Abstract
The paper starts by recalling the ordinary and etymological sense of the word “robustness”, for placing it then in the context of the current systemic view. Then I focus discussion on systems robustness in the paradigmatic case of living organisms. We discover that the notion of robustness is closely linked, in the case of organism, with the notion of difference, given that organisms arise precisely by a differentiation process (Sect. 13.1). So, in order to understand the ontology of robustness, we need to explore the ontology of difference; and in order to do so, we must distinguish between constitutive and comparative difference (Sect. 13.2.1). Then I deal with the problem of unity of the constitutive differences: I wonder if it is possible to unify the many differences that an organism exhibits in a single difference. It is an important question, given that unity is one of most essential characteristics of the organism (Sect. 13.2.2). And the answer to this question raises immediately a query for the intelligibility of this final and unique constitutive difference (Sect. 13.2.3). Such intellibility is possible thanks to the formal nature of the final difference, but it requires also a pluralistic approach. Besides that, we have to sketch the ontological and epistemological relationships between difference, identity and similarity (Sect. 13.3), which will be crucial for intelligibility of the difference, since according to a certain tradition, intelligibility depends on identity.
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Notes
- 1.
On the other hand, the degree of robustness of a system is always finite, since otherwise the system would be eternal, which cannot be said even of the entirety of the universe as a whole.
- 2.
Here “physical” is read as being opposed to “logical”. The physical is that which has reality apart from thought. In this sense, the physical is not opposed to the biological. In fact, all living beings have their own reality whether or not they are thought of. Nor is there any assertion of reductionism here: it is not held that biology can be reduced to physics , but only that living beings have their own reality.
- 3.
- 4.
Metaphysics , 1031b 31 and ff.
- 5.
On the Parts of Animals, 643a 24.
- 6.
There have even been cases of editors and translators of Aristotle’s texts that have sought to amend this reading. Nevertheless, it figures precisely in this way in all manuscripts save one (Inciarte 1974, 276).
- 7.
Metaphysics VIII 6; On the Soul II 1; On the Parts of Animals I.
- 8.
Metaphysics, 1038a 19–20.
- 9.
On the Generation of Animals, 742b 32.
- 10.
Metaphysics, 1037b 30 – 1038a 4.
- 11.
Metaphysics, 1038a 5–8.
- 12.
Metaphysics, 1038a 8–9.
- 13.
Metaphysics, 1038a 19–20.
- 14.
Metaphysics , 1038a 9; On the Parts of Animals, 642b 5 – 644a 12.
- 15.
On the Parts of Animals, 643b 10 and ff.
- 16.
On the Parts of Animals, 645b 13–22; On the Soul, 402b 10–16, 415a 16–20.
- 17.
Sophistical Refutations, 165a 5–14.
- 18.
Physics 204b 1–12; Metaphysics Z and H.
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Marcos, A. (2018). Difference and Robustness: An Aristotelian Approach. In: Bertolaso, M., Caianiello, S., Serrelli, E. (eds) Biological Robustness. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01198-7_13
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