Abstract
This chapter addresses the controversy surrounding the judicial recourse to proportionality and reconstructs the reasons for and against borrowing the test as a normative argument. It starts providing an overview of the specialized literature on the migration of proportionality and its reception in Brazil, where it has served the Supreme Federal Court (STF). Section 2.1 briefly reconstructs the three phases of the historical development of proportionality in Germany, giving a glimpse of the test in operation and how it has appeared in the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG). Section 2.2 presents the explanatory reasons often advanced for the worldwide spread of proportionality, ranging from the functions the test allegedly performs in decision-making to certain favorable historical conditions arguably shared by legal cultures. Section 2.3 discusses the Ellwanger Case (2003), which contains the first references to Alexy in the STF’s case law, and discloses peculiarities about the court’s organization and functioning. Finally, Sect. 2.4 expounds the democratic objection against borrowing and advances three theses (weak, moderate, and strong) that could justify the judicial recourse to proportionality. I submit that, whereas the principles theory implies the strong thesis and the STF seemingly justifies its borrowings with the help of the weak thesis, the moderate thesis is the correct one.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Bomhoff (2010), p. 123. Much of what is said below about the historical development of proportionality in Germany was also taken from Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2011), p. 465; Barak (2012a, b), pp. 178–179; Schwarze (1992), pp. 685–692. C.f. Pulido (2013), pp. 489–503, dividing the expansion of proportionality into six phases, which the author refers to as ‘migrations.’.
- 6.
Bomhoff (2013), p. 76.
- 7.
- 8.
Würtenberger (1999), pp. 65, 67.
- 9.
- 10.
Currie (1994), p. 308. Nineteenth-century German legal thought conceived of the Rechtsstaat principle as possessing characteristic elements that included “strict legality of every exercise of state power; freedom from arbitrary state action; proportionality of the means employed by the state to accomplish legitimate ends; and the comprehensive judicial control of every state action that affects the subjective rights of a citizen.” [Ledford (2004), p. 207].
- 11.
- 12.
See Rümelin and Schoch (1948) for a selection of writings from the jurisprudence of interests.
- 13.
- 14.
Cohn (1950), p. 118. See Kennedy (2011), p. 194 ff., on the importance of Jhering and Heck for the development of balancing in Germany; Sartor (2010), p. 194 ff., on the connection between proportionality and goal-oriented (or teleological) reasoning, which Jhering believed to be an essential aspect of legal thinking. Interestingly, Alexy (2010a), pp. 88, 115–116, mentioned Jhering two times in A Theory of Constitutional Rights: firstly, when discussing the impossibility of deriving solutions from legal norms by means of techniques that are intended to be exclusively logical and value-free; secondly, when explaining the different types of statements one can make about rights, reasons for rights, and enforcement of rights.
- 15.
Rümelin and Schoch (1948), p. 176.
- 16.
- 17.
Smend (1928), pp. 51–53.
- 18.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 98.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
Lerche (1999), pp. 19–23. See the reference to Krauss in the footnote 1 at 19.
- 22.
- 23.
BVerfG, 1 BVerfGE 167, Judgment of 20 March 1952, at 178.
- 24.
BVerfG, 3 BVerfGE 383, Judgment of 6 March 1954 at 399.
- 25.
BVerfG (First Senate), Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, Judgment of 15 January 1958.
- 26.
BVerfG (First Senate), Pharmacy Case, 7 BVerfGE 377, Judgment of 6 November 1958.
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
BVerfG (First Senate), Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, Judgment of 15 January 1958, translated by Tony Weir, in the website of the University of Texas School of Law.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
BVerfG (First Senate), 7 BVerfGE 230, Judgment of 15 January 1958, p. 234. See Bomhoff (2013), pp. 79–80, for more on the case.
- 32.
BVerfG, Blinkfüer Case, 25 BVerfGE 256, Judgment of 26 February 1969.
- 33.
- 34.
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 12 (1): “All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.”.
- 35.
BVerfG (First Senate), Pharmacy Case, 7 BVerfGE 377, Judgment of 6 November 1958, p. 377, translated in the website of the University of Texas School of Law.
- 36.
Ibid.
- 37.
Ibid., p. 404.
- 38.
Ibid., p. 405.
- 39.
BVerfG, Medical Insurance Case I, 11 BVerfGE 30, Judgment of 23 March 1960, pp. 42, 45.
- 40.
BVerfG, 13 BVerfGE 97, Judgment of 17 July 1961, p. at 104. The cases are mentioned by Grimm (2007), p. 385.
- 41.
- 42.
BVerfG, Pneumoencephalography Case, 17 BVerfGE 108, Judgment of 25 July 1963. The name was given in Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 419.
- 43.
It is beyond my scope here to exhaust the BVerfG’s case law on conflicts related to freedom of speech. The cases below were selected due to their remarkable contribution for the development of the proportionality analysis in general and balancing in particular, and yet, the selection could have included many others, as the BVerfG, Lebach Case, 35 BVerfGE 202, Judgment of 6 May 1973, for instance. See Michael (2001), pp. 654–659, for more decisions of the BVerfG on freedom of speech and other subject-matters that made reference to proportionality or one of its subtests—suitability, necessity, and balancing.
- 44.
- 45.
BVerfG, Schmid-Spiegel Case/Volga Artikel Case, 12 BVerfGE 113, Judgment of 25 January 1961, translated in (1998), pp. 26–27.
- 46.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
Grundgesetz, Article 5 (2).
- 50.
Quint (1989), pp. 313, footnote 209. In the same passage Quint speaks of ‘imperialism of balancing.’.
- 51.
Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 461.
- 52.
BVerfG (First Senate), Mephisto Case, 30 BVerfGE 173, Judgment of 24 February 1971, p. 197, translated by J. A. Weir, in the website of the University of Texas School of Law.
- 53.
- 54.
Alexy (2010a), p. 418.
- 55.
BVerfG, Deutschland Magazine Case, 42 BVerfGE 143, Judgment of 5 November 1976, p. 148 (my translation).
- 56.
Ibid., p. 148 (my translation).
- 57.
Ibid., pp. 148–149, translated in Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 462.
- 58.
Ibid., p. 149 (my translation).
- 59.
- 60.
BVerfG, 61 BVerfGE 126, Judgment of 19 October 1982, p. 135, translated in Schwarze (1992), p. 688.
- 61.
- 62.
BVerfG, Hashish Drug Case/Cannabis Judgement, 90 BVerfGE 145, Judgment of 3 September 1994, p. 172.
- 63.
Ibid., p. 171.
- 64.
Ibid., p. 171.
- 65.
Ibid., p. 172.
- 66.
Ibid. See Bilchitz (2014), p. 43 ff., for an analysis of the concept of necessity that he derives from the Cannabis Case.
- 67.
Ibid., p. 146. The case also raised issues about the intensity of review the BVerfG ought to perform. See in Chap. 6.
- 68.
- 69.
See Kumm (2007), p. 141, mentioning these and other decisions.
- 70.
- 71.
BVerfG, Tax-Free Subsistence Minimum Case, 82 BVerfGE 60, Judgment of 29 May 1990, p. 85, translated in Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 623. Proportionality is mentioned in the case at 101.
- 72.
- 73.
It is worth noting that Petersen (2015), p. 69, focused on decisions concerning freedom rights only.
- 74.
Ibid., p. 59.
- 75.
Ibid., p. 64. A more favourable political environment, due to the reduced governmental pressure over the decades, along with the goodwill and credibility the BVerfG gained among citizenry and political parties, may be a reason for the shift of focus towards balancing. See in this respect, Kommers (1976), pp. 255–303; Baldus (2005), pp. 237–248; Lembcke (2006), pp. 151–161; Häußler (1994), pp. 22–74; and Vorländer and Brodocz (2006), pp. 259–294.
- 76.
- 77.
Kühling (2006), p. 535 ff.
- 78.
- 79.
Schwarze (1992), p. 692 and 696, respectively, gives some examples, two of which are worth mentioning: Italy and United Kingdom. Respecting the former, Schwarze says, “in Italy, the proportionality principle has come to prominence under this designation only as a result of the case law developed by the European Court of Justice;” concerning the latter, “under the influence of European Community Law, in particular the case law of the ECJ, the proportionality principle has recently been introduced into English law.” Similarly, according to Cohn (2010), p. 585, the pre-existing method for invalidating administrative action in the U.K., unreasonabless review, “was transformed in the late 1980 s to accommodate pressure from Strasbourg,” and proportionality was then “transposed onto British law under British obligations under European Community law.” See also Rivers (2004), pp. 148–163.
- 80.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 146 ff.; Schwarze (1992), p. 705. A candidate for the post of the earliest case the ECtHR decided by resort to proportionality is Handyside v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Judgment of 1976, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A, No. 24) 737. It is nevertheless disputable whether this was really the first time the court had recourse to the test. See in this respect, Eissen (1993), p. 126.
- 81.
Pulido (2013), p. 497. See also Zhordania T (2012). The problems relating to the margin of appreciation doctrine under the European convention on human rights. Europa-Kolleg, Institute for European Integration, p. 15 ff.; Greer (2000), p. 20; (2003), p. 409 ff.; McBride (1999), pp. 23–36; Letsas (2006), p. 711 ff.; Arai (2002), pp. 14 ff., 186 ff.; Matscher (1993), pp. 63–81; Gerards and Senden (2009), p. 645. The relevance proportionality has assumed in the ECtHR’s case law led Letsas (2006), p. 711, to comment: ‘the principle … is by far the most important and most demanding criterion for whether the limitation of a right was permissible under the [European] Convention [of Human Rights].’.
- 82.
There is no consensus about which decision was the first to refer to proportionality in the ECJ’s case law. While some authors regard the Case 11/70 as having inaugurated a line of judgments by resort to proportionality, Schwarze (1992), p. 677, says that the ECJ already had recourse to proportionality before 1970, but the “principle made … an occasional and insubstantial appearance” then and “has acquired an extremely important role in the judicial review of administrative decisions and rules since 1970.”.
- 83.
- 84.
- 85.
Jans (2000), pp. 240, footnote 3.
- 86.
- 87.
Treaty on European Union [TEU], Article 5 (1).
- 88.
Walker (2010), p. 279.
- 89.
Zweigert and Kötz (1998), p. 34, observe that the functionalist approach has been for long deemed as the dominant and “basic” method of analysis in comparative constitutional law, although subjected to severe criticism as well. Generally speaking, scholars conducting functionalist inquiries “identify one or more functions performed by constitutions or constitutional institutions or doctrines in some societies, and analyse whether and how that function is performed elsewhere,” Jackson (2012), p. 62, says. Another possibility is that comparatists employ this method to discover problems shared by different legal systems and compare how each of them attempted to circumvent or solve the same issues, Michaels (2006), p. 346, notices. See Tushnet (1999), pp. 1238–1269, for an account of functionalism as serving not as a method for scholars, but for courts seeking for answers in foreign legal systems.
- 90.
For a definition of ‘transmissibility,’ see Wise (1990), p. 17.
- 91.
- 92.
- 93.
- 94.
- 95.
- 96.
- 97.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2011), p. 466.
- 98.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2010), p. 263; (2013a, b), pp. 134–135. For more on the reputation-building function of legal borrowings and migrations motivated by the prominence of the foreign system, court, or academic work from which the object was taken, see Graziadei (2006), p. 456; Choudhry (1999), p. 888; Epstein and Knight (2003), p. 210; Law (2008), pp. 1343–1349; Schauer (2000), pp. 11–18; Smits (2006), p. 531; Rosenkrantz (2003), p. 269 ff.; Perju (2010), pp. 348–349; Slaughter (1999), pp. 120–123; Watson (1974), pp. 51–52, 88–94; (1978), p. 327. Miller (2003), p. 854, explains that developing countries like Brazil often emulate constitutional models from the U.S. and Europe in support of their institutional arrangements, which would lack legitimacy otherwise.
- 99.
For more on the contextualist approach, see Jackson (2012), p. 67; McWhinney (1986), vi (foreword). In which concerns the historical approach, since Watson’s seminal work, historically based analysis has been a common method for explaining constitutional migrations and borrowings. See Watson (1974), p. 7, arguing that comparative law approximates to legal history; and Gordley (2006), pp. 754–775, discussing the role of legal history in comparative legal studies.
- 100.
Ackerman (1997), pp. 778, 795–796; Beatty (2004), pp. 2–3; Schlink (2011), p. 301. C.f. Robertson (2010), pp. 29–30, according to whom the explanation for borrowing proportionality does not have to lie in something of impact such as democratization after a violent dictatorship. Canada, for example, has adopted a variant of the test without having faced such a dramatic break in policy—although it is true that the Canadian Charter of Rights represented “a dramatic break from an English-style history of parliamentary supremacy.” Furthermore, he says, if a transition in the political regime was sufficient explanation for the new principle-based approach on rights, “the Italian Constitutional Court should have been as effective as the German court, for they were created at roughly the same time in very similar historical contexts.” Differently from what has been observed in Germany, however, constitutional review has been regarded as “half-hearted and limited” in Italy, he observes.
- 101.
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
Daly (2014), p. 8.
- 105.
Ibid., pp. 7–8.
- 106.
Freire, p. 5. See Martins (2003), pp. 20–21, on the reception of proportionality in Portugal, which he qualifies as “partial and insufficient.”.
- 107.
- 108.
Cittadino (2009), pp. 41–43, 60–64. Actually, the Federal Senate provided the members of the constitutional assembly with a compilation of translated constitutions from “more than thirty-six countries, including Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United States.” [Rosenn (2010), p. 443]. As a result, clauses of the Federal Constitution entirely reproduce the text of their foreign equivalents.
- 109.
- 110.
Verdú (1984).
- 111.
Cohen-Eliya and Porat (2009), pp. 387–395; (2011), p. 103; (2013a, b), pp. 46–49. See Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 46, 353, discussing the influence of communitarianism on the Basic Law and German philosophical tradition that draws “no clear distinction between state and society,” which has supported the state’s deeply commitment “to an objective order of values.”.
- 112.
Cittadino (2009), p. 43.
- 113.
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
- 117.
Ibid., pp. 139–148.
- 118.
Beatty (2004), p. 162.
- 119.
- 120.
Alexy (2003a), p. 136.
- 121.
In fact, not all constitutions textually provide for the proportionality test as an adjudicative method—only a minority of constitutions actually do—, nor do data support the belief that all courts across the world engage in some kind of proportionality analysis. Beatty (2004), for example, has only devoted close attention to examples from Germany, Canada, Israel, South Africa, Japan, Hungary, Australia, and the European Court of Human Rights. As Posner (2005), p. 301, correctly pointed out, “Beatty cites decisions from only 15 of [the world’s] 193 nations (plus decisions of one United Nations and two European tribunals), and 11 of the 15 are former British possessions. His sample of world judicial opinion, therefore, is hardly representative. He has not demonstrated that ‘proportionality’ is a universal legal norm.”.
- 122.
- 123.
Markesinis and Fedtke (2005), pp. 16–17.
- 124.
See an example in Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 374. The authors analysed the legal treatment that Germany and the U.S. gave to abortion. They compared the provisions in the Basic Law and the U.S. Constitution, and the different conclusions to which the BVerfG and the U.S. Supreme Court arrived at in the Abortion Case I and Roe v. Wade, respectively. The BVerfG ruled in the Abortion Case I that “the state has a constitutional duty to protect the life of the unborn child, and must criminalize abortion” [39 BVerfGE 1, Judgment of 25 February 1975, translated in Kommers and Miller (2012), pp. 374–383]. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that “the right to choose an abortion is within a woman’s fundamental right of privacy, invalidating a state law that criminalized abortion.” (410 U.S. 113, Judgment of 1973). Kommers (1997), p. 689, observed that the German judgment “stands in sharp contrast to the doctrinal analysis contained in the seminal American case,” although “there [was] nothing inexorable” about abortion in either German or American authoritative legal material. A conclusion is that, unless for the difference in each court’s understanding, both decisions “might have gone the other way.”.
- 125.
Kokott (1999), p. 77.
- 126.
- 127.
Kokott (1999), p. 77.
- 128.
Sarlet (2009), p. 74.
- 129.
Rosenn (2010), p. 443.
- 130.
- 131.
Kleinheisterkamp (2006), p. 299.
- 132.
- 133.
Herzog (2013), p. 174 (my translation).
- 134.
Ibid., pp. 174, 182–183.
- 135.
Neves (2013), p. 113.
- 136.
Montoro (1973), p. 4. Accordingly, Benvindo (2010), p. 380, noticed that, in some judgements, the STF seemly implies that it performs its destiny by appropriating from the principles theory and German proportionality, as if “this new approach was the consequence of the irreversible evolution of Brazilian democracy.”.
- 137.
STF, Ellwanger Case, HC 82424/RS, Judgment of 17 September 2003, Relator (acórdão): Min. Maurício Corrêa, D.J. 10 Mar. 2004. The judgement was controversial in the view of da Silva (2013), p. 572, e.g. For in-depth analyses of the case, see Benvindo (2010), pp. 19–29, 298–404; and Freire (2007), pp. 9–10.
- 138.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 5, XLII: “the practice of racism is a non-bailable crime, with no limitation, subject to the penalty of confinement, under the terms of the law.” All the translations of the Federal Constitution hereinafter are taken from Chamber of Deputies (2010), unless indicated otherwise.
- 139.
STF, Ellwanger Case, HC 82424/RS, Judgment of 17 September 2003, Relator (acórdão): Min. Maurício Corrêa, D.J. 10 Mar. 2004 (my translation).
- 140.
Ibid.
- 141.
Ibid.
- 142.
Klatt (2012), p. 7.
- 143.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 85.
- 144.
Rivers (2010), xvii, says that the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), is now “the prima locus of constitutional rights in the United Kingdom.” Concerning Israel, the rights are listed in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (5752-1992), S.H. 1391; and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (5754-1994), S.H. 1454, 90. According to Barak (2007), p. 370, Israeli courts have been interpreting the “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom” as including the principle of proportionality. The vastly documented fact that more and more countries are adhering to a constitutionalist model that favours judicial review led Shinar (2014), p. 195, to sarcastically ask: “if non-constitutionalist regimes are so great, why are countries getting rid of them?”.
- 145.
Weinrib (2006), p. 84 ff.
- 146.
Navia and Ríos-Figueroa (2005), pp. 191–195.
- 147.
McWhinney (1986), pp. 23–34.
- 148.
The mitigated filiation to civil-law traditions is also discernible in the authority given to some courts’ decisions. de Bustamante (2007), p. 293, points out that Brazil is a ‘qualified civil-law country’ because “there is a corpus of formally binding decisions from the Supreme Federal Court, the Higher Electoral Court, and the Higher Labour Court. The authority of such decisions derives from statutory law itself, and neither from a practice nor from the naked authority of the judge, as expounded in the most persuasive accounts of Common Law doctrine.”.
- 149.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 95, I, and Article 101, Main Body and Sole Paragraph. See Harding and Leyland (2009), for a comparative study on appointment rules for supreme and constitutional courts from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America; Comella (2009), for an European perspective; and Landfried (1988), pp. 147–151, particularly about the nomination of judges to the BVerfG.
- 150.
Constituição (1988), Article 97; Regimento Interno do Supremo Tribunal Federal, Article 2, Sole Paragraph, and Articles 3 and 4.
- 151.
McWhinney (1986), p. 23.
- 152.
- 153.
Sweet (2012), p. 818.
- 154.
Ibid., p. 818.
- 155.
Ferejohn and Pasquino (2003). 1682.
- 156.
Comella (2011), p. 268.
- 157.
Kommers and Miller (2012), p. 3.
- 158.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 159.
‘If a court concludes that a law on whose validity its decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained … from the Federal Constitutional Court where this Basic Law is held to be violated. This provision shall also apply where the Basic Law is held to be violated by Land law.’ (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Article 100 (1)).
- 160.
- 161.
In the Brazilian legal system, a ‘writ of security’ is the suitable lawsuit to be filed by an applicant who claims for protection against illegal actions and abuse of power, whenever the party responsible for the abusive act is a public officer or an agent of a governmental entity, and since the violated right is not protected by other constitutional actions—namely, habeas corpus and habeas data. Although the writ of security has been commonly translated as ‘writ of mandamus,’ the two terms are not equivalents. In Brazilian law, the writ of security is the appropriate action for situations in which petitions of writs other than the mandamus would be suitable in the Anglo-American system—especially, the writs of certiorari and injunction. Because of this, I have opted for a literal translation from the Portuguese ‘mandado de segurança.’ For more details, see: Marchant (1945); Rosenn (2011), pp. 19–23; Meirelles et al. (2013).
- 162.
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, Article 102, II, III, and Paragraph 3.
- 163.
Constituição (1988), Article 102, I, Paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 103.
- 164.
Constituição (1988), Article 102, I, d.
- 165.
McWhinney (1986), p. 23.
- 166.
da Silva (2013), p. 569.
- 167.
Ibid., p. 568.
- 168.
McWhinney (1986), p. 26. See Markham (2006), arguing for the anonymity of the dissents of the U.S. Supreme Court. On anonymity in the American model, see Markham, “Individually Signed Judicial Opinions,” 923–951, arguing against individually signed judicial opinions in the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law.
- 169.
See in this respect, da Silva (2012), p. 16 ff.
- 170.
McWhinney (1986), pp. 24–25.
- 171.
Ibid., p. 23.
- 172.
da Silva (2013), pp. 573, footnote 49.
- 173.
Jackson and Greene (2011), p. 600.
- 174.
Ibid., p. 599.
- 175.
- 176.
Choudhry (2011), p. 10.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179.
For an alternative approach, see Pulido (2013), p. 503 ff.
- 180.
Alexy (1993), p. 176.
- 181.
Ibid., p. 177.
- 182.
Ibid., p. 176.
- 183.
On first- or second-order normative justification for proportionality, see Gardbaum (2010), pp. 88–89.
- 184.
Annus (2004), p. 313.
- 185.
Gardbaum (2010), pp. 88–93.
- 186.
Alexy (2010a), p. 417.
- 187.
Pulido (2013), pp. 511–512.
- 188.
Alexy (2010b), p. 20.
- 189.
Ibid., p. 20; Beatty (2004), p. 162.
- 190.
Alexy (2003a), p. 131.
- 191.
Schlink (2011), p. 302.
- 192.
Alexy (2010c), p. 71.
- 193.
Alexy (2010a), p. 388. The identity thesis undermines the difference between the relation of proportionality to principles, on the one hand, and to fundamental rights, on the other; difference which Borowski (1998), pp. 61–63, introduced. For this reason, the present study will not endorse the division of the necessity thesis into a ‘first necessity thesis’ on the connection between principles and proportionality and a ‘second necessity thesis’ on the connection between fundamental rights and proportionality. Alexy (2014), p. 57, suggested this sub-division in reply to Borowski. C.f. Klement (2008), p. 761, objecting the identity between principles and fundamental rights.
- 194.
Alexy (2012a), p. 333.
- 195.
However, some authors had already identified such potential in the principles theory. See Jestaedt (2012), p. 159, affirming that ‘the doctrine of balancing … claims to be … an idea with potentially universal explanatory value’; Rivers (2010), p. xviii, saying that “from the perspective of the Theorie der Grundrechte, many of the distinguishing features of different constitutions are contingent, and transferability between systems is at least plausible”. See also Pulido (2013), p. 505 ff.; Poscher (2009), p. 443; Klatt and Meister (2013), pp. 62–63; (2014b), p. 23.
- 196.
Some excerpts of the principles theory raise doubt about its universalist pretensions. For example, Alexy and Dreier (1990), p. 12: “it is an open question whether general normative statements in this sense [of universally valid statements] can be justified or whether they are always relative to the cultures the legal systems in question are based upon.” Cf. Alexy (2012a), p. 332: “the doctrine of balancing as summarized in the weight formula is the basis of a comprehensive, universal theory of fundamental rights;” and Alexy (2007a), p. 162): “courts are not only participants in a parochial enterprise where they have special authority to establish what the law actually is, they are also participants in an universalistic enterprise, where they have no special authority to decide what is legally correct.”.
- 197.
For a critique of intentionalism as a method of interpretation, see Dworkin (1986), pp. 53–65.
- 198.
Klatt (2012), p. 8, footnote 40.
- 199.
Alexy (1989), p. 169, footnote 4.
- 200.
Ibid., p. 169, footnote 4.
- 201.
Alexy (2010c), pp. 3–4.
- 202.
Or “a legal assertion that is true (or correct) in one legal system need not necessarily be true (or correct) in another legal system” [Golding (1963), p. 57]. Interestingly, Alexy ( 2010d), p. 289, acknowledges that authoritative issuance and social efficacy interfere with legal correctness, for he says that: “the claim to correctness [which is constitutive of legal discourse] … does not relate to whether or not the normative statement in question is absolutely rational, but rather only to whether it can be rationally justified within the framework of the valid legal order.”.
- 203.
Consequently, a change in a legal concept has normative consequences. Curiously, Alexy’s theory includes an example in this respect. See the implications that arise from ‘incorporating into the concept of law the concept of validity’ in Alexy (2010c), p. 24.
- 204.
See Pulido (2013), p. 483, for a similar approach.
- 205.
Borowski (2011), p. 588.
- 206.
Bomhoff (2008), pp. 573, 575.
- 207.
Alexy (2004), p. 47.
- 208.
- 209.
Alexy (2010a), p. 74.
- 210.
- 211.
Or as ‘rational as possible.’ [Alexy and Peczenik (1990), pp. 145–146].
- 212.
See Schlink (1995), p. 1237, on the critique that ‘constitutional legal scholarship’ was “still overwhelmed by the Court’s [BVerfG] presence, even after its forty-year existence.”
- 213.
Alexy (2010c), pp. 35–68.
- 214.
Dworkin (1986), p. 99.
- 215.
See, for instance, Habermas (1996), p. 259, saying that “there are no rational standards for … weighing,” but not that judgements by resort to proportionality are irremediably and necessarily irrational. Rather, in his view, “the danger of irrational rulings increases” as a consequence.
- 216.
See Greer (2004), p. 433, lamenting that “the balance metaphor has been used by the European Court of Human Rights in ways which would, prima facie, confirm Habermas’s worst fears,” but conceding that, “subject to certain modifications, Alexy’s theory can, nevertheless, be applied to its judgments.”
- 217.
Alexy (2007b), p. 14.
- 218.
- 219.
Alexy and Dreier (1990), p. 3.
- 220.
Bomhoff (2008), pp. 576–578.
- 221.
Alexy (2012a), p. 352.
- 222.
Alexy (2007c), p. 341.
- 223.
For instance, Lafont (2012), pp. 294–297.
- 224.
Eriksen (2004), p. 103.
- 225.
Alexy (2004), p. 38.
- 226.
Ibid., pp. 42–43. On conceptions of substantive justice that underlie the idea of procedural justice, see Gargarella (2012), p. 336 ff.
- 227.
Alexy (2010a), p. 417.
- 228.
Alexy (2004), p. 38.
- 229.
Alexy (2012b), p. 289.
- 230.
- 231.
Alexy (2010e) p. 177.
- 232.
Kumm (2004b), pp. 222–224, 228–233.
- 233.
Alexy (2010a), p. 66.
- 234.
Ibid., p. 47. For more details about Alexy’s conception of principles as optimization requirements, see Chap. 4 below.
- 235.
Alexy (2000), pp. 300–301.
- 236.
See e.g., Alexy (1992a), p. 148, arguing that “fundamental rights should be furthered by legal practice.”
- 237.
- 238.
Alexy (2014), pp. 58, 63.
- 239.
Alexy (2010b), p. 20.
- 240.
Alexy (2012a), p. 329.
- 241.
Ibid., p. 333.
- 242.
Alexy (2010a), p. 388.
- 243.
Alexy (2010c), p. 71.
- 244.
Choudhry (1999), p. 836. It is noteworthy that the dialogical approach was originally conceived of as a method that comparative constitutional scholars can adopt for studying judicial borrowings, while here the dialogical interpretation is intended to provide judges with justification for borrowing.
- 245.
Ibid., p. 836.
- 246.
Ibid., p. 858.
- 247.
- 248.
Aarnio et al. (1981), p. 275.
- 249.
See Alexy (2014), p. 61, on the ‘positivity thesis’ about the connection between proportionality and fundamental rights.
- 250.
Gonçalves (2012), p. 25.
- 251.
Alexy (2014), pp. 60–61.
- 252.
In this sense, I agree with Beatty (2004), p. 176: “for the judges, proportionality is grounded in the word and structure and purposes of constitutional texts, not in the jurisprudence they write.” Nonetheless, differently from what he concluded, it does not follow from this that “proportionality is a constitutive, immutable part of every constitution.”.
- 253.
See McWhinney (1986), pp. xiii–xiv, speaking of “indigenous precursors,” rooted in the influenced country’s “own special, indigenous constitutional and general legal history”.
- 254.
Sweet and Mathews (2008), p. 118.
- 255.
Ibid., p. 118.
- 256.
- 257.
The requirement of a corresponding legal permission or command is a consequence of being the judge ‘legally bound even in the open area of the positive (issued and efficacious) law.’ [Alexy (2010c), p. 69].
- 258.
Reference is made here to Dworkin (1986), p. 220.
- 259.
This is a conclusion that one can derive from Alexy (2010c), pp. 35–68.
- 260.
Ibid., pp. 62–68.
- 261.
Comparative constitutional lawyers have documented that “borrowing often feeds on itself” [Wise (1990), p. 17]. That is the case if a court “[feels] especially compelled to follow foreign interpretation of [a] statute or constitution” that had migrated from a foreign legal system in the past [Annus (2004), p. 335]. The court responsible for the interpretation of a borrowed clause may “look to the ‘parent’ constitution and its interpretation in resolving constitutional problems.”.
- 262.
- 263.
Cittadino (2009), p. 43.
- 264.
- 265.
- 266.
Alexy (2010a), p. 388.
- 267.
Alexy (2010c), p. 71.
- 268.
Alexy (2010a), p. 73.
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Andrade Neto, J. (2018). On the Migration of Proportionality. In: Borrowing Justification for Proportionality. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 72. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02263-1_2
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