Abstract
Plato prefaces here the final conclusion of the dialogue, namely the correlation of aretē with a knowledge of kalon kagathon. At this point, as well as at the end of the dialogue, kalokagathia is linked to the state in which the individual has knowledge of what is good (what benefits him) and what is evil (what harms him). This state comes from phronēsis, which occurs as a result of the philosophical procedure that leads to the common benefit . The concepts of knowledge and phronēsis are thus in the last analysis inextricably linked. Plato manages to show the gradual retreat of the aristocratic approach of dikaion before the prevalence of the most just speech.
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Notes
- 1.
καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων [περὶ ἀνδρείας] πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, 192b9–c1.
- 2.
Continuing the thought I mentioned above, which stands in contrast with my analysis, Schmid (1992, 114) argues that Laches has in mind the model that has been formed by the ancient tradition, viz. the model of the Homeric Odysseus who constitutes an example of determination, courage in battle, composure (dominance of reason over emotions), power of the soul and freedom of will (“when he speaks of strength of soul as what is natural in the acquired habits of manly self-control ”. Cf. for further analysis of these views 123–126). However, it is difficult to derive this confidently from the text. The term pephukos (192c) merely proves the firm aristocratic belief of the inherent possession of the virtue under examination. My analysis is in closer agreement with Hobbs’ words (2000, at 88), which run: “It seems far more likely that in speaking of courage as ‘natural’, Laches means that it is an innate quality which you either possess or you do not; nothing you study or practice can alter the situation”.
- 3.
I agree with Passaloglou (1983, 83), who, with regard to the addition of meta phronēseōs when discussing the views of Schulz (1960) and Martens (1954), prefers the view that “the addition of μετὰ φρονήσεως is not casual, but […] it gives to endurance its specific meaning by relating it to the inner self”. For the deliberate ambiguity of the words chosen by Plato, see Stokes (1986, 78); Hobbs (2000, 89); and cf. Vicaire (1963, 47).
- 4.
Dobbs (1986, 837) aptly notes the resonance of the phrase for Laches: “This is a phrase full of resonance for Laches, since it is the very term used by the Greeks to describe the character proper to a true gentleman” .
- 5.
Cf. Hobbs (2000, 90).
- 6.
Pohlenz (1913, 25) argues that, here, phronēsis takes on a new distinct feature, in that it is not connected to minor issues (smikra) of a technical or professional nature, but to major ones (megala), namely the determining issues of human life: “Nicht ein technisches Wissen, sondern eine φρόνησις εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, eine Einsicht in die wichtigsten Probleme des Menschenlebens, in das Wertverhältnis der Güter des Lebens macht die καρτερία zur Tapferkeit”. Cf. also Socrates’ use of the term ta megista (for example, Ap. 22d7; Alc. Ι. 118a7; Grg. 451d7, 527e1); together with Friedländer (1964, 44); Dieterle (1966, 74–75); Passaloglou (1983, 84, n. 288); Stefou (2013, 39 n. 19; 47 n. 35; 58 n. 56, 184–189). Tatham (1988, 76), some decades earlier than Pohlenz, raises the question on a similar footing: “Socrates confronts Laches with the difficult question of the relation of the intellect to moral goodness […] and proves to him that he has never really thought over the question”. For a similar opinion, which highlights the relation of phronēsis and metrētikē (cf. Prt. 356d–e), see also Vicaire’s comment (1963, 43): “la φρόνησις est ici une intelligence calculatrice. Voir le développement sur la « metrétique » , qui peut commander les choix moraux”. Cf. Stokes (1986, 80–84); Emlyn-Jones (1996, 99 and 100).
- 7.
Namely, the subject of the current research which is the hou heneka (‘that for the sake of which’) of phronēsis/phronimos karteria. Cf. Passaloglou (1983, 84–85), as well as my earlier discussion in the sub-chapter hou heneka (see pp. 31ff). I also follow Santas (1971, 189), who writes: “the nobility of courage […] derives, at least in part, from the end for the sake of which the courageous man endures”; cf. also his 190.
- 8.
It is also worth noting Vlastos’ comment (1994, 111–113), who, lending his argumentation from Ap. 30d and Cri. 44d, argues that the evils mentioned in these examples are not the greatest, exactly because they do not refer to moral evils. Given that the greatest goods are the moral goods , while the smallest evils are the non-moral evils, when phronēsis is mentioned, it means moral wisdom .
- 9.
Note that ethelō has already been used twice in 190e5 and 191c2, cf. Passaloglou (1983, 80, and 80, n. 269).
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
Hobbs (2000, 96–99) discusses the problem created by the fact that, as she believes, Plato’s description of the philosophical practice with terms of manliness (anēr-‘manly’) is contrary to the view of the historical Socrates that virtues are not a privilege of a particular gender (‘gender-neutral’). However, this view ignores the Platonic irony that permeates this passage, as well as one of the main goals of Plato in the framework of this dialogue, which is nothing other than the justification of the philosophical life. Therefore, for the discussion to move forward, he must remind Laches of the motive-criterion that will urge him to pursue its continuation: the feeling of shame that constitutes a basic driving force of aristocratic ethics. The final justification of living philosophically will be accompanied by its presentation as a clearly ‘human’—and not exclusively manly—case (cf. 200b1).
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Stefou, K. (2018). Laches’ Second Definition of Andreia (192b9–194b7). In: Socrates on the Life of Philosophical Inquiry. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04188-5_7
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