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Prospects of Raiding Evolution: Prognosis Is Optimistic

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Political and Economic Transition in Russia

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Abstract

This chapter analyzes future prospects of raiding evolution and suggests that prognosis for predatory raiding movement in Russia is optimistic, at least for raiders. The rationale for discussing any topic largely depends on its magnitude and meaning for the future. In this sense, defining perspectives of predatory raiding movement is much more than just fortunetelling. Russian business ecosystem is not ready to weed out predatory raiders, and the state has no interest in doing this either. This chapter discusses the future of predatory raiding within a theoretical framing, labeled as a revolutionary theory of permanent lawlessness. When the rule of law is not the state’s priority, the decline in predatory raiding is unlikely.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Reiderstvo v Rossii prevratilos’ v “belovorotnichkovyj” ugolovny promysel [Raiding in Russia turned into a “white collar” criminal business]. Newsru.com , May 20, 2008. Retrieved May 9, 2009, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/20may2008/togliattiazot.html

  2. 2.

    Spetspodrazdeleniya voshli na fabriku, gde proizoshla strel’ba, no najti strelka poka ne udalos’ [Police special forces moved to the factory, where the shootout took place, but they have yet to find the shooter]. Newsru.com , December 27, 2017. Retrieved December 27, 2017, from https://msk.newsru.com/article/27dec2017/menshevik.html

  3. 3.

    Prokuror Moskvy vzyal pod lichnyj kontrol’ situatsiyu na fabrike “Men’shevik” [Moscow city prosecutor personally controls the situation on Menshevik factory]. Govorit Moskva, December 27, 2017. Retrieved December 27, 2017, from https://govoritmoskva.ru/news/146124/

  4. 4.

    V Ekaterinburge neizvestnye ugrozhayut ubijstvom zhitelyam doma, otkazavshimsya platit’ za stoyanku [In Ekaterinburg, unknown individuals threaten to kill dwellers of the building who refused to pay for parking]. Newsru.com , February 4, 2017. Retrieved February 4, 2017, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/04feb2017/eburgaction.html

  5. 5.

    U “Svidetelej Iegovy” otobrali nedvizhimost’ pod Peterburgom na 880 mln rublej [Jehovah’s Witnesses lost real estate in Petersburg valued at 880 million rubles]. Newsru.com , December 8, 2017. Retrieved December 8, 2017, from https://realty.newsru.com/article/08dec2017/iegov_realty

  6. 6.

    Otobrannoe u “Svidetelej Iegovy” zdanie v Peterburge otdadut uchenym [Building taken away from Jehovah’s Witnesses in Petersburg will be handed to scientists]. Newsru.com , December 26, 2017. Retrieved December 26, 2017, from https://realty.newsru.com/article/26dec2017/iegov_med

  7. 7.

    RPC pretenduet na tysyachu zdanij v Moskve [Russian Orthodox Church claims a thousand buildings in Moscow]. Newsru.com , December 22, 2017. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from http://www.newsru.com/religy/22dec2017/rest.html?utm_source=tema-main

  8. 8.

    Directly translated, koshmarit’ biznes means causing nightmares for business. Clifford Levy. Medvedev says Russia should end business ‘nightmares.’ The New York Times, August 1, 2008. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/europe/01iht-01russia.14927480.html Khvatit koshmarit’ biznes. Forbes, Retrieved from http://www.forbes.ru/ekonomika/vlast/32096-hvatit-koshmarit-biznes

  9. 9.

    Putin predlozhil vvesti ugolovnuyu otvetstvennost’ dlya silovikov za narushenie prav predprinimatelej [Putin suggested introducing criminal responsibility for law enforcement officers for violations of entrepreneurs’ rights]. Newsru.com , June 17, 2016. Retrieved June 17, 2016, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/17jun2016/siloviki.html

  10. 10.

    Khakamada v Kremle opustila Putina i zastavila zaikat’sya [Khakamada in Kremlin attacked Putin and made him mumble]. YouTube, Apr 10, 2018. Retrieved May 14, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQvO9gFwrSQ

  11. 11.

    Predprinimateley spasayut ot otsidki: kakie finansovye prestupleniya mogut stat’ neugolovnymi [Entrepreneurs are rescued from jail: what financial crimes may be decriminalized]. Zagolovki, May 23, 2018. Retrieved May 23, 2018, from http://zagolovki.ru/daytheme/bisnes/23May2018

  12. 12.

    Biznesmenam monetiziruyut sroki: nekotorye ikh prestupleniya mogut stat’ neugolovnymi [Businessmen can get their sentences monetized: some of their crimes may be decriminalized]. Kommersant, May 23, 2018. Retrieved May 23, 2018, from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3636585

  13. 13.

    Kulikov, Vladislav. (2018). Nakazhut, no ne posadyat [Punished, but not jailed]. Rossijskaya Gazeta, May 23, 2018. Retrieved May 23, 2018, from https://rg.ru/2018/05/22/verhovnyj-sud-predlozhil-dekriminalizovat-neskolko-statej-uk.html

  14. 14.

    Prezident podpisal ukazy o sostave novogo pravitel’stva [Putin signed orders on new government]. Kremlin.ru, May 18, 2018. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57495

  15. 15.

    Opublikovan polny spisok ministrov novogo pravitel’stva Rossii, utverzhdennyj Putinym [Complete list of ministers in the new government confirmed by Putin is published]. Strana.ua, May 18, 2018. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://strana.ua/news/141896-polnyj-spisok-vitse-premerov-i-federalnykh-ministrov-rossii-utverzhdennykh-putinym.html

  16. 16.

    Rossijsky fondovy rynok teryaet zarubezhnykh investorov uzhe pyat’ nedel’ [Russian stock market has been losing foreign investors for five weeks]. Newsru.com , May 25, 2018. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/finance/25may2018/ruinvest.html

  17. 17.

    Putin predlozhil Shuvalovu vozglavit’ VEB, Shuvalov poobeshchal “ne podvesti” [Putin offered Shuvalov to lead VEB, and Shuvalov promised “not to let him down”]. Newsru.com , May 23, 2018. Retrieved May 23, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/finance/24may2018/shuvalov.html

  18. 18.

    Kudrin nadeetsya, chto pravitel’stvo vskore perejdet k “proryvnym reformam” [Kudrin hopes that the government will soon move to break-through reforms]. Newsru.com , May 25, 2018. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/finance/25may2018/kudrinsbrbreakfst.html

  19. 19.

    Siluanov nazval osnovnye napravleniya reform v ekonomike [Siluanov named main directions for economic reforms]. Newsru.com , May 25, 2018. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/finance/25may2018/siluanovsbrbreakfast.html

  20. 20.

    Okolo tysyachi chelovek prishli na miting protiv iz’yatiya zemel’ u Timiryazevskoj sel’khozakademii [Around a thousand people showed up for the protest against a takeover of land that belongs to Timiryazev Agricultural Academy]. Newsru.com , April 11, 2016. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/11apr2016/timiryazevskaya.html

  21. 21.

    Patriarch Kirill is a de facto top-ranked politician, as the Russian Orthodox Church enjoys a very high status in the Russian state. See: Patriarkh Kirill napisal pis’mo Putinu: RPC opasaetsya peredela rynka tserkovnoj zemli [Patriarch Kirill wrote a letter to Putin: he worries about the redistribution of church lands]. Newsru.com , September 9, 2012. Retrieved September 9, 2012, from http://www.newsru.com/religy/11sep2012/lord_landlord.html

  22. 22.

    Reidery mogut zahvatit’ 200 oboronnyh predpriyatij v Rossii [Raiders can attempt to take over 200 defense firms in Russia]. Newsru.com , April 10, 2008. Retrieved May 9, 2009, from http://realty.newsru.com/article/10Apr2008/military

  23. 23.

    V ponedel’nik byl sovershen reiderskij zahvat moskovskogo del’finariya [Moscow dolphinarium was taken over by raiders on Monday]. Newsmsk, April 7, 2009. Retrieved June 23, 2009, from http://www.newsmsk.com/article/07Apr2009/delfin.html

  24. 24.

    V Yakutske proshel miting sborshchikov bivney mamonta, vozmushchennykh fil’mom “Rossii 24” [In Yakutsk, gatherers of mammoth tusk protested a documentary shown by Russia 24 channel]. Newsru.com , May 26, 2018. Retrieved May 26, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/russia/26may2018/bivni.html

  25. 25.

    V Moskve za proshedshij god sushchestvenno uvelichilos’ kolichestvo popytok reiderskih zahvatov predpriyatij [The number of attempts of raiding takeovers in Moscow over the last year has increased significantly]. Notheft.ru, January 21, 2009. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from http://www.notheft.ru/v-moskve-za-proshedshij-god-sushhestvenno-uvelichilos-kolichestvo-popytok-rejderskih-zahvatov-predpr

  26. 26.

    Shlapentokh (2007) clearly refers to the widely publicized case of Euroset-Motorola, also described by Yakovlev, Sobolev, and Kazun (2014): “The … case involved the illegal seizure of 167,000 Motorola cell phones (with an approximate value of $17 million) on 29 March 2006 by the customs authorities, supplied to Euroset on the basis of an official import contract (Kryazhev and Levitskiy 2006). The investigating authorities have changed the reasons for the seizure of the phones several times (including the allegation that ‘they were harmful to consumer health’), but in the end, the criminal case was closed on 24 August 2006 due to a lack of evidence and 117,500 cell phones were returned to Euroset. This case was widely reported in the media (and included an informal conversation between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at the G-8 Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006) and had serious political implications – in the form of dismissal of the head of the Federal Tax Service Aleksandr Zherikhov and Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov (Myers 2006).” Yakovlev, Sobolev, and Kazun (2014) suggest that when businesses face violent pressure from state agents, they prefer to cooperate with the authorities. Nevertheless, some businesses resist such a pressure and attract the attention of the general public with their complaints of abuse of authority committed by the law enforcement agencies. The authors consider the case of Euroset-Motorola a typical example of a “public defense” of property rights. Yakovlev, Andrei, Sobolev, Anton, & Kazun, Anton. (2014). Means of production versus means of coercion: can Russian business limit the violence of a predatory state? Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(2–3), pp. 175–176. See also: Kryazhev, D., & Levitskiy, R. (2006). Oplata po kontrafaktu: MVD nashlo novyy predlog dlya iz’yatiya sotovykh telefonov [Payment for a Counterfactual: MVD has a New Pretext for Seizing Cell Phones]. Kommersant, April 4. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/662801; Myers, S. L. (2006). Putin Fires Prosecutor, Providing Grist for Kremlinologists. The New York Times, June 3.

  27. 27.

    Predation. Biology Online Dictionary. Retrieved May 6, 2017, from http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Predation

  28. 28.

    Litvinova, Anastasiya. (2011). Tol’ko devyat’ chelovek iz sta eshche ne nauchilis’ davat’ vzyatki [Only nine out of every hundred people have not learned how to give bribes]. RBK Daily, June 15, 2011. Retrieved June 15, 2011, from http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/06/15/focus/562949980430428

  29. 29.

    Sredni razmer vzyatki v Rossii prevysil 10 tysyach dollarov [Average bribe in Russia exceeds $10,000]. Newsru.com , July 24, 2011. Retrieved July 24, 2011, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/22jul2011/vziatka.html

  30. 30.

    Rossiyane dayut “na lapu” v srednem po 250 tysyach rublej, rasskazali v MVD [Average bribes Russians pay are 250 thousand rubles, says MVD]. Newsru.com , October 18, 2011. Retrieved October 18, 2011, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18oct2011/corruption.html

  31. 31.

    Srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii vyros v 33 raza za chetyre goda [Size of average bribe increased 33 times over the last four years]. Newsru.com , August 22, 2012. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/22aug2012/vziatko.html

  32. 32.

    V politsii vychislili razmer sredney vzyatki – ona bol’she sredney zarplaty [Police named the size of an average bribe; it exceeds average salary]. Newsru.com , October 25, 2012. Retrieved October 25, 2012, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/25oct2012/bribes.html

  33. 33.

    MVD: srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii za god udvoilsya [MVD: the size of an average bribe in Russia over the last year has doubled]. Newsru.com , March 21, 2014. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/21mar2014/rubrbery.html

  34. 34.

    Pravozashchitniki zayavili ob uvelichenii vtroe srednego razmera vzyatki v Rossii [Human rights activists reported that average bribe in Russia has tripled]. Newsru.com , September 3, 2015. Retrieved October 18, 2015, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/03sep2015/corrup.html

  35. 35.

    V MVD nazvali srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii – za god on vyros na 75% [Ministry of the Interior reports that the average bribe in Russia increased 75 percent over the last year]. Newsru.com , March 16, 2017. Retrieved March 16, 2017, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/16mar2017/mvd.html

  36. 36.

    Srednyaya summa vzyatki v Moskve za proshlyj god vyrosla v 2,5 raza [Average bribe in Moscow increased 2.5 times in the past year]. Newsru.com , January 26, 2017. Retrieved January 26, 2017, from http://newsmsk.com/article/26jan2017/bolshedeneg2.html

  37. 37.

    MVD: srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii za god udvoilsya [MVD: the size of an average bribe in Russia over the last year has doubled]. Newsru.com , March 21, 2014. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/21mar2014/rubrbery.html

  38. 38.

    Rossiyane otsenili razgul korruptsii: mestnuyu vlast’ obvinyayut vse chashche, GIBDD – rezhe [Russians gave their thoughts on the scope of corruption: local authorities are alleged more frequently, while traffic patrol less frequently]. Newsru.com , October 23, 2013. Retrieved October 23, 2013, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/23oct2013/opros_2.html

  39. 39.

    Ushcherb ot korruptsii za 10 mesyatsev 2013 goda sostavil 21 milliard rublej [Corruption damage in first ten months of 2013 is estimated at 21 billion rubles]. Newsru.com , December 9, 2013. Retrieved December 9, 2013, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/09dec2013/21.html

  40. 40.

    MVD: srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii za god udvoilsya [MVD: the size of an average bribe in Russia over the last year has doubled]. Newsru.com , March 21, 2014. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/21mar2014/rubrbery.html

  41. 41.

    MVD: srednij razmer vzyatki v Rossii za god udvoilsya [MVD: the size of an average bribe in Russia over the last year has doubled]. Newsru.com , March 21, 2014. Retrieved March 21, 2014, from http://www.newsru.com/finance/21mar2014/rubrbery.html

  42. 42.

    Kadyrov v interv’ju: “Esli podumat’, mozhno zabolet’… No my staraemsya voobshche ne dumat’” [Kadyrov in an interview: “One can fall ill because of thinking… We try not to think at all”]. Newsru.com , June 18, 2010. Retrieved June 18, 2010, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18jun2010/kadyrov.html

  43. 43.

    FBK opublikoval samoe masshtabnoe rassledovanie – ob usad’bakh, yakhtakh i vinogradnikakh, kotorye yakoby prinadlezhat prem’eru Medvedevu [FBK published its largest investigation about mansions, yachts and vineyards that would be belong to premier Medvedev]. Newsru.com , March 2, 2017. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/russia/02mar2017/dimon.html

  44. 44.

    Kak oligarkh platit vzyatku vitse-prem’eru. Razbiraem mekhaniku [How oligarch gives a bribe to vice premier. Decomposing the mechanics]. Fond bor’by s korruptsiej, April 26, 2018. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://navalny.com/p/5852/

  45. 45.

    Naval’ny nazval pokupku Prokhorovym villy Khloponina v Italii klassicheskoj vzyatkoj vitse-prem’eru [Naval’ny called Prokhorov’s buying Khloponin’s villa in Italy a classical bribe to vice premier]. Newsru.com , April 26, 2018. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://realty.newsru.com/article/26apr2018/bribe

  46. 46.

    Prokhorov podal v sud na Naval’nogo iz-za obvinenij v dache “vzyatki villoj” byvshemu vitse-prem’eru Khloponinu [Prokhorov filed a lawsuit against Naval’ny in response to accusations of giving bribe by villa to ex-premier Khloponin]. Newsru.com , May 21, 2018. Retrieved May 21, 2018, from https://www.newsru.com/russia/21may2018/prohorov.html

  47. 47.

    Yury Mikhaylovich Luzhkov is a well-known Russian politician who served as the Mayor of Moscow from 1992 to 2010. He was also vice-chairman and one of the founders of the ruling United Russia party. Yury Luzhkov was dismissed from the Mayor’s office by the then president Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, with the offensively formulated official reason, “as the one who lost trust.”

  48. 48.

    Conflict over lands in South Butovo. Barometer of democracy, No. 56, June 19, 2006. Retrieved June 18, 2010, from http://www.demos-center.ru/projects/649C353/6AF8CAF/1155543103#2

  49. 49.

    Strasburg zapodozril neladnoe: oskorblennyj mer Luzhkov vsegda vyigryvaet v moskovskih sudah [Strasburg suspects something wrong: the offended Mayor Luzhkov always wins in Moscow courts]. Newsru.com , June 18, 2010. Retrieved June 18, 2010, from http://www.newsru.com/russia/18jun2010/limonov.html

  50. 50.

    Gerasimenko, Olesia. (2007). Luzhkov otzhal pol-Limonova [Luzhkov took over half-Lemonov]. Gazeta.ru, November 14, 2007. Retrieved November 14, 2007, from https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2007/11/14/2311487.shtml

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  1. University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA

    Ararat L. Osipian

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Osipian, A.L. (2019). Prospects of Raiding Evolution: Prognosis Is Optimistic. In: Political and Economic Transition in Russia. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03831-1_5

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