Abstract
We propose an application of hysteresis models to explain non-smooth adjustments to individuals’ wage acceptance within organizations, and argue that individuals’ response to incentives can be described as a probabilistic “lazy relay”, which should have certain interesting non-linearities in aggregated settings (e.g., multi-person organizations).
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References
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Rios, L., Cross, R., Rachinskii, D. (2018). A Model of Probabilistic Hysteretic Switching in Organizations. In: Korobeinikov, A. (eds) Extended Abstracts Summer 2016. Trends in Mathematics(), vol 10. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01153-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01153-6_11
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