Abstract
Plato finds a way here to present the nature of the Socratic dialectic in Socrates’ interlocutor’s mouth. After the presentation of the main features of the other dramatis personae , he manages to show, in full contrast, what Socrates ’ philosophical activity has to offer, a little before the dialectic discussion begins. In this way, Plato achieves a double goal: (a) he presents the outstanding feature of Socrates’ dialectic in the form of an extended reply, purifying it from the quality given to it by his interlocutors under the influence of their own erroneous ideology; and (b) he anticipates the end of the dialogue and the important victory of the Socratic elenchus by presenting the significance of philosophical discussion in human life.
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Notes
- 1.
In his article (1999), Emlyn-Jones (at 136) points out: “Socrates’ disclaimer of the possession of knowledge dictates the method of enquiry, the elenchos, a procedure which requires not exposition and polarized argument, but co-operative exchange between partners”. Cf. also by the same author (1996, 88, 94, 104, 110, 117, 119, 121).
- 2.
ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν […] οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει […] πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα […] καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ὑπομιμνῄσκεσθαι ὅτι μὴ καλῶς ἢ πεποιήκαμεν ἢ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον, 187e10–188b1.
- 3.
Emlyn-Jones (1996, 85) makes the following remark with regard to the idea of promēthia: “Socrates introduces the idea of προμηθία as a desirable quality in the Socratic search at 185a9”.
- 4.
See Stefou (2013, 55–56, 136, 142–143) on the Apology, and 182–183 on the Crito.
- 5.
- 6.
Passaloglou (1983) 60 comments that Nicias’ presentation of the Socratic method aims at certifying that Socrates has all the necessary qualifications with regard to educational matters. However, this opinion disregards, in my opinion, Plato’s ultimate literary goal. Moreover, noticing the incomplete presentation of the Socratic dialectic by Nicias, Schmid (1992, 86) notes: “Nicias’ portrait of Socrates’ method makes one wonder if he is not less directly acquainted with it than he suggests, or at any rate wonder why his view of it is so one-sided”.
- 7.
On misologia, cf. also Phd. 89d; R. 411d.
- 8.
- 9.
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων (Il. 9.443). With regard to this opinion, Schmid (1992, 89–90), comments: “Nor is his (Laches’) purely Dorian tuning entirely consistent with the Homeric tradition , which not only condemned Thersites as the basest of all men in the Iliad (2.211–77), but also made Ajax , paradigm doer of deeds but weak in counsel, a far lesser hero than the brilliant Odysseus (see 9.443; also 2.166–210, 24.725–28)”.
- 10.
τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον […] τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν ηὗρον ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης παρρησίας, 188e5–189a1.
- 11.
σὺ παρ’ ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ’ ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας ᾗ μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας καὶ ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πεῖραν ἀρετῆς ἣν χρὴ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν, 189b4–6.
References
Emlyn-Jones, C. 1996. Plato: Laches. London: Bristol Classical Press.
Emlyn-Jones, C. 1999. Dramatic Structure and Cultural Context in Plato’s Laches. CQ 49 (1): 123–138.
Michelini, A.N. 2000. Plato’s Laches: An Introduction to Socrates. RhM 143 (1): 60–75.
Passaloglou, E.P. 1983. A Study of Plato’s Laches. Thessaloniki: Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis.
Schmid, W.T. 1992. On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s Laches. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.
Stefou, Κ.C. 2013. ΑρχαÏκές Ηθικές Αξίες και Πολιτική Συμπεριφορά στο Έργο του Πλάτωνα. Dissertation, Ioannina.
Tatham, M.T. 1888. Plato’s Laches (= The Laches of Plato). London: Macmillan.
Vicaire, P. 1963. Platon: Lachès et Lysis. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
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Stefou, K. (2018). Nicias and Laches Give Their Consent to Socrates’ Cross-Questioning (187b8–189d3). In: Socrates on the Life of Philosophical Inquiry. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04188-5_4
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