Smooth NIZK Arguments

  • Charanjit S. JutlaEmail author
  • Arnab Roy
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11239)


We introduce a novel notion of smooth (-verifier) non- interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK) which parallels the familiar notion of smooth projective hash functions (SPHF). We also show that the single group element quasi-adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) of Jutla and Roy (CRYPTO 2014) and Kiltz and Wee (EuroCrypt 2015) for linear subspaces can be easily extended to be computationally smooth. One important distinction of the new notion from SPHFs is that in a smooth NIZK the public evaluation of the hash on a language member using the projection key does not require the witness of the language member, but instead just requires its NIZK proof.

This has the remarkable consequence that if one replaces the traditionally employed SPHFs with the novel smooth QA-NIZK in the Gennaro-Lindell paradigm of designing universally-composable password- authenticated key-exchange (UC-PAKE) protocols, one gets highly efficient UC-PAKE protocols that are secure even under adaptive corruption. This simpler and modular design methodology allows us to give the first single-round asymmetric UC-PAKE protocol, which is also secure under adaptive corruption in the erasure model. Previously, all asymmetric UC-PAKE protocols required at least two rounds. In fact, our protocol just requires each party to send a single message asynchronously. In addition, the protocol has short messages, with each party sending only four group elements. Moreover, the server password file needs to store only one group element per client. The protocol employs asymmetric bilinear pairing groups and is proven secure in the (limited programmability) random oracle model and under the standard bilinear pairing assumption SXDH.


QA-NIZK Bilinear pairings SXDH MDDH UC-PAKE Online attack Server compromise Dual-system 


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IBM T. J. Watson Research CenterYorktown HeightsUSA
  2. 2.Fujitsu Laboratories of AmericaSunnyvaleUSA

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