Abstract
The German leadership of the European Union, which has emerged and been consolidated over the decades, has been confronted with the institutional disintegration caused by Britain’s decision to exit the EU in a move known as Brexit. This new phenomenon of decomposition of the European integration process brings—besides economic and non-economic effects for Britain and the whole Union—an additional challenge for Germany. The German economy will be exposed to tangible losses, and Germany’s European policy will require difficult adjustments. The improvement of Germany’s position in the EU is being accompanied by an unequal increase in disparities with France and increased responsibility to meet the expectations of EU partners. Domestic as well as intra-EU and global factors will require the German government to increase the flexibility of “management” and intensify cooperation with EU member states.
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Notes
- 1.
The term “European policy” is used here in its narrow sense to denote a country’s policy on the European Union and unification processes. Cf. Olszyński, J. (2016), Polityka europejska Niemiec w latach 2012–2013, in Olszyński, J., Bielig, A., and Wandel, J. (ed.), Niemcy i Polska w drodze do “Europa 2020”, pp. 43–60.
- 2.
Multivariate simulations of quantitative changes based on sophisticated econometric models are carried out to help shape government economic policy and build business strategies. Cf. Busch, B. (2017), Produktions-und Lieferverflechtungen zwischen britischen Branchen, der EU und Deutschland, “IW-Trends”, 2/2017, pp. 61–82.
- 3.
According to Deutschland in Zahlen, Ausgabe 2017, IdW, Koeln.
- 4.
Ibidem, p. 136.
- 5.
Cf. Capuano, S. (2017), Moegliche Konsequenzen des Brexit fuer die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Grossbritannien und der EU, “Aktuelle Berichte IAB”, Nuernberg 2/2017.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 5 and Busch, B. (2017), op. cit.
- 7.
Capuano, S. (2017), op. cit., p. 4.
- 8.
Cf. Mathes, J. (2017), Der Brexit ist ein Rueckschritt fuer die europaeische Integration, https://www.iwd.de. Accessed 3 July 2017.
- 9.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 10.
https://europa.eu/revenue-income-pl. Accessed 15 October 2017.
- 11.
See Sinn, H. W. (2017), Die Bedeutung des Brexit fuer Deutschland und Europa, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 March 2017.
- 12.
Brytyjskie siły zbrojne, www.psz.pl. Accessed 16 October 2017.
- 13.
Szubart, K. (2017), Unia Europejska “dwóch prędkości”? Niemcy i WPBiO po Brexicie, BIZ No. 281, www.iz.poznan.pl. Accessed 3 July 2017.
- 14.
See Moeller, A. (2016), Die EU ohne Grossbritannien: politische Folgefragen, http://www.bpb.de/internazionales/europa/brexit/228804. Accessed 3 July 2017.
- 15.
Grosse, T. G. (2017), Ku Europie dwóch prędkości. Strategia Niemiec wobec integracji europejskiej, CAKJ, Kraków; Lippert, B. (2016), Die EU zwischen der Integration und “Souveraenitaetsreflexen”, http://www.bpb.de.internazionales/europa. Accessed 3 July 2017; and Moeller A. (2016), op. cit.
- 16.
The day after the referendum, leaders from EU institutions (including the president of the European Commission, the chief of the European Council, the head of the European Parliament, and the prime minister of the Netherlands, the country holding the rotating EU presidency at the time) declared that the European Union would continue as a bloc of 27 member states and that Brexit would not be the beginning of the end of the EU, https://www.salon24.pl. Accessed 16 October 2017.
- 17.
Ibid., p. 1.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 2. To underline the cooperative nature of Germany’s leadership role, she invited the French president and the Italian prime minister to urgent consultations.
- 19.
According to Frymark, K., and Popławski, K. (2016), Niemcy wobec Brexitu: powrót sporu o Europę dwóch prędkości, “Analizy OSW”, 29 June 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl. Accessed 16 October 2017.
- 20.
Ibid., p. 5.
- 21.
Ibid., p. 4.
- 22.
- 23.
Sinn H.-W. (2016), op. cit., and Matthes J. (2017), op. cit.
- 24.
See Grosse, T. G. (2017), op. cit., p. 10.
- 25.
See Bielecki, J. (2017), Polska - Niemcy: znikająca wspólnota interesów, http://www.rp.pl/analizy309219867. Accessed 28 September 2017.
- 26.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 27.
Grosse, T. G. (2017), op. cit., p. 7.
- 28.
Haszczyński, J. (2017), Pociąg z Merkel nam nie odjedzie, http://www.rp.pl/wybory-w-Niemczech. Accessed 21 September 2017.
- 29.
See Grosse, T. G. (2017), op. cit., pp. 13–20.
- 30.
The aforementioned economist H. W. Sinn has voiced a view that Germany will be forced to support the fiscal union because this will enable it to hide expected losses generated by the monetary union. See Kozieł, H. (2017), Niemiecki dryf ku unii fiskalnej, http://www.rp.pl/gospodarka309209909. Accessed 21 September 2017.
- 31.
Grosse, T. G. (2017), op. cit., p. 17.
- 32.
The EDF will start operating under the EU’s new financial framework after 2021 and will be endowed with an annual research budget of around EUR 500 million plus an additional EUR 5 million for the purchase of weapons; EUR 90 million has been set aside for the pilot programme in 2017–2019. Ibid., p. 14.
- 33.
Szubart, K. (2017), Unia Europejska “dwóch prędkości”? Niemcy i WPBiO po Brexicie, “Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego No. 281”, www.iz.poznan.pl. Accessed 21 September 2017.
- 34.
Frymark, K., and Popławski, K. (2016), op. cit., p. 4.
- 35.
Die Loesung heisst Norwegen, https://www.iwd.de/artikel/322535. Accessed 3 July 2017.
- 36.
Grosse, T. G. (2017), op. cit., p. 10.
- 37.
See Kędzierski, M. (2016), Europejskie Niemcy w niemieckiej Europie, www.psz.pl. Accessed 3 July 2017.
- 38.
Fischer, J. (2015), Fatale Entscheidung fuer ein deutches Europa, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 26 July 2015.
- 39.
Kędzierski M. (2016), op. cit., p. 6.
- 40.
This involves, for example, suggestions that the German government should avoid playing a role as a teacher and fastidious judge who demands that rules are dutifully followed and punishes any transgressions; and that instead it should create conditions for an enhanced atmosphere of trust. Cf. Maul, H. W. (2015), Uebermaechtig und verwundbar. Deutschlands Rolle in Europa, Internationale Politik, No. 5, pp. 132–136.
References
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Capuano S. (2017), Moegliche Konsequenzen des Brexit fuer die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen Grossbritannien und der EU (Aktuelle Berichte IAB, Nuernberg 2/2017).
Deutschland in Zahlen, Ausgabe 2017. Koeln: IdW.
Die Loesung heisst Norwegen. https://www.iwd.de/artikel/322535. Accessed July 3, 2017.
Fischer, J. (2015, July 26). Fatale Entscheidung fuer ein deutches Europa. Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
Frymark, K., & Popławski. K. (2016, June 29), Niemcy wobec Brexitu: powrót sporu o Europę dwóch prędkości. Analizy OSW. https://www.osw.waw.pl. Accessed October 16, 2017.
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Haszczyński, J. (2017). Pociąg z Merkel nam nie odjedzie. http://www.rp.pl/wybory-w-Niemczech. Accessed September 21, 2017.
http://www.bpb.de.internazionales/europa. Accessed July 3, 2017.
https://europa.eu/revenue-income-pl. Accessed October 15, 2017.
https://www.salon24.pl. Accessed October 16, 2017.
Kędzierski, M. (2016). Europejskie Niemcy w niemieckiej Europie. www.psz.pl. Accessed July 3, 2017.
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Lippert, B. (2016). Die EU zwischen der Integration und “Souveraenitaetsreflexen”. http://www.bpb.de.internazionales/europa. Accessed July 3, 2017.
Mathes J. (2017). Der Brexit ist ein Rueckschritt fuer die europaeische Integration. https://www.iwd.de. Accessed July 3, 2017.
Maul, H. W. (2015). Uebermaechtig und verwundbar. Deuschlands Rolle in Europa. Internationale Politik (5), 132–136.
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Olszyński, J. (2016). Polityka europejska Niemiec w latach 2012–2013. In J. Olszyński, A. Bielig, & J. Wandel (Eds.), Niemcy i Polska w drodze do “Europa 2020” (pp. 43–60). Warsaw: Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie – Oficyna Wydawnicza.
Sinn, H. W. (2017, March 16). Die Bedeutung des Brexit fuer Deutschland und Europa. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Szubart, K. (2017). Unia Europejska “dwóch prędkości”? Niemcy i WPBiO po Brexicie (BIZ No. 281). www.iz.poznan.pl. Accessed July 3, 2017.
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Olszyński, J. (2018). Changes in Germany’s European Policy in the Face of Brexit. In: Kowalski, A. (eds) Brexit and the Consequences for International Competitiveness. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03245-6_5
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