Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Legal Conventionalism

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 126))

  • 319 Accesses

Abstract

In his contribution, Jorge L. Rodríguez criticizes the position that Marmor has defended in previous works. Basically the criticism is that, according to Rodríguez, it cannot be the case that a convention is constitutive, and therefore the rule of recognition cannot be of this type. According to this author, the concept of convention employed by Marmor is too weak: it leads to consider a rule as conventional even though all the members of a community follow it because they consider that it is correct, and a rule may not be considered as conventional even though everyone is following it just because others follow it. Moreover, it seems to be pointless to speak of constitutional conventions inasmuch as, according to Rodríguez, the arbitrary character of conventions is incompatible with the constitutive character of a rule. As a consequence, Marmor’s view would be affected by an internal inconsistency because, following his own definitions, the constitutive character of the rule of recognition is incompatible with its conventional character.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    According to the practice theory of rules, their existence depends upon a form of social practice comprising both patterns of conduct regularly followed by the majority of the members of the group, and a distinctive normative attitude towards such patterns of behavior (acceptance). The latter consists in a disposition of the members of the group to take such patterns of behavior as guides for their future conduct and as standards of criticism of the behavior of others that can legitimize claims and various forms of pressure for conformity, see Hart (1994), p. 254.

  2. 2.

    See Hart (1994), pp. 255–257.

  3. 3.

    See, for instance, Dickson (2007), pp. 373–402.

  4. 4.

    See Lewis (1969), p. 78.

  5. 5.

    See Marmor (2001), pp. 12–13; Marmor (2011), p. 76; Coleman (2001c), pp. 94–95.

  6. 6.

    See Green (1999), pp. 35–52; Marmor (2001), pp. 9–10; Marmor (2009), pp. 165–166; Celano (2003), p. 350.

  7. 7.

    See Green (1988), pp. 117–121; Marmor (2001), pp. 28–29; Celano (2003), p. 350.

  8. 8.

    See Marmor (1998), pp. 201–202; Celano (2003), p. 351.

  9. 9.

    See Marmor (1998), pp. 509–531; Marmor (2001, 2009, 2011).

  10. 10.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 2; Marmor (2011), p. 77.

  11. 11.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 1.

  12. 12.

    See Lewis (1969), p. 97.

  13. 13.

    Marmor (2009), p. x.

  14. 14.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 5.

  15. 15.

    Marmor (2009), p. 5, note 4.

  16. 16.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 5.

  17. 17.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 6.

  18. 18.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 13; Raz (1994), p. 214.

  19. 19.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 11.

  20. 20.

    Marmor (2009), p. 21.

  21. 21.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 5.

  22. 22.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 10.

  23. 23.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 10.

  24. 24.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 8.

  25. 25.

    Marmor (2009), p. 12.

  26. 26.

    Marmor (2009), p. 11.

  27. 27.

    See Burge (1975), pp. 249–255.

  28. 28.

    See Marmor (2009), pp. 5–6.

  29. 29.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 11.

  30. 30.

    See Searle (1969), pp. 33–35; Searle (1995), Chapter 2.

  31. 31.

    For a critical view on Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, see for example Schauer (1991), pp. 6–7; Raz (1975), pp. 108–111.

  32. 32.

    Marmor (2001), p. 18.

  33. 33.

    The difference between asserting the existence of a rule and formulating a rule corresponds to von Wright’s distinction between norm-propositions and norms (see von Wright 1963, p. 106).

  34. 34.

    In deontic logic, the possibility of admitting iterated deontic operators is a contested issue (see, for instance, von Wright 1983, pp. 142–150).

  35. 35.

    See Marmor (2009), pp. 7–8.

  36. 36.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 43. For a critical view on Marmor’s thesis on the arbitrariness of constitutive conventions, see Arena (2011), pp. 441–506.

  37. 37.

    Marmor (2001), p. 14.

  38. 38.

    See Marmor (2001), p. 15.

  39. 39.

    Additionally, in this kind of situation it is even difficult to think of incompatible alternatives.

  40. 40.

    A similar objection was suggested in Celano (2003), p. 358.

  41. 41.

    See Marmor (2011), p. 49.

  42. 42.

    See Marmor (2011), p. 50.

  43. 43.

    See Marmor (2011), p. 51.

  44. 44.

    See Marmor (2011), pp. 81–82.

  45. 45.

    See Marmor (2011), p. 78.

  46. 46.

    See Marmor (2011), pp. 78–79. Marmor states that in his original account Hart argued that the rationale of the rule of recognition was the need for certainty in the identification of the law, and that in the “Postscript” Hart seemed to add a reason based on the need for coordination. And though Marmor considers that it is not open to discussion that the rule of recognition contributes to those goals, he claims they are insufficient to justify having a rule of recognition since the reasons to have rules of recognition would be, in his view, closely linked to the reasons for having law.

  47. 47.

    See Marmor (2011), p. 81.

  48. 48.

    Marmor (2001), p. 21.

  49. 49.

    See Celano (2003), p. 353.

  50. 50.

    See, for instance, Hart (1965), p. 358.

  51. 51.

    This is what Raz, among others, argues. In his view, not all secondary rules confer powers; only rules of change and rules of adjudication do so. By contrast, the rule of recognition is the exception (see Raz 1971, pp. 794–795 and note 24). Ambiguities in the Hartian typology have also been pointed out by many, including Green (1996), pp. 1687–1717; MacCormick (1981), pp. 130–134; Waluchow (1994), p. 75.

  52. 52.

    Thus, MacCormick claims that secondary rules are a sort of “mixed bag” (see MacCormick 1981, p. 133).

  53. 53.

    For example, Alexander and Schauer (2009), Hacker (1977), pp. 1–25, Himma (2009), Perry (2009), Shapiro (2009, 2011).

  54. 54.

    See, for example, Raz (1971), pp. 795–815; Ruiz Manero (1991), pp. 281–293; Shapiro (2009); Waluchow (1994).

  55. 55.

    See MacCormick (1981), pp. 145–146; Raz (1971), pp. 795–815; Raz (1975), p. 146; Ruiz Manero (1990); Shapiro (2009, 2011).

  56. 56.

    See Bulygin (1976), pp. 31–39; Bulygin (1991a), pp. 257–278; Bulygin (1991b), pp. 311–318.

  57. 57.

    See Bulygin (1991a), p. 278.

  58. 58.

    See Bulygin (1991b), p. 317.

  59. 59.

    See Bulygin (1976), p. 387. In the same sense, Zipursky (2001), pp. 246–247.

  60. 60.

    Because of the difficulties offered by Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, I will use von Wright’s less problematic distinction between prescriptions and (conceptual) rules when appropriate. See von Wright (1963), Chapter 1.

  61. 61.

    See Hart (1961), pp. 103–104; Hart (1968), p. 338.

  62. 62.

    See Hart (1961), pp. 94–95.

  63. 63.

    These two senses of validity are usually confused. For ambiguity in the notion of validity in Pure Theory of Law, see Ross (1961), pp. 199–220; Raz (1971), pp. 795–815; Raz (1974), pp. 94–111; Bulygin (1990), pp. 29–45; Nino (1978), pp. 357–376; Nino (1985); Garzón Valdés (1977), pp. 41–68.

  64. 64.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 32.

  65. 65.

    See Marmor (2009), p. 167.

  66. 66.

    Hart (1961), p. 135.

  67. 67.

    Hart (1961), p. 107. Raz remarks, on the one hand, that there is no reason to think that the rule of recognition contains all the criteria of validity of the rules in a legal system, since many other rules (of change) would also set criteria of validity. Yet, he tries to save the Hartian idea arguing that there are criteria of validity that, though legally binding, are not legally valid and, consequently, must be stipulated by the rule of recognition (see Raz 1971, pp. 809–810). In this suggestion, however, there is a confusion between validity as membership (a descriptive notion) and validity as binding force (a prescriptive notion).

  68. 68.

    Hart (1961), p. 96.

  69. 69.

    See also Hart (1958), pp. 54–55; Hart (1994), p. 247.

  70. 70.

    See Bobbio (1975), p. 241.

  71. 71.

    See Waldron (2009), Sect. IX.

  72. 72.

    See Hart (1961), pp. 195–107.

  73. 73.

    See Hart (1961), p. 107.

  74. 74.

    See Hart (1961), p. 109. The only reason why Hart claims here that the rule of recognition can neither be valid nor invalid is because he is identifying validity with the regular creation of a norm according to the criteria set by other norm or norms. By contrast, if we understand “validity” as membership in a legal system, the rule of recognition will be a valid rule according to the interpretation analyzed in the text.

  75. 75.

    See Hart (1961), p. 105.

  76. 76.

    See Kelsen (1960), p. 200.

  77. 77.

    See Bulygin (1991a), pp. 257–278.

  78. 78.

    Bulygin (1991a), pp. 263–264. The English translation is mine.

  79. 79.

    For a critical analysis on this idea, see Ferrer Beltrán and Rodríguez (2011), pp. 116–133.

  80. 80.

    This is basically the idea that inspires the institutional theory of law. See, for instance, MacCormick and Weinberger (1986).

  81. 81.

    Ross (1957), pp. 23 ff.

  82. 82.

    In an analogous sense, Ross states that “Since the series of authorities cannot be infinite, the inevitable conclusion follows that in the final instance the highest norms of competence cannot be enacted −they must be presupposed” (Ross 1958, p. 80).

  83. 83.

    See, for instance, Coleman (2001b), p. 114 ff.; Bayón (2002), pp. 33–54.

References

  • Adler K, Himma E (eds) (2009) The rule of recognition and the U.S. Constitution. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander L, Schauer F (2009) Social facts, constitutional interpretation and the rule of recognition. In: Adler K, Himma E (2009), chapter VII

    Google Scholar 

  • Arena F (2011) Marmor on the arbitrariness of constitutive conventions. Jurisprudence 2(2):441–506

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bayón JC (2002) El contenido mínimo del positivismo jurídico. In: Zapatero V (ed) Horizontes de la filosofía del derecho. Homenaje a Luis García San Miguel. Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, pp 33–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio N (1975) Per un lessico di teoria generale del diritto. In: Studi in memoria di Enrico Guicciardi. Cedam, Padova, pp 47–55. Cited by the version published under the title Norme secondary. In: Bobbio (1994), pp 233–244

    Google Scholar 

  • Bobbio N (1994) Contributi ad un dizionario giuridico. Giappichelli, Torino

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulygin E (1976) Sobre la regla de reconocimiento. In: Bacqué J (ed) Derecho, filosofía y lenguaje. Homenaje a Ambrosio L. Gioja. Astrea, Buenos Aires, pp 31–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulygin E (1990) An antinomy in Kelsen’s theory of law. Ratio Juris 3:29–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bulygin E (1991a) Algunas consideraciones sobre los sistemas jurídicos. Doxa 9:257–278

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bulygin E (1991b) Regla de reconocimiento: norma de obligación o criterio conceptual. Réplica a Juan Ruiz Manero. Doxa 9:311–318

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge T (1975) On knowledge and convention. Philos Rev 84:249–255

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Celano B (2003) La regola di riconoscimento è una convenzione. Ragion Pratica 21:347–360

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman J (ed) (2001a) Hart’s postscript. Essays on the postscript to the concept of law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman J (2001b) Incorporationism, conventionality, and the practical difference thesis. In: Coleman (2001a), pp 97–147

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman J (2001c) The practice of principle. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dickson J (2007) Is the rule of recognition really a conventional rule? Oxf J Leg Stud 27(3):373–402

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferrer Beltrán J, Rodríguez J (2011) Jerarquías normativas y dinámica de los sistemas jurídicos. Marcial Pons, Madrid

    Google Scholar 

  • Garzón Valdés E (1977) Algunos modelos de validez normativa. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía III(1):41–68. Cited by the version published in Garzón Valdés (1993), pp 73–105

    Google Scholar 

  • Garzón Valdés E (1993) Derecho, ética y política. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid

    Google Scholar 

  • Green L (1988) The authority of the State. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Green L (1996) The concept of law revisited. Mich Law Rev 94:1687–1717

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green L (1999) Positivism and conventionalism. Can J Law Jurisprud 12:35–52

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hacker P (1977) Hart’s philosophy of law. In: Hacker P, Raz J (1977), pp 1–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacker P, Raz J (1977) Law, morality and society. Essays in honour of H.L. A. Hart. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1958) Positivism and the separation of law and morals. Harv Law Rev 71:593–629. Cited by the version published in Hart (1983), pp 593–628

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1961) The concept of law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Cited by the 1994 second edition

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1965) Lon L. Fuller: the morality of law. Harv Law Rev 78:1281–1296. Cited by the version published in Hart (1983), pp 341–364

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1968) Kelsen’s doctrine of the unity of law. In: Kiefer H, Munitz M (eds) Ethics and social justice. State University of New York Press, Albany, pp 309–342. Cited by the version published in Hart (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1983) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hart H (1994) Postscript to The concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 238–276

    Google Scholar 

  • Himma K (2009) Four concepts of validity. Reflections on inclusive and exclusive positivism. In: Adler K, Himma E (2009), chapter V

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1960) Reine Rechtslehre. Franz Deuticke, Wien. Cited by the 1989 English version. Smith, Gloucester (Mass)

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D (1969) Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCormick N (1981) H.L.A. Hart. Edward Arnold Publishers, London. Cited by the 2008 second edition. Stanford University Press, Stanford

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCormick N, Weinberger O (1986) An institutional theory of law. New approaches to legal positivism. Reidel, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Marmor A (1998) Legal conventionalism. Leg Theory 4(4):509–531

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marmor A (2001) Positive law and objective values. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marmor A (2009) Social conventions. From language to law. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Marmor A (2011) Philosophy of law. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Nino C (1978) Some confusions around Kelsen’s concept of validity. Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosphie 64:357–376. Cited by the version published in Paulson S, Litschewski B (1998), pp 253–262

    Google Scholar 

  • Nino C (1985) La validez del derecho. Astrea, Buenos Aires

    Google Scholar 

  • Paulson S, Litschewski B (eds) (1998) Normativity and norms. Critical perspectives on Kelsenian themes. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry S (2009) Where have all the powers gone? Hartian rules of recognition, noncognitivism, and the constitutional and jurisprudential foundations of law. In: Adler K, Himma E (2009), chapter XI

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1971) The identity of the legal systems. Calif Law Rev 59:795–815

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1974) Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm. Am J Jurisprud 19:94–111

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1975) Practical reason and norms. Hutchinson, London. Cited by the 1990 second edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Raz J (1994) Ethics in the public domain: essays in the morality of law and politics. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross A (1957) Tû – Tû. Harv Law Rev 70:812–825

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross A (1958) On law and justice. Stevens, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross A (1961) Validity and the conflict between legal positivism and natural law. Academia. Revista sobre enseñanza del Derecho 12(2008):199–220. Cited by the version published in Paulson S, Litschewski B (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruiz Manero J (1990) Jurisdicción y normas. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruiz Manero J (1991) Normas independientes, criterios conceptuales y trucos verbales. Respuesta a Eugenio Bulygin. Doxa 9:281–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schauer F (1991) Playing by the rules. A philosophical examination of rule-based decision-making in law and in life. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle J (1969) Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Searle J (1995) The construction of social reality. Simon & Shuster, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapiro S (2009) What is the rule of recognition (and does it exist)?. In: Adler K, Himma E (2009), chapter IX

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapiro S (2011) Legality. Bellknap Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Wright GH (1963) Norm and action. A logical inquiry. Routledge & Keagan Paul, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Wright GH (1983) Practical reason. Philosophical papers, vol I. Basil Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldron J (2009) Who needs rules of recognition?. In: Adler K, Himma E (2009), chapter XII

    Google Scholar 

  • Waluchow W (1994) Inclusive legal positivism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Zipursky B (2001) The model of social facts. In: Coleman (2001a), pp 219–270

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Law Department, University of Mar del Plata, Mar del Plata, Argentina

    Jorge L. Rodríguez

Authors
  1. Jorge L. Rodríguez
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jorge L. Rodríguez .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

    Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña

  2. Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

    Josep M. Vilajosana

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Rodríguez, J.L. (2019). The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention. In: Ramírez-Ludeña, L., Vilajosana, J. (eds) Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_5

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03570-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-03571-6

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation