Abstract
Schwartz fills an important gap in existing health care ethics literature by describing an egalitarian conception of moral respect which applies to autonomous and non-autonomous patients alike. It reframes questions about respect, from its target to the role that respect plays in our moral lives. Taking into account various forms of objectification, it suggests that the unique role of moral respect is to recognize a person as more than a mere object; to recognize them as an equally intrinsically valuable being who possesses dignity. Schwartz describes various forms of objectification and considers three cases in which patients are disrespected even while the doctor is upholding their autonomous decision-making.
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Notes
- 1.
Throughout the book if I use ‘respect’ this should be understood to mean ‘moral respect’ unless I specify another concept such as “respect for authority” or “respect for autonomy.”
- 2.
Chapter 3 will return to this case to consider moral respect for non-autonomous children. Some details of this case have been changed or omitted to protect the identities of those involved.
- 3.
Chapter 2 returns to Case B as I consider the ways in which medical epistemology and clinical care are objectifying.
- 4.
This is her real name, and I have permission to discuss her story in the context of this book. Tara Johnson and I wrote about her experience in Gestational Trophoblastic Neoplasia (2007). Some details of this case have been changed or omitted to protect the identities of those involved.
- 5.
Some details of this case have been changed or omitted to protect the identities of those involved. I return to this case in Chapter 4.
- 6.
This case is an amalgam of a fictionalized case described by Tom Kitwood based on his observations (2011, pp. 91–94) and descriptions of observations made in an Ontario residential care unit provided by Moira Welsh (2018). Chapter 3 returns to a discussion of respect and elderly people who are no longer autonomous.
- 7.
Although I do not have space to consider whether animals also have dignity in this book, it might turn out that some or even many do have dignity. I would be happy with this result.
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Schwartz, M.C. (2019). Introduction. In: Moral Respect, Objectification, and Health Care. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02967-8_1
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