Skip to main content

Two Forms of Minimality in ASPIC\(^+\)

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies (EUMAS 2017, AT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 10767))

  • 682 Accesses

Abstract

Many systems of structured argumentation explicitly require that the facts and rules that make up the argument for a conclusion be the minimal set required to derive the conclusion. \(\textsc {aspic}^{\mathsf {+}}\) does not place such a requirement on arguments, instead requiring that every rule and fact that are part of an argument be used in its construction. Thus \(\textsc {aspic}^{\mathsf {+}}\) arguments are minimal in the sense that removing any element of the argument would lead to a structure that is not an argument. In this paper we discuss these two types of minimality and show how the first kind of minimality can, if desired, be recovered in \(\textsc {aspic}^{\mathsf {+}}\).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    We use the term circular to reflect the idea of circular reasoning [15] and “begging the question” [14].

  2. 2.

    This is a version of the issue pointed out by [4, p.119], that any inference-based description of an argument allows multiple arguments to be described in the same way. In fact what we have here is a stronger version of the problem, because [4] pointed out the problem for arguments which, in our terms, were described just by their grounds and conclusion. What we have here is the problem arising even when we state the inference rules as well. This issue the is converse of the problem that describing arguments by their entire structure, as \(\textsc {aspic}^{\mathsf {+}}\) and the assumption-based argumentation of [4] do, allows for redundant elements in the arguments, as we have just shown.

References

  1. Amgoud, L., Cayrol, C.: A reasoning model based on the production of acceptable arguments. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 34(3), 197–215 (2002)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  2. Besnard, P., Hunter, A.: A logic-based theory of deductive arguments. Artif. Intell. 128, 203–235 (2001)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  3. Cohen, A., Parsons, S., Sklar, E., McBurney, P.: A characterization of types of support between structured arguments and their relationship with support in abstract argumentation. Int. J. Approx. Reason. 94, 76–104 (2018)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Dung, P.M., Kowalski, R.A., Toni, F.: Dialectic proof procedures for assumption-based, admissable argumentation. Artif. Intell. 170(2), 114–159 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. García, A.J., Simari, G.: Defeasible logic programming: an argumentative approach. Theory Pract. Logic Program. 4(1), 95–138 (2004)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Krause, P., Ambler, S., Elvang-Gørannson, M., Fox, J.: A logic of argumentation for reasoning under uncertainty. Comput. Intell. 11(1), 113–131 (1995)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Loui, R.P.: Defeat among arguments: a system of defeasible inference. Comput. Intell. 3(3), 100–106 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Modgil, S., Prakken, H.: A general account of argumentation with preferences. Artif. Intell. 195, 361–397 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Pollock, J.: Cognitive Carpentry. MIT Press, Cambridge (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Pollock, J.L.: Defeasible reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 11, 481–518 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Pollock, J.L.: OSCAR–a general-purpose defeasible reasoner. J. Appl. Non-Classical Logics 6, 89–113 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Prakken, H.: An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argum. Comput. 1, 93–124 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Prakken, H., Sartor, G.: Argument-based logic programming with defeasible priorities. J. Appl. Non-classical Logics 7, 25–75 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  14. Sinnott-Armstrong, W.: Begging the question. Australas. J. Philos. 77(2), 174–191 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Walton, D.N.: Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation. State University of New York Press, Albany (1992)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This work was partially funded by EPSRC EP/P010105/1 Collaborative Mobile Decision Support for Managing Multiple Morbidities.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrea Cohen .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Li, Z., Cohen, A., Parsons, S. (2018). Two Forms of Minimality in ASPIC\(^+\). In: Belardinelli, F., Argente, E. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies. EUMAS AT 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10767. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01712-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-01713-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics