Abstract
In his contribution, Jorge L. Rodríguez criticizes the position that Marmor has defended in previous works. Basically the criticism is that, according to Rodríguez, it cannot be the case that a convention is constitutive, and therefore the rule of recognition cannot be of this type. According to this author, the concept of convention employed by Marmor is too weak: it leads to consider a rule as conventional even though all the members of a community follow it because they consider that it is correct, and a rule may not be considered as conventional even though everyone is following it just because others follow it. Moreover, it seems to be pointless to speak of constitutional conventions inasmuch as, according to Rodríguez, the arbitrary character of conventions is incompatible with the constitutive character of a rule. As a consequence, Marmor’s view would be affected by an internal inconsistency because, following his own definitions, the constitutive character of the rule of recognition is incompatible with its conventional character.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the practice theory of rules, their existence depends upon a form of social practice comprising both patterns of conduct regularly followed by the majority of the members of the group, and a distinctive normative attitude towards such patterns of behavior (acceptance). The latter consists in a disposition of the members of the group to take such patterns of behavior as guides for their future conduct and as standards of criticism of the behavior of others that can legitimize claims and various forms of pressure for conformity, see Hart (1994), p. 254.
- 2.
See Hart (1994), pp. 255–257.
- 3.
See, for instance, Dickson (2007), pp. 373–402.
- 4.
See Lewis (1969), p. 78.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
See Marmor (2009), p. 1.
- 12.
See Lewis (1969), p. 97.
- 13.
Marmor (2009), p. x.
- 14.
See Marmor (2009), p. 5.
- 15.
Marmor (2009), p. 5, note 4.
- 16.
See Marmor (2009), p. 5.
- 17.
See Marmor (2009), p. 6.
- 18.
- 19.
See Marmor (2009), p. 11.
- 20.
Marmor (2009), p. 21.
- 21.
See Marmor (2009), p. 5.
- 22.
See Marmor (2009), p. 10.
- 23.
See Marmor (2009), p. 10.
- 24.
See Marmor (2009), p. 8.
- 25.
Marmor (2009), p. 12.
- 26.
Marmor (2009), p. 11.
- 27.
See Burge (1975), pp. 249–255.
- 28.
See Marmor (2009), pp. 5–6.
- 29.
See Marmor (2009), p. 11.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
Marmor (2001), p. 18.
- 33.
The difference between asserting the existence of a rule and formulating a rule corresponds to von Wright’s distinction between norm-propositions and norms (see von Wright 1963, p. 106).
- 34.
In deontic logic, the possibility of admitting iterated deontic operators is a contested issue (see, for instance, von Wright 1983, pp. 142–150).
- 35.
See Marmor (2009), pp. 7–8.
- 36.
- 37.
Marmor (2001), p. 14.
- 38.
See Marmor (2001), p. 15.
- 39.
Additionally, in this kind of situation it is even difficult to think of incompatible alternatives.
- 40.
A similar objection was suggested in Celano (2003), p. 358.
- 41.
See Marmor (2011), p. 49.
- 42.
See Marmor (2011), p. 50.
- 43.
See Marmor (2011), p. 51.
- 44.
See Marmor (2011), pp. 81–82.
- 45.
See Marmor (2011), p. 78.
- 46.
See Marmor (2011), pp. 78–79. Marmor states that in his original account Hart argued that the rationale of the rule of recognition was the need for certainty in the identification of the law, and that in the “Postscript” Hart seemed to add a reason based on the need for coordination. And though Marmor considers that it is not open to discussion that the rule of recognition contributes to those goals, he claims they are insufficient to justify having a rule of recognition since the reasons to have rules of recognition would be, in his view, closely linked to the reasons for having law.
- 47.
See Marmor (2011), p. 81.
- 48.
Marmor (2001), p. 21.
- 49.
See Celano (2003), p. 353.
- 50.
See, for instance, Hart (1965), p. 358.
- 51.
This is what Raz, among others, argues. In his view, not all secondary rules confer powers; only rules of change and rules of adjudication do so. By contrast, the rule of recognition is the exception (see Raz 1971, pp. 794–795 and note 24). Ambiguities in the Hartian typology have also been pointed out by many, including Green (1996), pp. 1687–1717; MacCormick (1981), pp. 130–134; Waluchow (1994), p. 75.
- 52.
Thus, MacCormick claims that secondary rules are a sort of “mixed bag” (see MacCormick 1981, p. 133).
- 53.
- 54.
- 55.
- 56.
- 57.
See Bulygin (1991a), p. 278.
- 58.
See Bulygin (1991b), p. 317.
- 59.
- 60.
Because of the difficulties offered by Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, I will use von Wright’s less problematic distinction between prescriptions and (conceptual) rules when appropriate. See von Wright (1963), Chapter 1.
- 61.
- 62.
See Hart (1961), pp. 94–95.
- 63.
- 64.
See Marmor (2009), p. 32.
- 65.
See Marmor (2009), p. 167.
- 66.
Hart (1961), p. 135.
- 67.
Hart (1961), p. 107. Raz remarks, on the one hand, that there is no reason to think that the rule of recognition contains all the criteria of validity of the rules in a legal system, since many other rules (of change) would also set criteria of validity. Yet, he tries to save the Hartian idea arguing that there are criteria of validity that, though legally binding, are not legally valid and, consequently, must be stipulated by the rule of recognition (see Raz 1971, pp. 809–810). In this suggestion, however, there is a confusion between validity as membership (a descriptive notion) and validity as binding force (a prescriptive notion).
- 68.
Hart (1961), p. 96.
- 69.
- 70.
See Bobbio (1975), p. 241.
- 71.
See Waldron (2009), Sect. IX.
- 72.
See Hart (1961), pp. 195–107.
- 73.
See Hart (1961), p. 107.
- 74.
See Hart (1961), p. 109. The only reason why Hart claims here that the rule of recognition can neither be valid nor invalid is because he is identifying validity with the regular creation of a norm according to the criteria set by other norm or norms. By contrast, if we understand “validity” as membership in a legal system, the rule of recognition will be a valid rule according to the interpretation analyzed in the text.
- 75.
See Hart (1961), p. 105.
- 76.
See Kelsen (1960), p. 200.
- 77.
See Bulygin (1991a), pp. 257–278.
- 78.
Bulygin (1991a), pp. 263–264. The English translation is mine.
- 79.
For a critical analysis on this idea, see Ferrer Beltrán and Rodríguez (2011), pp. 116–133.
- 80.
This is basically the idea that inspires the institutional theory of law. See, for instance, MacCormick and Weinberger (1986).
- 81.
Ross (1957), pp. 23 ff.
- 82.
In an analogous sense, Ross states that “Since the series of authorities cannot be infinite, the inevitable conclusion follows that in the final instance the highest norms of competence cannot be enacted −they must be presupposed” (Ross 1958, p. 80).
- 83.
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Rodríguez, J.L. (2019). The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention. In: Ramírez-Ludeña, L., Vilajosana, J. (eds) Legal Conventionalism. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 126. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6_5
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