Modeling and Analysis of Deception Games Based on Hypergame Theory

Abstract

In this chapter, we discuss a deception game where attackers and defenders can have different perceptions towards a given situation. Although existing game theories have considered incomplete information to consider uncertainty, how players’ different perceptions or misperceptions can affect their decision-making has not been fully addressed. In particular, we discuss hypergame theory which has been used to resolve conflicts under uncertainty. In this chapter, we examine how a player’s perception (or misperception) affects their decision-making in choosing a best strategy based on hypergame theory. To deliver a concrete idea on how the attack–defense game can be modeled based on hypergame theory, we model a simple cybergame scenario and demonstrate an example probability model using Stochastic Petri Nets. Through the evaluation of the model, we show the experimental results to deliver insightful findings in terms of the relationships between perceptions by different players (i.e., an attacker or a defender), their chosen best strategies, and corresponding utilities. Lastly, we measure performance of the attacker and the defender in terms of attack success probability and mean time to security failure.