A Prospect Theoretic Look at a Joint Radar and Communication System

  • Andrey GarnaevEmail author
  • Wade Trappe
  • Athina Petropulu
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11118)


In this paper, we consider the problem of finding how a joint radar and communication system should divide its effort between supporting the radar and communication objectives when the system operates in an environment with hostile interference. Our model explores the uncertainty of the jammer’s location by assuming the joint system knows only the a priori probabilities of jammer’s positions. The underlying problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game involving the joint radar/communication system and a jammer. We then explore how irrational behavior by the rivals can affect the equilibrium strategies by using prospect theory (PT). It is shown that the PT system strategy is not sensitive to the jammer’s probability weighting parameter, while jammer’s strategy is sensitive to probability weighted parameters of both rivals.


Communication Radar Bayesian game Prospect theory 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrey Garnaev
    • 1
    • 2
    Email author
  • Wade Trappe
    • 2
  • Athina Petropulu
    • 3
  1. 1.Saint Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.WINLABRutgers UniversityNorth BrunswickUSA
  3. 3.ECERutgers UniversityPiscatawayUSA

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