Abstract
What is certification and does the legal meaning and significance of this regulatory tool depend on the institutional context in which it is placed? This contribution provides a legal governance perspective on certification. It first addresses the legal status of certificates and the legal effect of certification; then it analyses certification as a regulatory strategy and tool. Against this background, the contribution focuses on the legal positioning and fit of certification with the institutional contexts of public hierarchy and competitive markets. In the context of public hierarchy, certification is subject to public law principles, but does that mean that in a competitive market certification should be unrestrained? By examining competition law doctrines, this chapter shows how a laissez-faire approach to certification can threaten the foundations of a competitive market. It also shows that competition law enforcement can be helpful in preventing the damage to the public good which may occur when certification bodies engage in collusive or abusive behaviour. However, there is a limit to what competition law can do to achieve the goal of responsible use of certification in the context of a competitive/unregulated market. A reliance on the competition rules alone does not eliminate all the market failures and externalities that unregulated certification can bring about. Reasoning from the competition law experience, the contribution concludes that there is an interdependence between the two institutional contexts which should not be overlooked. Competitive markets can deliver on important public interest objectives but public law principles and enforcement are needed to protect competitive markets from conspiracies and abuses of power.
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Notes
- 1.
Black (2002). According to Black, regulation is ‘a focused and sustained attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve, as control, mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification’.
- 2.
Austin (1962).
- 3.
Ruiter (2002). See particularly the Supplement to this volume, which presents major distinctions between types of legal acts. Other types of speech acts are: commissive acts (e.g. a promise), directive acts (e.g. an order) and expressive acts (e.g. an emotional outcry).
- 4.
Only if the act of certification would be completely informal, without any procedure for the qualification of facts in terms of some norm (such as in saying: it is raining), would it be merely assertive (but even to say ‘it is raining’ seems to involve some measure of humidity or wetness against which to measure following some procedure).
- 5.
Compare a driver’s license certificate that merely asserts a person’s fitness (as competence) to drive (safely), but without inclusion of a score at the driver test, to a school or university diploma, as a certificate that may not only come accompanied by a report card but may also hold a judicium (e.g. cum laude).
- 6.
For example a statement of conformity by an assessor that has an interest in the certificate being issued does not add to intrinsic credibility.
- 7.
For instance by a rule about ipso jure permission or permission by a subsequent act, such as a building license that can only be granted upon having obtained a construction safety certificate.
- 8.
Such as when a university grants a PhD diploma grants the holder of the diploma the right to supervise PhD researchers, then this act counts as legal act.
- 9.
We will not elaborate on the legal act of certification as regards its scope, of relevance only inter partes, as is generally the case in private law, or erga omnes, which is more likely in public law, also as this requires further analysis of specific contextual rules.
- 10.
One may argue that the latter is basically voluntary, although contracts may not be as consensual as typically assumed—such as when in the supermarket retail market there is buyer power that requires suppliers of food stuffs to have their products certified.
- 11.
Murray and Scott (2002), pp. 491–516, esp. at 502.
- 12.
We do not rule out that certification could also fit an architecture-based (or code) regulatory strategy, but could not conceive of an example.
- 13.
Heldeweg (2013), pp. 107–139.
- 14.
Levi-Faur (2011), pp. 7–9.
- 15.
Ibid., 6–8.
- 16.
- 17.
As by periodical safety certification of cars.
- 18.
Less if we assume that it is not legally proper to have a public certification body concern itself with certification of standards that are not about upholding public interests—unless to uphold such commercial or social values is a public interest concern following the public interest in the proper functioning of (patterns of) legal relations that depend on compliance in these standards.
- 19.
In defining we build, inter alia, on the ISO/IEC 17000 Conformity Assessment terminology. See: https://www.iso.org/standard/29316.html—this is not an open source.
- 20.
- 21.
Defined by ISO as: the formal recognition by an independent body, generally known as an accreditation body, that a certification body operates according to international standards.’ See: https://www.iso.org/certification.html.
- 22.
- 23.
Ruiter (2002), Chapter 4.
- 24.
Ruiter (1993), p. 357.
- 25.
Regulated markets, between public hierarchy and competitive market (e.g. ‘semi-public services’); Networked markets, between competitive markets and civil society (e.g. ‘socio-industrial networks’); Regulated networks, between civil society and public hierarchy (e.g. ‘social enterprises’); Tripartite platforms, between all three ideal type modes (e.g. ‘societal platforms’).
- 26.
Assuming there is a general, conceptualizing legal arrangement as a format that holds rules on their instantiation etc.
- 27.
See Mohan (2010), pp. 24–33. The author provides a summary of the history of fair trade certification—from its roots in ‘alternative trading movement’ based on ‘solidarity economy’ propelled by NGOs and charities (Oxfam, Traidcraft as well as faith-based groups such as Christian Aid), to a more mainstream marketing initiative in which multinational companies cooperate. See also Wilson and Mutersbaugh (2015), p. 281. A prominent example is the Max Havelaar fair trade label which started out as a civil society initiative. Drawing the line between pure civil society and ‘market’ initiatives may be difficult since, especially with respect to eco-labels, producers may sponsor NGO certification or establish their own eco-label certification scheme. Kim (2014–2015), pp. 181, 185 f.
- 28.
The legality principle may almost be regarded a container principle, in that many meanings and functions have been attributed to it. We refer here to the principle that the competent authority is intrinsically involved in the decisions it takes and may hence be held responsible for them.
- 29.
Aside representation, eligibility may be underpinned by notions of fairness, independency and/or impartiality, wisdom, charisma etc.
- 30.
The term ‘exit’ is often used in respect of legitimacy, to emphasize the consensual aspect of exchange and the opportunity of the buyer to contract with a competitive offeror. In public hierarchy, the term ‘voice’ is often used to express the legitimacy of government in to command & control, as long as this is democratically underpinned. Hirschman (1970).
- 31.
Contracting takes at least two to achieve success; permitting may take only one, but has effect inter partes (mostly in private law) or possibly even erga omnes (mostly in public law), property is about a right in rem, and legal personality is about a legal form of collective action.
- 32.
We freely take these labels (‘collective choice’; ‘operational’) from Ostrom without suggesting that we import her IAD-framework. See Ostrom (2005). Note that ‘operational’ is about the use/relevance of Hohfeldian subjective rights, such as claims, duties, privileges, powers, liabilities and immunities. Hohfeld (1964).
- 33.
van Maanen (1986).
- 34.
A, probably soft law, regulatory response from civil society actors, such as through standards, certificates and boycotts, is surely a relevant alternative.
- 35.
It could be argued that regulation of a certification (and accreditation) scheme with a general purpose, non-specific of any type of service or good, would in fact be an addition to institutional rules (endogenously or exogenously), as it would be in service of (any private interest in; and in that sense ‘neutral’ or ‘colourless’) the proper working of the market, similar to, exogenously, how the introduction of a public consumer protection authority, would have such a broader, more institutional meaning. Collective choice rules are generally more ‘regulatory’ and more related to functional areas of law.
- 36.
- 37.
The so-called ‘new approach directives’ are a point in case. See: European Commission, Completing the Internal Market [1985] COM (85) 310 final.
- 38.
Braithwaite (2008).
- 39.
Consider that in the EU there actually exists a regulatory regime for accreditation with public authority: Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament of 9 July 2008, setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products, OJ L 218/30.
- 40.
Also financial security—think of the role of credit rating agencies.
- 41.
See Sect. 2.2.1 to sense the fit between the distinction between ‘intrinsic end in itself’ and ‘extrinsic means to an end’ regulatory objectives, and the distinction we make here between meta-regulation addressing institutional rules or collective choice rules.
- 42.
As alluded to earlier, actors in competitive markets and civil society can do the same, as by their standard setting or certification, but rather through competition- and community-based regulatory strategies.
- 43.
Hierarchy-based private regulation is an option on the basis of access to/use of private property rights. There may be scope (even) for code-based regulation in that firms in competitive markets may take decisions, following demand, that lead to exclusion of certain technologies that government in public hierarchy favours—such as in changes in ICT-services.
- 44.
Freedom being defined as the absence, in principle, of (legal) obligations.
- 45.
Also see our references above (in Sects. 2.3.2–2.3.3) to the legality principle and more in the below. The liberal state doctrine and legality principle basically hold that government/public law (unilateral) regulation is only allowed by exception (not as a general power such as in contracting), when necessary (because of specific private law failure on a point of public interest) and if proportionate (not publicizing more than necessary). With government regulation, one should always (keep) ask(ing) which private ailment it aims to remedy, and whether that facility is indeed still remedial.
- 46.
Most countries allow for judicial review of legislation for compatibility with the constitution. A notable exception in this respect is the Netherlands, where constitutional review of legislation is precluded by Art 120 of the Dutch constitution.
- 47.
And many others, such as those named in fine of Sect. 2.4.4.
- 48.
Eijlander et al. (2003), pp. 50–57.
- 49.
Eijlander et al. (2003) only look at the public/state v. private/market dichotomy. One could add to 4. civil society certificates that are only relevant to community-building.
- 50.
Art 2 ECHR—right to life; Art 8 ECHR—respect for private and family life.
- 51.
We could add that there is a public interest in maintaining basic autonomy through equal freedom in markets and in civil society, but will assume that this will be safeguarded by institutional rules of those governance modes as they apply to the private certification schemes in question—should these rules (and practices) fail, then this becomes another matter.
- 52.
Which we name only briefly—also considering other contributions to this volume.
- 53.
Decision (EC) No 768/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC [2008] OJ/L 218.
- 54.
Act of 12 November 2009, Stb 2009, 503 (Dienstenwet), implementing EU directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36.
- 55.
See the contribution by R Neerhof in this volume.
- 56.
A Quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation) is a hybrid organisation in that it is not a public body (and so does not fall within the normal scope of government hierarchy under democratic control) but it does exercise public authority. It often concerns expert agencies such as fair competition regulators.
- 57.
There may not be much competition on this market but the distinctive feature is that the actors are in competition with each other.
- 58.
The object of certification may be a product, service, business process or the business itself.
- 59.
The idea of ‘competition on the merits’ is linked to the understanding that competition law ensures that the best companies have a chance on the market. However, the actual interpretation of the term and the best type of analysis needed to achieve a merit-based competition regime are contested. On the one hand, promoting competition on the merits requires protecting opportunities for market access. On the other hand, it implies that the best (cheapest, most efficient) companies should be allowed to succeed. See OECD Roundtable, Competition on the Merits (2005) DAF/COMP(2005)27. There is much debate on whether the emphasis of competition law and policy should be on preserving ‘opportunities’ or ‘outcomes’. For an illuminating comparison of the different approaches to competition law and policy, see Fox (2003), p. 149.
- 60.
This formulation appears in a number of hard and soft law instruments but also in statements by commission officials. In a 2015 speech, Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager explained that the Commission’s ‘first goal is preserving good competitive conditions in the markets, which translates into lower prices, better quality and wider choice for consumers.’ See Vestager, ‘The values of competition policy’ (Keynote speech at CEPS Corporate breakfast ‘one year in office’, Brussels 13.10.2015). For an extensive discussion of the interpretation of the ‘consumer welfare’ concept, see Daskalova (2015), p. 133.
- 61.
Akerlof (1970), pp. 488–500.
- 62.
Viscusi (1978), p. 278.
- 63.
Ibid, 277–279. Unlike Akerlof’s example, the good-quality providers in this market do not exit the marketplace; rather, they seek to differentiate themselves in order to be able to price discriminate.
- 64.
The OECD Competition Assessment Tool views certification as a market barrier. See OECD (2016), p. 24.
- 65.
A fair-trade label or an eco-label may apply to products that do not necessarily compete on the same markets—e.g. dishwashers and washing machines are on separate relevant markets but use the same label; fair trade bananas and fair trade cocoa compete on separate relevant markets but use the same label.
- 66.
Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1 (hereinafter: Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines 2011), para 310. According to the Commission, ‘Dissemination of a standard can be enhanced by marks or logos certifying compliance thereby providing certainty to customers. Agreements for testing and certification go beyond the primary objective of defining the standard and would normally constitute a distinct agreement and market.’
- 67.
Fasten and Hofmann (2010). In the case of credit rating agencies, there may be a two-sided market when agencies sell ratings both to sellers and to buyers of securities.
- 68.
Filistrucchi et al. (2014), p. 293.
- 69.
Horizontal cooperation guidelines (2011), para 264.
- 70.
Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 941.
- 71.
In order to be considered direct competitors, companies need to compete on the same product market and on the same geographical market.
- 72.
Case C-246/86 SC Belasco and others v Commission of the European Communities (Belasco and Others v Commission), ECLI:EU:C:1989:301 at ECR 2120.
- 73.
The mark was not officially registered as a trademark.
- 74.
Case C-246/86 SC Belasco and others v Commission of the European Communities (Belasco and Others v Commission), ECLI:EU:C:1989:301.
- 75.
Ibid., para 30.
- 76.
Ibid., para 4. According to the background information, “[t]he agreement also provided for the adoption of defensive measures against competition from foreign undertakings or competition resulting from the establishment of new undertakings or the discovery of products to replace roofing felt. The members of Belasco also undertook to contribute to the purchase of any plant for the manufacture of the products concerned in the event of a company’s insolvency or the sale of an undertaking consequent on the exercise of rights by a third party and not to sell or hire out any plant for the manufacture of such products.”
- 77.
See e.g. ECJ, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111 and 113-114/73 Suiker Unie, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174.
- 78.
Equally important is other information which would allow companies to derive insights about the pricing, volumes, discounts, promotion, market expansion or secret innovation plans of rivals.
- 79.
Case C-194/14 P AC-Treuhand v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:717.
- 80.
European Commission, Horizontal Guidelines (2011), paras 264–268.
- 81.
In a case of 2011, the European Commission fined major detergent producers for using an environmental initiative launched in the context of their trade associations in order to coordinate pricing strategy. The environmental initiative in question aimed to improve the performance of detergents. See Press Release IP/11/473, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines producers of washing powder € 315.2 million in cartel settlement case’ (Brussels, 13.04.2011) and Case COMP/39579 Consumer Detergents, decision of 13 April 2011, [2011] OJ C 193/14.
- 82.
National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v Federal Trade Commission 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
- 83.
- 84.
On the impact of retailer-driven standards on small-scale farmers, see Purnhagen et al. (2013).
- 85.
Commission decision in Case IV.F.1/36.718 – CECED [2000] OJ L 187/47.
- 86.
Commission decision in Case COMP.F.1/37.894 CECED Dishwashers [2001] OJ C 250/2 and Commission decision in Case COMP.F.1/37.893 CECED Water Heaters [2001] OJ C 250/4.
- 87.
Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 947.
- 88.
Ibid., 947 f. In the case of raising rival’s costs, there may be two goals: (1) to foreclose the competitors from the market or (2) to establish a price umbrella, enabling incumbents to charge higher prices while retaining a more ‘competitive’ position vis-à-vis the rivals in question. See also Krattenmaker and Salop (1986), p. 209.
- 89.
Often this type of collusion will be accompanied by ‘type I’ collusion because, without some way to limit competition among themselves, collaborators will not be able to retain the gains from excluding competitors. See Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 985.
- 90.
486 U.S. 492 (1988).
- 91.
The case is discussed in Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 987. Lande and Marvel identify it as a ‘Type II’ collusion.
- 92.
486 U.S. 492 (1988) Syllabus.
- 93.
European Commission Case COMP/F-2/38.401—EN 197-1 Standard—EMC/European Cement Producers [2005].
- 94.
Similar concerns are expressed in Lundqvist (2014), pp. 201–205.
- 95.
It is remarkable that the Commission dismissed EMC’s complaint about close links between the standard-setting body CEN and the trade organisation of cement-producers, Cembureau, as ‘normal lobbying activity’. Certainly, in the context of public regulation, lobbying activity itself is also regulated. See European Commission Case COMP/F-2/38.401—EN 197-1 Standard—EMC/European Cement Producers [2005], para 102.
- 96.
See OECD (2016), p. 17, where it is noted that “[…] self-regulatory mechanisms, which allow firms to collaborate in certain areas, may also lead to firms coordinating their activities and engaging in cartel-like behaviour (e.g., price-fixing) and creating barriers to entry for new firms. This concern calls for greater alertness on the part of the regulatory officials and governments and even the need for some carefully crafted checks and balances to minimize the potential adverse effects.”
- 97.
The various requirements related to the necessary characteristics of cranes were set out in several decrees. A governmentally-appointed foundation was in charge of carrying out inspections and approving cranes.
- 98.
For instance, it required that applicants show their registration with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce—something which would not have been applicable for Belgian or German applicants.
- 99.
Commission Decision in Cases IV/34.179, 34.202, 216—Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbederijf and the Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven (Dutch Cranes) [1995] OJ L 312/79, para 37.
- 100.
Dutch Cranes decision para 23.
- 101.
See Art 3 of the Dutch Cranes decision. In its assessment, the Court did not deny that the other criteria could be useful but given that only two criteria were used, it ruled on whether these two criteria are pertinent. Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96 Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK), Federatie van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven (FNK) v Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter: SCK and FNK v Commission) [1997] ECLI:EU:T:1997:157, paras 133–135.
- 102.
Ibid., para 149.
- 103.
See Horizontal Cooperation guidelines [2011], paras 280–286. The requirements are summed up in para 280: ‘Where participation in standard-setting is unrestricted and the procedure for adopting the standard in question is transparent, standardisation agreements which contain no obligation to comply (3) with the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms will normally not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).’
- 104.
Commission Decision Case IV.F.1/36.718. - CECED [2000] OJ L187/47, para 65.
- 105.
Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 985.
- 106.
Ibid., 985.
- 107.
According to Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 985 additional circumstances include difficulties in monitoring transactions and difficulties in punishing cartel cheaters.
- 108.
Ibid., 949.
- 109.
An example is the California Dental Association discussed in Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 960 f. An example of a more nuanced attempt is in the National Society for Professional Engineers case; the society’s rules prohibited comparison price advertising with no distinction about the type of project (simple or complex). The result was that customers would have to incur search costs with an engineer before finding out what the price is and choosing to move on to a competing supplier.
- 110.
Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 961, use as example the case of Fastline Publications 1998 FTC LEXIS 55 (FTC May 11, 1998). In this case farm equipment dealers boycotted the publisher of a circular containing price information on the equipment in question. By agreeing to withdraw advertising monies from the publisher, the dealers put pressure to change the type of information presented to the customer. Similarly, in Santa Clara Car Dealers, a local dealers association withdrew advertising from a newspaper in order to punish the paper for running an article aimed to teach customers how to better search for and negotiate for cars. In Dillon Co. (102 FTC 1299 (1983) grocery stores conspired to prevent the data collection for a program broadcasting price differences among grocers.
- 111.
Detroit Auto Dealers Association, 111 FTC 417 (1989), discussed in Lande and Marvel (2000), pp. 964–966.
- 112.
See e.g. ES Development Inc. v. RWM Enterprises Inc, 939 F2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). In this case car dealers agreed to exercise objection rights they had under franchise agreements in order to prevent the opening of a one-stop shop car mall. The case is discussed in Lande and Marvel (2000), pp. 968–970. Another example is the Toys R Us case in which, a vertical cartel agreement organised by leading toy retailer in order to prevent the successful entry of the ‘warehouse or club’ model in the discount toy retail market. See Toys “R” Us Inc. v Federal Trade Commission, Decision of 1 August 2000 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Docket No. 98-4107.
- 113.
Lande and Marvel (2000), p. 976.
- 114.
Ibid., 977–984.
- 115.
This could be the case when costly certification is required by powerful retailers. If the retailers can extract the benefit from certification (e.g. by owning the certification bodies), the certification requirement implies a transfer of wealth.
- 116.
Commission Decision in Case IV/29.995—NAVEWA-ANSEAU [1981] OJ L 167/39, affirmed in Joined Cases 96 to 102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82 NV IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission of the European Communities (IAZ v Commission), ECLI:EU:C:1983:310.
- 117.
Equipment such as dishwashers and washing machines could lead to contamination of the water supply if certain criteria are not met.
- 118.
Parallel importation refers to the practice of independent dealers purchasing machines directly abroad and importing them. Such traders are to be distinguished from the ‘official dealers’ appointed by manufacturers for each country.
- 119.
Interestingly, in Fra.bo, another case concerning certification by private body of products used in the drinking water supply sector, a national trade association cancelled the certificate of a producer for failure to provide evidence that it meets the requirements set by DVGW. The affected producer, Fra.bo, challenged the decision by DVGW by relying on EU free movement of goods law (Art. 34 TFEU) and on EU competition law (Art. 101 TFEU). The Court, however, did not discuss the applicability of the competition provisions. However, there is no indication that the certifying process was misused with the purpose of limiting competition or harming consumers. Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW), ECLI:EU:C:2012:453.
- 120.
Reg (EU) No 1025/2012 on European standardisation [2012] OJ L 316/12. The regulation provides for stakeholder representation (SMEs, labour representatives, consumer protection organisations, environmental and ‘social interest’ groups).
- 121.
- 122.
- 123.
Kim (2014–2015), pp. 199–208 and 214.
- 124.
Ibid., 183.
- 125.
Case 26/75 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities [1975] ECLI:EU:C:1975:150, para 12. The Court rejected the Commission decision on ground that the company had changed its policy upon complaints by customers and had agreed to reimburse the difference in fees.
- 126.
Commission Decision IV/30.615—British Leyland [1984] OJ L 207/11.
- 127.
Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1986:421.
- 128.
Ibid., para 27.
- 129.
FRAND stands for ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’. The so-called ‘FRAND’ disputes relate to disputes related to the licensing terms for patents embedded in standards, in particular those patents essential for compliance with the standard (standard essential patents).
- 130.
- 131.
In the Rambus case, the Commission examined claims that Rambus deliberately did not inform the standard-setting organisation about the fact that it owned patents essential for compliance with the standard (standard essential patents). The Commission adopted a commitment decision with Rambus agreeing on a worldwide price cap for its royalties on the patents in question. See Press Release ’Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments from Rambus lowering memory chip royalty rates’, IP/09/1897 (Brussels, 9.12.2009).
- 132.
It should be noted there is no doctrine of excessive pricing under US antitrust law. On the difficulties of applying the excessive pricing doctrine, see: Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority), The Pros and Cons of High Prices (Conference Proceedings 2007) and the contributions therein.
- 133.
This paragraph and the following one are based on Lundqvist (2014), pp. 224–228.
- 134.
Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW), [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:453.
- 135.
Leibowitz (2005).
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Daskalova, V.I., Heldeweg, M.A. (2019). Challenges for Responsible Certification in Institutional Context: The Case of Competition Law Enforcement in Markets with Certification. In: Rott, P. (eds) Certification – Trust, Accountability, Liability. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02499-4_3
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