Abstract
By broadening the field of application of andreia, Socrates places it in pleasures, pains, desires and fears , and thereby in the individual human’s relationship with himself and his passions. In this way, he criticizes the traditional ethics that limits andreia to activity in war and identifies it with supremacy with war alone. Secondly—and equally importantly—Socrates stresses that andreia—and its opposite, deilia—is acquired in the aforementioned cases (pains, pleasures, desires and fears ). The presentation of andreia as an acquired quality lands a strong blow on traditional ethics. Therefore, andreia no longer constitutes an inherent quality that is passed down from one aristocratic generation to the next, but is something acquired through the individual’s practice. Andreios is the man who performs deeds of andreia.
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Notes
- 1.
As Schmid notes (1992, 101), Laches’ definition represents the traditional Greek view of patriotic or political courage (for which cf. Ar. EN ΙΙΙ.8.1116a17). His definition recalls almost verbatim the Spartan war-songs of Tyrtaeus (see particularly 12W2.13–19). In fact, as Schmid adds, the same view is even adopted by Theognis (1003–6W2). Passaloglou (1983, 77, n. 257) also refers to Tyrtaeus, particularly to the verses ὦ νέοι, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι παρ’ ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες,/μηδὲ φυγῆς αἰσχρῆς ἄρχετε μηδὲ φόβου (‘O young men, fight while standing beside each other,/do not begin shameful flight or fear’) (10W2.15–16). In fact, Schmid, at 77, notes: “Especially given Laches’ position and the turbulent times, this is the phrasing corresponding to his world of experience”. Laches is thus expressing his personal experience in the definition. Cf. also Umphrey (1976, 15 and 20, n. 6); Emlyn-Jones (1996, 94). For an extensive analysis of Tyrtaeus’ elegies, see Perysinakis (2012, 186–223). Furthermore, Hobbs (2000, 86) notes: “Although Socrates dismisses this as an example rather than a definition, it still tells us a considerable amount about how courage was currently perceived by the average non-philosopher”. Rabbås (2004) dedicates his article to the examination of Laches’ first definition. Within this framework, he notes, especially at 156–160, the connection of the definition with the dominant ethical tradition. Due to this connection, the definition acquires a normative content, because it is conservative and aristocratic, and a form based on a limited canon of ideals, images and examples of virtue.
- 2.
A reference is made to Il. 5.222–3 and 8.106–8.
- 3.
ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι […] κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην […] μήστωρα φόβοιο, 191b1–3.
- 4.
ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην, 191c7–8.
- 5.
According to Vicaire (1963, 41), Aristotle in EN ΙΙΙ.5–6.1115a undoubtedly had this Platonic passage in mind. Emlyn-Jones (1996, 95) notes that Aristotle in the same passage compares the courageous man who displays courage in war to the kata metaphoran, while, in addition, for a similar extension of the semantic field of application of the andreios, he compares Democritus (68B214DK). Cf. also Tatham (1888, 74), as well as his Appendix at 90–94.
- 6.
Cf. Stokes (1986, 75–76).
- 7.
Schmid (1992, 106–110) argues in favor of the view that, in fact, Socrates does not bring about a radical review of courage with the aim of making it a universal human virtue . The fact that he extends the field of application of courage, in his opinion, does not involve (at 107) “a radical extension of the traditional concept, for the ancient Greeks realized no less than we do today that a man needs courage in order to endure such hardships or evil turns of fortune”. Socrates’ discussion only rather proves (at 108) “that he is pointing out other kinds of actions that can manifest courage”. Schmid also challenges (at 108) the view that Socrates is innovating by reforming or transforming the traditional view through the establishment of virtue in the soul. He believes that Socrates does not introduce a new view, but he presents the traditional view in Laches. However, his argumentation faces many problems. More specifically, the issues raised have greatly concerned other scholars, the most important of which being whether the soul, as it is used in Homer or even Tyrtaeus (authors to whom Schmid resorts in order to support his view; and for Tyrtaeus , more specifically, see ψυχὴν καὶ θυμὸν τλήμονα παρθέμενος (‘staking soul and steadfast spirit’), 12W2.18), is an organ that functions independently or as a member-organ of the entirety that is called the human. Many proposals have been made for these issues: see, for example, Snell (1946), Furley (1956), Nussbaum (1972a, b), Bremmer (1983). The prevailing opinion is the one introduced by Snell, according to which the human being of the Homeric epics had not yet understood the meaning of a soul-entirety. For Nussbaum, the first time that the human appears as an entirety is in Heraclitus, where the soul functions as the connecting principle of the autonomous—by then—organs. However, this scholarly discussion will not be further discussed here. Certainly, Schmid’s view that (at 108) “the model of courage as involving struggle and dialogue between soul or mind and heart already had its classic expression in Homer” on the perspective that we set out has many problems. I believe that the analysis followed in the book adequately refutes Schmid’s arguments, presenting Socrates’ contribution to the philosophical thought of the dialogue during its conflict with the traditional view, a contribution that is mainly detected in rendering the virtue universal. Therefore, the conclusion that he proposes (at 109) that “[h]ence from the conventional ancient Greek point of view, there is nothing unusual about Laches’ emphatic agreement that manliness does involve physical discipline in regard to pleasures and desires” loses its power. Laches is incapable of philosophical thought or even correct judgment, and this inability is presented through his mindless adherence to traditional ethics. See also the discussion of Schmid (1992) 112 ff. Cf. also Stokes (1986, 74).
- 8.
Von Arnim (1914, 29), notes that the terms lupē, phobos, epithumia, hēdonē represent the four main passions (Kardinalaffekte) of ancient ethics: “Außer ihnen gibt es keine. Alle anderen sind nur Spezies von ihnen”. Cf. also Passaloglou (1983, 81, n. 271), who cites Friedländer’s opinion (1964, 43), according to which these four classes of passions survive as a basic scheme in the psychology of the Stoics. Cf. Lévystone (2006, 351).
- 9.
This analysis is partly contrary to the one included in Stokes’ following words (1986, at 73): “Yet here, in the Laches, we find Socrates agreeing, to all appearances quite gratuitously, with the suggestion that every man who performs a certain type of action does so in virtue of the good quality or virtue concerned”.
- 10.
- 11.
See Stefou (2013, 420–427).
- 12.
Within this framework, we can cite Emlyn-Jones’ note (1996, 96), which adds its own foundations in the attempt of this book to clarify the relationships of the virtues with each other: “These examples (referring to the examples that Socrates uses) blur into what we, and S., would call ‘temperance’ (σωφροσύνη-the subject of Charmides). S. does not pursue this line of argument in Laches, but the implications of the crossing of ‘boundary-lines’ between parts of ἀρετὴ point forward to the last argument section of the Dialogue”. Cf. also Grg. 507b and Stokes (1986, 74). See also Hobbs (2000, 87 and 88), who cites R. 442b in order to show the relationship between andreia and sōphrosunē, a relationship that she discusses more extensively at 231–233.
- 13.
The examples that Socrates uses “introduce […] the relationship between courage and intelligence, and hint at another important and related theme, that of the relationship between boldness and endurance in courage.” (so Schmid 1992, 102).
- 14.
The failure of the definition, according to Rabbås (2004, 148, 160–168), is that it provides a paradigm of virtue that is formed by the prevalent aristocratic ethical tradition, but it does not clarify how this example can take place or what place it can hold in periods or circumstances of turmoil with regard to issues of education and culture. Therefore, the Socratic elenchus turns to the tradition itself and the paradigms it provides.
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Stefou, K. (2018). Laches’ First Definition of Andreia (190e4–192b8). In: Socrates on the Life of Philosophical Inquiry. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04188-5_6
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