Abstract
The threat of predatory raiding has the potential to become the single most important source of additional transaction costs in Russia. This chapter clarifies whether predatory raiders in Russia can be considered as positive and useful market agents. This chapter also clarifies institutional aspects of raiding, by considering such issues as legitimacy of property rights and illegality of raiding. A periodically mentioned potential threat of renationalization that comes primarily from the state and voiced by different political groups keeps the legitimacy of property rights on both political and business agendas. Claims about property redistribution, dispersion, renationalization, or other possible actions in regard to property rights worry the business community. The Russian ruling political regime does not guarantee the stability of property rights and may serve the interests of predatory raiders.
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Notes
- 1.
Larina, Ekaterina. (2001). Bureaucracy faces the knife—and many questions. Most agree reform is needed, but little else is certain. The Russia Journal, 9, December 7–13, 2001. Retrieved July 7, 2009, from http://www.russialist.org/archives/5588-9.php
- 2.
Moskva snova suditsya s set’yu “Makdonalds,” dva restorana kotoroj prodolzhayut platit’ za arendu 1 rubl’ v god [Moscow continues court disputes with McDonalds, two restaurants of which continue to pay a rent of only 1 ruble a year]. Newsru.com , July 7, 2009. Retrieved July 7, 2009, from http://realty.newsru.com/article/10jul2009/mcdonalds
- 3.
Meriya Moskvy zovet investorov arendovat’ avarijnye usad’by za 1 rubl’ v god [Moscow Mayor’s Office calls on investors to rent dilapidated mansions for one ruble per year]. Newsru.com , January 24, 2012. Retrieved January 24, 2012, from http://realty.newsru.com/article/24jan2012/onepuble
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Kessler, Glenn. (2005). Rice Cites Yukos In Moscow Talks. Washington Post, April 21, 2005, p. A14. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5104-2005Apr20.html
- 5.
On propiska see, for instance, Vishnevsky, Anatolij. (1998). Serp i rubl’ [Circle and ruble]. Moscow: OGI, p. 101.
- 6.
Vlast’ davit na menya postoyanno. Tyur’moj. Interv’yu Reuters s Mikhailom Khodorkovskim (original’naya russkaya versiya) [State Authorities put pressure on me all time. By prison. Reuter’s interview with Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the original Russian version)]. Khodorkovsky.ru, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://khodorkovsky.ru/mbk/articles_and_interview/2011/09/18/16606.html
Khodorkovsky v interv’yu Reuters predrek Rossii novy krizis i porassuzhdal o mesti [Khodorkovsky predicted a new crisis for Russia and talked about revenge in an interview given to Reuters]. Newsru.com , September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18sep2011/hodorkovsky.html
Forget reform if Putin stays in power – Khodorkovsky. Reuters, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/uk-russia-politics-khodorkovsky-idUKTRE78H0RD20110918
- 7.
Vlast’ davit na menya postoyanno. Tyur’moj. Interv’yu Reuters s Mikhailom Khodorkovskim (original’naya russkaya versiya) [State Authorities put pressure on me all time. By prison. Reuter’s interview with Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the original Russian version)]. Khodorkovsky.ru, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://khodorkovsky.ru/mbk/articles_and_interview/2011/09/18/16606.html
Khodorkovsky v interv’yu Reuters predrek Rossii novy krizis i porassuzhdal o mesti [Khodorkovsky predicted a new crisis for Russia and talked about revenge in an interview given to Reuters]. Newsru.com , September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18sep2011/hodorkovsky.html
Forget reform if Putin stays in power – Khodorkovsky. Reuters, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/uk-russia-politics-khodorkovsky-idUKTRE78H0RD20110918
- 8.
Vlast’ davit na menya postoyanno. Tyur’moj. Interv’yu Reuters s Mikhailom Khodorkovskim (original’naya russkaya versiya) [State Authorities put pressure on me all time. By prison. Reuter’s interview with Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the original Russian version)]. Khodorkovsky.ru, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://khodorkovsky.ru/mbk/articles_and_interview/2011/09/18/16606.html
Khodorkovsky v interv’yu Reuters predrek Rossii novy krizis i porassuzhdal o mesti [Khodorkovsky predicted a new crisis for Russia and talked about revenge in an interview given to Reuters]. Newsru.com , September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18sep2011/hodorkovsky.html
Forget reform if Putin stays in power—Khodorkovsky. Reuters, September 18, 2011. Retrieved September 18, 2011, from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/uk-russia-politics-khodorkovsky-idUKTRE78H0RD20110918
- 9.
Buckley, Neil. (2012). A windfall tax will not lift Russian business confidence. Financial Times, February 24, 2012. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/59eaaeb2-5e28-11e1-b1e9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nWt9yef5
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Osipian, A.L. (2019). The Invisible Hand of the Market and Invincible Hand of the Raider. In: Political and Economic Transition in Russia. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03831-1_7
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