International Obligations of the EU and the Member States Under EU IIPAs

Stegmann, Philipp Theodor

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-04366-7_2

International Obligations of the EU and the Member States Under EU IIPAs

Philipp Theodor Stegmann²¹

Chapter
First Online: 25 January 2019

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Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 6))

Abstract

This chapter seeks to set out the incumbency of the international obligations under mixed and EU-only IIPAs. This issue is ultimately important for the international responsibility of the EU and the Member States: Being bound by an international obligation is a constituent element of international responsibility to arise. As Article 1 ARS and Article 3 ARIO make clear, international responsibility of a state or an international organisation requires an internationally wrongful act. Pursuant to Article 4(b) ARIO an internationally wrongful act of an international organisation consists of conduct attributable to an international organisation and ‘in breach of an obligation of that international organization’. Article 2(b) ARS equally requires a ‘breach of an international obligation of the state’. Thus, without the existence of an international obligation incumbent upon either the EU or a Member State there is, generally, no case for international responsibility for either one.

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Notes

1.
Pieter Jan Kuijper and Esa Paasivirta (2005) Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the responsibility of international organizations. 36(1) NYIntlL, p. 184; Mirka Möldner (2012) Responsibility of International Organizations – Introducing the ILC’s DARIO. 16 MPUNYB, p. 295; ARIO Commentary, pre-Article 6: ‘According to article 4 of the present articles, attribution of conduct under international law to an international organization is one condition for an international wrongful act of that international organization to arise, the other condition being that the same conduct constitutes a breach of an obligation that exists under international law for the international organization [emphasis added]’.
2.
ARS Commentary, Article 2, para. 7: ‘The terminology of breach of an international obligation of the State is long established and is used to cover both treaty and non-treaty obligations’; ARIO Commentary, Article 4, para. 2: ‘The obligation may result either from a treaty binding the international organization or from any other source of international law applicable to the organization’.
3.
The Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 ICJ Reports, pp. 89–90, para. 37.
4.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
5.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations and between International Organizations of 1986, UN Doc A/CONF.129/15.
6.
Martin Björklund (2001) Responsibility in the EC for Mixed Agreements – Should Non-Member Parties Care? 70(3) NordicJIntlL, p. 389.
7.
Eva Steinberger (2006) The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the EC Member States’ Membership of the WTO. 17(4) EJIntlL, p. 843.
8.
Malcolm N Shaw (2017) International Law, 8th edn. Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–157.
9.
Ibid.
10.
Christian Tomuschat (2002) The International Responsibility of the European Union. In: Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations. Kluwer Law International, p. 177; Gleider I Hernández (2013) Beyond the Control Paradigm? International Responsibility and the European Union. 15 CYELS, p. 648.
11.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174.
12.
Hernández, this chapter, fn. 10, p. 648.
13.
Jan Klabbers (2015) An Introduction to International Organizations Law, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, pp. 267 et seq.
14.
A list of international agreements concluded by the EU can be found at the European Commission Treaty Office Database: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do. Accessed 26 August 2018.
15.
Some federal states, though, divide treaty-making competences between the central state and its constituent subdivisions, which may hinder the central state to enter into a particular treaty binding on the federal state as a whole that concerns competences held by the constituent subdivisions. See Robert Schütze (2014) Federalism and Foreign Affairs, Mixity as an (Inter)national Phenomenon. In: Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, pp. 175–208; Gleider I Hernández (2013) Federated entities in international law: disaggregating the federal state?. In: Duncan French (ed.) Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law. Cambridge University Press, pp. 491–512; Hernández, this chapter, fn. 10, pp. 655–659.
16.
Piet Eeckhout (2011) EU External Relations Law. Oxford University Press, p. 214.
17.
Ibid, p. 213.
18.
Allan Rosas (1998) Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements. In: Martti Koskenniemi (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union. Kluwer Law International, pp. 128–133.
19.
Mirka Möldner (2011) European Community and Union, Mixed Agreements. In: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. http://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e628?rskey=xJ6L12&result=1&prd=EPIL. Accessed 26 August 2018, para. 7.
20.
Ibid.
21.
Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, para. 12.
22.
See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (1983) Mixed Agreements – A List of Problems. In: (eds.) Mixed Agreements. Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, p. 6; Geert De Baere (2008) Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations. Oxford University Press, p. 234; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 221.
23.
Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, para. 8.
24.
Rosas, this chapter, fn. 18, p. 130; Opinion 1/75 Understanding on a Local Costs Standard [1975] ECR 1361, p. 1364; Opinion 2/91 ILO Convention No 170 [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 34. But see Schmalenbach in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds.) (2011) EUV/AEUV Kommentar, 4th edn. CH Beck, Article 216 TFEU, para. 5; Nanette A Neuwahl (1991) Joint participation in international treaties and the exercise of power by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed agreements. 28(4) CMLRev, pp. 732 et seq.
25.
Thomas Eilmansberger (2009) Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law. 46(2) CMLRev, p. 392.
26.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3.
27.
Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, para. 9.
28.
Rosas, this chapter, fn. 18, p. 131.
29.
In this regard, see Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, para. 7.
30.
Christian Tietje (2008) The Applicability of the Energy Charter Treaty in ICSID Arbitration of EU Nationals vs. EU Member States. 78 BTransnatlWR, pp. 14–15.
31.
Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267; Opinion 2/92 OECD-National Treatment Instrument [1995] ECR I-521.
32.
Article 56(1) EC reads: ‘Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited’.
33.
Pursuant to Article 57(2) EC, the EC can ‘adopt the measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment – including investment in real estate – establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets’.
34.
Joachim Karl (2004) The Competence for Foreign Direct Investment: New Powers for the European Union? 5(3) JWIT, pp. 414–415; Jan Asmus Bischoff (2011) Just a Little Bit of “Mixity”? The EU’s Role in the Field of International Investment Protection Law. 48(5) CMLRev, pp. 1535, 1536; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 14; Christoph Herrmann and Judith Crämer (2015) Foreign Direct Investment - A “Coincidental” Competence of the EU. 43 HitoJLP, pp. 87–90; Eilmansberger, this chapter, fn. 25, p. 391.
35.
See with references contained therein, Herrmann/Crämer, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 88.
36.
Karl, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 414–415; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1535.
37.
Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, para. 16.
38.
Opinion of AG Maduro, Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-1301; Case C-249/06 Commission v Schweden [2009] ECR I-1335, paras. 27–28; see also Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 14; Eilmansberger, this chapter, fn. 25, pp. 389–390; Lorenza Mola (2008) Which role for the EU in the development of international investment law? 26/08 SIEL Online Proceedings Working Paper. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154583. Accessed 26 August 2018, p. 15; Jan Ceyssens (2005) Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the European Constitution. 32(3) LIEcoI, pp. 260–262; Philip Strik (2014) Shaping the Single European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment. Hart Publishing, p. 78.
39.
Eilmansberger, this chapter, fn. 25, p. 391; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, pp. 7, 14–15; Richard Happ and Jan Asmus Bischoff (2011) Role and Responsibility of the European Union under the Energy Charter Treaty. In: Graham Coop (ed.) Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty. JurisNet, p. 167; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 1535–1536; Karl, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 416 et seq; Ceyssens, this chapter, fn. 38, pp. 260, 268; Mola, this chapter, fn. 38, pp. 14–16; Michael Waibel (2013) Competence Review: Trade and Investment. Paper for Balance of EU competences review: trade and investment conducted by the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills of the government of the United Kingdom. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507138. Accessed 26 August 2018, p. 14; Herrmann/Crämer, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 87–90; Thomas Roe and Matthew Happold (2011) Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty. Cambridge University Press, p. 89; Armand de Mestral (2010) The Lisbon Treaty and the Expansion of EU Competence over Foreign Direct Investment and the Implications for Investor-State Arbitration. In: Karl P Sauvant (ed.) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2009–2010. Oxford University Press, p. 372; Anca Radu (2008) Foreign Investors in the EU – Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions between Bilateral Investments Treaties and EU law. 14(2) ELJ, p. 240; P Strik, this chapter, fn. 38, p. 78. Advocating that investment protection before Lisbon fell under shared competence, Angelos Dimopoulos (2011) EU Foreign Investment Law. Oxford University Press, pp. 92–94, 108, 116–119, 256; Niklas Maydell (2007) The European Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Competence. In: August Reinisch and Christina Knahr (eds.) International Investment Law in Context. Eleven International Publishing, pp. 80 et seq; Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang (2010) The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy. 21(4) EJIntlL, p. 1050.
40.
Cf. Mola, this chapter, fn. 38, p. 15: ‘[…] because the post-establishment phase within the EU, or in other terms, the operation, conduct and management of company, still relies upon the national treatment rule, then the EU law lacks internal harmonization and therefore, according to the Opinion 2/92 and 1/94 case law, external competence on post-establishment’.
41.
See Article 1(4) ECT and Annex EM of the ECT.
42.
But see Articles 154, 155, 175(2)(c) TEC.
43.
With respect to the legal basis upon which the EC and the Member States became parties to the ECT, and therefore with respect to the division of competences as regards the subject matter of the ECT see: Council Decision 94/998/EC [1994] OJ L 380 p. 1, and Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom [1998] OJ L 69 p. 1. See also Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 166–167; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, pp. 7, 14–15; Graham Coop (2009) Energy Charter Treaty and the European Union: Is Conflict Inevitable? 27(3) JERL, pp. 405–406, 415–416.
44.
On the EU’s international investment policy and the role of the Commission in it, see Johann Robert Basedow (2018) The EU in the Global Investment Regime – Commission Entrepreneurship, Incremental Institutional Change and Business Lethargy. Routledge.
45.
Citing an abundant body of literature with respect to the debate about the scope of the EU’s competence for international investment protection post-Lisbon, August Reinisch (2014) The EU on the Investment Path – Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other Investment Agreements. 12(1) StClJIntlL, p. 115.
46.
See on the wording in particular, Steffen Hindelang and Niklas Maydell (2011) The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots. In: Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel and Steffen Hindelang (eds.) European Yearbook of International Economic Law – International Investment Law and EU Law. Springer, pp. 12 et seq.
47.
Communication from the EC and its Member States to the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, 16 April 2002, WT/WGTI/W/115, paras. 7, 14–16.
48.
CETA, TTIP, the EU-Vietnam FTA and the EU-Singapore IIPA retain a broad asset-based definition of investment comprising both FDI and FPI. See e.g. Article 8.1 CETA; Article 1.2(1) EU-Singapore IIPA. With respect to the definition of investment in CETA, see Marc Bungenberg (2014) The Scope of Application of EU (Model) Investment Agreements. 15(3–4) JWIT, pp. 414–417.
49.
Explanatory Memorandum to REG, p. 3; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, Brussels 7 July 2010, COM (2010) 343, p. 8.
50.
Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11573, paras. 181–182: ‘[…] the concept of direct investments concerns investments […] which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity. As regards shareholdings in new or existing undertakings, as the explanatory notes confirm, the objective of establishing or maintaining lasting economic links presupposes that the shares held by the shareholder enable him, either pursuant to the provisions of the national laws relating to companies limited by shares or otherwise, to participate effectively in the management of that company or in its control’.
51.
The CJEU has described the notion of ‘portfolio investment’ as ‘the acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking’. See Joined Cases C-282/4 and C-283/04 Commission v The Netherlands [2008] ECR I-9141, para. 19.
52.
See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 et al (Lisbon Treaty), 30 June 2009, para. 379: ‘The extension of the common commercial policy to ‘foreign direct investment’ (Article 207(1) TFEU) confers exclusive competence on the European Union also in this area. Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term ‘foreign direct investment’ only encompasses investment, which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise […]. The consequence of this would be that exclusive competence only exists for investment of this type whereas investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreement’.
53.
See for the view of the Commission and the CJEU on the difference between FDI and FPI: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, Brussels 7 July 2010, COM (2010) 343, pp. 2–3.
54.
OECD (2008) Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th edn. https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2018, p. 10; see also Working Group on the relationship between trade and investment, Communication from the EC and its Member States, 16 April 2002, WT/WGTI/W/115, para. 18.
55.
Eileen Denza (2013) Responsibility of the European Union in the Context of Investment. In: Malcolm D Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) The International Responsibility of the European Union. Hart Publishing, p. 226.
56.
Explanatory Memorandum to REG, pp. 3–4; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, Brussels 7 July 2010, COM (2010) 343, pp. 8, 10.
57.
Explanatory Memorandum to REG, pp. 3–4; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, Brussels 7 July 2010, COM (2010) 343, pp. 8, 10; for a good discussion whether this is viable and legally sound, see Hindelang/Maydell, this chapter, fn. 46, pp. 23–28.
58.
Explanatory Memorandum to REG, p. 3.
59.
Dörr in Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf and Martin Nettesheim (eds.) (2017) Das Recht der Europäischen Union: EUV/AEUV, 63rd edn. CH Beck, Article 47 TEU, paras. 44–45.
60.
Cf. Opinion 2/92 OECD-National Treatment Instrument [1995] ECR I-521, para. 32; Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267, paras. 86, 100; Case C-476/98, Commission v Germany (Open Skies) [2002] ECR I-9855, paras. 82–89; Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805, paras. 40–45; Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145, paras. 117–128.
61.
Jan Asmus Bischoff (2014) Initial Hiccups or More? About the Efforts of the EU to Find its Future Role in International Investment Law. 11(1) TDM, p. 7.
62.
Reinisch, this chapter, fn. 45, p. 140.
63.
In the same direction, Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 104–105; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1545; Marc Bungenberg (2011) The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States in the Area of Investment Politics. In: Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel and Steffen Hindelang (eds.) European Yearbook of International Economic Law – International Investment Law and EU Law. Springer, pp. 40–42; Hindelang/Maydell, this chapter, fn. 46, p. 13.
64.
Bungenberg, this chapter, fn. 63, p. 29.
65.
See Reinisch, this chapter, fn. 45, p. 117.
66.
Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 1543–1544.
67.
See Angelos Dimopoulos (2012) Creating an EU Investment Policy: Challenges for the Post-Lisbon Era of External Relations. In: Paul James Cardwell (ed.) EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era. Asser Press, p. 408; Christian Tietje (2009) Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon. 83 BTransnatlWR, p. 17.
68.
Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, pp. 1541–1543; Wolfgang Weiß (2013) Common Commercial Policy in the European Constitutional Area: EU External Trade Competence and the Lisbon Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court. In: Marc Bungenberg and Christoph Herrmann (eds.) Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon. Springer, pp. 34–36.
69.
See Christian Tietje, Emily Sipiorski and Grit Töpfer (2013) Responsibility in Investor-State-Arbitration in the EU: Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established under EU’s International Investment Agreements. 10(2) TDM, pp. 16–17.
70.
See Article 8.39 CETA, Article 3.18 EU-Singapore IIPA, Article 28 Section 3 Investment Chapter TTIP and Article 27 Section 3 Investment Chapter EU-Vietnam FTA. Under these rules the remedy of restitution of property is also possible, but only provided that the Tribunal offers the respondent to pay compensation instead of restitution of property.
71.
Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1534; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 67, pp. 16–17; Eilmansberger, this chapter, fn. 25, pp. 394–396; Shan/Zhang, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 1059, 1064.
72.
Opinion 2/15 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (16 May 2017), para. 305. For further analysis of the judgment, its political dimension and its repercussions on EU international investment policy, see Marise Cremona (2018) Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017: ECJ, 16 May 2017, Opinion 2/15 Free Trade Agreement with Singapore. 14(1) ECLRev, pp. 231–259; David Kleimann, Gesa Kübek (2018) The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment Agreements in the EU: The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15. 45(1) LIEcoI, pp. 13–45; Philip Hainbach (2018) The CJEU’s Opinion 2/15 and the Future of EU Investment Policy and Law-Making. 45(2) LIEcoI, pp. 199–209.
73.
For example, transport, energy or safety concerns in public health matters, see Freya Baetens, Gerard Kreijen and Andrea Varga (2014) Determining Responsibility Under the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should Know. 47(5) VandJTransnatlL, p. 1224.
74.
Hindelang/Maydell, this chapter, fn. 46, p. 13; to the contrary, Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 61, p. 8.
75.
Opinion 2/15 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (16 May 2017), see e.g. paras. 244 and 292. See also Cremona, this chapter, fn. 72, pp. 250 et seq, pp. 256, 258.
76.
Cf. Pieter Jan Kuijper and Esa Paasivirta (2004) Further Exploring International Responsibility: The European Community and the ILC’s Project on Responsibility of International Organizations. 1(1) IntlOrgLRev, p. 116; Stefan Talmon (2005) Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the European Community require special treatment?. In: Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.) International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 410.
77.
Joni Heliskoski (2001) Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European Community and its Member States. Kluwer Law International, pp. 86 et seq; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, pp. 200 et seq and pp. 258 et seq.
78.
Klabbers, this chapter, fn. 13, p. 281.
79.
Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, p. 184: ‘There is a ‘horizontal’ dimension between the Community and its Member States, which raises another set of issues for purposes of international responsibility. International agreements in fields of shared competences between the Member States and the Community frequently result in so-called ‘mixed agreements’, to which both the EC and the Member States are contracting parties. Such a situation calls for apportionment of their respective responsibilities vis-à-vis third parties to such an agreement’.
80.
See Piet Eeckhout (2006) The EU and the Member States in the WTO–Issues of Responsibility. In: Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System. Oxford University, pp. 457–460; André Nollkaemper (2012) Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for Non-Performance of Obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements. In: Elisa Morgera (ed.) The External Environmental Policy of the European Union – EU and International Law Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, p. 333. See also below Sect. 3.1.3.
81.
James Crawford (2014) State Responsibility: The General Part. Cambridge University Press, p. 344; Rensmann in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.) (2012) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary. Springer, para. 75 and also Schmalenbach in Dörr/Schmalenbach, Article 26 VCLT, para. 57; Eleftheria Neframi (2002) International responsibility of the European Community and of the Member States under Mixed Agreements. In: Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.) The European Union as an Actor in International Relations. Kluwer Law International, p. 200; Albert Bleckmann (1983) The Mixed Agreements of the EEC in Public International Law. In: David O’Keeffe and Henry Schermers (eds.) Mixed Agreements. Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, p. 159; Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 10, p. 185; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1562; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 61, pp. 14–15 at fn. 51, 53 with many references; Henrik Ringbom (2008) European Union Maritime Safety Policy and International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 151–152; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, pp. 415–517; Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 77, p. 147; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, pp. 7–9. But see Christian Pitschas (2001) Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten. Duncker & Humblot, pp. 240 et seq, arguing that the EU and the Member States are each only bound by the parts of the mixed agreement lying within their exclusive competence even where the delimitation of competences is not disclosed. Joint obligations would only arise in cases of truly shared competences or ‘parallel’ mixity.
82.
Duncan B Hollis (2012) Oxford Guide to Treaties. Oxford University Press, p. 121.
83.
See ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations – Comments and Observations received from International Organizations, 56th Session, UN Doc A/CN.4/545, at paras. 13–14.
84.
Ibid.
85.
Ibid.
86.
See Opinion of AG Mischo, Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, paras. 29–30.
87.
Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] ECR I-625, para. 29. The case concerned the Fourth Convention between the European Economic Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of the other part, signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989, OJ L 229, 17 August 1991.
88.
Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] ECR I-625, para. 69.
89.
Opinion of AG Tesauro, Case C-53/96 Hermès International [1998] ECR I-3603, paras. 13–14, 20; Case C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior [2000] ECR I-11307, para. 33.
90.
Opinion of AG Tesauro, Case C-53/96 Hermès International [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 14.
91.
Case C-53/96 Hermès International [1998] ECR I-3603, para. 24.
92.
Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, paras. 26, 29–30.
93.
The case concerned the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 1976, 1102 UNTS 27, and the Athens Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources 1980, 1328 UNTS 105.
94.
See Kuijper, above Chap. 1, fn. 15, p. 210; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 322; Frank Hoffmeister (2010) Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the European Union and its Member States. In: Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World. Hart, pp. 264–265. But see Peter M Olson (2010) Mixity from the Outside: the Perspective of a Treaty Partner. In: Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World. Hart Publishing, pp. 342–343.
95.
Rainer Arnold (1981) Der Abschluss gemischter Verträge durch die Europäischen Gemeinschaften. 19(4) Archiv des Völkerrechts, p. 432; Martin Nettesheim (2009) Kompetenzen. In: Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds.) Europäisches Verfassungsrecht: Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge. Springer, p. 433; Pitschas, this chapter, fn. 81, pp. 31–32; see also Dörr in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, this chapter, fn. 59, Article 47 TEU, paras. 27–28; Rainer Arnold and Elisabeth Meindl (2018) K. Außenhandelsrecht. In: Manfred A Dauses and Markus Ludwigs (eds.) Handbuch des EU-Wirtschaftsrecht, 44th edn. CH Beck, para. 84.
96.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Reports 174, p. 179.
97.
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.) (1992) Oppenheim’s International Law – Volume I Peace: Introduction and Part 1, 9th edn. Oxford University Press, p. 16.
98.
Cf. Schmalenbach in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 6 VCLT, para. 29; Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 64; Schmalenbach in Calliess/Ruffert, this chapter, fn. 24, Article 216 TFEU, para. 7; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 842; Per Lachmann (1984) International Legal Personality of the EC: Capacity and Competence. 10(1) LIEuropIntg, p. 5; Dapo Akande (2014) International Organisations. In: Evans Malcolm D (ed.) International Law, 4th edn. Oxford University Press 2014, pp. 254–255; Henry G Schermers and Nielms M Blokker (2011) International Institutional Law, 5th edn. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, paras. 1562–1570.
99.
Akande, this chapter, fn. 98, pp. 254–255; Schermers/Blokker, this chapter, fn. 98, para. 1570.
100.
Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 842.
101.
Cf. Boustany/Didat in Oliver Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.) (2011) The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties – A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Article 27 VCLT-IO 1986, para. 13; Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, paras. 85–86.
102.
Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, para. 86; Dörr in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, this chapter, fn. 59, Article 47 TEU, para. 47.
103.
Akande, this chapter, fn. 98, p. 255.
104.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 418.
105.
Hoffmeister in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 17 VCLT, paras. 1–2; Walter in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 19 VCLT, paras. 1 et seq.
106.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 256.
107.
WTO Panel Reports, Cases WT/DS62/R; WT/DS67/R; WT/DS68/R, EC–Customs Classification of certain computer equipment (LAN), para. 8.16; WTO Panel Reports, Cases WT/DS375/R; WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R EC and MS–Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology, para. 8.2; WTO Panel Report, Case WT/DS316/R EC and certain MS–Measures Affecting Trade and Large Civil Aircraft, para. 7.174.
108.
As regards federal states, where the treaty-making competences of the federal state are often broader than its implementing competences, which predominantly lie with the constituent subdivisions, this is long undisputed. See below Sect. 3.2.4.1.
109.
Under certain conditions states and international organisations may plead their lack of treaty-making competence pursuant to Articles 46 VCLT/VCLT-IO. Thus, not only the lack of implementing, but also the lack of treaty-making competences are covered by Articles 27 VCLT/VCLT-IO in general.
110.
Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 8.
111.
Pursuant to Article 1(1)(j) VCLT-IO the rules of the organisation are defined as ‘the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established practice of the organization’.
112.
Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, pp. 8–9; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 169; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 843; Angelos Dimopoulos (2014) The Involvement of the EU in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Question of Responsibilities. 51(6) CMLRev, p. 1688; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 255; Schmalenbach in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 27 VCLT, para. 10; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 416; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 198.
113.
Cf. Boustany/Didat in Corten/Klein, this chapter, fn. 101, Article 27 VCLT-IO 1986, para. 3.
114.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 417.
115.
Ibid, p. 416.
116.
Ibid.
117.
Schmalenbach in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 26 VCLT, para. 56; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 417.
118.
Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, paras. 3, 22–25; Mark Eugen Villiger (2009) Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Article 46 VCLT, para. 11.
119.
Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, para. 25; Opinion of AG Tesauro in ibid, para. 12; Opinion of AG Lenz in Case 165/87 Commission v Council [1988] ECR 5545, para. 35; Opinion of AG Alber in Case C-233/02 France v Commission [2004] ECR I-2759, para. 50; Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-13/07 Commission v Council (withdrawn), para. 173; Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-4721, para. 59.
120.
Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 34; Villiger, this chapter, fn. 118, Article 46 VCLT, para. 8.
121.
Anthony Aust (2013) Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, pp. 273–274; Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, paras. 34–36 with many references.
122.
Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 40; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 844.
123.
See Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, pp. 844–848; Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, pp. 333–336; Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, para. 87; Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, pp. 389–395; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 265–266; Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 75.
124.
Boustany/Didat in Corten/Klein, this chapter, fn. 101, Article 27 VCLT-IO 1986, para. 13.
125.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 256.
126.
Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, para. 87; see also Opinion of AG Mischo, Case C-13/00, Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, paras. 29–30.
127.
Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 61, pp. 546–547; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1563.
128.
The fact that bilateral mixed agreements are of ‘shared mixity’ and not of ‘parallel mixity’ is regularly demonstrated by the fact that the EU and the Member States form a single contracting party. See below Sect. 2.3.1.1.7.
129.
Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 846; Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, paras. 86–87.
130.
Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 846; Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, pp. 389–395.
131.
Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 75; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 200; Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 334.
132.
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) 2002 ICJ Reports 275, para. 266.
133.
Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 73: ‘For non-members, the rules of an international organization are, in principle, not more easily ascertainable than the internal law of a State. Just as States or international organizations do not have a general legal obligation to keep themselves informed of legal developments in other States’.
134.
Schmalenbach in Calliess/Ruffert, this chapter, fn. 24, Article 216 AEUV, para. 7.
135.
Cf. Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 845; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 200; Christian Tomuschat (1983) Liability for Mixed Agreements. In: David O’Keeffe and Henry Schermers (eds.) Mixed Agreements. Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, p. 130.
136.
See Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 48 with many references.
137.
Markus Burgstaller (2011) The Energy Charter Treaty as Mixed Agreement: A Model for Future European Investment Treaties?. In: Graham Coop (ed.) Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty. JurisNet, p. 145; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 846.
138.
Articles 46 VCLT/VCLT-IO refer to the moment a treaty party expresses ‘its consent to be bound by a treaty’, which is usually the moment of conclusion, i.e. the signing and ratifying of the treaty. In general, competence shifts cannot alter the assumption of obligations under an agreement ex post facto. Otherwise, again, the rationale of Articles 27, 46 VCLT/VCLT-IO, i.e. the stability of treaties and the protection of good faith, would be undermined. See in this respect Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 257; Villiger, this chapter, fn. 118, Article 46 VCLT, para. 10.
139.
Maurits J F M Dolmans (1985) Problems of Mixed Agreements: Division of Powers within the EEC and the Rights of Third States. TMC Asser Instituut, pp. 25, 39–42, 97; Rosas, this chapter, fn. 18, pp. 129–131; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, pp. 846–847.
140.
Ibid.
141.
See again above Sect. 2.2.2.1.
142.
This view presupposes that there is no contractual delimitation of obligations under the ECT along competence lines, which is in fact not the case. See in this respect below Sect. 2.3.1.2.3.1.
143.
See this chapter, fn. 72.
144.
Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267.
145.
See again above Chap. 1, fn. 16.
146.
Aust, this chapter, fn. 121, p. 275.
147.
Arnold/Meindl, this chapter, fn. 95, para. 87.
148.
Ibid.
149.
Cf. Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 74.
150.
Ibid, para. 54.
151.
With the same result, Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 258; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 169–170; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 175.
152.
Arguing in this direction, Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 256: ‘Irrespective of whether future EU IIPAs are concluded as pure Union agreements or as mixed agreements, it will be evident to third countries that FDI is a field of a priori exclusive EU competence and, therefore, the EU is the only responsible actor for the performance and violations of the investment obligations. […] in case of actions brought against individual Member States, Member States could successfully invoke Article 46 [VCLT] and escape responsibility for violation [sic] of provisions resulting from their own or EU conduct’; see also Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 112, p. 1688.
153.
See again above Sect. 2.2.2.2.
154.
See Opinion 2/15 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (16 May 2017).
155.
Pieter Jan Kuijper and Esa Paasivirta (2013) EU International Responsibility and its Attribution: From the Inside Looking out. In: Malcolm D Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) The International Responsibility of the European Union. Hart, p. 59: ‘The area of shared competences is more complex. The area of shared competences is dynamic in the sense that it requires verification whether the EU has exercised its competence’; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 257; Allan Rosas (2003) International Dispute Settlement: EU Practices and Procedures. 46 GYIntlL, p. 284; Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Sellafield) [2006] ECR I-4635, para. 33. But see Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 77, pp. 46–47, submitting that the EU cannot exercise shared competences when concluding a mixed agreement.
156.
See Marise Cremona (2006) External Relations of the EU and the Member States: Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law. 2006/22 EUI Working Paper LAW. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6249/LAW-2006-22.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 26 August 2018, p. 17; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 257; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 457.
157.
See Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, para. 30; Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Sellafield) [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 96–97.
158.
Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Sellafield) [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 107–108.
159.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 257.
160.
Cf. Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 258; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, pp. 847–848: ‘For third Members, this manner of [implicit] competence partition is very unpredictable and largely inscrutable’.
161.
Steffen Hindelang (2009) The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law. Oxford University Press, p. 66; Friedl Weiss and Silke Steiner (2013) The Investment Regime under Article 207 of the TFEU – A Legal Conundrum: The Scope of ‘Foreign Direct Investment’ and the Future of Intra-EU BITs. In: Freya Baetens (ed.) Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, p. 361; Walid Ben Hamida (2005) The Mihaly vs. Sri Lanka Case: Some Thoughts Relating to the Status of Pre-Investment Expenditures. In: Todd Weiler (ed.) International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading cases from ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law. Cameron May, p. 47.
162.
Jeswald W Salacuse (2013) The Three Laws of International Investment – National, Contractual and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital. Oxford University Press, p. 15.
163.
Weiss/Steiner, this chapter, fn. 161, p. 361.
164.
For example, contractual rights may qualify as ‘investment’ under BITs whereas under EU law they would qualify as services. See in this regard Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 406.
165.
See Article 1(6) ECT defining investment as ‘every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor’ followed by a non-exhaustive list of protected investments.
166.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, pp. 405–406. Regarding the definition of ‘investment’ under BITs in general, see Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore, Matthew Weiniger (2007) International Investment Arbitration Substantive Principles. Oxford University Press, paras. 6.26–6.35.
167.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 406.
168.
See again fn. 48.
169.
For example, the definition of investment in Article 8.1 CETA (similar in Article 1.2 EU-Singapore IIPA, the EU-Vietnam FTA and TTIP) reads: ‘Forms that an investment may take include: a) an enterprise; b) shares, stocks and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; c) bonds, debentures and other debt instruments of an enterprise; d) a loan to an enterprise; e) any other kinds of interest in an enterprise; f) an interest arising from: i. a concession conferred pursuant to domestic law or under a contract, including to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources, ii. a turnkey, construction, production, or revenue-sharing contract, or iii. other similar contracts; g) intellectual property rights; h) any other moveable property, tangible or intangible, or immovable property and related rights; i) claims to money or claims to performance under a contract’.
170.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 198.
171.
See below Sect. 3.2.1.2.
172.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, pp. 408, 414–417; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, pp. 328, 331; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 187–188; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 201; Second Report on the Responsibility of International Organizations by Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, ILC 56th session, UN Doc A/CN.4/541, 2 April 2004, para. 8. Cf. below fn. 163.
173.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 408; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 331; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 201. Cf. below fn. 163.
174.
Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 328; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, pp. 414–417.
175.
Ibid.
176.
Ibid.
177.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, pp. 408, 414–417; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 187–188.
178.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, pp. 408, 414–417; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 187–188; Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 840; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 253; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 328; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 201; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 61, pp. 546–547; Allan Rosas (2014) Exclusive, Shared and National Competence in the Context of EU External Relations: Do Such Distinctions Matter?. In: Inge Govaere, Erwan Lannon, Peter van Elsuwege, Stanislas Adam (eds.) The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 26; Marc Maresceau (2010) A Typology of Bilateral Mixed Agreements. In: Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World. Hart, pp. 13–14.
179.
For a list of bilateral agreements concluded by the EU alone or together with its Member States: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByType.do?id=1. Accessed 26 August 2018.
180.
But see Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, p. 188.
181.
Fourth Convention between the European Economic Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of the other part, signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989 [1991] OJ L 229, p. 3.
182.
Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part [2008] OJ L 289, p. 3.
183.
Ibid, Article 233(2)(3).
184.
Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 350.
185.
Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] ECR I-625, para. 29.
186.
Ibid, para. 28.
187.
Ibid, para. 33.
188.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 197. Cf. above Sect. 2.3.1.1.7.
189.
Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council (EDF) [1994] ECR I-625, para. 29.
190.
See Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 415; Pieter Jan Kuijper, James H Mathis and Natalie Y Morris-Sharma (2015) From Treaty-Making to Treaty-Breaking: Models for ASEAN External Trade Agreements. Cambridge University Press, p. 136; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 328.
191.
Villiger, this chapter, fn. 118, Article 41 VCLT, para. 4; Odendahl in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 41 VCLT, para. 1; Kamala Dawar (2010) Disconnection Clauses: An Inevitable Symptom of Regionalism? SIEL Online Proceedings Working Paper No. 2010/11. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1632433. Accessed 26 August 2018; Maja Smrkolj (2008) The Use of the ‘Disconnection Clause’. In: International Treaties: What Does it Tell us about the EC/EU as an Actor in the Sphere of Public International Law? Paper presented at the GARNET Conference ‘The EU in International Affairs’ in Brussels, 24–26 April 2008. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133002. Accessed 26 August 2018.
192.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 197; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 330; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 419; Case C-13/00, Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, para. 15.
193.
See below Sect. 2.3.1.2.3.1.
194.
With the same result, Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 175; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 174–175, 182; Markus Burgstaller (2009) European Law and Investment Treaties. 26(2) JIntlA, pp. 205–206; Coop, this chapter, fn. 43, pp. 416–417.
195.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, pp. 195, 198; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 418; Tobias Lock (2015) The European Court of Justice and International Courts – International Courts and Tribunals Series. Oxford University Press, p. 120.
196.
Andrès Delgado Casteleiro (2012) EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base? 17(4) EFARev, p. 496; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1562.
197.
Cf. Steinberger, this chapter, fn. 7, p. 843; Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 153; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 418.
198.
Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 152; Dolmans, this chapter, fn. 139, p. 66; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 418; John Temple Lang (1986) The Ozone Layer Convention: A New Solution to the Question of Community Participation in “mixed” International Agreements. 23(1) CMLRev, pp. 157–176; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 170.
199.
Cf. Joni Heliskoski (2010) EU Declarations of Competences and International Responsibility. In: Malcolm D Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World. Hart Publishing, pp. 190, 205; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, pp. 492, 508; Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, pp. 259, 263; Cremona, this chapter, fn. 156, pp. 21–22; Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 335; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 185, 219; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 155, p. 56: ‘Simply, it is relevant to know and to understand during normal international cooperation how and by whom the obligations are to be carried out’; Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 10, p. 185; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 137, pp. 141–142.
200.
See below Sect. 2.3.1.2.3.2.1.
201.
See Kuijper/Mathis/Morris-Sharma, this chapter, fn. 190, p. 144; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, pp. 197–198.
202.
Association Agreement with the Republic of Hungary [1993] OJ L 347, p. 2.
203.
Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, paras. 22, 35; Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 263; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 203 using the term ‘interpretive clauses’; see also Opinion 1/91 Economic Area Agreement I [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 33: ‘The expression ‘Contracting Parties’ is defined in Article 2(c) of the agreement. As far as the Community and its Member States are concerned, it covers the Community and the Member States, or the Community, or the Member States, depending on the case. Which of the three possibilities is to be chosen is to be deduced in each case from the relevant provisions of the agreement and from the respective competences of the Community and the Member States as they follow from the EEC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty’.
204.
Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part [2002] OJ L 352, p. 3; see further with similar wording: Article 104 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia [1997] OJ L/327 p. 1; Article 233 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part [2008] OJ L 289, p. 3; Article 1.2 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part [2011] OJ L 127, p. 6.
205.
Agreement on the European Economic Area [1994] OJ L 1, p. 3.
206.
See e.g. Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, pp. 491–510; Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, pp. 189–212; Rensmann in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 46 VCLT, para. 76; Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, pp. 259–260; Möldner, this chapter, fn. 19, paras. 22, 35; Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, pp. 335–337; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, p. 185; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, pp. 256–257, 262; Cremona, this chapter, fn. 156, pp. 20–22; Klabbers, this chapter, fn. 13, pp. 281–282; Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1565; Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, pp. 376–382; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 417; Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 153; Lock, this chapter, fn. 195, p. 120; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, p. 329.
207.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, p. 209; Hollis, this chapter, fn. 82, p. 120; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, p. 492.
208.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, pp. 192 et seq.
209.
Ibid, pp. 196–200.
210.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 195; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, p. 492; Lock, this chapter, fn. 195, p. 120.
211.
Opinion 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, para. 35. The ECJ stated that ‘it is not necessary to set out and determine, as regards other parties to the Convention, the division of powers in this respect between the Community and the Member States, particularly as it may change in the course of time […] it being understood that the exact nature of that division is a domestic question in which third parties have no need to intervene’.
212.
Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (Sellafield) [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 104, 116.
213.
A list of declarations of competences made by the EU can be found at the European Commission Treaty Office Database: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/viewCollection.do. Accessed 26 August 2018.
214.
Cf. Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, pp. 197–200.
215.
For example, pursuant to Article 4(2) Annex IX UNCLOS: ‘An international organization shall be a Party to this Convention to the extent that it has competence in accordance with the declarations, communications of information or notifications referred to in article 5 of this Annex [requiring the issuance of a declaration of competence]’.
216.
For example, Article 2(j) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime [2004] OJ L 261, p. 70, states that ‘references to ‘States Parties’ under this convention shall apply to such organisations within the limits of their competences’.
217.
For example, the Convention on Customs Treatment of Pool Containers used in International Transport [1995] OJ L 91, p. 46, provides in Article 14(3): ‘The organisation concerned shall, for the matters within its competence, exercise the rights and fulfil the responsibilities which this Convention confers on States which are Contracting Parties to this Convention’.
218.
E.g. Article 13(2) Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer [1998] OJ L 297, p. 10, and Article 24(2) Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [2002] OJ L 130, p. 4, state: ‘[…] the organisation and its Member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under [the treaty]’.
219.
Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, p. 494.
220.
E.g. Article 2 Annex IX UNCLOS stipulates that: ‘At the time of signature an international organization shall make a declaration specifying the matters governed by this Convention in respect of which competence has been transferred to that organization by its member States which are signatories, and the nature and extent of that competence’. Article 5(1) Annex IX UNCLOS reiterates the organisation’s obligation of issuing such a declaration. Other multilateral mixed agreements have similar wordings, see Article 24(3) Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [2002] OJ L 130, p. 4; Article 13(3) Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer [1998] OJ L 297, p. 10; Article 14(3) Convention on Customs Treatment of Pool Containers used in International Transport [1995] OJ L 91, p. 46; Article 36(3) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime [2004] OJ L 261, p. 70.
221.
See e.g. Article 5(2) Annex IX UNCLOS.
222.
Moreover, this would follow e contrario from provisions, such as Article 5(3) Annex IX UNCLOS, stating that it is presumed that the members of the organisation have retained their competence to act as regards those competences, which have not been specifically declared.
223.
Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 260; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, p. 496; Ian MacLeod, Ian D Hendry and Stephen Hyett (1996) The External Relations of the European Communities. Clarendon Press, pp. 160–161; Phoebe Okowa (1995) The European Community and International Environmental Agreements, Yearbook of European Law. 15(1) YEL, p. 176; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 170.
224.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, p. 201.
225.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, pp. 202–203; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, pp. 495–496; Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 259.
226.
E.g. the declaration to the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [2002] OJ L 130, p. 4; the declaration to the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) [1991] OJ C, 16/12/1991, p. 238; the declaration to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity [2002] OJ L 201, p. 50, and the declaration to the Rotterdam Convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade [2003] OJ L 63, p. 29.
227.
Declaration to the Statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [2009] OJ L 178, p. 18.
228.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, p. 203.
229.
The declaration in relation to the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime [2005] OJ L 261, p. 70, states: ‘This competence relates to Articles 7, 9 and 31 (2)(c) of the Convention’. The declaration regarding the Convention on Customs Treatment of Pool Containers used in International Transport [1995] OJ L 91, p. 46, states that the EU is competent for all matters governed by the Convention except ‘the determination of duties, taxes, fees, or other charges referred to in Article 1 (a) of the Convention’. The declaration regarding the Convention relating to temporary admission (Istanbul Convention) [1993] OJ L 130, p. 4, has a similar wording. The declaration regarding the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances [1990] OJ L 326, p. 57, provides that ‘the European Economic Community is at present competent for questions of commercial policy relating to the substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, questions which are dealt with in Article 12 of the Convention’.
230.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, p. 205.
231.
Ibid.
232.
Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 336; Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 153.
233.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 197. But see Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 377.
234.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 419; Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 197; Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 382; Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, pp. 156–157; Nollkaemper, this chapter, fn. 80, pp. 321–322, 329–330; Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 135, p. 130; Eric Stein (1990) External Relations of the European Community: Structure and Process. In: Andrew Clapham (ed.) European Union Law. Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Volume I – 1. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 115, 179; Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 77, pp. 147–153.
235.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 419.
236.
Walter in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 19 VCLT, paras. 88–93.
237.
Walter in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 19 VCLT, para. 89.
238.
Hoffmeister in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 17 VCLT, para. 9.
239.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 204; Stein, this chapter, fn. 234, pp. 115, 179 noting that: ‘Unless a mixed agreement provides unambiguously for a distinction between the [Union]’s and the Member State’s rights and obligations, a breach on the part of the [Union] or the Member States causes joint responsibility’; to the contrary, Hoffmeister, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 263; Opinion 1/91 Economic Area Agreement I [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 33.
240.
Cf. Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 336.
241.
Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 419; Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 336; Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 199, p. 205; Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 135, p. 130: ‘If the Community and its Member States wilfully and purportedly refrain from formally publicizing the exact demarcation line between their respective areas of jurisdiction, their partners cannot be expected to make the necessary inquiries themselves’.
242.
Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 204; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 255; see in this respect below Sect. 4.1.2.
243.
Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 137, p. 128; Denza, this chapter, fn. 55, p. 223; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 168–170; Frank Hoffmeister (2010) Litigating against the European Union and its Member States – Who Responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International Organizations? 21(3) EJIntlL, p. 745; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 207–208; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 172, 175; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 9.
244.
See Electrabel SA v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012, para. 5.20 (Commission Submissions, para. 45).
245.
Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 1, pp. 207–208; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 168; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 172; Denza, this chapter, fn. 55, p. 223.
246.
See again for the entire text above Chap. 1, fn. 16.
247.
Cf. Denza, this chapter, fn. 55, p. 222.
248.
Cf. below Sect. 3.2.
249.
Cf. Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 170; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 174; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 9; Philippe Pinsolle (2010) Selected Nationality Issues in ECT Arbitration. In: Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros and David Arias (eds.) Liber Amicorum: Bernardo Cremades. La Ley, p. 967 at fn. 2975.
250.
See below Sect. 3.2.2 for whether the division of competences as derives from the EU Treaties should determine international responsibility under mixed IIPAs in general and under the ECT specifically.
251.
Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 77, p. 173; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 174; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, p. 9.
252.
Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 170.
253.
Cf. Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 61, p. 16.
254.
Cf. Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 175; Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 170.
255.
Dörr in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 31 VCLT, para. 101; Odendahl in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 45 VCLT, paras. 14 et seq.
256.
See para. 3(c) Proposal Revised ECT Statement.
257.
Cf. Neframi, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 197; see again above Sect. 2.3.1.1.7.
258.
See this chapter, fn. 24.
259.
Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30, pp. 10–14.
260.
The following cases, in which investors of Member States sued other Member States, bear witness to that possibility, Charanne BV and Construction Investments SARL v Spain, SCC Case No 062/2012, Award, 21 January 2015; EDF International v Republic of Hungary, UNCITRAL Award, 4 December 2014 (not public); Electrabel SA v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012; AES Summit Generation Ltd and Tisza Eromu Kft v The Republic of Hungary, Case No /07/22, Award, 23 September 2010. See also Tietje, this chapter, fn. 30; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 194, pp. 206–210. Questioning that possibility, Angelos Dimopoulos (2011) The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements between EU Member States und EU and International Law. 48(1) CMLRev, pp. 63–93.
261.
Happ/Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 178–180; Richard Happ (2007) The Legal Status of the Investor vis-à-vis the European Communities: Some Salient Thoughts. 10(3) IntlALRev, pp. 74–81; Philippe Pinsolle (2007) The Dispute Resolution Provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty. 10(3) IntlALRev, pp. 82–91; Pinsolle, this chapter, fn. 249, pp. 965–974. But see Jan Kleinheisterkamp (2012) Investment Protection and EU Law: The Intra- and Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty. 15(1) JIntlEcoL, p. 105; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 194, pp. 206–207; Christer Söderlund (2011) The Future of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Context of the Lisbon Treaty. In: Graham Goop (ed.) Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty. JurisNet, p. 117. See on the notion of EU nationality and EU citizenship of Member State investors for purposes of Article 1(7) ECT and relevant for the question whether Member State investors are of another contracting party, Crina Baltag (2012) The Energy Charter Treaty: The Notion of Investor. Kluwer Law International, pp. 79–81, 101, 107.
262.
See above Sect. 2.3.1.2.2.
263.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 251–252; Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, p. 499; Heliskoski, this chapter, fn. 77, pp. 161–166; Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 381.
264.
Olson, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 336.
265.
See again this chapter, fn. 199.
266.
Cf. Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 112, p. 1690; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 137, p. 143.
267.
Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267.
268.
Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, para. 90; Opinion 2/91 ILO Convention No 170 [1993] ECR I-1061, paras. 15–17; Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels [1977] ECR 741; see also Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, pp. 195–196; Angelos Dimopoulos (2008) The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism between Internal and External Economic Relations? 4 CYELP, pp. 117–119; Markus Krajewski (2005) External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and more Democratic Common Commercial Policy? 42(1) CMLRev, pp. 116–118; Hernández, this chapter, fn. 10, pp. 646–647; for a detailed appraisal of the ‘doctrine of parallelism’ in EU law, see Robert Schütze (2014) Parallel External Powers: from ‘Cubist’ Perspectives towards ‘Naturalist’ Constitutional Principles? In: Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, pp. 237–283.
269.
The provision reads: ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’.
270.
Gracia Marín-Durán (2015) The EU and its Member States in WTO Dispute Settlement: A ‘Competence Model’, or a Case Apart, for Managing International Responsibility?’. Presented at the joint workshop organised by EUI, ESIL Interest Group on ‘The EU as a Global Actor’ and CLEER on ‘The EU and International Dispute Settlement’, 19–20 February 2015. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683491. Accessed 26 August 2018, pp. 8, 24–25.
271.
See Krajewski, this chapter, fn. 268, pp. 116–118; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 11; Tietje/Sipiorski/Töpfer, this chapter, fn. 69, p. 18; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 268, pp. 117–119; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 408; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 137, p. 134; Hahn in Calliess/Ruffert, this chapter, fn. 24, Article 207 TFEU, paras. 119–121; Dörr in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, this chapter, fn. 59, Article 47 TEU, para. 47.
272.
Krajewski, this chapter, fn. 268, pp. 115–118; Hollis, this chapter, fn. 82, p. 119: ‘[…] the (external) capacity to conclude an international treaty does not necessarily coincide with the (internal) allocation of powers in its implementation’.
273.
Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 264; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 80, pp. 460–461; Marín-Durán, this chapter, fn. 270, pp. 8–9, 24–25.
274.
Tietje/Sipiorski/Töpfer, this chapter, fn. 69, p. 18.
275.
Joshua Robbins (2006) The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties. 13 UMIntlCLRev, p. 417.
276.
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (2000) The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes. Kluwer Law International, p. 60; Christoph H Schreuer (2013) Investments, International Protection. In: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. http://opil.ouplaw.com/abstract/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1533?rskey=HFO8B8&result=1&prd=EPIL. Accessed 26 August 2018, para. 1.
277.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 53 et seq.
278.
Bischoff, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 1543.
279.
See for a distinction of absolute and relative protection standards, McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, this chapter, fn. 166, para. 7.19.
280.
There are also positive obligations under IIPAs that require a State to act in order to protect the investment. Under those positive obligations, implementation is coupled to a certain conduct by the State and, concomitantly, a breach is coupled to an omission. For example, some forms of ‘denial of justice’ under the minimum standard of treatment (also considered part of the FET standard) or breaches under the ‘Full Protection and Security’ standard or certain promises by the host state to enable or enhance certain investments require positive action by the State. See in this respect Robbins, this chapter, fn. 275, pp. 424–431; Christoph H Schreuer and Rudolf Dolzer (2012) Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, pp. 226–227; Christoph H Schreuer (2007) Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with other Standards. 5(4) TDM, p. 4 with many references; with respect to the ‘Full Protection and Security Standard’, see McLachlan/Shore/Weiniger, this chapter, fn. 166, paras. 7.142 et seq: ‘The Full Protection and Security Standard] is concerned with failures by the State to protect the investor’s property from actual damage caused by either miscreant State officials, or by the actions of others, where the State has failed to exercise due diligence’.
281.
It has even been held that omissions cannot per se amount to an expropriation, Eudoro Armando Olguín v Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/98/5, Award, 26 July 2001. See also Robbins, this chapter, fn. 275, pp. 417–419.
282.
Schreuer, this chapter, fn. 280, p. 4.
283.
See Dolzer/Schreuer, this chapter, fn. 280, pp. 130–160 with many examples from case law.
284.
Robbins, this chapter, fn. 275, pp. 420–421.
285.
Tietje/Sipiorski/Töpfer, this chapter, fn. 69, pp. 16–18; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 17.
286.
The ECT though is limited to energy investments.
287.
See in general Catharine Titi (2014) The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law. Nomos and Hart Publishing; Catharine Titi (2015) Are Investment Tribunals Adjudicating Political Disputes? Some Reflections on the Repoliticization of Investment Disputes and (New) Forms of Diplomatic Protection. 32(3) JIntlA, pp. 261–288; Tietje/Sipiorski/Töpfer, this chapter, fn. 69, pp. 16–18; Tietje, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 17.
288.
See Lars Markert (2011) The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties: Balancing Investors’ Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States. In: Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel and Steffen Hindelang (eds.) European Yearbook of International Economic Law – International Investment Law and EU Law. Springer, pp. 145–171; Kyla Tienhaara (2011) Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science. In: Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds.) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration. Cambridge University Press, pp. 606–628.
289.
See Dolzer/Schreuer, this chapter, fn. 280, pp. 120–123.
290.
See Jonathan Bonnitcha (2014) Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, pp. 210 et seq.
291.
See Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc and AS Baltoil v The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001.
292.
See e.g. Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, Award, 17 February 2000, para. 71.
293.
The many investment treaty cases concerning the Argentine crisis are a good example. See Titi (2015) Are Investment Tribunals Adjudicating Political Disputes? Some Reflections on the Repoliticization of Investment Disputes and (New) Forms of Diplomatic Protection, this chapter, fn. 287, pp. 267 et seq.
294.
Metalclad Corporation v United States of Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, SA v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003.
295.
CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 121.
296.
See in general and citing arbitral case law, Ali Lazem and Ilias Bantekas (2015) The treatment of tax as expropriation in International investor–state arbitration. Arbitration International, aiv030. https://doi.org/10.1093/arbint/aiv030. Accessed 26 August 2018, pp. 1–46.
297.
Saluka Investments BV v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 306.
298.
See Tietje/Sipiorski/Töpfer, this chapter, fn. 69, p. 18; Ingolf Pernice (2014) Part III – Study on International Investment Protection Agreements and EU Law. EU Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union – Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions in the EU’s International Investment Agreements, Volume 2 – Studies. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/534979/EXPO_STU(2014)534979(ANN01)_EN.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2018, p. 136; Karl, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 432; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 408.
299.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 108–116.
300.
Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 39, pp. 114–115; Dimopoulos, this chapter, fn. 67, p. 416; Herrmann/Crämer, this chapter, fn. 34, p. 93.
301.
Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 381 with further references therein.
302.
See below Sect. 3.1.2.
303.
Cf. Delgado Casteleiro, this chapter, fn. 196, pp. 498–499; Burgstaller, this chapter, fn. 137, p. 143; Roe/Happold, this chapter, fn. 39, p. 172.
304.
Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 381.
305.
Temple Lang, this chapter, fn. 198, p. 163; see also Ringbom, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 156: ‘But in theory, too, the ex ante delimitation is based on the (usually misleading) assumption that conventions and their subsequent implementation may be divided into separate and fully distinguishable parts’.
306.
Joni Heliskoski (2010) Adoption of Positions under Mixed Agreements (Implementation). In: Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World. Hart, p. 150.
307.
Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 155, p. 36; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 116; Talmon, this chapter, fn. 76, p. 410; Hollis, this chapter, fn. 82, p. 108; Schmalenbach in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 26 VCLT, para. 55.
308.
Malgosia Fitzmaurice (2002) Third Parties and the Law of Treaties. In: Jochen A Frowein and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 6. Kluwer Law International, p. 38.
309.
Cf. Article 218 TFEU; see also Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 258.
310.
See Ramses A Wessel and Leonhard den Hertog (2013) EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: A Competence Responsibility Gap? In: Malcolm D Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) The International Responsibility of the European Union. Hart Publishing, pp. 345–347 and citations contained therein.
311.
Proelss in Dörr/Schmalenbach, this chapter, fn. 81, Article 34 VCLT, paras. 1–4, 10.
312.
Shaw, this chapter, fn. 8, p. 703.
313.
See in general on Article 36bis VCLT-IO, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna, Austria, 18 February–21 March 1986, UN Doc A/CONF.129/C.1/SR.19, 19th meeting of the Committee of the Whole. http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/1986_lot/docs/english/vol_1/a_conf129_c1_sr19.pdf&lang=EF. Accessed 26 August 2018, pp. 140–145; Catherine Brölmann (2001) A Flat Earth? International Organizations in the System of International Law. 70(3) NordicJIntlL, pp. 327–330; Catherine Brölmann (2007) The Institutional Veil in Public International Law – International Organisations and the Law of Treaties. Hart Publishing, pp. 213–225; Hollis, this chapter, fn. 82, pp. 84–86; Kuijper, this chapter, fn. 94, p. 223; Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, pp. 196–197.
314.
Article 36bis of the ILC Draft of the VCLT-IO provided that: ‘Obligations and rights arise for state members of an international organization from the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if (a) the states members of the organization, by virtue of the constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty; and (b) the assent of the states members of the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought to the knowledge of the negotiating states and negotiating organizations’.
315.
Cf. Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, pp. 196–197.
316.
See Fitzmaurice, this chapter, fn. 308, pp. 64–65.
317.
Mary E Footer (2010) International Organizations and Treaties: Ratification and (Non)-implementation of the Other Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In: Alexander Orakhelashvili and Sarah Williams (eds.) 40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, pp. 193–194.
318.
Shaw, this chapter, fn. 8, p. 723.
319.
Brölmann (2007), this chapter, fn. 313, p. 256.
320.
Ibid, p. 264.
321.
Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 10, p. 179; see also Klabbers, this chapter, fn. 13, pp. 278–280.
322.
Cf. Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, p. 396; Cedric Ryngaert and Holly Buchanan (2011) Member State responsibility for acts of international organizations. 7(1) ULRev, pp. 136–138. To the contrary, see Andrew Stumer (2007) Liability of Member States for Acts of International Organizations: Reconsidering the Policy Objections. 48(2) HarvIntlLJ, pp. 570 et seq.
323.
Cf. Tomuschat, this chapter, fn. 10, p. 179.
324.
Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, p. 198.
325.
See Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 325; Panos Koutrakos (2015) EU International Relations Law. Hart Publishing, pp. 211–212; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 155, p. 39; Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, pp. 196–197; Fransesca Martines (2014) Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union. 25(1) EJIntlL, pp. 132–133; Klabbers, this chapter, fn. 13, pp. 279–280; Lock, this chapter, fn. 195, p. 101; Crawford, this chapter, fn. 81, p. 429; Streinz/Mögele in Rudolf Streinz (ed.) (2012) EUV/AEUV – Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, 2nd edn. CH Beck, Article 216 TFEU, paras. 45–47; Schmalenbach in Calliess/Ruffert, this chapter, fn. 24, Article 216 TFEU, paras. 25–26; leaving it open: Björklund, this chapter, fn. 6, pp. 395–400; Allan Rosas International Responsibility of EU and the European Court of Justice. In: Malcolm D Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds.) The International Responsibility of the European Union. Hart Publishing, pp. 151–152. For an opposite view, see Stein, this chapter, fn. 234, p. 168; MacLeod/Hendry/Hyett, this chapter, fn. 223, p. 127.
326.
Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, p. 197; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, p. 325.
327.
Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, para. 11; Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, para. 25; Case C-13/00, Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, para. 15: ‘In ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the [Union] institutions, the Member States fulfil, within the [European] system, an obligation in relation to the [Union], which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement’; Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325, para. 26. But see Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 2641, para. 13, stating in addition to the above citation that: ‘Member States fulfil an obligation […] in relation to the non-member country concerned […]’. Importantly, this reference in Kupferberg to the Member States’ obligation towards the treaty parties of the EU to comply with EU-only treaties has been abandoned in the above-mentioned ECJ case law.
328.
Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, pp. 325–326.
329.
Rosas, this chapter, fn. 325, p. 142; Martines, this chapter, fn. 325, pp. 132–133.
330.
Case C-61/94, Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989; Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 155, p. 39; Hollis, this chapter, fn. 82, p. 111.
331.
Kuijper/Paasivirta, this chapter, fn. 155, p. 39; Koutrakos, this chapter, fn. 325, p. 211.
332.
See Case 181/73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, paras. 2 et seq; see also Rosas, this chapter, fn. 325, p. 142; Eeckhout, this chapter, fn. 16, pp. 321 et seq; Jan Pieter Kuijper and Marco Bronckers (2005) WTO Law and the European Court of Justice. 42(5) CMLRev, p. 1314; Schütze, this chapter, fn. 15, p. 197.

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Stegmann, P.T. (2019). International Obligations of the EU and the Member States Under EU IIPAs. In: Responsibility of the EU and the Member States under EU International Investment Protection Agreements. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04366-7_2

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