The Principles-Theory Variant of Proportionality

Andrade Neto, João

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_3

João Andrade Neto^4,5

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 72))

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Abstract

This chapter tackles issues surrounding the meaning of proportionality. It advances what the principles-theory variant of the test is and how the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) has made use of this variant propounded by Alexy. Accordingly, Sect. 1 differentiates two types of controversies that have surrounded the concept of proportionality and the studies on its migration. Section 2 shows that from the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG), Alexy derived a particular conception of proportionality, which he embedded in an encompassing theory that postulates the conceptual necessity of the test and thus makes a strong case for its universality. This variant of proportionality is grounded in three premises: the optimization thesis, the wide-scope conception of rights, and the thesis of argumentative representation. Section 3 details a set of decisions in which the STF or one of its Justices or panels have recourse to the principles-theory variant of proportionality or its sub-tests. Section 4 meets critiques often addressed to the use Brazilian Justices have made of the test: that the STF performs an inaccurate imitation of proportionality analysis, mistakes the concept of proportionality for something else, and resorts to no adjudicative method whatsoever. Finally, I start to affirmatively answer the question of whether there can be a place for the principles-theory variant proportionality in the Brazilian law, regardless of the absence of a corresponding clause in the Federal Constitution.

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Notes

1.
See Dworkin (1986), pp. 43–48, distinguishing ‘semantic disagreements’ from ‘genuine disagreements’ in law.
2.
See Balmer (2008), p. 784, on the proportionality of crime with punishment. C.f. Schlink (2012), pp. 719–722, suggesting that the separation between proportionality in issues of punishment and proportionality in constitutional adjudication is not so sharp.
3.
Law (2004), pp. 693–694.
4.
Bomhoff (2010), pp. 110, 138.
5.
Ibid., p. 109; Bomhoff (2008a), p. 555.
6.
Law (2004), p. 697.
7.
Ibid., p. 698.
8.
Kumm (2004), p. 579; Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2010), p. 265; Urbina (2012), p. 49; Klatt (2012), p. 8; Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 7; Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 67.
9.
Kumm (2012), p. 13.
10.
See Möller (2014), p. 32; Barak (2012a, b), p. 131; Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 67.
11.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 72.
12.
Cohn (2010), p. 607; Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), p. 371.
13.
Bomhoff (2013), pp. 190–191.
14.
Kumm (2004), p. 593.
15.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), p. 371.
16.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 90.
17.
Law (2004), p. 694; Kumm (2004), p. 576.
18.
Barak (2012a, b), p. 131.
19.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 75.
20.
Ibid., pp. 75–76.
21.
Alexy (1992), p. 149.
22.
Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 67.
23.
See Porat (2014), p. 401 ff., for an overview of the debates concerning balancing in U.S. constitutional law.
24.
Reznik (2000), pp. 242–282.
25.
Schauer (2010), pp. 36–37.
26.
See Möller (2012a), pp. 17–20, on the particularities of the U.S. model of rights; and Schauer (2010), p. 37, saying that ‘the typical proportionality inquiry is structured …, and it is this structure of burdens and presumptions that explains why it is a mistake to treat a proportionality inquiry as equivalent to an open-ended decision on the balance of all reasons and all facts’.
27.
Frantz (1961), p. 1424; Aleinikoff (1987), p. 943; Huscroft et al. (2014), p. 1.
28.
Frantz (1961), p. 1424.
29.
Bomhoff (2008b), p. 122.
30.
Möller (2012a), pp. 17–18.
31.
Bomhoff (2013), pp. 190–234. Not all comparatists notice this difference, which has led to some erroneous conclusions. To illustrate that, we can mention Aleinikoff (1987), who is commonly deemed as referring to balancing in the German sense (the final step of the proportionality test), when in fact he deals with the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach only.
32.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), p. 399.
33.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2010), p. 265.
34.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), p. 399.
35.
Bomhoff (2008b), p. 122.
36.
Ibid., p. 124.
37.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), p. 402. See Porat (2014), pp. 413–415, classifying the role of balancing in European-based systems as ‘strong,’ and in the U.S. as ‘weak’.
38.
See Sweet and Mathews (2010), pp. 117–140; Sullivan and Frase (2009), pp. 53–66. C.f. Pildes (1993), p. 711; (1998), p. 725, arguing for the presence of proportionality in the U.S. law.
39.
Huscroft et al. (2014), p. 1.
40.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2010), p. 265.
41.
Yowell (2014), p. 111.
42.
Lochner v. New York, Judgment of 1905, 198 U.S. 45.
43.
BVerfG (First Senate), Pharmacy Case, 7 BVerfGE 377, Judgment of 6 November 1958. The case was discussed in Chap. 2 above.
44.
Möller (2014), p. 31.
45.
McCrudden (2014), p. 20.
46.
Webber (2010), pp. 199–200; Sullivan (1992), p. 293; Schauer (1981), p. 265; Barak (2012a, b), pp. 752–754; Tushnet (1999), p. 1278. For a complete study on the U.S. categorical conception of rights, see Gardbaum (2008), p. 32 ff. Curiously, Gardbaum resists the idea of an American exceptionalism and argues that ‘the United States shares the same deep structure, conception, and analysis of constitutional rights as other modern Western democracies’.
47.
See Dworkin (1986), p. 46, on genuine conceptual controversies, in which ‘the competing interpretations are directed toward the same objects or events of interpretation’.
48.
See for instance Rivers (2006), p. 176, distinguishing the optimising conception, which “sees proportionality as a structured approach to balancing fundamental rights with other rights and interests in the best possible way,” and the state-limiting conception, which “sees proportionality as a set of tests warranting judicial interference to protect rights.” At p. 179, he also reports on ‘the tendency of British, and it would seem, Canadian and South African courts, to treat “necessity” as the final stage of proportionality review and to suppress the language of balancing’.
49.
Alexy (1992), p. 149.
50.
Particularly concerning the sub-test of legitimate aims, it is controversial whether it should precede or operate within balancing. See Andrade Neto (2015).
51.
See Möller (2014), pp. 31–40, for an overview on the competing versions theorists and courts have suggested to proportionality; Möller (2012a), pp. 137–140, mapping four different concepts of balancing.
52.
Kumm (2004), p. 579; Rivers (2006), p. 181; Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 76; Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 7; Grimm (2007), p. 16; Webber (2009), p. 71; Urbina (2012), p. 57; Barak (2012a, b), p. 742.
53.
Schlink (1976), p. 76 ff.; Böckenförde (1999), p. 83.
54.
von Bernstorff (2014), p. 66 ff.
55.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, C. 11 (U.K.).
56.
R. v. Oakes, 17550, Judgment of Can., [1986] 1 S.C.R.. See Grimm (2007), p. 383.
57.
Gardbaum (2010), p. 83.
58.
Grimm (2007), p. 393.
59.
Sweet and Mathews (2010), p. 107.
60.
Grimm (2007), p. 389.
61.
See also Sweet and Mathews (2010), p. 107.
62.
Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 67.
63.
See Chap. 2 above for a brief discussion about the conception of justice that underlies the principles theory.
64.
See for instance, Alexy (2003b), p. 433; Alexy (2010f), p. 9. C.f. Schauer (2010), pp. 40–45.
65.
See for instance, Rivers (2010), p. xvii. C.f. Habermas (1996), p. 259.
66.
Dworkin (1986), pp. 52, 65–68.
67.
See Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), footnote 87 at 389, observing that “the German fundamental concept of the Rechtsstaat —‘a state governed by law’—differs from the common law concept of rule of law, in that it is tied to an organic conception of the state that seeks to integrate state and society.”
68.
Alexy (1992), p. 149.
69.
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 19 (1) and (2): “Insofar as, under this Basic Law, a basic right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law …, the law must specify the basic right affected and the Article in which it appears;” and “[i]n no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.” The controversy over the normative source for proportionality is mentioned in Currie (1994), p. 309.
70.
See Alexy (2010b), pp. 66–69, 214, on the connection of proportionality with the optimization thesis and the wide-scope conception of rights, respectively; and Alexy (2005), p. 578, on its connection with the thesis of argumentative representation.
71.
Borowski (2011), pp. 579–580.
72.
Brugger (1994), pp. 396–398.
73.
Kaufman and Hassemer (1969), pp. 484–486.
74.
Borowski (2011), p. 580.
75.
See e.g., Poscher (2003), pp. 80–81; (2009), p. 438 ff.
76.
Klatt (2012), p. 7; Borowski (2011), p. 579.
77.
Alexy (2010b), p. 5.
78.
Rivers (2010), p. xvii; Kumm (2004), pp. 574–575.
79.
Alexy (2010b), pp. 13–14.
80.
Ibid., p. 14.
81.
Ibid.
82.
Schlink (1992), p. 718, says: “the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not speak expressly of principles as rules of optimization. However, constitutional scholarship correctly observes that a relative conception of fundamental rights as rules of optimization harmonizes well with the conception of them as objective principles.”
83.
Borowski (2011), p. 580.
84.
Kumm (2004), pp. 575, 576.
85.
Alexy (2010b), p. 66.
86.
Ibid., pp. 66–67, footnote 84.
87.
Ibid.
88.
Alexy (1992), p. 149.
89.
For instance, Alexy (2004), p. 45; (2010c), p. 24; (2014a), p. 512.
90.
For instance, BVerfG, Child Welfare Case, 22 BVerfGE 180, Judgment of 18 July 1967, p. 199.
91.
Alexy (2010b), p. 66.
92.
Kirsch (1977), p. 77, translated in Alexy (2010b), pp. 105, footnote 222.
93.
Alexy (2014a), p. 513.
94.
Alexy (2010c), pp. 27–28.
95.
Alexy (2003a), p. 135.
96.
Ibid., pp. 135–136.
97.
Ibid.
98.
Alexy (2010b), p. 411.
99.
Alexy (2003a), pp. 135–136.
100.
Alexy (2010c), p. 28.
101.
Alexy (2003a), pp. 135–136.
102.
Alexy (2010b), p. 401.
103.
Alexy (2003a), pp. 135–136.
104.
Alexy (1994), p. 227.
105.
Alexy (2007), p. 25.
106.
Alexy (2014a), p. 514. An ongoing debate about balancing concerns how one can allocate formal principles within the weight formula by connecting it to the variable R, which stands for the ‘reliability of the empirical assumptions concerning what the measure in question means for the non-realization of the one principle and the realization of the other principle’. As it happens with the treatment Alexy reserves to formal principles in general, this part of the principles theory has been discussed, criticized, and revised, but doubts persist, and the debates seem to be far from a satisfactory conclusion.
107.
See for example, Alexy (2003b), pp. 443–448; (2014a), pp. 512–524; Borowski (2011), pp. 578–586; (2013), pp. 1413–1416; Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 11–13, 56–58; (2012b), pp. 694–700; Klatt and Schmidt (2012a), pp. 71–77; Pavlakos (2007), p. 13; Pulido (2004), pp. 129–140.
108.
Alexy (2009a), p. 9.
109.
Alexy (2010b), p. 409.
110.
‘The problem of scales’ or the discussion on the commensurability/incommensurability of the elements that ought to be considered in the balancing test according to Alexy is the subject of an intense academic controversy. See Alexy (2003a), p. 136; (2003b), pp. 440–442; (2010b), pp. 10–11; (2010b), p. 32; Barak (2010), pp. 15–16; Huscroft et al. (2014), pp. 11, 14–17; Jackson (2004), pp. 833–834; Khosla (2010), p. 299; Klatt and Meister (2012a), pp. 58–66, 72–73; (2012b), pp. 695–699; Möller (2012b), pp. 719–723, 728–729; Rivers (2006), pp. 199–203; Rivers (2007), pp. 179–180, 185; Schauer (2010), pp. 35–36; da Silva (2011), pp. 273–301; Tsakyrakis (2009), pp. 471–475, 482; Urbina (2012), pp. 57–74, 80; Webber (2010), pp. 187, 191–198; Endicott (2014), pp. 311–342; Allan (2014), p. 222; Somek (2006), pp. 135–136.
111.
Alexy (2007), p. 11; (2003a), p. 136. Interestingly, Alexy (2007), p. 15, says that “‘l’ stands not just for the common term ‘light,’ but also for other expressions such as ‘minor’ or ‘weak,’ and ‘s’ stands for ‘high’ and ‘strong’ as well as for ‘serious’.”
112.
Alexy (2007), p. 15.
113.
Ibid., p. 15.
114.
Ibid.
115.
Alexy (2010b), p. 410. If the quotient is equal to 1, one is before a stalemate, which received special treatment in the principles theory for leading to a case where the legislature is granted discretion to deliberate. See Chap. 6 below.
116.
Ibid., p. 107.
117.
Klatt (2012), p. 20.
118.
Alexy (2010b), p. 407.
119.
Klatt and Meister (2012a), p. 57.
120.
Alexy (2010b), p. 66.
121.
Alexy (2010c), p. 24. See also Alexy (2000), p. 297; (2007), p. 10.
122.
Alexy (2010c), p. 24; (2010b), p. 66; (2012), p. 333
123.
Borowski (2011), p. 580.
124.
Alexy (2010b) , p. 67.
125.
Alexy (2005), pp. 572–573. See also Alexy (2000), pp. 297–298.
126.
C.f. Poscher (2015), p. 74, opposing the optimization thesis, thus rejecting the connection between proportionality and principles as optimization requirements.
127.
Alexy (2000), p. 298; (2003a), p. 135; (2010b), p. 67.
128.
Alexy (2000), p. 298; (2010b), p. 102; (2010e), p. 174.
129.
Alexy (2010b), p. 69.
130.
Ibid., p. 388.
131.
C.f. Klement (2008), p. 761, rejecting the identity between fundamental rights and principles, thus objecting the identity thesis and the necessary connection between fundamental rights and proportionality.
132.
Alexy (2010c), pp. 23–24.
133.
Barak (2012a, b), p. 131.
134.
See Kumm (2004), pp. 582–584; (2007), p. 141; Cremer (2014), pp. 59–62; Borowski (2011), pp. 581–582.
135.
Alexy (2014b), p. 58.
136.
Alexy (2010b), p. 76.
137.
Alexy (2005), p. 578.
138.
Alexy based his conception of external/internal justification on Wróblewski (1992), pp. 209–264; (1985), pp. 288–291. See Borowski (2011), p. 578, on the influence of Wróblewski’s ideas on the principles theory; Klatt and Schmidt (2012a), p. 74; and (2012b), p. 13, on how proportionality (and particularly balancing) relates to the internal justification/external justification dichotomy.
139.
Alexy (2010a), p. 221.
140.
Alexy (2003b), p. 434.
141.
Alexy (2010a), pp. 221, 230–231; (2010d), pp. 35–94.
142.
Klatt and Schmidt (2012a), p. 74.
143.
See Alexy ( 2010f), pp. 9–18. See also de Bustamante (2012), pp. 59–71; Duarte (2015); Brożek (2008), pp. 188–201.
144.
Alexy (2010c), p. 29.
145.
Klatt (2012), p. 20.
146.
Alexy (2010c), p. 32.
147.
Ibid., p. 32.
148.
Klatt (2014), p. 898; Alexy (2010d), p. 69, refers to those as ‘doubtful cases’.
149.
Alexy (2012), p. 356, highlights that “each instance of balancing begins with at least two subsumptions.” Yet, as I explain in the text, it is also correct to say that balancing ends with a subsumption.
150.
Alexy (2010b), p. 53.
151.
Ibid., p. 85.
152.
Klatt (2014), pp. 898–899. See also Klatt and Schmidt (2012a), p. 74.
153.
STF, Ineligibility Act Case, ADPF 144/DF, Judgment of 6 August 2008, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 35, 26 Feb. 2010.
154.
STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case I, HC 84078/MG, Judgment of 5 February 2009, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e. 26 Feb. 2010; STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case II, RHC 93172/SP, Judgment of 12 February 2009, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J.e. 84, 6 May. 2011.
155.
STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011.
156.
STF, Ellwanger Case, HC 82424/RS, Judgment of 17 September 2003, Relator (acórdão): Min. Maurício Corrêa, D.J. 10 Mar. 2004.
157.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009; STF, Arrested Defaulter Case II, RE 466.343/SP, Judgment of 3 December 2008, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009.
158.
STF (First Panel), Abortion Case, HC 124306/RJ, Judgment of 9 August 2016, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 52, 17 Mar. 2017.
159.
STF, Ineligibility Act Case, ADPF 144/DF, Judgment of 6 August 2008, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 35, 26 Feb. 2010.
160.
Lei Complementar 64, de 21 de maio de 1990, Brazil, D.O.U., 21.05.1990, Article 1, d, e, g, h (repealed 2010).
161.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, LVII: “No one shall be considered guilty before the issuing of a final and unappealable criminal sentence.” All references in English to the Federal Constitution are taken from http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1344/constituicao_ingles_3ed.pdf, unless it is indicated otherwise.
162.
Alexy (1986), p. 146, quoted in STF, Ineligibility Act Case, ADPF 144/DF, Judgment of 6 August 2008, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 35, 26 Feb. 2010.
163.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009; STF, Arrested Defaulter Case II, RE 466.343/SP, Judgment of 3 December 2008, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009. For more on the cases, see Varella (2014), pp. 146–147; Daly (2014), pp. 12–13; Santos (2013), pp. 27–40; de Morais (2016), p. 140.
164.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Article 7, Paragraph 7.
165.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, LXVII: “There shall be no civil imprisonment for indebtedness except in the case of a person responsible for voluntary and inexcusable default of alimony obligation and in the case of an unfaithful trustee.”
166.
Código Civil, Lei 10.406, de 1^o de outubro de 2002, D.O.U., 11.01.2002, Article 652.
167.
Decreto-Lei 911, de 10 de janeiro de 1969, D.O.F.C., 03.10.1969, Article 4.
168.
See in this respect, Santos (2013), pp. 24–25.
169.
Alexy (1986), p. 146, quoted in STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009. Identical quotation had been used before in STF, Ineligibility Act Case, ADPF 144/DF, Judgment of 6 August 2008, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 35, 26 Feb. 2010.
170.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009 (my translation).
171.
Ibid.
172.
The first decision on the matter is STF, RE 80004/SE, Judgment of 1 June 1977, Relator: Min. Xavier de Albuquerque, D.J. 29 Dec. 1977.
173.
See STF, HC 72131/RJ, Judgment of 23 November 1995, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J. 1 Aug. 1995.
174.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case II, RE 466.343/SP, Judgment of 3 December 2008, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009.
175.
STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case I, HC 84078/MG, Judgment of 5 February 2009, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e. 26 Feb. 2010; STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case II, RHC 93172/SP, Judgment of 12 February 2009, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J.e. 84, 6 May 2011.
176.
Código de Processo Penal, Decreto-Lei 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941, D.O.F.C. 13.10.1941, Article 637.
177.
For instance, HC 72.366/SP, HC 72.366/SP, Judgment of Brazil, Relator: Min. Néri da Silveira, 13 Sep. 1995, D.J. 26 Nov. 1999 (1995).
178.
In a series of previous decisions, the STF had extended the pre-trial detention to heinous crimes, for instance. See e.g., STF, HC 70634/PE, Judgment of 9 November 1993, Relator: Min. Francisco Rezek, D.J. 24 Jun. 1994.
179.
STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011.
180.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XXXVI: “The law shall not injure the vested right, the perfect juridical act and the res judicata.”
181.
Código de Processo Civil, Lei 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973, D.O. 17.01.1973, Article 468 (repealed 2015).
182.
STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011.
183.
Alexy (1993), p. 92, paraphrased in STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011.
184.
Alexy (2003b), paraphrased in STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011.
185.
STF, Paternity Test Case, RE 363889/DF, Judgment of 2 June 2011, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, D.J.e. 238, 16 Dec. 2011, my translation.
186.
Ibid.
187.
STF (First Panel), Abortion Case, HC 124306/RJ, Judgment of 9 August 2016, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 52, 17 Mar. 2017.
188.
STF, Anencephaly Case, ADPF 54/DF, Judgment of 12 April 2012, STF, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, D.J.e. 80, 30 Apr. 2013.
189.
Ibid.
190.
STF, Sugarcane-Straw-Burning Case, RE 586224/SP, Judgment of 5 March 2015, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 85, 8 May 2015.
191.
STF, Intellectual Property Management Case, ADI 5062/DF, Judgment of 27 October 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 134, Jun. 21, 2017.
192.
STF, Treasury Debt Update Case, RE 870947/SE, Judgment of 20 September 2017, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 262, Nov. 20, 2017.
193.
STF, Ellwanger Case, HC 82424/RS, Judgment of 17 September 2003, Relator (acórdão): Min. Maurício Corrêa, D.J. 10 Mar. 2004.
194.
STF, Ineligibility Act Case, ADPF 144/DF, Judgment of 6 August 2008, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J.e. 35, 26 Feb. 2010.
195.
STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case I, HC 84078/MG, Judgment of 5 February 2009, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, D.J.e. 26 Feb. 2010; STF, Pre-Trial Detention Case II, RHC 93172/SP, Judgment of 12 February 2009, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lúcia, D.J.e. 84, 6 May. 2011.
196.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case II, RE 466.343/SP, Judgment of 3 December 2008, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009; STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009.
197.
STF, Sugarcane-Straw-Burning Case, RE 586224/SP, Judgment of 5 March 2015, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 85, 8 May 2015.
198.
STF, Treasury Debt Update Case, RE 870947/SE, Judgment of 20 September 2017, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 262, Nov. 20, 2017.
199.
STF, Intellectual Property Management Case, ADI 5062/DF, Judgment of 27 October 2016, STF, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, D.J.e. 134, Jun. 21, 2017.
200.
STF (First Panel), Abortion Case, HC 124306/RJ, Judgment of 9 August 2016, Relator (acórdão): Min. Roberto Barroso, D.J.e. 52, 17 Mar. 2017.
201.
STF, Arrested Defaulter Case I, RE 349.703/RS, Judgment of 2 December 2008, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, D.J.e. 104, 5 Jun. 2009.
202.
Alexy (2007), p. 21.
203.
STF, ADI 815/DF, Judgment of 28 March 1996, Relator: Min. Moreira Alves, D.J. 10 May 1996.
204.
According to Sarmento (2003), pp. 37–40, two conceptions of hierarchy of constitutional principles fit the Brazilian legal system: static and dynamic.
205.
da Silva (2001), p. 31, maintains similar opinion.
206.
See e.g., de Morais (2016); Sarlet (2009), p. 397.
207.
da Silva (2001), p. 34.
208.
Martins (2003), p. 21.
209.
Sarmento (2006), pp. 198–204.
210.
Silva (2001), p. 31 (my translation).
211.
de Morais (2016), pp. 249–253.
212.
Ibid., p. 249.
213.
Ibid., p. 243 ff.
214.
Alexy (2010b), p. 388.
215.
In fact, Alexy conceives of a right as something distinct of an interest, but not all the principles-theory enthusiasts adhere to this differentiation. See Klatt and Meister (2012a), Chap. 3, for a discussion in this respect.
216.
See Webber (2009), pp. 5–6, for instance.
217.
Schlink (1992), p. 718.
218.
Schlink (1992), p. 718; (1995), p. 1237.
219.
de Morais (2016), p. 248 (my translation).
220.
Ibid., p. 121.
221.
Alexy (2010b), p. 66.
222.
Grimm (2007), p. 393.
223.
Gardbaum (2010), p. 83.
224.
STF, Electricity Rationing Case, ADC 9/DF, Judgment of 13 December 2001, Relator (acórdão): Min. Ellen Gracie, D.J. 24 Apr. 2004; STF, Gas Cylinders Case, ADI 855/PR, Judgment of 6 March 2008, Relator (acórdão): Min. Gilmar Mendes, D.J.e 59, 27 Mar. 2009. See da Silva (2001), pp. 36–41, for an analysis of how the STF applied the proportionality test to these cases.
225.
da Silva (2001), pp. 44–45.
226.
de Morais (2016), p. 248.
227.
Costa, pp. 248–253.
228.
Barros (1996), p. 88.
229.
Morais (2016), pp. 248–249.
230.
See e.g., STF, HC 76060/SC, Judgment of 31 March 1998, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, D.J. 15 May 1998.
231.
da Silva (2001), pp. 28–31. See also Stumm (1995), p. 159; Costa (2008), footnote 2 at 15, and 248–253.
232.
Barroso (2009), p. 230, for example. Ávila (2012), p. 182, affirms that proportionality and reasonableness are not identical, but concedes that the former comprehends the latter.
233.
See Barroso (2009), p. 230: ‘the scholarship and case law in Europe as in Brazil usually refer to the principle of proportionality, concept that in general lines bears a relation of fungibility to the principle of reasonableness’. (my translation).
234.
See for instance, Cohn (2010), p. 585, pointing out that, behind the difference in wording, proportionality as developed in Germany shares basic similarities with the unreasonableness review in the U.K.
235.
da Silva (2001), pp. 28–31.
236.
Legal comparatists refer to the phenomena as assimilatory modification. See Wise (1990), p. 17: “[Borrowing] need not result in exact replication of the borrowed model. Cultural elements are rarely copied in precisely their original form; they usually undergo ‘assimilatory modification’ or ‘functional shift’. Borrowing itself is a highly creative, selective process;” Sapir (1916), p. 32: “almost invariably … a new idea or activity borrowed from outside falls in line with already existing ideas or activities.”
237.
Barroso and de Barcellos (2008), pp. 362–363. See Barros (1996), p. 125; Sarmento (2003), p. 87.
238.
Barroso (2009), p. 231.
239.
Curiously, similar conception of reasonableness as a regulative idea deriving from practical rationality is not strange to Alexy’s theory, judicial decision-making in general, or the case law of the BVerfG in particular. See Alexy (2009b), pp. 7–9, on the connection between reasonableness and balancing; MacCormick (2005), p. 168, on different meanings of reasonableness in law including the requirement that a judicial decision should be reasonable; and Schwarze (1992), on the notion of reasonableness in the early case law of the BVerfG.
240.
For more on the mixed influence of U.S. and European law on Brazilian constitutionalism, see Chap. 2 above on the peculiarities of the STF’s structure and functioning, and Chap. 6 below on the constitutional text and STF’s duty to guard the Federal Constitution.
241.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, LIV: “No one shall be deprived of freedom or of his assets without the due process of law.” This wording is altogether similar to the U.S. Const. amend. V: “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” See Barros (1996), pp. 122–123, on the influence of the U.S. constitutionalism in Brazil; and Sarmento (2003), pp. 91–93; and Mendes (1996), pp. 14–16, on how the concept of reasonableness is familiar to the Brazilian legal practice.
242.
See Mendes (2001), p. 2, e.g.
243.
Constitutional comparatists have documented other cases in which the idea of reasonableness and proportionality appeared together, but in common law systems. See Cohn (2010), pp. 625–626, for an example of a British judgement.
244.
Freire (2007), p. 11.
245.
Ibid., p. 11.
246.
Alexy (1991), p. 77; (1992), p. 150.
247.
Alexy (1992), p. 150.
248.
Ibid., p. 150.
249.
Freire (2007), p. 1; Barroso (2009), pp. 128–145; Brugger (1994), p. 396.
250.
This does not come as a surprise. As Alexy (1991), p. 74, realizes, the uncertainty of legal methodology is only one reason for the existence of disputes in legal interpretation; others are the openness of law and the possibility of divergences about rightness or justice.
251.
da Silva (2013), pp. 569–584; de Chueiri (2012), pp. 1–11; de Baracho Júnior (2003), pp. 509–520; Rodriguez (2013).
252.
da Silva (2001), p. 26.
253.
Sarlet (2009), p. 396.
254.
Sarmento (2003), p. 53; Barros (1996), p. 87.
255.
Leiria (2008), p. 168.
256.
Ávila (2012), pp. 182–184.
257.
See Mendes (2001), p. 2; Barroso (1998), pp. 75–77; Barros (1996), pp. 93–94; Sarlet (2009), p. 396.
258.
Barroso (2009), pp. 374–375; Stumm (1995), p. 173.
259.
See STF, ADI 1.407 MC/DF, Judgment of 7 March 1996, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, D.J. 24 Nov. 2000, for an example of a decision that derived proportionality from this clause. See also da Silva (2001), p. 32; Sarmento (2006), p. 164; Costa, p. footnote 2 at 15; and Mendes (2012), pp. 76–79; (2001) p. 18, on the connection between proportionality and due process of law in Brazil, particularly in the case law of the STF.
260.
da Silva (2001), p. 43.
261.
Ibid., pp. 45–46.

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Padre Arnaldo Janssen Faculty of Law, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
João Andrade Neto
Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
João Andrade Neto

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Andrade Neto, J. (2018). The Principles-Theory Variant of Proportionality. In: Borrowing Justification for Proportionality. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 72. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_3
Published: 12 November 2018
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-02262-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-02263-1
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