 1855), physics involves four kinds of metaphysics. (1) Inference to the best explanation of phenomena: theoretical entities explaining the phenomena are not given in experience (yet they are of an experiential form). (2) Inference to possible appearances: they are not given in actual experience. (3) Inductive metaphysics: philosophical ‘completion’ of physical theories. (4) Speculative metaphysics: to assume theoretical entities of no experiential form. (1) and (3) seem to overlap.

  3. 3.

    Causal depth of an explanation denotes accuracy or the level of detail in which it characterizes phenomena, and the degree of variability in the phenomena it can manage. Cf. Michael Keas, “Systematizing the theoretical virtues”, in: Synthese, 195, 6, 2018, pp. 2761–2793.

  4. 4.

    Metaphysical weight of a theory is determined by the number of different types of metaphysical entities and quantities of each type. Both need to be counted, for one can compensate the other. Cf. Daniel Nolan, “Quantitative parsimony”, in: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48, 3, 1997.

  5. 5.

    Thomas Aquinas, Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2. Anton C. Pegis (Ed.). New York: Random House 1945, p. 129.

  6. 6.

    Girard Etzkom and Francis Kelly (Eds.), Opera Theologica, vol. 4. New York: St. Bonaventure University 1979, p. 290.

  7. 7.

    Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. 3rd ed. Translated into English by Andrew Motte. New York: Daniel Adee 1846, bk. 3, Rules I and III.

  8. 8.

    J.B.S Haldane, Science and Theology as Art-Forms, 1927. As quoted in p. 105, James W. McAllister, Beauty & Revolution in Science. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1996.

  9. 9.

    Albert Einstein, “On the method of theoretical physics”, p. 165, in: Philosophy of Science, 1, 2, 1934, pp. 163–169. Originally delivered as The Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford, 10 June 1933.

  10. 10.

    Eino Kaila, Human Knowledge: A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism. Translated from the Finnish 1939 version by Anssi Korhonen. Juha Manninen, Ilkka Niiniluoto and George A. Reisch (Eds.). Chicago: Open Court 2014, pp. 77–83.

  11. 11.

    This formulation in Ilkka Niiniluoto, “Descriptive and Inductive Simplicity”, pp. 158–9, in W. Salmon and G. Wolters (Eds.), Logic, Language, and the Structure of Theories, Proceedings of the Carnap-Reichenbach Centennial, University of Konstanz, 21.-24. May 1991. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press/Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1994, pp. 147–70.

  12. 12.

    Ilkka Niiniluoto, “Evaluation of Theories”, p. 190, in: Theo Kuipers (Ed.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: General Philosophy of Science – Focal Issues. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2007, pp. 175–217.

  13. 13.

    Mario Bunge, The Myth of Simplicity. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1963, p. 75.

  14. 14.

    Michael Friedman, “Explanation and scientific understanding”, p. 11, in: Journal of Philosophy, 71, 1, 1974, pp. 5–19.

  15. 15.

    Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World, p. 431, in: Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (Eds.) Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989, pp. 410–505.

  16. 16.

    These virtues are listed in the following works. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London and New York: Routledge 1999, p. 171. Anjan Chakravartty, op. cit. Daniel Nolan, “The A Posteriori Armchair”, p. 224, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93, 2, 2015, pp. 211–31.

  17. 17.

    William Whewell, Novum Organon Renovatum. London: John W. Parker 1858, pp. 83–96.

  18. 18.

    Adolfas Mackonis, “Inference to the best explanation, coherence and other explanatory virtues”, in: Synthese, 190, 6, 2013, pp. 975–995.

  19. 19.

    Adolfas Mackonis, op. cit., p. 983.

  20. 20.

    Jeffrey Poland, Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994, p. 29.

  21. 21.

    Ernst Mach, The Economical Nature of Physical Inquiry. In Popular Scientific Lectures, 5th ed., pp. 186–213. Translated by T.J. McCormack. La Salle: Open Court 1943, p. 207.

  22. 22.

    Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics: a Critical and Historical Account of its Development. 4th ed. Translated by T.J. McCormack. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1919, p. 491.

  23. 23.

    Ernst Mach, History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. 2nd ed.Translated by Philip Jourdain. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1911, p. 9.

  24. 24.

    I thank Karl and Hayo Siemsen for guiding me into this interpretation.

  25. 25.

    Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics. op. cit, p. 490.

  26. 26.

    Ernst Mach, “The Guiding Principles of My Scientific Theory of Knowledge and Its Reception by My Contemporaries”, p. 39, in: Stephen Toulmin (Ed.), Physical Reality. New York: Harper Torchbooks 1970, pp. 28–43. Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical. Translated by C. M. Williams. La Salle: Open Court 1984, pp. 361–2.

  27. 27.

    Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics. op. cit., p. 482.

  28. 28.

    Ernst Mach, History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, op. cit, p. 9. S.G. Brush, “Mach and Atomism”, in: Synthese, 18, 2, 1968, pp. 192–215. John Blackmore, “An Historical Note on Ernst Mach”, in: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 36, 3, 1985, pp. 299–305.

  29. 29.

    Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics. op. cit., e.g. pp. 229, 542–3.

  30. 30.

    See Leibniz’s Letters to Clarke III.4. and IV.41.

  31. 31.

    Tuomo Suntola, The Short History of Science — or the long path to the union of metaphysics and science. Espoo: Physics Foundations Society 2012, p. 267.

  32. 32.

    Ernst Mach, History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, op. cit.

  33. 33.

    Mach had doubts about the Theory of Relativity: “Will it prove to be more than a transitory inspiration in the history of science?” Ernst Mach, The Principles of Physical Optics: an Historical and Philosophical Treatment. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2013, p.viii. Originally published: London: Methuen & co., 1926.

  34. 34.

    References that GR does not implement Mach’s Principle. D. W. Sciama, “On the origin of inertia”, in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 113, 1953, pp. 34–42. M. Reinhardt, “Mach’s principle — A critical review”, in Zeitschritte fur Naturforschung A, 28, 1973, pp. 529–537. D. J. Raine, “Mach’s principle and space-time structure”, in Reports on Progress in Physics, 44, 1981, pp. 1151–1195.

  35. 35.

    Tuomo Suntola, The Dynamic Universe: Toward a Unified Picture of Physical Reality, 4th ed. Espoo: Physics Foundations Society; Helsinki: The Finnish Society for Natural Philosophy. 2018

  36. 36.

    Cf. Thomas Uebel, “Vienna circle”, in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University 2015.

  37. 37.

    Atocha Aliseda and Donald Gilles, “Logical, Historical, and Computational Approaches”, p. 436, in: Theo Kuipers (Ed.) General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Amsterdam, Oxford: Elsevier 2007, pp. 431–514.

  38. 38.

    Don Ross, James Ladyman and David Spurrett, “Defence of Scientism”, pp. 9–10, in: James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett and John Collier (Eds.), Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press 2007, pp. 1–65.

  39. 39.

    Cf. Andrew Melnyk, “Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And If So, How?”, p. 94, in: Don Ross, James Ladyman and Harold Kincaid (Eds.), Scientific Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, pp. 79–95.

  40. 40.

    Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970.

  41. 41.

    Ernst Nagel, The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Explanation. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1961.

  42. 42.

    Psillos considers the atomic hypothesis as such postulate, for it functions as a bridge between “the kinetic theory of gases and the molecular theory of the chemical elements, and gains support from both.” Stathis Psillos, op. cit., p. 173.

  43. 43.

    Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1959.

  44. 44.

    Anjan Chakravartty, “Scientific Realism”, in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University 2015.

  45. 45.

    Ilkka Niiniluoto, Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987, p.xii.

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Styrman, A. (2019). Economical Unification in Philosophy of Science Before and After Ernst Mach. In: Stadler, F. (eds) Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04378-0_15

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