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Targets for the Reorganisation of the Investment Protection Regime

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From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment Courts to a Multilateral Investment Court

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

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Abstract

A reorganization of the investment protection regime by introducing a two-tiered court system or a multilateral appellate body could offer advantages in comparison to the current system. In a first step, the expected positive effects of the new approach are discussed. In a second step, the two options of a two-tiered Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) and a Multilateral Investment Appeals Mechanism (MIAM) are compared based on the outcomes of the previous discussion.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hereto in particular Schill (2015).

  2. 2.

    Publications of decisions and the status of individual proceedings on the ICSID website, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx.

  3. 3.

    Cf. for instance CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech Republic; see thereto Carver (2004), p. 23 et seqq.

  4. 4.

    Cf. thereto in detail Griebel and Kim (2007), p. 188 et seqq.

  5. 5.

    On the application of the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause to dispute settlement agreements, cf. Maffezini-decision on the one hand and Plama v. Bulgaria on the other hand; thereto Schill (2016), p. 251 et seqq.; Gaillard (2005); Douglas (2011), p. 97; Maupin (2011), p. 157; Paparinskis (2011), p. 14 et seqq.

  6. 6.

    Cf. thereto SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 and SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6; thereto also Alexandrov (2004), p. 555 et seqq.; Chung (2007), p. 961 et seqq.; Schreuer (2004), p. 231 et seqq.; Sinclair (2004), p. 411 et seqq.; Wälde (2005), p. 183 et seqq.

  7. 7.

    See thereto in particular Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11.

  8. 8.

    Cf. thereto for instance SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 on the one hand and LANCO v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6 on the other hand.

  9. 9.

    Cf. thereto inter alia Steinbach (2016), p. 1 et seqq.

  10. 10.

    See for instance von Bogdandy and Krenn (2015), p. 420; von Bogdandy and Venzke (2012), p. 32 et seqq.

  11. 11.

    Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, Procedure for electing judges to the European Court of Human Rights, Information document prepared by the Secretariat of 21.2.2017, AS/Cdh/Inf(2017)rev3.

  12. 12.

    Cf. UNCTAD (2013), p. 4; Eberhardt (2014), p. 3; Schill (2017), p. 2.

  13. 13.

    Cf. UNCTAD (2013), p. 4; Paulsson (2010), p. 339 et seqq.

  14. 14.

    Cf. van Harten (2010), pp. 441, 445; Brower and Schill (2009), p. 489: “arbitrators ‘will be influence[d] by their self interest in reappointed in future cases’.”

  15. 15.

    Wuschka (2015); Franck (2009), p. 435 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Resolution of the International Bar Association Council of 23.10.2014.

  17. 17.

    Cf. van Harten (2008), p. 21 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    Hueckel (2012), p. 611; Chung (2007), p. 967 et seqq.; UNCTAD (2013), p. 3 et seq.

  19. 19.

    Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), p. 19.

  20. 20.

    Hodgson (2015), p. 749 et seqq.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Hindelang (2015), p. 20.

  22. 22.

    Cf. for instance UNCTAD (2013), p. 3; Peterson (2001), p. 13; Schill (2011), p. 66; Bastin (2012), pp. 223 et seq., 227; Public Statement on the International Investment Regime—31 August 2010, http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/; Wuschka (2016), p. 32 et seqq.

  23. 23.

    United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the Mauritius Convention on Transparency), which was adopted on 10.12.2014 and entered into force on 18.10.2017.

  24. 24.

    UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (Rules on Transparency), which are in force since 1.4.2014.

  25. 25.

    Cf. www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Conventionstatus.html.

  26. 26.

    European Parliament resolution (2013), para. 43.

  27. 27.

    Recently, the Yukos-process has caused sensation here, where apparently the presiding arbitrator has transferred a large part of the actual tasks incumbent on himself to a co-worker. Cf. thereto Newman and Zaslowsky (2015).

  28. 28.

    Johannesson and Mavroidis (2016), p. 12 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Raviv (2014), p. 6.

  30. 30.

    European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (2014), p. 8; Hodgson (2014). Cf. also European Commission (2015), p. 1: “The overall proceedings under the ICS, including appeal, are limited to 2 years (the Tribunal of First Instance must decide within 18 months and the Appeal Tribunal within 6 months). As a comparison, the average duration of proceedings under existing investment treaties is 3–4 years, with annulment or set-aside (for procedural grounds) potentially adding around another 2 years, meaning that the total length is often around 6 years (with many taking longer).”

  31. 31.

    Schill (2015), p. 8.

  32. 32.

    Voon (2017), p. 7 et seqq.

  33. 33.

    Schill (2015), p. 8.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Schütze (2016), p. 15 on the advantages of institutional arbitration over ad hoc arbitration.

  35. 35.

    Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. University of Vienna, Wien, Austria

    August Reinisch

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  1. Marc Bungenberg
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  2. August Reinisch
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Bungenberg, M., Reinisch, A. (2018). Targets for the Reorganisation of the Investment Protection Regime. In: From Bilateral Arbitral Tribunals and Investment Courts to a Multilateral Investment Court. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01189-5_3

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