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Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic: Russia’s Threat Perception and its Military Strategy in the Arctic Region

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Abstract

This chapter explores the background of Russia’s recent military build-up in the Arctic region. While those activities have been explained in past studies as Russia’s effort to consolidate its control over its natural resources and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic region, this chapter critically examines such understanding and proposes an alternative view. Russia’s main motivation is, in our view, based on a more classical military strategy: securing nuclear deterrence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kristensen, H. M. 2013. “Russian SSBN Fleet: Modernizing but Not Sailing Much,” FAS Blog, May 3, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/05/russianssbns/

  2. 2.

    According to the Ministry of Defense of Norway, the number of flights by Russian bombers along the Norwegian coast in 2006 was only 14, but this dramatically increased to 88 in 2007 and 75 in 2008. Zysk, K. 2011. “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural Resources,” in Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, ed. James Kraska Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 86. In addition, the patrol flights over the Arctic are conducted by bombers deployed in the Far East, and it has been clarified that in 2014, the flight frequency of these bombers over the Arctic increased by around three times (the exact number is not known). “Воздушный патруль,” Красная звезда, July 14, 2014.

  3. 3.

    These units have the ability to conduct strategic military operations in the Arctic using snowmobiles and cold-weather equipment.

  4. 4.

    Северный флот. http://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/north/news.html

  5. 5.

    For example, in “Vostok 2014,” which was the large scale war game the OSK “East” conducted in 2014, emergency deployment exercises were conducted on the Chukchi Peninsula by units under the control of the OSK. In addition, there is also a plan to deploy a naval coastal defense fleet on the same peninsula in the future.

  6. 6.

    А.Б.Широкорад, Битва за русскую арктику XVI-XXI вв, Издательский дом Вече, 2008: 3–92.

  7. 7.

    The significance of the Arctic in terms of military strategy is summarized in the excellent survey article by Gjert Dyndal of the Ministry of Defense of Norway, Command and Control University. Dyndal, G. 2013. The Northern Flank and High North Scenarios of the Cold War, October 24, https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/285 604/Paper_The%20Northern%20Flank%20and%20High%20North%20Scenarios%20of%20the%20Cold%20War_Dyndal%202,013.pdf.

  8. 8.

    The GIUK gap refers to maritime space between Greenland, Iceland, and the British Isles. It is a military choke point that Soviet ships had to pass through to travel from the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic, and therefore the U.S. Navy laid a severe anti-submarine warning network in this sea area.

  9. 9.

    Dyndal, G. 2017. “50 Years Ago: The Origins of NATO Concerns about the Threat of Russian Strategic Nuclear Submarines,” NATO Review, March 24, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/50-years-ago-nato-concerns-threat-russian-strategic-nuclear-submarines-soviet-bastion-high-north/EN/index.html

  10. 10.

    The National Institute of Polar Research, ADS (Arctic Data archive system). https://ads.nipr.ac.jp/vishop.ver1/ja/vishop-extent.html

  11. 11.

    The National Institute of Polar Research. 2017 “The Area of Sea Ice in September in the Arctic Ocean: The Record Smallest Area Was Not Observed for the First Time in 5 Years,” September 15, http://www.nipr.ac.jp/info/notice/20170915.html

  12. 12.

    Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf

  13. 13.

    Kramer, A. E. 2011. “Warming Revives Dream of Sea Route in Russian Arctic,” New York Times, October 17, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/business/global/warming-revives-old-dream-of-sea-route-in-russian-arctic.html

  14. 14.

    Koizumi, Y. 2014. “Maritime Legislation in Russia: Focusing on Security Policy in the Arctic Ocean” Foreign Legislation, no. 259: 89–91.

  15. 15.

    Centre for High North Logistics Information Office, NSR Transit 2013, http://www.arctic-lio.com/docs/nsr/transits/Transits_2013_final.pdf

  16. 16.

    Huebert positioned the period from the end of the Soviet Union in 1989 to 2006 as the peak period for cooperation on the Arctic. Huebert. “Security Challenge”: 369.

  17. 17.

    Although the war in Georgia in 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis from 2014 onwards were themselves low-intensity conflicts, Russia indicated the possibility that they would be escalated by interventions from the West. Therefore, it is believed that in Russia’s military strategy, the deterrence against such an escalation through nuclear capabilities was integrated into its strategy for small-scale conflicts. Please refer to the following for more details: Koizumi, Y. “Russia’s Intervention Strategy as Seen from the Ukrainian Crisis: What is its Hybrid Strategy?” International Issues, No. 658: 38–49.

  18. 18.

    Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу, http://scrf.gov.ru/security/economic/document98/

  19. 19.

    At a security conference held in December 2010 on the theme of energy security, it was reported that 50% of the confirmed reserves of Russia’s oil resources had already been excavated, and that the remaining confirmed reserves of natural gas were 165 trillion cubic meters. “Энергетика социальной безопасности,” Российская газета, December 14, 2010.

  20. 20.

    Please refer to the following for the current state of Russia’s resource development in the Arctic Circle. Harada, D. 2017. “Under the European and US Sanctions: The Current State of Russia’s Development of Oil and Gas in the Arctic Circle,” Oil and Natural Gas Review, 51, no. 5: 43–78.

  21. 21.

    Markushina, N. and M. Lagutina. 2017. “The Arctic Region and the ‘New North’: The Russian Approach,” in Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations, ed. Natalia Tsvetkova. Lexington Books: 332.

  22. 22.

    О Стратегии развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 2020 года, http://government.ru/info/183 60/.

  23. 23.

    The Soviet Union built six nuclear icebreakers for the navy, and four of these are now operated by the state-run Atomflot. In 2017, the first new-type nuclear icebreaker, the successor of the former vessels, was also launched.

  24. 24.

    Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года, https://rg.ru/2009/05/19/strategia-dok.html

  25. 25.

    Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/

  26. 26.

    “Рогозин: против объектов РФ в Арктике могут быть совершены диверсии,” РИА Новости, 2013. 6.28.

  27. 27.

    “Арктику обезопасят от террористов: Александр Бортников встал на защиту Северного морского пути,” Независимая газета, August 12, 2015.

  28. 28.

    В.А.Корзун, Конфликтное использование морских и прибрежны зон россии в XXI веке, Экономика, 2004: 6.

  29. 29.

    М.А. Гареев, “Стратегическое сдерживание- новая концепция военной безопасности России,” ИА REGNUM, 2008.10.8.

  30. 30.

    Валерий Герасимов, “Ценность науки в предвидении,” Военно-промышленный курьер, No. 8 (47 6), February 27, 2013.

  31. 31.

    “Миротворцы ОДКБ защитили “Республику Уралия,” Российская газета, October 8, 2013.

  32. 32.

    Zysk, “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy”: 99–100.

  33. 33.

    This type of threat awareness is seen in practically all the Russian works on Arctic security. For example, please refer to the following. А.И. Подберезкин, Военные угрозы России, Издательство «МГИМО-Университет,» 2014: 130–131.

  34. 34.

    U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014–2030, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/USN-Arctic-Roadmap-2014.pdf

  35. 35.

    Sergunin and Konyshev, Russia in the Arctic: 145.

  36. 36.

    “Putin Says Russia Needs to Beef up Arctic Presence,” AP, May 12, 2013.

  37. 37.

    This is because anti-submarine vessels cannot navigate the ice-covered sea area and anti-submarine aircraft cannot drop sound buoys under the ice.

  38. 38.

    А. А. Храмчихин, “Станет ли Арктика театром военных действий по последнему переделу мира?” Арктика и Север, no.10, 2013, 2.; Юрий Банько, “Арктика – зона конфронтации: Россия вступает в битву за свои интересы на Севере,” Независимое военное обозрение, April 18, 2014.

  39. 39.

    Владимир Дворкин, “Сдерживание и стратегическая безопасность,” Алексей Арбатов, Владимир Дворкин ред., Ядерная перезагрузка, Московский центр Карнеги, 2011: 23–45.

  40. 40.

    В.В. Герасимов, Оценка глобального потенциала ПРО часть 3, 2012.5.5. lessthanhttp://mil.ru/files/morf/2-2_m2%20centr.wmvgreaterthan

  41. 41.

    Владимир Пырьев, Владимир Дворкин, “Программа США/НАТО и стратегическая стабильность,” Алексей Арбатов, Владимир Дворкин ред., Протиоракетная оборона: Противостояние или сотрудничество? Московский центр Карнеги, 2012: 173–191. However, in a separate single-author article included in this book, Dvorkin states that if the missile launched is a liquid fuel-type SLBM with a slow rate of ascent, it may be intercepted by missiles developed in the future. Владимир Дворкин, “Перспектив противоракетного сотрудничества США/НАТО и России,” ibid,: 197–198.

  42. 42.

    Sergunin and Konyshev, Russia in the Arctic: 145–146.

  43. 43.

    Markushina and Latutina, “The Arctic Region”: 327–328.

  44. 44.

    “Russia Warns Sweden and Finland Against NATO Membership,” Defense News, June 12, 2014.

  45. 45.

    Huebert, “Security Challenge”: 365.

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Koizumi, Y. (2019). Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic: Russia’s Threat Perception and its Military Strategy in the Arctic Region. In: Takahashi, M. (eds) The Influence of Sub-state Actors on National Security. Springer Polar Sciences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01677-7_5

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