Abstract
Blockchains are the distributed ledger technology underpinning cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Blockchains facilitate exchange, provide public goods (security, property rights), map identities, and provide a platform for contracting and the enforcement of contracts. Some applications of blockchains offer the possibility of new forms of ‘corporate’ organisation—such as distributed autonomous organisations. Other applications suggest the possibility of removing public good provision from states to networks—such as property titling and identity. This chapter offers a constitutional political economy perspective on the development of the blockchain ecosystem. We argue that blockchains are constitutional orders—rule-systems in which individuals (or firms, or algorithms) can make economic and political exchanges, and so offer a unique economic environment for institutional discovery and constitutional experimentation.
Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts are with the RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub. A version of this chapter was first presented at the Western Economic Association Conference 93rd Annual Conference, June 29, 2018 in Vancouver, BC, Canada.
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Notes
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This terminology was first developed in https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/2355445.
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Berg, C., Davidson, S., Potts, J. (2018). Blockchains as Constitutional Orders. In: Wagner, R. (eds) James M. Buchanan. Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_18
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