Abstract
A key issue for any dispute resolution mechanism is the question of the efficiency of the awards. This is ensured by the fact that these are not only final and binding (see para. 471 et seqq.), but also legally enforceable if necessary.
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Notes
- 1.
Toope (1990), p. 102 et seq.; however, an important distinction is, that a decision, indeed, can be accepted as res judicata, but, at the same time can be unenforceable e.g. due to state sovereignity.
- 2.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 18.3.1965, 575 UNTS 159; 4 ILM 532 (1965).
- 3.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958, 330 UNTS 38; 7 ILM 1046 (1968).
- 4.
Article 94 para. 2 UN Charter provides powers for the UN Security Council to enforce ICJ decisions.
- 5.
As of 5.8.2018.
- 6.
Article 54 ICSID Convention: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. […].”
- 7.
Article 55 ICSID Convention: “Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.”
- 8.
As of 5.8.2018.
- 9.
Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1120 et seq.; see also Article 3 Additional Facility Rules: “Since the proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, none of the provisions of the Convention shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, awards, or reports which may be rendered therein.”
- 10.
- 11.
Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2010, www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf.
- 12.
LCIA, Arbitration Rules 1998, 37 ILM 669 (1998), www.lcia-arbitration.com/; LCIA, Arbitration Rules 2014 www.lcia.org/dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx.
- 13.
Article I para. 1 NYC: “This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”
- 14.
- 15.
Article I para. 3 NYC.
- 16.
See United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2.5.2001, [2001] BCSC 664, 5 ICSID Reports 236; United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, Canada, Ontario Court of Appeal, 11.1.2005, 9 ICSID Reports 508, 516, para. 41; Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Svea Court of Appeal, 15.5.2003, 9 ICSID Reports 439, 493.
- 17.
E.g. Article 1136 para. 7 NAFTA: “A claim that is submitted to arbitration shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for purposes of Article I of the New York Convention and Article I of the Inter-American Convention.” Article 26 para. 5 lit. b) ECT: “Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of Article I of that Convention.”
- 18.
Cf. Paulsson (1995), p. 232.
- 19.
Article II para. 1 NYC: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”
- 20.
See Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, England, Court of Appeal, 9.9.2005, [2005] EWCA 1116, 12 ICSID Reports 129. Cf. Article 26 para. 5 lit. a) ECT: “The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written consent of the Investor given pursuant to paragraph (4) shall be considered to satisfy the requirement for: […] (ii) an “agreement in writing” for purposes of article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as the New York Convention].” Cf. also Article 25 para. 2 lit. b) US Model BIT 2004; Article 28 para. 2 lit. b) Canadian Model BIT 2004.
- 21.
Article III NYC: “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.”
- 22.
Article V NYC: “1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”
- 23.
Article 54 ICSID Convention: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. […].”
- 24.
Reinisch (2016), p. 765 et seq.
- 25.
Cf. Article 41 VCLT.
- 26.
A modification of the ICSID Convention between states consenting hereto, requires that the remaining Member States neither are affected in their rights nor in their obligations, and that the modification is not contradictory with the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole (as stated in Article 41 VCLT and, even though not undisputed, provided in customary law). Since a modification most probably would not affect the rights and obligations of other ICSID Member States, the admissibility of the modification dependes on the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. If the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention would be a dispute settlement mechanism between investors and states, in reference to Article 1 para. 2 ICSID Convention, and the concrete design of this dispute settlement would not belong to the object and purpose, a modification for MIC decisions would presumably be admissible. For a closer look on this topic, see Reinisch (2016), p. 761.
- 27.
Calamita (2017).
- 28.
Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1265.
- 29.
Article I NYC: “(1) This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought. (2) The term “arbitral awards” shall include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have submitted.”
- 30.
See on the contrary Petrochilos (2004), p. 378, para. 8.100, who considers that the classification of a decision as arbitral award by a legal order is no ratione materiae requirement for the applicability of the NYC; he disagrees expressly with Sanders by arguing that the NYC uses the term “awards” in a “rudimentary legal manner”: “to refer to what is commonly known as ‘award’ and ‘arbitration’ […] it uses autonomous terms, without reference to any law, to refer to the intrinsic characteristics of as type of proceedings.” According to Petrochilos, the NYC should clarify explicitly, that “awards” are defined pursuant to a certain legal order like in other provisions of the NYC (e.g. Art. V NYC).
- 31.
Article 31 UNCITRAL Model Law regulates only “form and content of award”. Herefrom it can be concluded that the awards are made by “arbitrators” of an “arbitral tribunal”.
- 32.
Ehle (2012), pp. 32–34, concluding that from national laws and decisions no uniform or only predominant practice can be derived about whether the lex fori, the lex arbitri, a combination of both or an autonomous interpretation of the NYC is decisive for the characterisation of awards. Bermann (2014), p. 13 et seq., concludes from a comparative law perspective that a considerable number of legal orders do not state a significant definition of awards, neither by law, nor by case law; in and about the same number of legal orders have a very broad definition of awards and a smaller group requires the finality and the legally binding effect of the decision for the definition of awards by copying Art. 31 UNCITRAL Model Law. Born (2014), p. 246 et seqq.
- 33.
Ehle (2012), p. 35.
- 34.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), para. 86; see Born (2014), p. 240, remarking on the prerequisites of “due process”; Ehle (2012), pp. 34–36, identifying two characteristics of all awards: they are made by a tribunal and are final and legally binding. This opinion focuses on the definition of the term “arbitral tribunal”, which corresponds to the above mentioned “awards”: “a private panel of one or more arbitrators appointed to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration instead of state court proceedings, deriving its authority and jurisdiction from an agreement between the parties.” Ehle considers the compliance with principles of fair trial as a characteristic of arbitral tribunals. Additionally, the attribute, that tribunals are ad hoc institutions is repeatedly mentioned. However, in the context of the enforcement of MIC decisions through the New York Convention this characteristic does not have to be addressed, since Article I para. 2 NYC explicitly declares awards of permanent arbitral institutions as enforceable.
- 35.
See e.g. Altain Khuder LLC v. IMC Mining Inc, Victoria State Court, 2011, para. 295: “unlike court proceedings, arbitration proceedings are consensual”; Born (2014), pp. 249–251.
- 36.
A similar constellation is explicitly provided in Article 26 para. 5 ECT. This provision states that the consent of all parties to the ECT regarding the submission to arbitral tribunals is to be considered compliant with the ICSID Convention and New York Convention enforcement requirements. Article 26 para. 5 ECT: “(5) (a) The consent given in paragraph (3) together with the written consent of the Investor given pursuant to paragraph (4) shall be considered to satisfy the requirement for: (i) written consent of the parties to a dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; (ii) an “agreement in writing” for purposes of article II of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the “New York Convention”); and (iii) “the parties to a contract [to] have agreed in writing” for the purposes of article 1 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. (b) Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of article I of that Convention.” See also Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, England, Court of Appeal, 9.9.2005, [2005] EWCA 1116, 12 ICSID Reports 129; cf. also Article 25 para. 2 lit. b) US Model BIT 2004; Article 28 para. 2 lit. b) Canadian Model BIT 2004; Article 1136 para. 6 NAFTA.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
Ehle (2012), p. 54 et seq. takes the view that IUSCT cannot make awards in the sense of the New York Convention, since the Algiers Accords was made admissible based on public international law treaties and not based on private law declarations; hence, the element of voluntary submission, according to Ehle, is missing. Ehle concludes that arbitral tribunals established by law can never make arbitral awards in the sense of the NYC, based partly on the text of the convention, partly on the travaux préparatoires. Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 38 et seq., identify this point as the main problem of possible enforceability of arbitral awards of a permanent international arbitral tribunal under the NYC.
- 40.
See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Nos. 88-5879 and 88-5881, 1989, France No. 33; Abrahim Rahman Golshani v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bureau for International Legal Services, Cour d’Appel (Court of Appeal), 28.6.2001.
- 41.
In other cases, the characterisation of IUSCT decisions as awards in the sense of the New York Convention was not mentioned.
- 42.
In Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, the court held that the President can replace a voluntary submission for arbitral awards under the New York Convention (according to Article I para. 2 as permanent arbitral award) with an Executive Order submitting US citizens to the jurisdiction of the IUSCT. Alternatively, the circumstance, that Gould had brought the case before the IUSCT voluntarily, would constitute a ratification of the submission by the President. In the cases, Iran Aircraft Industries v. AVCO and Flatow v. Iran, the courts had decided correspondingly. In France, the court had equally decided in Golshani v. Iran, that Golshani could not argue, that no declaration of submission existed, since he had voluntarily brought the case before the IUSCT.
- 43.
In 1985, the English High Court had made an obiter dictum in Dallal v. Bank Mellat, that the NYC would not be applicable for the enforcement of the IUSCT in England. The High Court had not held the decision as an award under the NYC, since according to the lex arbitri (according to the High Court Dutch law), an award would require a declaration of submission in writing and signed by both parties. However, the High Court in Dallal had solely to decide on the admissibility of the IUSCT and not on the question whether the NYC would be applicable to IUSCT decisions. The High Court had decided that Dallal had submitted himself voluntarily to the IUSCT by bringing the case before the tribunal and, therefore, at least had established the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In any case, according to the High Court, the prerequisites of a voluntary submission were fulfilled.
- 44.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), para. 88.
- 45.
Ehle (2012), p. 37, para. 32.
- 46.
Ehle (2012), p. 37.
- 47.
Born (2014), pp. 255–258 accepts the difference between arbitration and choice of jurisdiction clauses in court proceedings: in the case of arbitral proceedings, a dispute is transferred to another, non-state level and will not be decided by state officials, whereas, in the case of choice of jurisdiction clauses, only a specific national court was chosen by the parties. Additionally, in the case of choice of jurisdiction clauses, the parties do not choose the individuals who take the decision, but the judges out of an existing judiciary, that are chosen by the court, independent from the parties’ wishes.
- 48.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 36 et seq.
- 49.
Toope (1990), p. 284.
- 50.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 36 et seq.
- 51.
Neither Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Flatow v. Iran nor Dallal v. Bank Mellat discuss this aspect.
- 52.
- 53.
Brower and Brueschke (1998), p. 10.
- 54.
Neither Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Flatow v. Iran nor Dallal v. Bank Mellat discuss this aspect.
- 55.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), see the sources in para. 96.
- 56.
- 57.
Ehle (2012), p. 57, para. 99.
- 58.
- 59.
Additionally, Petrochilos (2004), p. 357 concludes that it is sufficient and necessary, if an arbitral award was made in another state than the enforcement forum, for applying the NYC.
- 60.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 57 define anational/delocalized awards as “awards not made under domestic law” and point out how much attention the possible enforcement of such awards under the NYC has gained recently.
- 61.
According to Ehle (2012), p. 60 et seq., the majority opinion favours the idea that arbitration should or must be established, especially by the agreed seat-state and/or the lex arbitri. Ehle argues this with the following reasoning: a subsumption is neither under the term foreign, nor under the term non-domestic possible; a historical interpretation of anational awards under the NYC is also not possible, since a national awards were not a topic discussed within the NYC negotiations. Petrochilos (2004), p. 371 instead concludes that there is no proof that the NYC could not be applied to awards, which have been rendered under merely international law. Toope (1990), pp. 127–129 does as well conclude that a-national awards do exist and can be enforced under the NYC. The UNCITRAL Guide on the NYC, para. 63, however, assumes that the text of Article 1 para. 1 NYC permits the enforcement of a national awards, so that the domestic or a national nature of the awards would be without effect on the applicability of the NYC.
- 62.
Cour de Cassation, Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 2007, 44 = 25(4) ASA Bull. 829 (2007) = XXXII Y.B. Com. Arb. 299 (2007).
- 63.
See Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 23.10.1989, 887 F.2d 1357, the court denied that there was a condition under the NYC, that the award had to be rendered under domestic law. The reasons for refusal of an enforcement were stated explicitly in the NYC. None of these reasons required the award to be rendered under domestic law (1364-5).
- 64.
Cases regarding the enforcement of awards SEEE v. Yugoslavia (26.10.1973, Hoge Raad) and SEEE v. Yugoslavia (13.11.1984, Cour d’appel de Rouen); Götaverken v. France, LIAMCO and Gould are commonly been referred to as proofs of judicial practice regarding the enforcement possibility of anational awards under the NYC.
- 65.
Schreuer et al. (2009), p. 1122 et seq. explain that an enforcement of ICSID awards under the NYC will probably not come up in the future, but such a case would need to be handled in a manner similar to the enforcement of ICSID additional facility awards. Additional facility awards should be enforced under the NYC, since a majority of legal scholars and some court decisions assumed as well that “international, a-national and denationalized awards” fall within the scope of the NYC. Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 58 therefore saw in their legal opinion no reason why an award of another international arbitral tribunal should not be enforced under the NYC.
- 66.
Kaufmann-Kohler and Potestà (2016), p. 58.
- 67.
Article V para. 1 lit. e) NYC: “of the country in which, or under the law of which”.
- 68.
Ehle (2012), p. 69.
- 69.
According to the travaux préparatoires, the majority of states did not want to implement such rules into the NYC, since they considered it redundant. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Czechoslovakia, who wanted to make the awards rendered by their arbitral institutions enforceable under the NYC, were finally able to gain acceptance for their proposal. It can be extracted from the travaux that the supreme topic of negotiations regarding Article I para. 2 was the voluntary submission to these permanent arbitral bodies. The majority of the states were of the opinion that awards from permanent arbitral tribunals would also fall into the scope of Article I para. 1 NYC, as long their jurisdiction was not compulsory. The free choice of arbitrators was e.g. not discussed in the negotiations. A German court followed this strong focus on voluntary submission and denied the enforcement of a Polish tribunal’s decision under the NYC, since the jurisdiction of the tribunal was compulsory. Kammergericht Berlin (Court of Appeal), decision of 7.3.1995 – 14 U 2979/93; see as well BGH (Federal Supreme Court), decision of 20.1.1994 – III ZR 143/92, BGHZ 125, 7.
- 70.
FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 1.11.2010.
- 71.
Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court of Brandenburg), decision rendered on 13.6.2002 – 8 Sch 02/01.
- 72.
Transpac Capital Pte Ltd v. Buntoro, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 7.7.2008.
- 73.
Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc. et al., Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 23.10.1989, 887 F.2d 1357.
- 74.
Article I para 3 NYC: “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.”
- 75.
In 2012, out of the 147 state parties of the NYC, 46 had applied reservations for commercial matters.
- 76.
According to Ehle (2012), p. 81 et seq. the interpretation of “commercial matters” has not so far created problems in practice, since the states interpret the term widely. Also, he concludes that courts have a tendency to interpret “commercial matters” as broadly as envisaged in the UNCITRAL Model Law (footnote 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law defines “commercial” as “[…] Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.”); Born (2014), p. 302 et seq., defines “commercial matters” as “relationship involving an economic exchange where one (or both) parties contemplate realizing a profit or other benefit.” This definition would also be consistent with the tenor of national court decisions regarding the NYC.
- 77.
See U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. § 201; according to § 202 the NYC applies “only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the United States.”
- 78.
However, Born (2014), p. 300 et seq. shows that in the context of state immunity, space for different interpretation is given. In cases of public law, such as trusts law, concession and other contracts which are based on national sovereignty, doubts concerning the interpretation of the term “commercial matters” seem to be significant. According to Born, the parties of concession contracts, however, intend arbitration clauses in a way that they constitute commercial matters in the sense of the NYC, since effective enforcement would be one of the fundamental goals of international arbitration treaties.
- 79.
United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2.5.2001, [2001] BCSC 664, 5 ICSID Reports 236; United Mexican States v. Feldman Karpa, Canada, Ontario Court of Appeal, 11.1.2005, 9 ICSID Reports 508, 516, para. 41.
- 80.
CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13.9.2001, 9 ICSID Reports 121.
- 81.
Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Sweden, Svea Court of Appeal, 15.5.2003, 9 ICSID Reports 439, 493.
- 82.
See Brower and Brueschke (1998), p. 8.
- 83.
Toope (1990), p. 280.
- 84.
Toope (1990), p. 281: “the practical importance of the Account cannot be overstated.”
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Bungenberg, M., Reinisch, A. (2018). Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions. In: From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment Courts to a Multilateral Investment Court. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01189-5_7
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